Izzivi javnopravnega uveljavljanja konkurenčnega prava na Kosovu by Mucaj, Avdylkader
i 
 
 
University of Ljubljana 
(Faculty of Law) 
 
 
Doctoral dissertation 
 
 
 
Challenges of Public Enforcement of Competition Law in Kosovo 
Izzivi javnopravnega uveljavljanja konkurenčnega prava na Kosovu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Author:                                                                                     Mentor: 
Avdylkader Mucaj                                                                   Assoc. Prof. Ana Vlahek, PhD 
 
 
 
Ljubljana, 2019 
 
ii 
 
Declaration 
 
The research work presented in this thesis is original and one hundred percent my own, other 
than where I have clearly indicated the work of others by quoting or referencing it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
Acknowledgement 
 
Research and study on this doctoral dissertation was neither of short duration nor easy. 
However, I have received great help from many people who supported me during this 
challenging journey. 
First, I would like to thank my mentor Ana Vlahek, together with two other Commission 
members, Peter Grilc and Mitja Kovač, for guiding me.  
Second, I would like to thank my wife Dija for her patience and support during my research. 
This period often involved long absences from my family. She not only understood me, but 
encouraged me too. In addition, I cannot pass without thanking my son Ylli, not for his help 
due to the fact that he was born after I started the doctoral research, but on the one hand for 
his frequent disturbances, and on the other and far more importantly, for being my motivation 
and driving force. 
Third, special thanks goes to my mother for her help in so many ways. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
Dedication 
 
The research and study incorporated in this doctoral dissertation is dedicated to my father! 
  
v 
 
Abbreviations 
 
CJEU – Court of Justice of the European Union 
EC – European Commission 
EU – European Union 
FED – Fiscal Electronic Devices  
GC – General Court  
NCA – National Competition Authorities 
OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
SRSG – Special Representative of the Secretary General 
UNCTAD – United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UNMIK – United Nations Interim Administrations Mission in Kosovo 
US – United States  
 
  
vi 
 
Executive Summary 
 
 
‘Passing new laws without implementing them effectively is at best a meaningless exercise’. 
William E Kovacic 
‘Yet the mere adoption of a competition law is a necessary but not sufficient condition for it to be part of market 
reform’. 
Michal S Gal 
 
The primary purpose of and motivation for this research was examination of the main 
challenges that hindered the effective enforcement of competition law in Kosovo, for the 
period 2009–2013. The reason why the research covers only this period is simply that the 
Kosovo Competition Authority (‘the Authority’) started its work in 2009 and was fully active 
until 2013. Between 2013 and 2016 the Authority’s work was paralyzed due to the fact that 
the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo (‘the Assembly’) did not appoint new 
commissioners, with the mandate of the existing commissioners ending in 2013. Up to mid-
2016 when the Assembly appointed new commissioners, the Commission, the decision-
making body within the Authority, was inactive, meaning that neither investigations nor 
decisions took place. Perhaps surprisingly, even now at the beginning of 2019, the 
Commission that took its mandate in 2016 has issued no decision fining an undertaking for 
breaching competition rules, albeit that investigation have been launched in some sectors. 
In particular, the research was primarily focused on detailed analysis of the work of the 
Authority during the 2009-2013 period and the courts involved in the competition law 
enforcement chain during the period 2010-2018. The work of the Authority and of the courts 
has been analyzed through detailed examination of their rulings as well as case files. This 
analysis has been done in the light of their respective institutional mandates, the relevant 
legal provisions in force in Kosovo, EU case law, and the academic literature. 
The findings of the research suggest that the approach of the Authority and the courts in 
relation to the enforcement of competition law should be urgently changed, facilitated by the 
necessary legislative amendments. 
As regards the Authority’s role as guardian of the enforcement of competition law, changes 
are clearly necessary. There is a strong need for the appointment of professionally competent 
staff. The Authority’s internal structure also needs improvement, with adjustment of duties 
and responsibilities. Processes must be put in place to ensure the strict observance of 
procedural requirements, from the investigation phase to the making of the decision, and in 
vii 
 
the general approach to competition law. As regards the substantive aspects of the 
Authority’s work, the Authority must properly enforce competition provisions, inter alia, 
indicating precisely the legal provisions alleged to have been violated, clearly and 
unequivocally providing statements of reasons for its rulings, and persuasively representing 
its work in court during litigation with regard to its rulings. 
The approach of the courts to competition cases also requires change. The findings of the 
research suggest an inadequate approach by the courts to competition law. This is largely a 
result of a misunderstanding of competition rules and more specifically of the embodied 
objectives and the philosophy behind the competition legislation. For the approach of the 
courts to change, legislative changes are also necessary, and a change of court department for 
the adjudication of competition matters is also required. 
Since the research has on the one hand highlighted the main challenges that have 
characterized the work of the aforementioned institutions, and on the other provided 
grounded arguments and clear recommendations for overcoming these challenges, it is hoped 
that the main goal of this research will be fulfilled. That goal is the advocacy of the effective 
enforcement of competition law in Kosovo. 
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1 Chapter: Background  
 
It is widely accepted that most of the competition regimes currently in force worldwide are 
derived either from the United States (‘US’) antitrust law1 or the European Union (‘EU’) 
competition law. ‘European competition laws, both in substance and the procedural 
framework, have thus had a significant influence on the style and content of competition laws 
adopted in new jurisdictions’.2 In addition, as Ariel Ezrachi argues, ‘competition regimes 
have the same DNA’.3 The list of countries that have enacted competition laws at present 
exceeds 100,4 including Kosovo. 
Eminent authors in the field, among them Michael S Gal,5 William E Kovacic6 and Daniel D 
Sokol,7 argue that enacting competition law is not sufficient without effective enforcement. 
Most of the authors also argue that developing countries face challenges in competition law 
enforcement.8 Therefore, the core of this study is the critical assessment of past challenges in 
competition law enforcement activities in Kosovo as compared with jurisdictions where 
                                                 
1 See Joel Davidow, ‘The Worldwide Influence of United States Antitrust’ (1990) 35(3) Antitrust Bulletin 603. 
2 Marcus Pollard, ‘More Than a Cookie Cutter: the Global Influence of European Competition Law’ (2014) 5(6) 
Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 329.  
3 Ariel Ezrachi, ‘Sponge’ (2016) 49 Oxford Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 51. [Hereinafter: Ariel Ezrachi, 
‘Sponge’]. See also, Amber Darr, ‘Role of Courts in Enforcing Competition Laws: A Comparative Analysis of 
India and Pakistan’ (2018) 1 Oxford Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 1-3.   
4 See Keith N Hylton and Fei Deng, ‘Antitrust Around the World: An Empirical Analysis of the Scope of 
Competition Laws and Their Effects’ (2007) 74(2) Antitrust Law Journal 271 (listing 102 jurisdictions with 
antitrust regimes in 2007) and William E Kovacic, ‘Lessons of Competition Policy Reform in Transition 
Economies for US Antitrust Policy’ (2012) 74(2) St John's Law Review 361, 362. [Hereinafter: William E 
Kovacic, ‘Lessons of Competition Policy Reform in Transition Economies for US Antitrust Policy’].  
5 Michal S Gal, ‘The Ecology of Antitrust Preconditions for Competition Law Enforcement in Developing 
Countries’ (2004) NYU Law and Economics Working Papers, Paper 10, 1. [Hereinafter: Michal S Gal, ‘The 
Ecology of Antitrust Preconditions for Competition Law Enforcement in Developing Countries’].  
6 William E Kovacic, ‘The Competition Policy Entrepreneur and Law Reform in Formerly Communist and 
Socialist Countries’ (1996) 11(3) American University International Law Review 437, 468. [Hereinafter: 
William E Kovacic, ‘The Competition Policy Entrepreneur and Law Reform in Formerly Communist and 
Socialist Countries’].  
7 Daniel D Sokol, ‘Monopolists Without Borders: The Institutional Challenge of International Antitrust in a 
Global Gilded Age’ (2007) 4(1) Berkeley Business Law Journal 37, 56. [Hereinafter: Daniel D Sokol, 
‘Monopolists Without Borders’]. 
8 See eg Mel Marquis, ‘Competition Law in the Philippines: Economic, Legal, and Institutional Context’ (2018) 
6(1) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 79. (‘Where democracy is fragile and institutions function poorly, 
particularly in a developing country, competition law faces tremendous challenges’); Michal S Gal, ‘Antitrust in 
a Globalized Economy: The Unique Enforcement Challenges Faced by Small and Developing Jurisdictions’ 
(2009) 33(1) Fordham International Law Journal 1 and Dina I Waked, ‘Adopting Antitrust Law in Developing 
Countries: Reasons and Challenges’ (2016) 12(2) Journal of Law, Economic & Policy 193. 
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competition law is well-established, such as the two abovementioned.9 Most commonly, the 
enforcement of competition law has two main pillars: public and private enforcement. 
However, this study focuses only on public enforcement, by examining anti-competitive 
agreements, concerted practices and abuse of a dominant position. 
Public enforcement in Kosovo is institutional enforcement by the Authority. Whereas in the 
EU and the US is not much different.10 The EU enforcement is carried out by the European 
Commission (DG COMP) and the National Competition Authorities (NCA) of each Member 
State. The current EU system was established in 2004, when Regulation 1/200311 entered into 
force.12 Many authors refer to that momentum as a ‘modernization package’.13 In the United 
States the two institutions with shared competence for public enforcement of antitrust law are 
the Department of Justice ― Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission.14 In 
addition, within the aforementioned jurisdictions, the courts are part of the enforcement 
mechanism in the adjudication of competition decisions, mostly upon receipt of complaints. 
Most competition laws share the same values; for example, in the US the most commonly 
accepted goal of antitrust law is consumer welfare. Herbert Hovenkamp notet that ‘after 
decades of debate, today we enjoy more consensus about the goals of the antitrust laws than 
at any time in the last half century. Few people dispute that antitrust’s core mission is 
protecting consumers’ right to the low prices, innovation, and diverse production that 
competition promises’.15 In the EU one of the goals of competition law is integration of the 
                                                 
9 The comparative approach when it comes to EU enforcement practices is mainly based on and supported by 
EU case law, whereas where the reference for comparison purposes is to US antitrust law, academic legal 
writings are used. 
10 See eg Douglas H Ginsburg, ‘Comparing Antitrust Enforcement in the United States and Europe’ (2005) 1(3) 
Journal of Competition Law and Economics 427.  
11 Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the 
Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1. [Hereinafter: EU Regulation 01/2003]. 
12 See KJ Cseres, ‘The Impact of Regulation 1/2003 in the New Member States’ (2010) 6(2) Competition Law 
Review 145.  
13 David J Gerber, ‘Two Forms of Modernization in European Competition Law’ (2008) 31(5) Fordham 
International Law Journal 1235. [Hereinafter: David J Gerber, ‘Two Forms of Modernization in European 
Competition Law’]; Jürgen Basedow, ‘The Modernization of European Competition Law: A Story of 
Unfinished Concepts’ (2007) 42 Texas International Law Journal 429 and Ben Depoorter and Francesco Parisi, 
‘The Modernization of European Antitrust Enforcement: The Economics of Regulatory Competition’ (2005) 
13(2) George Mason Law Review 309.  
14 See Barry E Hawk and Laraine L Laudati, ‘Antitrust Federalism in the United States and Decentralization of 
Competition Law Enforcement in the European Union: A Comparison’ (1996) 20(1) Fordham International Law 
Journal 18 and William Blumenthal, ‘Models for Merging the US Antitrust Agencies’ (2013) 1(1) Journal of 
Antitrust Enforcement 24.  
15 Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution, (1st edn, Harvard University Press 
2008) 1. [Hereinafter: Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution]. See also Robert 
H Bork, ‘The Goals of Antitrust Policy’ (1967) 57(2) American Economic Review 242; Barak Orbach, 
‘Foreword: Antitrust’s Pursuit of Purpose’ (2013) 81(5) Fordham Law Review 2151; [Hereinafter: Barak 
Orbach, ‘Foreword: Antitrust’s Pursuit of Purpose’]; Eleanor M Fox, ‘Against Goals’ (2013) 81(5) Fordham 
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internal market of the EU.16 In Kosovo the stated goal of the Law on Competition17 was 
promotion of a competitive and sustainable market economy.18  
However, Kosovo, similar to the other parts of the former Yugoslavia, does not have a long 
tradition based on the rules of a free-market economy, where the formal rules of competition 
are present and respected.19 As a result, the economy has been largely controlled by the state 
through socially owned and state-owned enterprises.20 
However, since 1999 Kosovo’s economic model has undergone a substantial transformation, 
from a state-controlled economy to a market economy. To establish and support such 
changes, Kosovo passed its first Law on Competition in 2004,21 and subsequently passed the 
Law on Protection of Competition22 in 2010. In addition, in order to enforce the rules of 
competition laid out in the laws, the Assembly established the Authority in 2008.23 Kosovo’s 
                                                                                                                                                        
Law Review 2157. [Hereinafter: Eleanor M Fox, ‘Against Goals’] and Barak Orbach, ‘How Antitrust Lost Its 
Goal’ (2013) 81(5) Fordham Law Review 2253. [Hereinafter: Barak Orbach, ‘How Antitrust Lost Its Goal’]. 
16 Giorgio Monti, ‘Article 81 EC and Public Policy’ (2002) 39(5) Common Market Law Review 1057. Lists the 
following goals of EU competition law: (i) economic freedom (ii) market integration, and (iii) efficiency; Wolf 
Sauter, Coherence in EU Competition Law (1st edn, Oxford University Press 2016) 73. [Hereinafter: Wolf 
Sauter, Coherence in EU Competition Law] (‘the EU’s treaty framework has always linked competition policy 
to the internal market’); Daniel Zimmer (ed) The Goals of Competition Law (Edward Elgar 2012) 65. 
[Hereinafter: Daniel Zimmer (ed) The Goals of Competition Law] (‘The promotion of market integration is a 
key objective of EU law and was obviously the focus of competition law from the start’). See also, Case C-289/ 
04 P Showa Denko KK v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2006:431, para 55; Joined Cases T-259/ 02 to 264/ 02 and 
271/ 02 Raffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG et al v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2006:396, para 255. 
17 Law no 2004/36 on Competition (Official Gazette 14/2007, 01.07.2007). Available at 
http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/ligjet/2004_36_en.pdf. Last accessed on 28 May 2018. 
[Hereinafter: Law on Competition]. 
18 Ibid Art 1. This is so, according to an Albanina verison of the law. Whereas the English version states that 
‘the purpose of the present law is to ensure the development of a sound market economy in Kosovo. Even 
though, it is not clear what is meant with the expression, sound market economy. 
19 Cf Andrej Fatur, Klemen Podobnik & Ana Vlahek, Competition Law in Slovenia (Wolters Kluwer 2016) 27-
32. [Hereinafter: Andrej Fatur, Klemen Podobnik & Ana Vlahek, Competition Law in Slovenia].  
20 See generally, Daniel D Sokol, ‘Competition Policy and Comparative Corporate Governance of State-Owned 
Enterprises’ (2009) Brigham Young University Law Review 1713. 
21 See n 17. 
22 Law no 03/L-229 on Protection of Competition (Official Gazette No 88/2010, 25.11.2010). Available at 
http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/ligjet/2010–229-eng. pdf. Last accessed on 28 May 2017, as 
amended and supplemented by Law no 04/L-226 (Official Gazette No 17/2014, 10.03.2014). Available at 
http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/ligjet/04-L-226%20a. pdf. Last accessed on 20 June 2017. 
[Hereinafter: Law on Protection of Competition]. 
23 See Kosovo Competition Authority, Annual Report 2017 1, 7 [in Albanian only]. Available at https://ak.rks 
gov.net/assets/cms/uploads/files/Raporti%20i%20Punes%202017_FINAL_AKKpdf. Last accessed on 14 April 
2018. [Hereinafter: Authority’s Annual Report 2017]. 
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Constitution, which came into force in 2008, determines that a market economy based on free 
competition is the foundation of the economic order of the country.24 
The essence of this dissertation is to identify and analyze the main challenges25 faced by the 
institutions responsible for the enforcement of competition law provisions, in particular the 
Authority and the competent courts. ‘The judiciary is a key player in the antitrust system via 
judicial evaluation of antitrust cases. In the US context, generalized courts have evolved over 
time as a result of shifts in judicial interpretation, economic thinking, and government 
policies and priorities’.26 Richard A Posner notes that ‘the real problem of antitrust in the new 
economy lies on the institutional side: the enforcement agencies and the courts do not have 
adequate technical resources, and do not move fast enough, to cope effectively with a very 
complex business sector that changes very rapidly’.27 
  
                                                 
24 Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo 9 April 2008, Art 10. Cf Peter Grilc, Unfair Competition Law in 
Slovenia, Hilty R.M., Henning-Bodewig F. (eds) Law Against Unfair Competition, MPI Studies on 
Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law (vol 1 Springer 2007) 221. (‘The basis of competition law 
in Slovenia is represented by a series of constitutional provisions enabling the independence of legal entities. 
The main constitutional provisions are as follows: Art. 33, private property rights; Art. 49, rights on the freedom 
of employment; Art. 74, freedom of commercial initiative; Art. 74(2) the prohibition of unfair competition; and 
Art. 74(4) on certain acts restricting competition’).  
25 Daniel Sokol, ‘Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger Control’ (2010) 17(4) George Mason Law Review 1055. 
[Hereinafter: Daniel Sokol, ‘Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger Control’] (‘we cannot expect a brand-new 
antitrust agency with no previous experience to undertake enforcement in the area of bundled discounts. This 
task challenges even the most experienced antitrust agencies and antitrust systems’). See also Einer Elhauge, 
‘Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory’ (2009) 123(2) Harvard Law 
Review 399;  
26 See Daniel Sokol, ‘Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger Control’ (n 25) 1063. 
27 Richard A Posner, ‘Antitrust in the New Economy’ (2001) 68(3) Antitrust Law Journal 925.  
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2 Chapter: Methodology 
 
The research methodology employed in this study is qualitative, being primarily based on 
case study analysis, case law, review of the literature, and with inputs from relevant studies 
and reports. The purpose of adopting such a methodology is to gain a clear picture of the 
claims of the hypothesis as well as research questions. Howard Lune & Bruce L. Berg, 
emphasize that ‘social research has a simple mission to help us know what’s going on’.28  
Yet, Lee Epstein & Gary King noted that ‘...in deciding whether to write this Article...our 
purpose was to identify where the problems were’.29 In addition, I am confident that this 
research has done exactly this. 
This research uses primary and secondary sources. Primary data refers to the Authority’s 
decisions and court judgments. Secondary sources used are EU case law in the field of 
competition, books, journals, studies, reports and so on.  
The research incorporates examination of enforcement policies in Kosovo. These 
enforcement policies are assessed in the light of the jurisprudence of the EU courts, supported 
by relevant academic writings. This is so due to the fact that Kosovo’s competition legislation 
originates in and is based on EU competition foundations, and because Kosovo’s legal 
practice related to competition law enforcement is at a very early stage and has not yet 
developed. The EU imposes competition policies similar to its own, especially during the 
accession process for new countries wishing to join the EU.30  In this context, the main 
claims and findings of the research are compared and supported by reference to settled EU 
case law and academic commentaries in the field. 
The research focuses on procedural and substantive aspects of the cases decided by the 
Authority. Considering that the Authority is a young agency and at the initial stage of its 
work, the shaping of procedures for the effective enforcement of competition law is to be 
considered of fundamental importance, and of equal significance as the substantive aspects of 
the cases. 
                                                 
28 Howard Lune & Bruce L. Berg Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences (9th edn, Pearson 2017) 
9. 
29 Lee Epstein & Gary King, ‘The Rules of Inference’ (2002) 69(1) The University of Chicago Law Review 1, 
15. See also Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, An Introduction to Empirical Legal Research (1st edn, Oxford 
University Press 2014) 16, 19 and 24.  
30 See eg Stabilization and Association Agreement between Kosovo and the European Union, Article 75 
(Competition and other economic provisions) 27 October 2015. Available at http://www.kryeministri-
ks.net/repository/docs/Kosovo-EU_SAA_Final_2.pdf. Last accessed on 15 April 2018. See also European 
Commission, Kosovo Progress Report 2018 (2018) 1, 55. (‘The legislative framework is broadly aligned with 
Article 101 (restrictive agreements) and Article 102 (abuse of a dominant position) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)’). 
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The other aspect of competition law and practice of which this research undertakes an in-
depth analysis in the case studies is judicial review. Critical review of the approach of the 
courts is at the core of the research. This is undertaken with the aims of contributing to the 
establishment of effective legal practice in the field, and of ensuring the observance of the 
principles of legal certainty in the field of competition law enforcement in Kosovo. 
Finally, the research incorporates also theoretical analysis of competition policies as well as 
enforcement procedures.  
The chart below illustrates the research cycle of this doctoral dissertation.31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 This chart is the work of the author of this doctoral dissertation.  
Research
Ideas
Theory
Case law
Case studyAnalysys 
Findings 
Recommendations 
Conclusions
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3 Chapter: Hypothesis and Research Questions  
 
This doctoral dissertation asserts that: despite the fact that the Authority was formally 
established and fully staffed between 2009 to 2013, analysis of the Authority’s cases 
shows an inability on the part of the Authority to contribute to effective competition 
and to an effective economy in Kosovo. 
Despite the Authority’s attempts to enforce competition legislation, its work so far has fallen 
short, for multiple reasons. One reason lies in the fact that the Authority has demonstrated a 
lack of ability to strictly observe both procedural and substantive aspects of the law which are 
mandatory for the effective enforcement of competition law. Almost all of the Authority’s 
rulings which have been subject of qualitative appraisal in this research support this notion. 
Another apparent reason why the Authority finds its work deadlocked is because the courts 
engaged in the adjudication of competition cases tended to misunderstand competition law 
goals. In such a situation, even in cases where the Authority was able to support the alleged 
violations of competition law with direct evidence, the courts jeopardized the Authority’s 
work. For this reason, this research also includes qualitative appraisal of the work of the 
courts which have been involved in the adjudication of competition cases. Going beyond the 
Authority as guardian of competition law enforcement, the courts’ responsibility for the 
effective enforcement of competition law in Kosovo is recognised; indeed, they can be said to 
share responsibility for the inadequacies uncovered by the research. 
As a result, a functioning market economy has not yet been established in Kosovo, and 
remains at an early stage. This inept trend as regards the enforcement of competition law 
must be resolved in order to support the process of change and create the necessary 
conditions for a competitive market economy in Kosovo. 
The main research questions that this research has addressed and tried to answer are as 
follows: 
 What are the main challenges and obstacles that are hindering the effective 
enforcement of competition law in Kosovo? 
 Is the Authority capable of effectively enforcing competition legislation and creating 
the necessary conditions for a market-oriented economy in Kosovo? 
 How are the courts shaping their role with regard to competition law enforcement?  
 Are the courts facilitating or impeding such enforcement? 
 Do the identified challenges lie in institutional arrangements or legislative shortfalls? 
8 
 
 Which of the findings the research has yielded are the most relevant in order to 
overcome the identified challenges with regard to the effective enforcement of 
competition law in Kosovo? 
 
 
 
 
  
9 
 
4 Chapter: Structure of the Thesis 
 
The dissertation is organized in structured chapters. The first chapter is an introductory 
chapter which discusses briefly the origins of competition law, with particular attention to its 
goals and enforcement activities. The second chapter discusses the methodology employed in 
this thesis. The third chapter sets out the hypothesis and the research questions. The fourth 
chapter describes the structure of the thesis. The fifth chapter analyzes legislative and 
institutional arrangements for competition law enforcement. This include, inter alia, 
enactment of the first competition law in Kosovo; establishment of the Authority; the 
Authority’s legal mandate; the Authority’s structure; the criteria for appointment to the 
decision-making organ; institutional independence. The sixth chapter deals in general with 
the administrative procedure, including: initiation of investigations; collection of data; 
unannounced inspections; right of the parties to the procedure to access files; and hearing 
sessions. The seventh chapter is divided into three sections, representing the main body of the 
thesis, conducting comparative case studies. This includes key cases in the field decided by 
both EU institutions, the European Commission (EC) and the EU courts. The three analyzed 
cases are: (i) the insurance companies’ case; (ii) the fiscal cash electronic devices case; and 
(iii) the cement case. All phases of the cases are examined — from the initial steps of the 
investigation, to the Authority’s hearings and rulings, the court hearings, the court expert 
report and the court records and final judgements. The eighth chapter summarizes the main 
findings and concluding remarks of the research as well as reflects the author’s view of the 
whole theme. In addition, the dissertation incorporates statistical appendices, centering on the 
effective enforcement of competition law in Kosovo, as well as tables detailing the outcome 
for the Authority’s decisions at different levels of the court hierarchy and comparison 
analyses of yearly incomes of the Authority’s top officials with other similar institutions. The 
bibliography is presented at the end of the dissertation. 
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5 Chapter: Legislative and Institutional Arrangements 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the legislative and institutional arrangements for 
competition law policies in Kosovo. In addition, it provides an historical context for 
competition legislation in Kosovo, together with a description of the institutional 
arrangements which form the enforcement mechanism. As regards the institutional 
arrangements, inter alia, it discusses the Authority’s legal mandate, and the criteria for 
appointing professional staff to the Authority — one of the most important prerequisites for 
the effective enforcement of competition law provisions. 
Apart from briefly presenting chronological aspects of competition policy developments in 
Kosovo, the chapter is intended to provide guidance as regards the Authority’s mandate and 
the appointment of competent staff to the Authority. 
 
5.2 Enactment of the First Competition Law in Kosovo 
 
The first Law on Competition 32 in Kosovo was approved by the Assembly of Kosovo in 
2004.33 The enaction of the Law on Competition in 2004 tends to be seen as a response to the 
privatization34 process and the emerging liberalization movement from a state-owned 
economy to a market-oriented economy35 after 1999.36 Prior to the entry into force of the 
                                                 
32 See n 17. 
33 Adopted by the Assembly of Kosovo on September 2004. See the Assembly’s web page: 
http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/?cid=2,191,123. Last accessed on 9 April 2018. 
34 See generally, Robert Muharremi, ‘The Role of the United Nations and the European Union in the 
Privatization of Kosovo’s Socially-Owned Enterprises’ (2013) 14(7) German Law Journal 889; Rita Augestad 
Knudsen, ‘Privatization in Kosovo: The International Project 1999–2008’ (2010) Norwegian Institute of 
International Affairs 1. Available at https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/121346/Knudsen%20report-
NUPI%20Report.pdf. Last accessed on 4 April 2018. Also Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE) ‘Privatization in Kosovo: Judicial Review of Kosovo Trust Agency Matters by the Special 
Chamber of the Supreme Court of Kosovo’ (2008). Available at 
https://www.osce.org/kosovo/32012?download=true. Last accessed on 4 April 2018.  
35 See Armando E Rodriguez and Malcolm B Coatet, ‘Limits to Antitrust Policy for Reforming Economies’ 
(1996) 18 Houston Journal of International Law 311, 314 (‘The benefits of privatization may not be automatic, 
but may be dependent on the regulatory and competitive environment in which the newly privatized firms 
operate’).  
36 See generally, Marc Winerman, ‘The Origins of the FTC: Concentration, Cooperation, Control, and 
Competition’ (2003) 71 Antitrust Law Journal 1 and Umut Aydin and Kenneth P Thomas, ‘The Challenges and 
Trajectories of EU Competition Policy in the Twenty-first Century’ (2012) 34(6) Journal of European 
Integration 531. 
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aforementioned law, Kosovo did not have any legislation in force in the field of competition 
law, or a specific body authorized to protect and promote competition. 
It should be observed at the outset that Kosovo is not distinct from other countries formerly 
under socialist governance, where the economy was largely controlled by the state. As 
regards competition law before the 1990s, similar to most former socialist countries37 there 
were no competition rules in place similar to those in the Western countries. Until the entry 
into force of the Law on Competition in 2004, anti-competitive conduct by undertakings was 
not sanctioned at all. 
The purpose of this law, inter alia, was promotion of a competitive and sustainable market 
economy in Kosovo, by prohibiting acts of undertakings38 that restrict, suppress or distort 
competition.39 
The entry into force of the Law on Protection of Competition40 in 2010 repealed the Law on 
Competition, and changed the official name of the authority from Kosovo Competition 
Commission to Kosovo Competition Authority. The Law on Protection of Competition is still 
in force, together with its amendments.41 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 See generally, Tibor Varady, ‘The Emergence of Competition Law in (Former) Socialist Countries’ (1999) 47 
American Journal of Comparative Law 229; William E Kovacic, ‘The Competition Policy Entrepreneur and 
Law Reform in Formerly Communist and Socialist Countries’ (n 6) and Robert H Lande, ‘Creating Competition 
Policy for Transition Economies: Introduction’ (1997) 23 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 339.  
38 Law on Competition (n 17), Art 2(1) states: ‘Undertaking shall mean (i) any enterprise (including a personal 
business enterprise) public enterprise, partnership, joint venture, legal entity, association (including an 
association of undertakings), project, branch, office, or other organization or establishment (regardless of 
ownership, domicile or place of business or establishment) engaged in economic activity, and/or (ii) any person 
acting on behalf of any of the foregoing’). See also Wolf Sauter, Coherence in EU Competition Law (n 16) 75 
(‘The notion of undertaking is of central importance in competition law because its rules only apply where 
undertakings are involved’) and EU case law, Case C-475/ 99 Firma Ambulanz Glöckner v Landkreis 
Südwestpfalz ECLI:EU:C:2001:577, para 19; Joined Cases C-180/ 98 to C-184/98 Pavel Pavlov et al v Stichting 
Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten ECLI:EU:C:2000:428, para 75; Case 118/ 85 Commission v Italy 
ECLI:EU:C:1987:283, para 7; Case C-35/ 96 Commission v Italy ECLI:EU:C:1998:303, para 36; Case C-244/94 
Fédération Française des Sociétés d'Assurances and Others v Ministère de l'Agriculture et de L· Pêche 
ECLI:EU:C:1995:392, para 14; Case C-55/96 Job Centre ECLI:EU:C:1997:603, para 21 and Case C-41/ 90 
Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v Macrotron GmbH ECLI:EU:C:1991:161, paras 22–23. 
39 Law on Competition (n 17) Art 1(1). 
40 See n 22. 
41 Ibid. 
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5.3 Establishment of the Kosovo Competition Authority 
 
In addition to the legislative changes, the Law on Competition also required the establishment 
of an independent competition regulatory body,42 similarly to other Western countries. 
The Authority was established by the Assembly of Kosovo in 2008,43 with responsibility for 
promoting44 competition among undertakings,45 and for consumer welfare.46 Currently, the 
Authority continues to function under the Law on Protection of Competition. The Law on 
Protection of Competition defines the Authority as a public institution, independent in 
performing its duties as specified by the law, for which it is accountable to the Assembly of 
Kosovo.47 In the work of the Authority, every form of influence which might affect its 
independence and impartiality is prohibited, at least formally.48 
In Kosovo, however, a significant number of independent agencies have been established, be 
it under the supervision of the Kosovo Assembly49 or a particular Ministry, depending on the 
agency’s scope. The establishment of these agencies with specific mandates, such as in the 
case of the Authority, is not proven to have resulted from the will and vision50 of Kosovo’s 
institutions. The European Commission, however, has reported incessantly as regards 
competition policy developments in Kosovo, including the need to establish the Authority.51  
In this regard, some appear to be the result of demands and in some cases international 
pressure from the EU52 and the US. Hence, agencies are often neglected and lack necessary 
                                                 
42Law on Competition (n 17) Art 20(1).  
43 See n 23.  
44 Ibid (n 42).  
45 Law on Competition (n 17) Art 21(1) stipulates that: (‘The KCC shall have the responsibility and authority to 
enforce the present law and to promote competition among undertakings and consumer welfare in Kosovo’). 
46 See eg, Wolf Sauter, Coherence in EU Competition Law (n 16) 74 (‘there are three types of economic goals 
that characterize EU competition law: (i) market integration (including market structure and the process of 
competition) (ii) efficiency, and (iii) the consumer interest’). 
47 Law on Protection of Competition (n 22) Art 24(1). 
48 Cf Andrej Fatur, Klemen Podobnik & Ana Vlahek, Competition Law in Slovenia (n 19) 91. (‘The SCPA’s 
independence from the Government has now been additionally stressed and has hopefully been intact also in 
practice’). 
49 See the list of independent agencies under the Assembly of Kosovo, available at: 
http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/?cid=2,1044. Last accessed on 16 April 2018.  
50 See Timothy J Muris, ‘Principles for a Successful Competition Agency’ (2005) 72 University of Chicago Law 
Review 165, 167. [Hereinafter: Timothy J Muris, ‘Principles for a Successful Competition Agency’] (‘the core 
mission [of the competition Agency] must derive from a vision of the institution clearly shared among and 
respected by constituents not just today but over long periods’). 
51 See European Commission, Kosovo Progress Report 2008 (2008) 1, 37 (‘The Competition Commission (CC) 
is not yet operational. The assembly has yet to appoint the candidates selected for this commission. Kosovo 
needs to finalise the establishment of the CC, including the allocation of the necessary resources’). 
52 Ibid.  
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support from central institutions, specifically the Government and the Assembly. This is also 
evidenced by the fact that for nearly three years (2013–2016) the Authority was inactive. 
‘After almost three years, in which the KCC had not been able to fulfil its mandate due to the 
lack of a quorum, its five board members were finally appointed by the assembly in June 
2016. Regarding implementation, due to the failure to nominate its members from 2013–
2016, the KCC was not able to take any decisions and its activities were very limited, 
focusing mainly on judicial representation of previous cases’.53 This due to the lack of 
commissioners to form a decision-makingbody within the Authority. ‘The KCA is still not 
operational, lacking a quorum since November 2013 due to delays in replacing five members 
of the KCC whose terms of office had ended. The KCA has thus not been able to carry out its 
duties as new investigations have to be approved by the KCC board’.54  As a result,55 the 
work of this Authority has been paralyzed for years. ‘The Competition Commission has not 
been operational since November 2013 due to delays in the appointment of four out of five 
members whose mandate had come to an end. In the absence of a quorum (at least three 
members) of the Competition Commission, the KCA has not been able to fulfil its 
mandate’.56  
Apart from the non-enforcement57 of competition law provisions for a long period of time, 
this delay also negatively58 affected the credibility59 of the Authority as an institution.60 
                                                 
53 See European Commission, Kosovo Progress Report 2016 (2016) 1, 47.  
54 See European Commission, Kosovo Progress Report 2015 (2015) 1, 41. 
55 Law on Protection of Competition (n 22) Art 29 requires that the quorum for Commission meetings and 
decision-making is at least three members of the Commission out of five. Decisions can be taken only with at 
least three affirmative votes.  
56 See European Commission, Kosovo Progress Report 2014 (2014) 1, 34  
57 The Authority was unable to enforce competition law due to the absence of the Commission members, the 
Commission being the decision-making organ within the Authority. In such a situation, the Authority can 
neither initiate investigations nor take decisions.  
58 See International Competition Network, Capacity Building and Technical Assistance-Building Credible 
Competition Authorities in Developing and Transition Economies, Report prepared by the ICN Working Group 
on Capacity Building and Competition Policy Implementation (2003) 1, 42. 
59 See Michal S Gal, ‘The Ecology of Antitrust Preconditions for Competition Law Enforcement in Developing 
Countries’ (n 5) 12 (‘The competence and credibility of competition law enforcement are necessary in order to 
limit anti-competitive conduct’).  
60 Since 2013 when the mandate of the Commission members ended, there was much media reporting on the 
issue, pointing out that this institution has been neglected by the Government and the Assembly and treated as 
an unimportant public body. See some of the media reports (in Albanian): 
http://cms.koha.net/?id=27&l=112158; https://telegrafi.com/pas-pese-vjetesh-kompletohet-autoriteti-
konkurrences/; http://www.ekonomiaonline.com/ekonomi/biznes/komisioni-jofunksional-qe-shpenzoi-mijera-
euro/; http://kallxo.com/gjnk/rregullatori-i-tregut-eshte-jofunksional/; http://zeri.info/ekonomia/66694/qeveria-
lejon-paralizimin-e-antimonopolit/; and http://www.gazetaexpress.com/lajme/autoriteti-i-konkurrences-tri-vjet-
pa-bord-161216/?archive=1.  
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5.3.1 The Authority’s Legal Mandate 
 
The Law on Competition authorized the Authority to promote competition within the territory 
of Kosovo61 by detecting and fining undertakings proved to be involved in prohibited 
agreements and abuse of a dominant position.62 
In addition, the Law on Competition gave the Authority specific tasks and responsibilities to 
fulfil, such as: 
‘to provide information and advice on the requirements of the law to persons, 
undertakings and public authorities; to hold seminars and training courses for the purpose 
of informing people generally and especially legal and economic professionals and 
undertakings on the rights, obligations and subject matter established and/or covered by 
the law’.63 
Since competition law and policy was a new field in Kosovo for both public authorities and 
business undertakings, the abovementioned tasks and responsibilities should have been 
considered and used as a public advocacy64 enforcement tool by the Authority.65 
The Authority, however, did not use the opportunity granted by the law, and neither did it 
fulfil its legal obligation as mandated by the law. The Authority has shown no evidence that it 
has undertaken any seminar, training or information campaign in order to inform 
undertakings, public bodies or individuals, despite the fact that the law and the EU required 
such efforts. The European Commission in 2011 stated that ‘the Competition Authority 
should make additional efforts in competition advocacy eg awareness/information campaigns 
on competition policy for the business community in Kosovo’.66 
                                                 
61 Law on Competition (n 17) Art 20. 
62 Ibid Arts 3–13. 
63 Law on Competition (n 17) Art 24(1) (a) and (b).  
64 See eg Simon J Evenet, ‘Competition Advocacy: Time For a Rethink Symposium on Competition Law and 
Policy in Developing Countries’ (2006) 26(3) Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 495; 
Maurice E Stucke, ‘Better Competition Advocacy’ (2012) 82(3) St John's Law Review 951; James C Cooper, 
Paul Pautler and Todd J Zywicki, ‘The Theory and Practice of Competition Advocacy at the FTC’ (2005) 72(3) 
Antitrust Law Journal 1091; and International Competition Network, Advocacy and Competition Policy (2002) 
1. Available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc358.pdf. Last accessed on 
16 April 2018.  
65 See Michal S Gal, ‘The Ecology of Antitrust Preconditions for Competition Law Enforcement in Developing 
Countries’ (n 5) 17. 
66 See Stabilisation and Association Process Dialogue Internal Market, Competition, Health and Consumer 
Protection, 6–7 June 2011, 20. Available  at 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/kosovo/documents/eu_kosovo/sapd_internal_market_conclusio
ns_final_en.pdf. Last accessed 2 October 2017; European Commission, Kosovo Progress Report 2013, 32 
(‘More needs to be done to increase awareness of competition rules and their advocacy’); and European 
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Informing and educating the general public may assist the Authority by making the public 
aware of anti-competitive conduct engaged in by undertakings. ‘A central contribution of 
new competition agencies is to educate consumers, business leaders, and government 
officials about the competition policy system and help them understand the rationale for 
relying on market rivalry as the organizing principle for economic activity’.67 Thus may 
reduce the cost to the Authority of detecting anti-competitive behaviours and facilitating 
competition law enforcement.68 In addition, promotion is a regulatory function.69 In this 
regard, a public advocacy programme may serve to persuade undertakings unintentionally 
involved in various practices that restrict or distort competition to discontinue such practices. 
Informing the public should include an explanation of the cost of monopolies, abuse of a 
dominant position, cartels and other behaviours restricting or distorting competition. Another 
important aspect which should be included in public advocacy is the effect on the promotion 
of consumer welfare70 of competitive markets in Kosovo. The Authority has the 
responsibility to promote competition among undertakings and thus advance consumer 
welfare. Richard Whish and David Bailey note that ‘competition law consists of rules that are 
intended to protect the process of competition in order to maximize consumer welfare’.71 In 
the same vain, Renato Nazzini suggests that an ‘appropriate objective of competition law is 
the maximization of social welfare in the long term’.72 
                                                                                                                                                        
Commission, Kosovo Progress Report 2016 (n 53) 47 (‘Advocacy activities need to be significantly 
strengthened’).  
67 See William E Kovacic, ‘Getting Started: Creating New Competition Policy Institutions in Transition 
Economies’ (1997) 23(2) Brooklyn Journal of International Law 403, 438. [Hereinafter: William E Kovacic, 
‘Getting Started: Creating New Competition Policy Institutions in Transition Economies’].  
68 See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Laraine L Laudati (eds) European Competition Law Annual 1997: The 
Objectives of Competition Policy (Hart Publishing 1998) 77. [Hereinafter: Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Laraine 
L Laudati (eds) European Competition Law Annual 1997: The Objectives of Competition Policy]. 
69 See eg Spencer Weber Waller, ‘Prosecution by Regulation: The Changing Nature of Antitrust Enforcement’ 
(1998) 77 Oregon Law Review 1383, 1384 (‘Officials of the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade 
Commission routinely describe their mission as “law enforcement” and deny that they are acting as regulators’). 
70 See eg Barak Orbach, ‘Foreword: Antitrust’s Pursuit of Purpose’ (n 15) 2151 (‘Consumer welfare is the stated 
goal of US antitrust law’). See also the US Supreme Court case Reiter v Sonotone Corp 442 US 330, 343 
(1979). In this particular case the Court ruled that ‘Congress designed the Sherman Act as a consumer welfare 
prescription’. 
71 Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition Law (7th edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 1. [Hereinafter: 
Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition Law]. 
72 Renato Nazzini, The Foundation of European Competition Law: The Objective and Principles of Article 102 
(1st edt Oxford University Press 2011) 45. [Hereinafter: Renato Nazzini, The Foundation of European 
Competition Law: The Objective and Principles of Article 102]. See also Liza Lovdahl Gormsen, A Principled 
Approach to Abuse of Dominance in European Competition Law (1st edn, Cambridge University Press 2010), 
20 (‘Many jurisdictions embracing competition law state that the objective is to improve consumer welfare’). 
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This advocacy role might be even more important in promoting competition than in the 
repression of anti-competitive behaviour through competition law enforcement.73 Michal S 
Gal notes that ‘an additional factor that often plays a role in developing countries’ low 
enforcement levels involves the weakness of their competition culture. ‘Competition policy in 
transition countries should cover many areas of public activity. Some aspects of the transition 
process should be covered by competition policy, such as: restructuring of enterprises and 
sectors; regulated sectors and activities; state aid monitoring; and competition advocacy in 
public’.74   A competition law that does not enjoy full and consistent government support can 
lead to the primacy of short-term industrial policy considerations over competitive concerns. 
Workshops, press releases, and seminars, and joint efforts of competition advocacy, can all 
benefit from the pooling of scarce resources and from the experience of jurisdictions with 
stronger competition cultures’.75 
Such public education should have been disseminated via multiple channels, including 
seminars and training courses with public authorities, trade associations and undertakings, 
and should have included explanations of rights, obligations and consequences regarding 
breaches of competition law, thus representing competition law enforcement in a win-win 
light.76 For the purposes of information for the general public, useful methods would have 
included the organization of conferences or roundtable meetings, media campaigns, 
publication of articles in the daily newspapers, and selection of the first cases based on direct 
links to consumer welfare, which would resound stridently with the general public. In this 
regard, one of the strongest cases was the Bakery77 case, the first case the Authority dealt 
with.78 This was especially so since almost all of Pristina’s residents were affected. In the 
second paragraph of the decision, the Authority concluded that the signatory parties were not 
aware that such an agreement breached competition law provisions. There was no further 
                                                 
73 Michal S Gal and Eleanor M Fox, ‘Drafting Competition Law for Developing Jurisdictions’ (n 4) 20. See 
also, Frederic Jenny and Yannis Katsoulacos (eds) Competition Law Enforcement in the BRICS and in 
Developing Countries (Springer 2016) 93 (‘A competition regime can promote a pro-competitive environment 
also by allowing its competition agency (or another body) to advocate competition’).  
74 See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Laraine L Laudati (eds) European Competition Law Annual 1997: The 
Objectives of Competition Policy (n 68) 73.  
75 Michal S Gal, ‘Regional Competition Law Agreements: An Important Step for Antitrust Enforcement’ (2010) 
60(2) University of Toronto Law Journal 239, 246. 
76 See eg William E Kovacic, Hugh M Hollman and Patricia Grant, ‘How Does Your Competition Agency 
Measure Up?’ (2011) 7(1) European Competition Journal 25, 41. [Hereinafter: William E Kovacic, Hugh M 
Hollman and Patricia Grant, ‘How Does Your Competition Agency Measure Up?’] (‘Agencies can learn a lot 
from the groups which know the competition agency best: advocacy organisations, law firms, economic 
consultancies, in-house counsel and academics’).  
77 Kosovo Competition Authority, Annulling the Agreements Between Representatives of Bakeries for Bread 
Price-fixing. Decision no 1, 14 April 2009. This particular case had to do with the fact that almost all of the 
bakeries located in Pristina were involved in informal price-fixing. 
78 See Taimoon Stewart, An Empirical Examination of Competition Issues in Selected CARICOM Countries: 
Towards Policy Formulation (Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of West 
Indies, St. Augustine 2004) 20. 
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action in this case since the bakers’ agreement was verbal. Upon receipt of the decision by 
the Authority that this agreement was in breach of the Law on Competition, they agreed to 
respect the Authority's decision. 
Nevertheless, under the Law on Protection of Competition, which is currently in force, 
among the tasks and responsibilities of the Authority are the detection and investigation of 
anti-competitive conduct of undertakings, and the fining of those undertakings if it is proved 
that they have breached legal provisions in force. This includes, inter alia, anti-competitive 
agreements, abuse of a dominant position and concentrations. 
Other tasks that the Law on Protection of Competition mandated to the Authority are to 
provide a professional opinion to almost all state organs, including the highest, such as the 
Assembly of Kosovo and the Government, regarding any legislation that may negatively 
affect competition, and to promote awareness of competition policies. Article 23 of the Law 
on Protection of Competition reads:  
‘The Authority, on the request of the Kosovo Parliament, Government of the Republic of 
Kosovo, central organs of public administration, legal persons with public authority and 
local organs, provides professional opinions for the laws and regulations and other 
bylaws that significantly affect market competition. The Authority may provide its 
opinion about compatibility of existing laws and other regulations with this law, it may 
provide opinions which encourage knowledge about market competition, improve the 
level of awareness and information relating to the role of law and the market competition 
policy respectively, and provide professional opinions on resolutions and comparative 
developments of practices in the field of legislation and market competition policies’.79 
This is a substantial power of the Authority, authorizing the use of legal opinions to monitor 
and promote80 competition in Kosovo. It may enable the avoidance of conflict between laws 
or by-laws within the territory of Kosovo in the field of competition. In Kosovo, not only in 
the competition field but also in other sectors, there are certain cases where the same issues 
are regulated differently by laws or by-laws. The Authority has issued such opinions 
regarding the decision of the Ministry of Economy and Finance selecting undertakings to sell, 
install, and maintain Fiscal Electronic Devices,81 and the decision of the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry placing safeguard measures on cement imports.82 However, the Authority 
should be more proactive in this regard, and act on its own initiative and not only upon 
                                                 
79 Law on Protection of Competition (n 22), Art 23. 
80 See Eleanor M Fox, ‘Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium’ (1981) 66(6) Cornell Law Review 
1140, 1191 (Suggesting that ‘antitrust law and policy should, as its central mission, seek to preserve and 
promote the competition process’). 
81 Kosovo Competition Authority, Notice for Restriction and Distortion of Competition by the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance, 1 January 2010.  
82 Kosovo Competition Authority, Request for the Ministry of Trade and Industry to Review its Decision, no 
01/4508/2012, 21 June 2012. 
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complaints. Andrej Fatur, Klemen Podobnik & Ana Vlahek notes that ‘besides the strictly 
prosecutorial ones, the CPO was entrusted with certain pro-competitive tasks, for example, 
with the exercise of supervision of the application of the PRCA, monitoring of and analysing 
the conditions of the market, submitting opinions on general issues under its competence to 
the Parliament and  the Government’.83 The European Commission emphasised on its policy 
that ‘a pro-active competition policy is characterised by: – improvement of the regulatory 
framework for competition which facilitates vibrant business activity, wide dissemination of 
knowledge, a better deal for consumers, and efficient economic restructuring throughout the 
internal market; and – enforcement practice which actively removes barriers to entry and 
impediments to effective competition that most seriously harm competition in the internal 
market and imperil the competitiveness of European enterprises’.84 The Authority should ex 
officio carry out studies and analyses to ascertain whether certain laws or regulations in force 
within the territory of Kosovo are contrary to the Law on Protection of Competition and thus 
restrict competition in any sector. On the other hand, the organization of various seminars and 
media85 campaigns may serve to educate consumers and to promote basic rules in the field of 
competition. ‘Eeducating consumers in the law and its benefits may significantly reduce 
enforcement costs and thus budgetary needs of a competition authority, by creating 
motivations of consumers to inform the authority of possible anti-competitive conduct’.86 
This may also encourage87 natural persons and undertakings to lodge complaints88 if it is 
believed that competition law provisions are being breached as a result of anti-competitive 
conduct by undertakings. ‘Educational measures, aimed at stakeholder sensitization, may 
                                                 
83 Andrej Fatur, Klemen Podobnik & Ana Vlahek, Competition Law in Slovenia (n 19) 78.  
84 European Commission, A Pro-active Competition Policy for a Competitive Europe (2004) Brussels 1. See 
also, Michal S Gal and Eleanor M Fox, ‘Drafting Competition Law for Developing Jurisdictions’ (n 4) 20 
(‘Increasingly, it is recognized that NCAs play an important role in the promotion of a competitive environment 
by proactively influencing regulatory activities to ensure the rejection of unnecessarily anti-competitive 
regulatory measures’); Michal S Gal, ‘The Ecology of Antitrust Preconditions for Competition Law 
Enforcement in Developing Countries’ (n 5) 8 (‘The Venezuelan competition authority’s proactive efforts to air 
the arguments on market dynamics and the impact of different economic measures on market conditions, for 
example, assisted the process of opening up and liberalizing its economy’); Frederic Jenny and Yannis 
Katsoulacos (eds) Competition Law Enforcement in the BRICS and in Developing Countries (n 73) 136 and 
Eleanor M Fox, ‘Antitrust and Institutions: Design and Change’ (2010) 41(3) Loyola University Chicago Law 
Journal 473, 477. 
85 See Angela Huyue Zhang, ‘The Role of Media in Antitrust: Evidence from China’ (2018) 41(2) Fordham 
International Law Journal 473 and Matthew Gentzkow and Jesse M Shapiro, ‘Competition and Truth in the 
Market for News’ (2008) 22(2) Journal of Economic Perspectives 133.  
86 Michal S Gal, ‘The Ecology of Antitrust Preconditions for Competition Law Enforcement in Developing 
Countries’ (n 5) 12.  
87 See European Commission, ‘Notice on Best Practices for the Conduct of Proceedings Concerning Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU’ [2011] OJ C308/06 para 10 (‘The Commission therefore encourages citizens and 
undertakings to inform it about suspected infringements of the competition rules. This can be done either by 
lodging a formal complaint or by simply providing market information to the Commission’).  
88 See Michael Gal listning three conditions for private players in order to file a complaint. Michal S Gal, ‘The 
Ecology of Antitrust Preconditions for Competition Law Enforcement in Developing Countries’ (n 5) 18. 
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reduce enforcement costs in three main ways. First, they strengthen the motivation of 
consumer groups to assist the authority in detecting violations, which in turn serves to reduce 
investigation costs’.89 This way, apart from becoming better known to the public, the 
Authority, at the same time would most likely become more accepted, as an important 
institution in the field of competition law and policy. 
 
5.3.2 The Authority’s Structure 
 
Based on the Law on Protection of Competition, the Authority’s structure is: (i) the 
Commission; (ii) the Secretariat; (iii) the Legal and Administrative Department; and (iv) the 
Market Supervision Department.90 The Secretariat is an administrative body that manages the 
daily work of the Authority. The Legal and Administrative Department develops the 
Authority’s personnel policies and staff management plans. It also coordinates the process of 
drafting primary and secondary legislation in close cooperation with the Commission and 
endeavours to ensure compliance of legislation proposed by the Authority with EU legislation 
and other applicable laws in Kosovo. The Market Supervisory Department carries out 
investigation upon request of the Commission, in order to ensure fair and effective 
competition in the market. It aims, through the investigative proceedings provided by law, to 
supervise the market, and proposes appropriate measures to restore competition in cases of 
restriction or distortion. Upon completion of investigations, the Department prepares 
investigative reports for the Commission. Most Commission decisions are taken based on the 
recommendations of such reports. The core supervisory and investigative role of this 
Department is uncovering anti-competitive agreements and abuses of dominant positions.91 
 
5.3.3 The Decision-Making Bodies Within the Authority 
5.3.3.1 The Commission 
 
Within the Authority, the so-called Commission is the most important and the main decision-
making organ.92 The Commission is a collegial organ comprised of five members 
                                                 
89 See Michal S Gal, ‘When the Going Gets Tight: Institutional Solutions when Antitrust Enforcement 
Resources are Scarce’ (2010) 41(3) Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 417, 431. [Hereinafter: Michal S 
Gal, ‘When the Going Gets Tight: Institutional Solutions when Antitrust Enforcement Resources are Scarce’]  
90 Kosovo Competition Authority ‘Annual Report 2017’ (n 23) 36. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Law on Protection of Competition (n 22) Art 28. 
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(commissioners), with one of them acting as chairperson.93 The Commission is responsible 
for deciding all cases under investigation, either fining the parties for breach of competition 
law provisions or concluding that no competition law breach has occurred.94 The quorum for 
meetings of the Commission is three members.95 The Chairperson chairs the Commission 
meetings.96 All decisions require the affirmative vote of the majority of the members present 
and voting.97 
 
5.3.3.2 Criteria for Becoming a Member of the Commission 
 
The criteria for appointing members of the Commission tend to be too general and are thus 
deficient. The Law on Protection of Competition stipulates that any citizen of Kosovo, having 
acquired a university degree and having seven years work experience, can become a member 
of the Commission. Article 26(1) reads: ‘Commission members should be citizens of the 
Republic of Kosovo who have advanced qualifications in the fields of law or economics, or 
an equivalent field, and at least seven (7) years of professional experience’98  However, in 
order for the Authority to improve its performance and advance its professional work in the 
effective enforcement of competition policy, only experience in the field of competition 
should suffice. 
The criteria99 for selecting members of the Commission within the Authority should also be 
more rigorous, to ensure that the Authority is professionally competent and that it 
successfully accomplishes its mandate to enforce competition law. ‘Nominal legal 
commands, such as antitrust statutes, count for little without effective means for their 
enforcement. To a large degree, a country reveals the intensity of its commitment to enforce 
the law through its choice of officials to head its public enforcement institutions. The more 
capable the appointees, the more serious the nation's intent to implement its laws 
                                                 
93 Ibid Art 25. 
94 Ibid Art 28. 
95 Ibid Art 26(4). 
96 Ibid Art 26(5). 
97 Ibid Art 26(6). 
98 Ibid Art 26(1). 
99 See ‘Criteria to Become a Member of the Commission’, discussed below.  
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effectively’.100 Daniel D Sokol notes that ‘an antitrust agency is only as good as the quality of 
the staff of the Agency’.101 
Members of the Commission must fulfil at least one of the two most important conditions: 
they must have either education or work experience in the field of competition. ‘The best of 
laws cannot be applied without adequate human resources, ie a staff of sufficient size with 
adequate technical competence. The last condition is especially important in the area of 
competition law, which often involves a high-level economic analysis that complements a 
legal one in order to detect and to analyze the effects of business conduct. Lack of such 
human resources may lead to under-enforcement of the laws. It may also undermine the 
standing and reputation of the competition authority, especially where it results in 
incompetent enforcement efforts such as the loss of many cases brought by the authority’.102 
The best scenario, however, would be if both conditions were fulfilled, although this is not an 
easy situation to achieve, since economies in transition generally have a small number of 
individuals with knowledge of the economics of competition law or experience in market-
oriented economies.103 In addition, William E Kovacic, suggests that ‘the new agency must 
begin by acquiring the human capital to do its job well. The initial aim should be to hire a 
small number of capable professionals with exposure to the law or economics of competition 
law’.104 
 
5.3.3.3 Appointment of Commission Members 
 
Under the Law on Competition,105 members of the Commission were appointed by the 
Assembly of Kosovo.106 However, since the entry in force of the Law on Protection of 
                                                 
100 William E Kovacic, ‘Lessons of Competition Policy Reform in Transition Economies for US Antitrust 
Policy’ (n 4) 364. See also more generally, Timothy J Muris, ‘Principles for a Successful Competition Agency’ 
(n 50). 
101 Daniel D Sokol, ‘Designing Antitrust Agencies for More Effective Outcomes: What Antitrust Can Learn 
from Restaurant Guides’ (2010) 41(3) Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 573, 579. [Hereinafter: Daniel D 
Sokol, ‘Designing Antitrust Agencies for More Effective Outcomes: What Antitrust Can Learn from Restaurant 
Guides’]. 
102 See Michal S Gal, The Ecology of Antitrust Preconditions for Competition Law Enforcement in Developing 
Countries (n 5) 13. 
103 William E Kovacic, ‘Institutional Foundation for Economic Legal Reform Transition Economies: The Case 
of Competition Policy and Antitrust Enforcement’ (2001) 77 Chicago-Kent Law Review 267, 269.  
104 William E Kovacic, ‘Getting Started: Creating New Competition Policy Institutions in Transition 
Economies’ (n 67) 431. 
105 Law on Competition (n 17).  
106 Ibid Art 25(3).  
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Competition,107 the President and other members of the Commission shall be selected by the 
Government through public announcement and their names submitted to the Assembly of 
Kosovo for appointment.108 
Having considered the fact that the Authority is responsible to the Assembly, the best 
scenario would be that the selection process for commissioners be organized and managed by 
the Assembly. This would ensure greater independence for the commissioners and the 
Authority itself,109 and at the same time limit government interference in the work of the 
Authority. Although the Law on Protection of Competition states that: ‘[the] Authority is 
independent in performing its duties specified by this law’,110 it is hard to be convinced that 
this is demonstrated by the activities of the Authority, since the selection and proposal of 
commissioners comes directly from the Government. As a result, influence by the 
Government is more likely than if the selection was made by the Assembly, it being the body 
to whom the Authority is responsible and to whom it reports. 
In the 2008 Assembly vote on two members of the Commission, it was said that despite 
political interference, the nominees had to be approved because this was required by law.111 
‘The agency’s administrative and professional staff have heard a sequence of political 
appointees offer their vision for the future. They are familiar with a wide array of slogans, 
clichés, and motivational techniques. The staff has heard them all. With each new group of 
political appointees, the staff seeks to learn the new vocabulary and re-flag existing projects 
to please the new regime’.112 
In the recent selection of Commission members, the Government, in its decision113 proposing 
members for the Assembly to select, did not give any reason or explanation regarding the 
basis on which these commissioners were proposed. Although the Authority remained 
                                                 
107 Law on Protection of Competition (n 22). 
108 Ibid Art 25(4). 
109 See Mattia Guidi, Competition Policy Enforcement in EU Member States: What is Independence For? 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2016) 93 (‘Independence is often considered as a necessary prerequisite for regulatory 
agencies’). 
110 Law on Protection of Competition (n 22) Art 24. 
111 Kosovo Assembly, Transcript of the Plenary Session of the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo (the Library 
of the Assembly) held on 6 and 7 November 2008, Point 16 of the Agenda: Consideration of the 
recommendation of the Committee on Economy, Trade and Industry for Selection of Members of the 
Competition Commission 85 (2008).  
112 William E Kovacic, ‘Distinguished Essay: Good Agency Practice and the Implementation of Competition 
Law’ in Christoph Herrmann, Markus Krajewski, and Jorg Philipp Terhechte (eds) European Yearbook of 
International Economic Law (2013) 3, 8 [Hereinafter: William E Kovacic, Distinguished Essay: Good Agency 
Practice and the Implementation of Competition Law].  
113 Government of Kosovo, Decision No 07/83, 6 April 2016, available at http://www.kryeministri-
ks.net/repository/docs/Vendimet_e_Mbledhjes_se_83-te_te_Qeverise_se_Republikes_se_Kosoves_2016.pdf (in 
Albanian only). Last accessed on 9 May 2017.  
23 
 
without commissioners or a decision-making body from 2013114 and was thus paralyzed in its 
functioning,115 the Assembly has not proven willing to remedy this situation by the 
appointment of staff expert in the field of competition. Professional knowledge can be 
established without difficulty on the basis of biographies, with special emphasis on education 
and work experience. Regarding education, the economics of competition law is exceedingly 
relevant.116 Former judge Richard Posner has gone so far as to suggest that ‘antitrust law has 
become a branch of applied economics’.117 Currently, the education of Commission members 
does not include prior relevant education, training or work experience in the field of 
competition.118 
The Assembly Committee on Economic Development, Infrastructure, Trade and Industry, in 
its meeting held on 26 April 2016, after reviewing the list of candidates for membership of 
the Competition Commission proposed by the Government, estimated that most of the 
proposed candidates did not meet the condition of professional competence.119 
A member of the Committee stressed that:120 
 ‘…the Government has evaluated the legal conditions, but it is the duty of this 
committee to evaluate the professional aspect of the candidates. Based on their CVs, the 
proposed candidates have no experience in the competition field, so they do not meet the 
professional criteria. The Competition Authority, an important institution for regulating 
Kosovo’s market, has been inactive for years, and this has caused significant damage to 
                                                 
114 See n 54. 
115 See n 53. 
116 See Roger D Blair and Jill Boylston Herndon, ‘The Implications of Daubert for Economic Evidence in 
Antitrust Cases’ (2000) 57(3) Washington and Lee Law Review 801, 802 (‘challenges to the admissibility of the 
economic expert’s testimony already are becoming routine in antitrust cases’) and Marc Jaeger, ‘The Standard 
of Review in Competition Cases Involving Complex Economic Assessments: Towards the Marginalisation of 
the Marginal Review?’ (2011) 2(4) Oxford Journal of European Competition Law & Practice. [Hereinafter: 
Marc Jaeger, ‘The Standard of Review in Competition Cases Involving Complex Economic Assessments: 
Towards the Marginalisation of the Marginal Review?’]. 
117 John E Lopatka and William H Page, ‘Economic Authority and the Limits of Expertise in Antitrust Cases’ 
(2005) 90(3) Cornell Law Review 617, 620. [Hereinafter: John E Lopatka and William H Page, ‘Economic 
Authority and the Limits of Expertise in Antitrust Cases’]. See also Richard A Posner, ‘The Problematic of 
Moral and Legal Theory’ (1998) 11(7) Harvard Law Review 1637; Jerry M Santangelo, ‘Changing 
Configurations of Antitrust Law: Judge Posner's Applications of His Economic Analysis to Antitrust Doctrine’ 
(1983) 32(4) DePaul Law Review 839 (‘When Congress promulgated the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890, the 
federal judiciary became the guardian of a major doctrine of American economic policy’). 
118 See Commission members’ CVs. Available at https://ak.rks-gov.net/al/struktura. Last accessed on 7 May 
2018. 
119 The Assembly of Kosovo, the Committee on Economic Development, Infrastructure, Trade and Industry, 
Procès-verbal of the meeting 17–26 April 2016. [Hereinafter: Procès-verbal of the meeting].  
120 All quotes are translations by the author from the original Albanian.  
24 
 
Kosovo’s market. Opportunities for establishing a monopoly have been immense and 
those opportunities have been exploited, due to the absence of the Commission’.121 
Another Committee member added: 
‘… the fact that the Authority has been inactive for a long period of time is not a reason 
to vote in favour of the proposed candidates. These candidates have no professional 
training and there is a lack of evidence that would assure us that they would not be 
influenced by political matters’.122 
One Commission member noted: 
‘I have a dilemma, as this institution will be required to perform much work and the 
proposed membership, lacking professional training in the relevant field, is unlikely to 
accomplish it successfully. Therefore, the recommendation to the Assembly should be 
that the candidates lack expertise in competition policy, and as a result, this proposed list 
should be returned to the Government, so that it can propose candidates who are better 
prepared in the field of competition.123 I agree that some of the candidates do not have 
professional qualifications in the field of competition, or business experience’.124 
The committee chairman stated: 
‘I have seen the nominees’ CVs, and want to have the strongest economics and 
microeconomics experts involved in competition policy’.125 
After evaluating the proposed candidates and after discussions, the Committee recommended 
to the Assembly: 
‘Not to approve the Government's proposal to appoint candidates for membership of the 
Competition Commission’.126 
As stated, it is clear from examination of the CVs of the proposed Commission members that 
they had neither relevant work experience nor adequate education in the field of competition 
law. For this reason, the relevant Assembly committee recommended to the Assembly to 
reject the proposed candidates.127 
                                                 
121 The Committee member BB. 
122 The Committee member RQ. 
123 The Committee member FR. 
124 The Committee member BG. 
125 The Committee chairperson MM. 
126 Procès-verbal of the meeting (n 119).  
127 See eg William E Kovacic and David A Hyman, ‘Competition Agency Designed: What’s on the Menu?’ 
(2012) 8(3) European Competition Journal 527 (‘The establishment of a competition agency requires decisions 
about its relationship to elected officials in the executive and legislative branches of government. Ideally, the 
agency will be simultaneously autonomous from political pressure in exercising its authority to investigate 
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However, despite the recommendation of the Committee, the Assembly128 appointed the 
same candidates. This fact was, however, emphasised on the EU Progress Report for 
Kosovo.129 In Addition, on its previous Progress Report the EU urged both the Assembly and 
the Government that the ‘appointments need to be made on the basis of professional 
qualifications and merit, not political patronage’.130 
 
Conclusion  
 
In order to have a competitive economy, every country must accomplish at least two 
prerequisites: first, adopt competition legislation, and second, set up responsible institutions 
to enforce such legislation. Herbert Hovenkamp notes that ‘competitive markets are neither 
self-creating nor self-executing. They must be supported by well managed institutions or else 
they will fail to provide socially desirable results.’131 
From a formal point of view, Kosovo has fulfilled both conditions. As Kosovo is about to 
shift from a state-controlled economy to a market-oriented economy, certain challenges exist 
for an agency which must be equipped with well-trained and experienced staff to support this 
process of change. To be effective, decision-makers must possess the necessary skills to 
understand, analyze and effectively apply the legal rules in specific cases. This requires, inter 
alia, the Authority to act independently, have adequate technical competence at all stages of 
the enforcement process, from the investigative phase to the final ruling, as well as for 
litigation, have sufficient financial support and advocacy programmes.132 William E Kovacic 
notes that ‘no input to a competition agency’s work is more important than knowledge’.133   
                                                                                                                                                        
infringements and prosecute violations, but accountable for the exercise of its powers and expenditure of public 
resources. Various design choices influence the degree to which these two (admittedly somewhat inconsistent) 
goals are met’). 
128 See Michael Gal, The Ecology of Antitrust Preconditions for Competition Law Enforcement in Developing 
Countries (n 5) 6. 
129 European Commission, Kosovo Progress Report 2016 (n 53) 47.   
130 European Commission, Kosovo Progress Report 2015 (n 54) 4.  
131 Herbert Hovenkamp, ‘Progressive Antitrust’ (2018) University of Illinois Law Review 71, 112.  
132 See eg Marcus Pollard, ‘More Than a Cookie Cutter: the Global Influence of European Competition Law’ 
(2017) 8(9) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 549. Discussing the Commission’s proposal for a 
New Directive to empower the NCA’s in order to become more effective enforcers of the competition policies.  
133 William E Kovacic, Hugh M Hollman and Patricia Grant, ‘How Does Your Competition Agency Measure 
Up?’ (n 76) 33. See also, Michal S Gal, ‘When the Going Gets Tight: Institutional Solutions when Antitrust 
Enforcement Resources are Scarce’ (n 89) 422 argues that (‘Human resource constraints are also often cited as a 
major obstacle to enforcement’); Michal S Gal and Eleanor M Fox, ‘Drafting Competition Law for Developing 
Jurisdictions’ (n 4) 19; Paulo Correa and Frederico Aguia, Merger Control in Developing Countries: Lessons 
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This applies to a great extent in Kosovo, since competition policies are not well-known, even 
among institutions directly involved in the enforcement process, such as the courts. Thus, the 
Authority, apart from bearing its own responsibility to act, carries the burden of ‘educating’ 
others to properly understand and apply competition policies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
from the Brazilian Experience (UNCTAD 2002) and Armando E Rodriguez and Mark D Williams, ‘The 
Effectiveness of Proposed Antitrust Programs for Developing Countries’ (1994) 19(2) North Carolina Journal of 
International Law and Commercial Regulation 210.  
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6 Chapter: The Administrative Procedure 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Analysis of the conduct of administrative procedures by the Authority reveals that strict 
adherence to procedure is one of the most important aspects in the enforcement of 
competition legislation. It is important in order to guarantee the procedural rights of the 
parties to the procedure, and so that the Authority’s rulings may survive court scrutiny. To 
date, according to the findings of the research, in almost all cases that the Authority has lost 
in the courts, procedural flaws have been one reason for the loss,134 disregarding substantive 
omissions. Furthermore, Article 32 of the Law on Protection of Competition determines that: 
‘The Authority, while practising its function, implements provisions of Law on 
Administrative Procedure, except in cases when this law foresees otherwise’.135 
The significance of respecting the procedures, apart from this being a legal obligation for the 
Authority, becomes even more relevant considering that the competent court for reviewing 
decisions of the Authority is the administrative court. Consequently, the first aspect which 
this court assesses is whether the administrative procedures have been observed regarding the 
decision which is the subject of legal scrutiny. 
Given that the Authority has made many procedural omissions in its work in the past, a fact 
which has been confirmed by analysis of certain cases, some of the main legal provisions 
relating to procedure will be briefly analyzed and discussed. ‘Redressing antitrust’s 
democracy deficit on the procedural side can be done with the tools of administrative law. 
Administrative law is the body of law that controls the procedures of governmental decision 
making’.136 The purpose of this examination is to identify such omissions, and to provide 
guidance for the Authority’s enforcement activities in the future. 
 
 
                                                 
134 According to EU case law, breach of procedural requirements gives rise to an action for annulment of 
Commission acts. See in particular, Case C-286/95 P Commission v Imperial Chemical Industries 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:188, para 41; Case C-137/92 P Commission v BASF and Others ECLI:EU:C:1994:247, para 
76 and Joined Cases C-287/95 P and C-288/95 P Commission v Solvay ECLI:EU:C:2000:189, para 45.  
135 Law on Protection of Competition (n 22). See also to that effect, Caroline Cauffman and Qian Hao (eds) 
Procedural Rights in Competition Law in the EU and China (Springer 2016) 1. [Hereinafter: Caroline Cauffman 
and Qian Hao (eds) Procedural Rights in Competition Law in the EU and China].  
136 Harry First and Spencer Weber Waller, ‘Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit’ (2013) 81(5) Fordham Law Review 
2543, 2572. [Hereinafter: Harry First and Spencer Weber Waller, ‘Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit’].  
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6.2 Initiative to Start the Procedure 
 
The Law on Protection of Competition stipulates that the Initiative to Start the Procedure, as 
well as ex officio by the Authority, may be lodged by any legal and natural person, economic 
association, chamber of commerce, consumer association or central or local public body.137 
In the SharrCem case, which shall be discussed and analyzed in the seventh chapter, the 
request to initiate an investigation for abuse of a dominant position was filed by SharrCem’s 
business rivals in the cement industry. The Authority must instigate an initiative to start the 
procedure upon complaint from anyone knowing or believing that certain undertakings are 
involved in anti-competitive conduct that breaches the Law on Protection of Competition. In 
particular, if a case is successfully investigated by the Authority based on such complaints, 
others would be motivated to lodge such complaints. Thus, the Authority should endorse the 
so-called ‘Leniency Program’, which has been introduced in the United States,138 the EU139 
and other jurisdictions.140 With the objective of uncovering violations of the Law on 
Protection of Competition, the Authority may release from fines a participant in a cartel who 
notifies the Authority of the cartel and provides data, facts and evidence which enable 
initiation of the procedure.141 
 
                                                 
137 Law on Protection of Competition (n 22) Art 34(1). 
138 In the United States, the Department of Justice–Antitrust Division considers that the Leniency Program is its 
most important investigative tool for detecting cartel activity, namely the Corporate Leniency Policy which was 
introduced in 1993 and the Individual Leniency Policy (1994) (even though the first Leniency Program in the 
US was introduced in 1978). Available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/810281/download; 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2006/04/27/0092.pdf (Last accessed on 13 October 2017).  
139 The European Union introduced Leniency Policies too, which proved to be very successful (see 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/leniency/leniency.html). The European Union introduced Leniency 
legislation beginning with the Commission Notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel cases, 
[1996] OJ C207/4, 18 July 1996; Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel 
Cases, [2002] OJ C45/3, 19 February 2002; Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of 
Fines in Cartel Cases, [2006] OJ C298/17, 8 December 2006 and Amendments to the Commission Notice on 
Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel [2006] OJ C256/1, 5 August 2015. See Fernando Castillo 
de la Torre and Eric Gippini Fournier, Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review in EU Competition Law (Edward 
Elgar 2017) 6. [Hereinafter: Fernando Castillo de la Torre and Eric Gippini Fournier, Evidence, Proof and 
Judicial Review in EU Competition Law]. 
140 In Kosovo leniency was first introduced under the Law on Protection of Competition (n 22) Art 60. In 
Slovenia leniency was introduced under the Prevention of the Restriction of Competition Act in 2008, Art 76 
(Official Gazette RS, no 36/08 11 April 2008). Available at http://www.varstvo-
konkurence.si/fileadmin/varstvo-konkurence.si/pageuploads/ZPOmK-1-consoli_version.pdf. Last accessed on 
16 October 2017.  
141 Law on Protection of Competition (n 22) Art 60(1). 
29 
 
6.3 Conclusion to Start the Procedure 
 
The Law on Protection of Competition requires that the Conclusion to Start the Procedure 
must contain a description of the factual situation, a reason for initiation of the procedure and 
a request to provide data and documentation.142 
However, almost none of the Conclusions to Start the Procedure issued by the Authority 
contain the elements specified in the legislation, including the Conclusion to Start the 
Procedure in the SharrCem case, which was issued based on the abovementioned Article. 
Specifically absent were details of the factual situation and the circumstances justifying 
initiation of the procedure. 
 
6.4 Collection of Data 
 
The Authority has authorization to make a written request to the parties to the procedure for 
all necessary information, during the investigation phase.143 In addition, the parties are 
obliged to provide all requested information. If they do not, the Authority may ascertain a 
violation of the law by that particular party and issue a fine.144 On written request, the 
Authority is obliged to state the legal basis of the request and the deadline for the response; 
and to give a warning to the parties to the procedure that in the case of non-cooperation with 
the Authority, punitive measures may be pronounced.145 
In the insurance company cases analyzed in the seventh chapter, some of the companies 
refused to cooperate and did not provide the information required by the Authority regarding 
employees suspected to be signatories of the Gjakova anti-competitive agreement. The 
Authority required from the Elsig undertaking a copy of the employment contracts for all 
employees of the company for the year 2009 for the Gjakova and Peja branches.146 Elsig, in 
response to the request of the Authority, refused to provide the required documents.147 
The Authority’s request, apart from reference to Article 38 and the three-day deadline, did 
not contain other legally required information such as: statement of reasons, the subject 
matter, the objective of the request, and a warning to the parties to the procedure that if they 
                                                 
142 Ibid Art 36(1–4). 
143 Ibid Art 38(1). 
144 Ibid Art 38(3). 
145 Ibid Art 38(2). 
146 Kosovo Competition Authority, Request for Copies of Contracts for All Employees of ELSIG Insurance 
Company for the period 01.01.2009–31.12.2009, 5 June 2015. 
147 Elsig, Response to the Authority’s Request for Data, 10 June 2015. 
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did not comply with the request, punitive measures may be pronounced against them. The EU 
courts have ruled that ‘...an excessively succinct, vague and generic — and in some respects, 
ambiguous — statement of reasons does not fulfil the requirements of the obligation to state 
reasons laid down in Article 18(3) of Regulation No 1/2003 in order to justify a request for 
information...’148 ‘In particular, the CJEU defined the legal standard which the statement of 
reasons for a decision requesting information under Article 18(3) must meet. The 
Commission must, inter alia: 1. describe the legal basis for the request, 2. state the purpose 
and reasons justifying the request with sufficient precision, 3. specify the information which 
the request is intended to reveal, 4. fix a time limit within which the information is to be 
provided’.149 In its request the Authority was obliged to fulfil all the requirements of the Law 
on Protection of Competition, and in particular to state the warning to the parties regarding 
non-compliance with the request. At the same time, the Authority had to make it clear that if 
the parties refused to cooperate, the Authority could ascertain a violation of the law and issue 
fines against both legal and natural persons. 
 
6.5 Unannounced Inspections of Business Premises 
 
During the investigation phase, the Authority can perform unannounced inspections of the 
business premises of the undertakings under investigations, but prior to such inspections it 
must possess the official authorization of a competent court.150 
Under these provisions the Authority has a legal obligation during the investigation to 
exercise only those rights that the law gives and in the manner prescribed by the law. In the 
case of SharrCem the legal representatives of the undertaking claimed that inspections by the 
Authority were conducted unlawfully, since officials of the Authority showed no written 
authorization by courts for such inspections. In such cases it is crucial to ensure, inter alia, 
authorization from a competent court to conduct inspections. The CJEU ruled ‘…it should be 
noted first that the Commission is required to specify the subject-matter and purpose of the 
investigation. That obligation is a fundamental requirement not merely in order to show that 
the investigation to be carried out on the premises of the undertakings concerned is justified 
                                                 
148 Cf the CJEU in case C-247/14 P, HeidelbergCement v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2016:149 annulled the GC 
judgment, Case T-302/11, EU:T:2014:128 as well as the Commission’s decision in case Case COMP/39520 , 
due to infringement of Article 18(3) of EU Regulation 1/2013.  
149 Francesco Carloni & Gabriela Da Costa, ‘Judgments in the Cement Case: Requirement for Greater Clarity, 
Specificity, and Justification of Information Requests from the Commission’ (2016) 7(7) Journal of European 
Competition Law & Practice 457, 458. 
150 Law on Protection of Competition (n 22)  Art 39(1). 
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but also to enable those undertakings to assess the scope of their duty to cooperate while at 
the same time safeguarding the rights of the defence’. 151 
 
6.6 Procès-verbal 
 
Despite the legal duty of the Authority to prepare an inspection report after an inspection,152 
in the SharrCem case, which was investigated under the Law on Protection of Competition, 
such a report is not mentioned anywhere in the investigative procedure, including hearings, 
Notification of Stated Facts Defined in the Procedure, and written comments after receiving 
such a notification. Law on Protection of Competition Article 43 states: 
‘Upon completion of unannounced inspection, within fifteen days, the authorized person 
shall prepare an inspection report. The report shall consist of: place and date of the 
report; legal basis for execution of unannounced inspection; place and time of 
unannounced inspection; personal names of authorized persons who have participated in 
inspection, parties present during the inspection; description of inspection flow and of 
any action carried out during the unannounced inspection and obtained statements; and 
list of documents and other items used and/or temporarily sequestrated during the 
unannounced inspection. The report shall be provided to parties in the procedure and to 
persons who were subject of the unannounced inspection. Parties in the procedure and 
persons who were subject of the unannounced inspection have the right to submit their 
remarks, in writing, concerning the report within fifteen days from the date of receiving 
the report’.153 
 
6.7 Right of Access to Files 
 
Despite the fact that the right of the parties to the procedure to access files during the 
investigative phase is guaranteed by law,154 in the SharrCem case the Authority refused such 
                                                 
151 See eg Joined Cases 46/87 and 227/88 Hoechst v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1989:337, para 29. Case C-94/00 
Roquette Frères ECLI:EU:C:2002:603, para 47; and Case T-339/04 France Télécom v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2007:80, para 57. See also Didier Theophile & Igor Simic, ‘Legal Challenges to Dawn Raid 
Inspections under the Principles of EU, French and ECHR Law’ (2012) 3(6) Journal of European Competition 
Law & Practice 511. (‘Because evidence gathered during dawn raids is key to the Commission’s investigation 
and may lead to the infliction of substantial fines, it is paramount that adequate procedural guarantees be offered 
to undertakings with regard to the conduct of the said dawn raids’). 
152 Law on Protection of Competition (n 22) Art 43. 
153 Law on Protection of Competition (n 22) Art 43. 
154 Ibid Art 44. 
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a request. The refusal in question, which can be considered ungrounded and contrary to law, 
will be analyzed and discussed in detail in SharrCem case. 
 
6.8 Taking over Obligations by Enterprises 
 
During the investigation phase, the Law on Protection of Competition allows the parties to 
the procedure to submit commitments to take over the obligations in order to eliminate anti-
competitive effects in the relevant market as a result of anti-competitive conduct of 
undertakings.155 
Bearing in mind that competition law and policy is a new field in Kosovo and that the 
Authority is just beginning its work, this legal provision should have been applied in the first 
cases, thereby sending a clear signal to the undertakings in question and others that the 
Authority will investigate and prosecute all undertakings that violate competition law. It 
would also send a message that the primary purpose of the Authority is not punishment, but 
the establishment of effective competition and equal opportunity for all undertakings active in 
the market.156 As long as the Authority achieves its main goal, it is not particularly relevant 
whether undertakings are fined or not. If the Authority finds the same undertaking again 
involved in action that restricts or distorts competition, it can then impose heavy punitive 
measures.157 
 
6.9 Hearing Session 
 
The Law on Protection of Competition requires that in any procedure for ascertaining 
distortion of competition in a relevant market, the Authority must hold hearings with the 
parties to the procedure.158 During the hearings, inter alia, the parties to the procedure are 
informed of the allegations against them, make their views known, and present counter-
arguments. 
                                                 
155 Ibid Art 46. 
156 See the EU case law in that regard, Case C-462/99 Connect Austria ECLI:EU:C:2003:297, para 83; Joined 
Cases C-327/03 and C-328/03 ISIS Multimedia and Firma ECLI:EU:C:2005:622, para 39; Case C-202/88 
France v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1990:64, para 51; and Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2008:101 para 198 (‘However, a system of undistorted competition … can be guaranteed only if 
equality of opportunity is secured as between the various economic operators’). 
157 See Case T-59/99 Ventouris v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2003:334, para 219. 
158 Law on Protection of Competition (n 22) Art 47. 
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In all cases discussed and analyzed in this dissertation, hearings were held. However, the 
parties involved in the insurance company cases, the SharrCem case and the fiscal electronic 
devices case claimed that procedures were not in place to allow them to verify exactly what 
was stated during the hearings. In addition, in the SharrCem case, Cement Factory Fushë 
Krujë and Besimi Commerce, who had submitted a written request for investigation of this 
particular case, were not invited. 
 
6.10 Publication of the Authority’s Decisions 
 
The Authority’s decisions and lawsuits and any court decisions must be published on the 
Authority’s webpage.159 Only some of the decisions that the Authority took concerning 
prohibited agreements and concentrations are published on the Authority’s website. None of 
the court decisions are published on the website, regardless of the fact that it is a legal 
obligation of the Authority to do so. ‘In order to enhance the performance and public 
credibility of the administration of competition laws, high levels of transparency in the 
performance of investigative, enforcement, and adjudicative functions are desirable, 
justifying public disclosure of matters under investigation and their disposition, and reasons 
therefore. This kind of transparency may also enhance public participation in the 
administration of competition law by putting affected or interested members of the public on 
notice of matters with which the competition law agency is seized’.160 For research purposes 
in relation to this dissertation, the court decisions and the Authority’s decisions were obtained 
through official written requests to access public documents based on the Law to Access 
Public Documents.161 
 
6.11 Conclusion 
 
Building capacity within the Authority in terms of professional knowledge162 of competition 
law and of administrative procedures is essential for the successful enforcement of 
competition law in Kosovo by the Authority. ‘Good institutional design is a critical 
                                                 
159 Ibid Art 55(4).  
160 Michael J Trebilcock and Edward M Iacobucci, ‘Designing Competition Law Institutions’ (2002) 25(3) 
World Competition 361, 366. 
161 Law to Access Public Documents (Official Gazette 18/25, 25.11.2010). 
162 See William E Kovacic, ‘Distinguished Essay: Good Agency Practice and the Implementation of 
Competition Law’ (n 111) 14 (‘The successful agency of the future is one that invests heavily in building 
knowledge and in refreshing its intellectual capital’). 
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component of good competition policy and competition law enforcement. Designs cannot be 
conjured in the abstract; they must fit the family that lives in the house, its aspirations, 
possibilities, and practical limits’.163 
Significant legal power is given to the Authority concerning the investigations that can be 
carried out to uncover and punish violations of the Law on Protection of Competition. 
However, the Authority it is legally binding to fully respect the rights of the parties in the 
procedure as well. ‘Procedural law formally determines the manner in which a procedure 
must be pursued. The role of the rules on procedure in EU competition law can be described 
as prescribing the steps that must be taken in the appropriate legal form in order to ensure that 
the process involved may have legally valid results within the overall framework of 
applicable norms, including in terms of the respective rights and duties of the parties involved 
in the procedure’.164 Thus, the first and most crucial aspect the court assesses is whether 
administrative procedures165 and procedural rights166 have been observed by the Authority in 
deciding its cases.167 If in the view of the court the Authority did not respect legal procedures, 
this is sufficient grounds for the decisions of the Authority to be considered unlawful, and as 
a result, the substantive part of the decision alleging violation of competition law is not 
adjudicated. 
Unfortunately, in most of the cases that the Authority has lost in the courts, at all levels, one 
of the main reasons for such loss was administrative flaws. As a result, the procedural aspects 
are to be considered a precondition168 that shapes effective enforcement of competition 
law.169 
  
                                                 
163 Eleanor M Fox, ‘Antitrust and Institutions: Design and Change’ (n 83) 487  
164 See Wolf Sauter, Coherence in EU Competition Law (n 16) 118. 
165 See generally William E Kovacic, ‘Rating the Competition Agencies: What Constitutes Good Performance?’ 
(2009) 16(4) George Mason Law Review 903 and Philip Lowe, ‘The Design Of Competition Policy Institutions 
for the 21st Century—the Experience of the European Commission and DG Competition’ (2008) 1 Competition 
Policy Newsletter 1. [Hereinafter: Philip Lowe, ‘The Design Of Competition Policy Institutions for the 21st 
Century—the Experience of the European Commission and DG Competition’]. 
166 See Caroline Cauffman and Qian Hao (eds) Procedural Rights in Competition Law in the EU and China (n 
135) 1 (‘Procedural rights are an essential tool for guaranteeing that the rule of law is respected in competition 
cases’). 
167 See H. Andersson, Sweden, in: Compatibility of Transactional Resolutions of Antitrust Proceedings with Due 
Process and Fundamental Rights & Online Exhaustion of IP Rights (Springer 2016) 374. [Hereinafter: Bruce 
Kilpatrick, Pierre Kobel and Pranvera Kellezi, Compatibility of Transactional Resolutions of Antitrust 
Proceedings with Due Process and Fundamental Rights & Online Exhaustion of IP Rights] (‘The primary 
objective of the Administrative Procedure Act is to protect the legal security of citizens in their contact with 
administrative bodies’). 
168 See Case C-286/95 P; Case C-137/92 P, and Joined Cases C-287/95 P and C-288/95 P, cited in n 133.  
169 See generally, David J Gerber, ‘Two Forms of Modernization in European Competition Law’ (n 13).  
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7 Chapter: Case Studies 
7.1 The Insurance Company Cases: Introduction 
 
The first part of this chapter will analyze and discuss a case against ten insurance companies 
for entering into an anti-competitive agreement.170 It is treated as one case, where all of the 
insurance companies were alleged to have committed the same breach of the Law on 
Competition. The Authority fined all of the companies separately but on the same legal basis, 
claim, and evidence and in the same amount. Nevertheless, analysis of the case in question 
will shed light on the procedural and substantive flaws in the Authority’s enforcement 
activities, including in investigations, decision-making and court litigation. 
However, as will be shown, the court firmly distinguished the companies from each other, 
making different decisions on the same case and issue. This occurred up to the Court of 
Appeal in the Dardania case, which shall be the subject of analysis in this chapter. This case 
‘defined the rules of the game’, although not in line with the embodied objectives of the Law 
on Competition. Thus, courts of lower instance were instructed to decide all cases in the same 
way as the Dardania case, which was to serve as an authoritative precedent,171 even though 
precedent is not a common legal practice in civil law countries,172 including Kosovo. Such 
precedent might be deleterious in Kosovo, on the one hand because of the courts’ lack of 
legal expertise in the field of competition law, and on the other hand because cases following 
‘precedent’ are likely to be decided without a full determination of the facts and legal 
provisions, in a field which is in its infancy. 
                                                 
170 The names of the signatories for the insurance companies of the anti-competitive agreement. KS ‘SIGURIA’; 
KS ‘INSIG’; KS ‘CROATIA SIGURIMI’; KS ‘SIGAL’; KS ‘SIGMA’; KS ‘YLLIRIA’; KS ‘GRAWE ELSIG’; 
KS ‘KOSOVA E RE’; KS ‘SIGKOS’; and KS ‘DARDANIA’. 
171 See eg Frederick Schauer, ‘Precedent’ (1987) 39(3) Stanford Law Review 571 (arguing that one may be 
asked to follow a precedent of which one does not approve). See also, Neil Duxbury, The Nature and Authority 
of Precedent (Cambridge University Press 2008) 1. 
172 See Andrej Fatur, Klemen Podobnik & Ana Vlahek, Competition Law in Slovenia (n 19) 36. (‘The legal 
order in RS is based on the continental law system, thus the statutes represent the primary source of law. 
Therefore, precedents are not deemed an official source of law in the Slovenian legal order’); Allen E 
Shoenberger, ‘Change in the European Civil Law Systems: Infiltration of the Anglo-American Case Law 
System of Precedent Into the Civil Law System’ (2009) 55 Loyola Law Review 5 (‘In the civil law systems of 
justice, black letter law states that case law precedents are irrelevant; the text of the codes prevails’); Mary G 
Algero, ‘The Sources of Law and the Value of Precedent: A Comparative and Empirical Study of a Civil Law 
State in a Common Law Nation’ (2005) 65(2) Louisianan Law Review 775, 787 (‘In legal systems based on the 
civil law tradition, cases are not formally recognized as a source of law, and the doctrine of stare decisis is not 
recognized’); Mitchel de S-O-l'E Lasser, ‘Judicial (Self-) Portraits: Judicial Discourse in the French Legal 
System’ (1995) 104 Yale Law Journal 1325 and Vincy Fon and Francesco Parisi, ‘Judicial Precedents in Civil 
Law Systems: A Dynamic Analysis’ (2006) 26 International Review of Law and Economics 519.  
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7.2 Facts of the Case 
 
On 03.07.2009, ten173 insurance companies signed an anti-competitive agreement174 in 
Gjakova175 in relation to insurance policies for compulsory third-party liability motor 
insurance. According to the contested agreement, the insurance companies agreed not to offer 
any kind of discount on the price of these services. The Authority managed to obtain a copy 
of the agreement in question and initiated investigations into all the insurance companies for 
entering into an agreement that violated the Law on Competition, specifically Article 3. The 
ten insurance companies were fined the sum of 100,000.00 € each.176 The agreement in 
question, inter alia, included the term: 
‘… not to allow any kind of discount by insurance companies, to maintain the insurance 
market as at present’.177 
However, in this case, the Authority could not persuade the courts that hard-core cartels are 
prohibited almost per se, nor were the courts capable of understanding that such prohibition 
is encompassed in the competition rules in force.178 As Kai Hüschelrath notes, ‘hard-core 
cartels are a prime candidate for per se prohibition’.179 In addition, the US Supreme Court 
has stated its opinion that cartels are ‘the supreme evil of antitrust’.180 In the same vain, the 
former EU competition commissioner Mario Monti called cartels a cancer for the market-
oriented economy.181 In addition, Andrej Fatur, Klemen Podobnik & Ana Vlahek note that 
                                                 
173 All the companies active in Kosovo at that time that were licensed by the Central Bank of Kosovo to practise 
insurance activities. See n 168.  
174 See generally Louis Kaplow, ‘On the Meaning of Horizontal Agreements in Competition Law’ (2011) 99(3) 
California Law Review 683; Louis Kaplow, ‘An Economic Approach to Price Fixing’ (2011) 77 Antitrust Law 
Journal 343; and Donald F Turner, ‘The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious 
Parallelism and Refusals to Deal’ (1962) 75(4) Harvard Law Review 655. 
175 The city of Gjakova is a city in western Kosovo with a population of around 95,000. 
176 Under the provisions of the Law on Competition, Art 35(1) this was the maximum amount an undertaking 
could be fined if proved to have violated provisions of the Law on Competition. 
177 The Agreement of the ten insurance companies signed in Gjakova, 3 July 2009 [Hereinafter: the contested 
agreement].  
178 It is important to highlight, however, that in this case the courts erred in law by accepting ungrounded claims 
of the insurance companies, contrary to the objectives of competition policy. In addition, a few judgments, as 
will be discussed later, that were made in compliance with competition law, were set aside by the Court of 
Appeal.  
179 Kai Hüschelrath and Heike Schweitzer (eds) Public and Private Enforcement of Competition Law in Europe 
(Springer 2014) 10.  
180 Verizon Commc’ns Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko LLP 540 US 398 408 (2004). See also, Daniel D 
Sokol, ‘Monopolists Without Borders: The Institutional Challenge of International Antitrust in a Global Gilded 
Age’ (n 7) 53.  
181 The 3rd Nordic Competition Policy Conference on Fighting Cartels – Why and How, Stockholm, 11–12 
September 2000, organized by the Swedish Competition Authority. 
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‘price fixing in the ambit of horizontal agreements is seen as the most heinous form of 
restriction of competition’.182 
In this case, the most relevant legal provision was Article 3 of the Law on Competition. For 
this reason it is quoted in full: 
‘Fundamental Prohibition of Agreements and Decisions by Associations of Undertakings 
and Concerted Practices that Restrict Competition 
3.1. An agreement between undertakings, a decision by an association of undertakings, 
or a concerted practice by undertakings is prohibited if (i) it may affect trade within 
Kosovo, (ii) it has as its purpose or effect an appreciable prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition in Kosovo and (iii) it is, or is intended to be, implemented in 
Kosovo. The prohibition of this Article 3.1 applies equally to all such agreements, 
decisions and practices, whether written or not. 
3.2. Without prejudice to the general scope of Article 3.1, the prohibition established by 
that Article specifically applies to an agreement, decision or practice that: 
a. directly or indirectly fixes purchase or selling prices or any other term or condition of 
trade or business; 
b. limits or controls production, a market, technical development or investment; 
c. limits, divides or shares a market or one or more sources of supply; 
d. applies dissimilar conditions to like transactions with other undertakings, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
e. makes the conclusion of a contract subject to acceptance by the other party of one or 
more supplementary obligations that, by their nature or according to usual practice, have 
no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
3.3. An agreement or decision that is prohibited by Article 3.1 is null, void and 
unenforceable. 
3.4. A person, undertaking or association of undertakings that attempts to execute, 
impose, implement and/or perform such an agreement, decision or practice shall be 
subject to the administrative and criminal penalties established by Title VI of the present 
law. 
3.5. Unless the context clearly requires another interpretation, any provision of Title I of 
the present law that is stated to apply to, or in relation to, an agreement between 
undertakings shall be interpreted in a manner that ensures such provision applies equally 
                                                 
182 Andrej Fatur, Klemen Podobnik & Ana Vlahek, Competition Law in Slovenia (n 19) 139.  
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to, or in relation to, a decision by an association of undertakings or a concerted practice 
by undertakings’.183 
Anti-competitive conduct by undertakings is caught by the abovementioned provisions of the 
Law on Competition, irrespective of whether the conduct amounts to an agreement, a 
decision or a concerted practice, if it is proved to have as an object or effect the distortion of 
competition.184 
 
7.3 The Procedures Followed by the Authority 
7.3.1 Initiation of Investigation 
 
From the initial investigation in the insurance companies’ case, the Authority did not comply 
with either the procedural requirements or the substantive aspects of the legal provisions in 
force. 
In this regard, the Authority used, as a legal basis for initiating investigation and for its 
decision, the Law on Administrative Procedure,185 specifically Article 97(1).186 In the brief 
reasoning of the decision, apart from noting that the Authority had been established by the 
Assembly of Kosovo and that the authorization of its work is stipulated in the Law on 
Competition, the Authority did not provide any further reasoning as to why such an 
investigation was legally sound. In the disposition of the decision it was stated that: 
‘For the initiation of investigations against insurance companies operating in the territory 
of Kosovo, H. Sh.187 was authorized for the collection of data’.188 
In addition to the fact that the decision to initiate an investigation was not based on any legal 
provision of the Law on Competition, it was actually contrary to those provisions. Pursuant to 
                                                 
183 Law on Competition (n 17) Art 3.  
184 Cf Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands and Others ECLI:EU:C:2009:343, para 24 (‘It follows, as the 
Advocate General stated in essence at point 38 of her Opinion, that the criteria laid down in the Court’s case law 
for the purpose of determining whether conduct has as its object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion 
of competition are applicable irrespective of whether the case entails an agreement, a decision or a concerted 
practice’). 
185 Law No 02/L-28 on Administrative Procedure (Official Gazette 8/2007, 01.01.2007). Available at 
http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/ligjet/2005_02-L28_en.pdf. Last accessed on 12 July 2017. 
186 Kosovo Competition Authority, Decision for Initiating Investigation Against Insurance Companies, 23 
March 2009. [Hereinafter: the Authority’s Decision for Initiating Investigation Against Insurance Companies].  
187 Commission member within the Authority. 
188 The Authority’s Decision for Initiating Investigation Against Insurance Companies (n 186). 
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Article 29189 of the Law on Competition, the Authority should issue an order for the purpose 
of obtaining information. An order issued by the Authority pursuant to this Article should be 
in writing and should set forth: the purpose and legal basis of the order; the nature of the data, 
information, documents, items of movable and/or immovable property, testimony required; 
the period for compliance with the order, which shall not be less than ten (10) calendar days; 
and a notice of the possibility of administrative and criminal penalties for failure to comply 
with the order in a complete and non-misleading manner. Almost none of the 
abovementioned legal criteria were respected by the Authority when it issued its decision to 
initiate investigation. As shall be discussed and established, adherence by the Authority to the 
required procedures during investigations and decision-making is of the utmost importance. 
Any procedural omission in one of the phases of the case may negatively affect the outcome 
for the Authority’s decision during judicial review. 
 
7.3.2 First Hearing Sessions 
 
During the investigation of this case, the Authority held two hearings, one on 13.09.2010190 
and the other on 22.10.2010, in order for the insurance companies to state and present their 
counter-arguments regarding the agreement being investigated by the Authority.191 
All the invited parties agreed to attend the hearings. However, in the first hearing, because of 
the fact that discussions focused almost entirely on another subject, that is, border insurance 
                                                 
189 Law on Competition (n 17). 
190 Kosovo Competition Authority, Records of Hearing with the Representatives of the Insurance Companies, 
13 September 2010. [Hereinafter: Records of the First Hearing]. 
191 According to the EU courts, the right to a fair hearing is a fundamental principle of EU law, which also forms 
part of the rights of the defence during administrative procedures. See in particular, Case C-413/06 P 
Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America v Impala ECLI:EU:C:2008:392, para 61; Case 17/74 
Transocean Marine Paint Association v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1974:106, para 15; Joined Cases 100/80 to 
103/80 Musique diffusion française and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1983:158, para 10; Joined Cases C-
204/00 P C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P Aalborg Portland and Others v 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:2004:6, para 66; Case T-372/10 Bolloré v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2012:325, para 65. 
In Joined Cases T-25/95, T-26/95, T-30/95, T-31/95, T-32/95, T-34/95, T-35/95, T-36/95, T-37/95, T-38/95, T-
39/95, T-42/95, T-43/95, T-44/95, T-45/95, T-46/95, T-48/95, T-50/95, T-51/95, T-52/95, T-53/95, T-54/95, T-
55/95, T-56/95, T-57/95, T-58/95, T-59/95, T-60/95, T-61/95, T-62/95, T-63/95, T-64/95, T-65/95, T-68/95, T-
69/95, T-70/95, T-71/95, T-87/95, T-88/95, T-103/95 and T-104/95 Cimenteries CBR and Others v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2000:77, para 718, the Court required that the Commission must nevertheless observe the general 
principles of Community law during the administrative procedure, which include the right to a fair hearing.  
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tariffs,192 and not the contested agreement, the Authority decided to invite the representatives 
of the insurance companies to another hearing. 
 
7.3.3 Second Hearing Sessions 
 
At the second hearing,193 held on 22.10.2010, the Authority notified the representatives of the 
insurance companies of the statement of objections on the alleged anti-competitive agreement 
signed by all the insurance companies. 
The hearing was opened by the President of the Authority, who had initially notified the 
representatives194 of the insurance companies that they were being investigated by the 
Authority regarding compulsory third-party liability motor insurance. Furthermore, the 
President of the Authority notified the representatives of the insurance companies that after 
analysis of the insurance policy prices, which were based on UNMIK195 Regulation No. 
2001/25, the Authority had determined that the prices were very similar, if not identical, 
suggesting that the insurance companies were involved in a price-fixing agreement.196 
In this hearing session, the representative of the insurance company Kosova e Re stated: 
‘I can confirm that the prices are not determined by any written or oral agreement. The 
Central Bank of Kosovo197 reviews the tariffs every year and a key element is their 
correctness towards policyholders’.198 
The representative of the insurance company Sigma also declared: 
‘I guarantee you that there is no price-fixing agreement between the insurance 
companies’.199 
Moreover, the representative for the insurance company Sigkos declared: 
                                                 
192 Details of Kosovo border tariffs available from the Kosovo Insurance Bureau. Available at https://bks-
ks.org/?module=Page&action=show&id=50. Last accessed on 12 June 2018. 
193 Kosovo Competition Authority, Records of Hearing with the Representatives of the Insurance Companies, 
22 October 2010. [Hereinafter: Records of the Second Hearing].  
194 In this hearing, the representatives of the insurance companies: Kosova E Re, Sigma, Siguria, Sigkos, Insig, 
Illyria, Croatia Sigurimi and Dardania participated. 
195 United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, based on Security Council Resolution 1244/1999. 
See https://unmik.unmissions.org/.  
196 Records of the Second Hearing (n 193). 
197 The Central Bank of Kosovo is the licensing and supervisory body over insurance companies in Kosovo. For 
further information see https://www.bqk-kos.org/?m=t&id=1. 
198 Records of the Second Hearing (n 193) 1. 
199 Ibid. 
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‘We tried to create an agreement between two companies for voluntary insurance and we 
failed, let alone an agreement between ten companies’.200 
At this hearing, the Authority presented and read the agreement between the insurance 
companies which had been signed by their branch directors in Gjakova. 
The representative of the company Siguria noted that this agreement: 
‘[h]as to do with policy sales with approved prices and not having enormous discounts, 
which frequently happens’.201 
By this assertion, the insurance company Siguria explicitly admitted that an agreement 
existed and that they were aware of such an agreement. Based on the declaration by Siguria 
that this agreement was concluded to avoid price discounts, it was clear that it was consumers 
who were directly harmed202 by it, not the insurance companies, since all of them were 
signatories. ‘The antitrust laws prohibit both collusion among rivals and exclusion of rivals, 
when such conduct harms competition. From an economic point of view, the competitive 
danger from each is similar. A collusive agreement among rivals involving price or output, 
for example, harms competition by reducing industry output and raising prices’.203 The Law 
on Competition forbids any anti-competitive agreement which restricts or distorts 
competition, and the agreement in question has this object and effect. In the same vein EU 
competition law also prohibits agreements that have an anti-competitive object204 or effect.205    
                                                 
200 Ibid. 
201 Ibid 2. 
202 See Antitrust Modernization Commission, Report and Recommendations (Made for the Congress of the 
United States 2007) 1, 3. [Hereinafter: Antitrust Modernization Commission, Report and Recommendations] 
(‘Antitrust law prohibits anticompetitive conduct that harms consumer welfare’). Available at 
https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf. Last accessed on 21 March 
2018.  
203 See Jonathan B Baker, ‘Preserving a Political Bargain: The Political Economy of the Non-Interventionist 
Challenge to Monopolization Enforcement’ (2010) 76(3) Antitrust Law Journal 605. [Hereinafter: Jonathan B 
Baker, ‘Preserving a Political Bargain: The Political Economy of the Non-Interventionist Challenge to 
Monopolization Enforcement’]. 
204 Article 101(1) TFEU (‘The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market: all 
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may 
affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition within the internal market’). See also European Commission, ‘Guidelines on the 
Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to Horizontal Co-operation 
Agreements’ [2011] OJ C11/1. [Hereinafter: European Commission, ‘Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 
101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to Horizontal Co-operation Agreements’].  
205See Case T-322/01 Roquette Frères v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2006:267, paras 73–75. See Case C-23/14 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:651 paras 66–67; Case C-52/09 TeliaSonera Sverige ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, para 64; Case T-
127/04 KME Germany and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2009:142, para 68; Case T-241/01 Scandinavian 
Airlines System v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2005:296, para 122; Case T-59/02 Archer Daniels Midland v 
Commission ECLI:EU:T:2006:272, paras 159–161; Case T-43/02 Jungbunzlauer v Commission 
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According to Jones and Sufrin, ‘an agreement is caught if either its object or its effect is the 
restriction of competitionʼ.206 The fact that the insurance companies agreed not to allow 
discounts was sufficient, and it was abundantly clear that competition was restricted, thereby 
harming consumers. 
The representative of the insurance company Sigkos declared: 
‘The agreement in question does not relate to the determination of tariffs, 207 but to the 
non-distortion of the market’.208 
Thus, based on analysis of the declaration, the fact that the company did not repudiate the 
agreement but on the contrary attempted to present it as a lawful agreement, suggests that not 
only did this agreement exist, but that it was concluded with the knowledge of the head 
offices of the companies. This is an important fact, because in later court proceedings the 
insurance companies denied that they were aware of such an agreement. To the worst, courts 
have erroneously accepted such a claim.  
When the representatives of the insurance companies were asked by the Authority what 
market distortion209 meant to them, the representative of the company Siguria declared: 
‘Sales of insurance policies below the allowed price are a market distortion’.210 
                                                                                                                                                        
ECLI:EU:T:2006:270, paras 153–155 and Case T-329/01 Archer Daniels Midland v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2006:268, paras 176–178.  
206 Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EC Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials (3rd edn, Oxford 
University Press 2008) 220. See also the EU case law, Case 56/65 Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau 
Ulm ECLI:EU:C:1966:38; 249 (‘Finally, for the agreement at issue to be caught by the prohibition contained in 
Article 85 (1) it must have as its object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within 
the Common Market’); Case C-234/89 Stergios Delimitis v Henninger Bräu ECLI: ECLI:EU:C:1991:91, para 
13 (‘If such agreements do not have the object of restricting competition within the meaning of Article 85(1) it 
is nevertheless necessary to ascertain whether they have the effect of preventing, restricting or distorting 
competition’); Joined Cases 29 and 30/83 Compagnie Royale Asturienne Des Mines Sa Rheinzink GmbH v 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:1984:130, para 33; Joined Cases 56 and 58/64 Etablissements Consten Sarl & 
Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission ECLI: ECLI:EU:C:1966:41 342 (‘for the purpose of applying Article 
85 (1) there is no need to take account of the concrete effects of an agreement once it appears that it has as its 
object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition’).  
207 See eg Case T-15/89 Chemie Linz v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1992:37 para 135 (‘In those circumstances it is 
for the applicant to adduce evidence to show that its participation in the meetings was without anti-competitive 
intention by showing that it indicated to its competitors that it was participating in the meetings in a spirit which 
was different from theirs’).  
208 Records of the Second Hearing (n 193) 2. 
209 See Moritz Lorenz, An Introduction to EU Competition Law (1st edn, Cambridge University Press 2013) 75. 
[Hereinafter: Moritz Lorenz, An Introduction to EU Competition Law] (‘Article 101 (1) TFEU prohibits any 
form of cooperation between independent undertakings assuming that it leads to distortion or restriction of 
competition’).  
210 Records of the Second Hearing (n 193) 2.  
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However, the representative of the company in question did not consider the fact that one of 
the most important principles of competition is the setting of prices in a way that is 
independent from other undertakings.211 If all the companies’ prices are identical, the 
following question arises: Where is the competition? The market is not distorted when similar 
or identical services have different prices in the market, offered by various companies. But 
competition is distorted when various companies are involved in price-fixing, as was the case 
with the insurance companies, meaning that consumers do not have an opportunity to choose 
between different or more favourable prices for the same services or goods, as is the objective 
of competition law.212 
The representative of the insurance company Illyria declared: 
‘The purpose is that the agents will not offer discounts on the insurance policies, but will 
adhere to the Central Bank approved prices’.213 
The representative of the insurance company Sigma acknowledged: 
‘We have respected all the Central Bank rules, and do not see any culpability here’.214 
In addition to not repudiating the agreement for which the companies were being investigated 
and attempting to present the agreement as lawful, Sigma insisted that the insurance 
companies were not culpable regarding the agreement because it did not violate Central Bank 
rules. Therefore, it is clear that the insurance companies’ only concern regarding the legality 
of this agreement was in relation to the Central Bank, not the Law on Competition and the 
Authority. 
Only the representative of the insurance company Croatia Sigurimi repudiated the existence 
of this agreement at the hearing, declaring: 
‘The signature of the representative of Croatia Sigurimi is not recognizable, and we 
consider that this agreement is invalid’.215 
The fact that almost none of the representatives of the insurance companies repudiated the 
agreement, but instead attempted to present it as lawful, is a sufficient indication that this 
agreement not only existed but was entered into with the knowledge of the head offices of the 
insurance companies. This fact should have been highlighted in the Authority’s argument and 
presented to the court as one of the main arguments that such an agreement existed and that 
                                                 
211 See eg Case T-15/89 Chemie Linz AG v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1992:37, para 303 and Joined Cases 40 to 
48, 50, 54 to 56, 111, 113 and 114–173 Suiker Unie others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1975:174, paras 173–174.  
212 See Moritz Lorenz, An Introduction to EU Competition Law (n 209) 1 (‘Competition is meant to ensure low 
prices and a broad range of choice for consumers and overall efficiency and innovation’).  
213 Records of the Second Hearing (n 193) 3.  
214 Ibid. 
215 Ibid. 
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the head offices of the insurance companies were aware of it. Later in the court proceedings 
the insurance companies claimed that the signatories of the agreement were not competent, 
and that the agreement was signed only by representatives of the Gjakova branches,216 who 
were not competent to sign such agreements, and that the agreement in question could not be 
valid because it was not stamped by the companies with their company seals. ‘An agreement 
within the meaning of Art. 101 (1) TFEU may consist of a contract between different private 
undertakings in any case. The fundamental application of this provision is not subject to any 
doubt to the extent related to contract concluded between different undertakings under private 
law. Such cases present two overlapping declarations of intent. The parties have thus 
expressed their common intent to act in the market in a certain manner as is firmly required 
based on established case law. In addition, the undertakings have bound themselves 
accordingly. They have entered into a binding obligation to restrict competition if that is the 
subject matter of the contract. The type of contract is unimportant. Classification under 
national law is likewise irrelevant for this reason’.217 
These later claims, which completely contradicted the declarations of the insurance company 
representatives in the hearing before the Authority, were accepted by the courts as arguments 
with probative value. In this regard, for example, Lenaerts, Maselis, and Gutman argue that 
when an ‘undertaking admits during the administrative procedure the allegations against 
them, it is stopped from disputing them during the court proceedings’.218 The same approach 
is supported by EU case law. ‘Thus, where, as in the present case, the undertaking expressly 
admits, during the administrative procedure, the substantive truth of the facts which the 
Commission alleges against it in its statement of objections, those facts must thereafter be 
regarded as established and the undertaking barred from disputing them during the procedure 
before the Court’,219      
In deciding this issue, in almost all the insurance company cases, the court overruled the 
Authority’s rulings on these claims. However, during the court proceedings, the Authority 
never objected to the later claims of the insurance companies, that is, that the agreement had 
not been signed by competent persons and that the companies were not aware of it, claims 
that were contrary to the declarations made by the insurance company representatives during 
the hearing sessions. 
                                                 
216 For example the European Commission considers even corporate groups using the same approach as a single 
undertaking. See Commission Decision No 88/501/EEC Tetra [1988] OJ L272/27, para 43. See also more 
generally, John Armour, Henry Hansmann, and Reinier Kraakman, ‘The Essential Elements of Corporate Law’ 
June 2009, Harvard Law School, Discussion Paper No 643.  
217 Walter Frenz, Handbook of EU Competition Law (Springer 2016) 245. [Hereinafter: Walter Frenz, Handbook 
of EU Competition Law]. 
218 Koen Lenaerts, Ignace Maselis, and Kathleen Gutman, EU Procedural Law (1st edn, Oxford University 
Press 2014) 388. [Hereinafter: Koen Lenaerts, Ignace Maselis, and Kathleen Gutman, EU Procedural Law].  
219 Case T-224/00 Archer Daniels Midland Company and Archer Daniels Midland Ingredients v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2003:195, para 227 and Joined Cases T-236/01, T-239/01, T-244/01 to T-246/01, T-251/01 and T-
252/01 Tokai Carbon and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2004:118, para 108. 
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Such an objection, although it was crucial and could have been argued without difficulty, was 
not made by the Authority in any of the court proceedings. Thus, a proper reading of the 
evidence, on which the Authority relied, in particular the minutes of the hearings, reveals that 
the assertions of the parties under investigation were inconsistent as regards what was stated 
during the hearing before the Authority, and what was stated afterwards during the court 
proceedings. 
 
7.4 The Authority’s Decision Imposing a Fine on the Insurance Companies 
 
At the end of the administrative investigation procedure into the alleged infringements, the 
Authority took the decision220 to impose fines in the amount of one hundred thousand euros 
on each of the ten insurance companies221 for infringement of Article 3 of the Law on 
Competition as a result of participation in an anti-competitive agreement. 
That conclusion was based on the allegation that the anti-competitive agreement distorted 
competition within the relevant market. In defining the relevant market, the Authority 
concluded that the geographic market is the whole territory of Kosovo.222 
The Authority stated in its decision that: 
                                                 
220 Kosovo Competition Authority, Decision no 5/1 on the Agreement for Setting the Prices of Third Party 
Compulsory Motor Insurance Policies, Against Siguria, 27 December 2010; Kosovo Competition Authority, 
Decision no 5/2 on the Agreement for Setting the Prices of Third Party Compulsory Motor Insurance Policies, 
Against Insig, 27 December 2010; Kosovo Competition Authority, Decision no 5/3 on the Agreement for Setting 
the Prices of Third Party Compulsory Motor Insurance Policies, Against Croatia Sigurimi, 27 December 2010; 
Kosovo Competition Authority, Decision no 5/4 on the Agreement for Setting the Prices of Third Party 
Compulsory Motor Insurance Policies, Against Sigal, 27 December 2010; Kosovo Competition Authority, 
Decision no 5/5 on the Agreement for Setting the Prices of Third Party Compulsory Motor Insurance Policies, 
Against Sigma, 27 December 2010; Kosovo Competition Authority, Decision no 5/6 on the Agreement for 
Setting the Prices of Third Party Compulsory Motor Insurance Policies, Against Illyria, 27 December 2010; 
Kosovo Competition Authority, Decision no 5/7 on the Agreement for Setting the Prices of Third Party 
Compulsory Motor Insurance Policies, Against Elsig, 27 December 2010; Kosovo Competition Authority, 
Decision no 5/8 on the Agreement for Setting the Prices of Third Party Compulsory Motor Insurance Policies, 
Against Kosova Re, 27 December 2010; Kosovo Competition Authority, Decision no 5/9 on the Agreement for 
Setting the Prices of Third Party Compulsory Motor Insurance Policies, Against Sigkos, 27 December 2010 and 
Kosovo Competition Authority, Decision no 5/10 on the Agreement for Setting the Prices of Third Party 
Compulsory Motor Insurance Policies, Against Dardania, 27 December 2010. [Hereinafter: The Authority’s 
Decisions].  
221 See (n 176). 
222 The Authority’s Decisions (n 220).  
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‘Following the debate during the hearings, the Authority concluded that the insurance 
companies had entered into a price-fixing agreement, and thus denied consumers the 
choice of more favourable policies’.223 
As regards the legal basis of the decision, the Authority, apart from alleging violation of 
Article 3, also referred to concerted practices, even though this was not the case here, and to 
Articles 101, 102, and 106 of the TFEU.224 However, as shall be proved based on the findings 
of this study, the adoption of a decision intended to have legal effects without express 
indication of the proper legal basis can lead to infringement of the principle of legal 
certainty,225 and thus not survive court scrutiny, since it is the task of the court to ensure such 
certainty. In addition, the reasoning of the Authority’s decisions tends to be insufficient, in 
particular as regards the statement of reasons.226 The Authority’s decisions contain nothing of 
substance, simply summarizing that which has already been stated at the hearings, the 
chronology of the case, and the Authority’s mandate. 
Finally, in its decisions in the insurance cases, the Authority advised the dissatisfied parties 
that they could complain to the competent authority within 15 days of receiving the 
decision.227 However, the competent authority was not precisely specified. 
 
7.5 The Insurance Companies’ Request for a Review of the Authority’s Decision 
 
                                                 
223 Ibid. 
224 European Union, Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C115/47 
9 May 2008. [Hereinafter: TFEU]. 
225 See to the same effect Case C-325/91 Franc v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1993:245, para 30. See more 
generally, in relation to the principle of legal certainty: Xavier Groussot and Timo Minssen, ‘Res Judicata in the 
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Economic Efficiency’ (2017) 44(1) European Journal of Law and Economics 131.  
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power of review. See to that effect Case 108/81 Amylum v Council ECLI:EU:C:1982:322, para 19; Joined Cases 
296/82 and 318/82 Netherlands and Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1985:113, para 
19; Case C-350/88 Delacre and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1990:71, para 15; Case C-466/93 Atlanta 
Fruchthandelsgesellschaft and Others v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft ECLI:EU:C:1995:370, 
para 16; Case C-56/93 Belgium v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1996:64 ECLI:EU:C:1996:64, para 86; Case C-
166/95 P Commission v Daffix ECLI:EU:C:1997:73, para 24; and Case C-367/95 Commission v Sytraval and 
Brink's France ECLI:EU:C:1998:154, para 63. 
227 Authority’s decision against Elsig (n 220).  
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As noted above, the Authority advised that parties dissatisfied with the ruling within a period 
of 15 days of receiving the ruling could submit an appeal to the competent organ according to 
the legal procedures in force. However, the Authority did not clearly identify the competent 
organ according to law. The Law on Administrative Procedure228 obliges it to do so. Article 
84(2) stipulates that the administrative act, which in this case is the Authority’s decision, 
shall contain, inter alia, a reminder that the parties have the right to appeal against the 
decision through administrative bodies or through the courts.229 However, all the insurance 
companies exercised their right to request230 a review of the ruling, to the review 
committee,231 under Article 36232 of Regulation No 2004/44233 on the application of the Law 
on Competition and Article 129234 of the Law on Administrative Procedure, within the 
legally prescribed period. 
In the request for review, the insurance companies claimed that the Authority had made 
erroneous and incomplete factual findings regarding the contested agreement. They asserted 
that the agreement in question did not contain the necessary elements to qualify as an 
agreement. ‘Since it is clear from the case-law of the Court of Justice that in order for there to 
be an agreement within the meaning of Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty it is sufficient that the 
undertakings in question should have expressed their joint intention to conduct themselves on 
                                                 
228 Law on Administrative Procedure (n 185). 
229 Art 84(2). 
230 Grawe Elsig, Request for a Review of the Authority’s Decision, No 5/7 10 January 2011. The requests for 
review of the Authority’s decisions from the other insurance companies were almost identical. [Hereinafter: 
Request for a Review of the Authority’s Decisions]. 
231 The review was allowed according to Competition Law. See n below.  
232 Art 36 reads: ‘The Review Committee shall be comprised of a Chairman appointed by the SRSG upon the 
recommendation of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General for Economic Reconstruction 
and Development, one member appointed by the KCC and one member appointed by the party that has filed the 
request for review. Any aggrieved party may apply to the Review Committee to review any decision issued by 
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days of the date the Regulator’s decision was served upon the aggrieved party. For the avoidance of doubt, 
orders and rules issued by the KCC in accordance with this Regulation shall also be subject to review by the 
Review Committee, if an undertaking applies for such review. The Review Committee shall adopt its own 
procedure applicable to the consideration of applications by aggrieved parties. After considering the 
representations made by the aggrieved party and the KCC, the Review Committee shall give the aggrieved party 
and the KCC a detailed written decision within one (1) month of the date the Review Committee has set for 
receiving such representations. The decision by the Review Committee shall be made public, provided that 
confidential information in the text of the decision shall be made illegible’. 
233 United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, Regulation No 2004/44 on the Promulgation of 
the Law on Competition, UNMIK/REG/2004/44 29 October 2004. 
234 Law on Administrative Procedure (n 185) Art 129, relating to the entity receiving appeals, reads: ‘When the 
administrative appeal is in the form of a request for review, it shall be submitted to the body that issued the 
challenged administrative act or refused to issue the requested administrative act. When an administrative appeal 
is in the form of an appeal, it shall be submitted to the higher bodies. In cases when the administrative appeal is 
made in the form of an appeal, it shall be submitted to the higher body, which in turn may forward the case to 
the body that issued/refused to issue the act along with its determination for the resolution of the case’. 
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the market in a specific way’.235 They further asserted that in order to be considered an 
agreement and to have legal effect, an agreement must contain at least the names and 
surnames of the signatories, whose authorization or signature represents that that person was 
competent to sign on behalf of the company according to the internal rules and procedures of 
the undertakings. Furthermore, they claimed that the disputed agreement was not sealed and 
did not follow company protocol and that the insurance companies did not know the identity 
of the signatories, etc.236 Further, the companies argued that pursuant to Article 92 of the Law 
on Administrative Procedure,237 an administrative act is null and void if it is issued by an 
unidentified or incompetent organ, which in this case meant that the act did not produce any 
legal effect.238 
Taking into consideration the nature of the agreement, these assertions were irrelevant. In 
such cases, the crucial elements to be considered are the object and effect of the contested 
agreement.239 If the agreement has as its object restriction or distortion of competition, it 
must be regarded as an infringement per se of the competition rules.240 Prima facie it appears 
from the substance and intention241 of the contested agreement that its object is to restrict 
competition. Thus, it is unnecessary to prove anti-competitive effect in the relevant market.242 
These are the most essential elements of any agreement to be considered in relation to 
competition law in enforcement proceedings either by the Authority or the courts.243 In this 
situation, the questions of who signed the contested agreement and whether the company’s 
protocol has or has not been followed are irrelevant. If the text of this agreement is carefully 
                                                 
235 See Case T-7/89 Hercules Chemicals v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1991:75 para 256. According to the EU case 
law, the anti-competitive agreements may be caught even if no longer into force, if they continue to produce 
effects on the relevant market. See Case 243/83 SA Binon & Cie and SA Agence et messageries de la presse v 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:1985:284 para 17.  
236 Request for a Review of the Authority’s Decisions (n 230) 2. 
237 Law on Administrative Procedure (n 185). 
238 Request for a Review of the Authority’s Decisions (n 230) 3. 
239 See Case 56/65 Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm ECLI:EU:C:1966:38, para 20 (’for the 
agreement at issue to be caught by the prohibition contained in Article 85 (1) it must have as its object or effect 
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common Market’). See also more generally, 
Barak Orbach, ‘How Antitrust Lost Its Goal’ (n 15).  
240 See Case T-148/89 Tréfilunion v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1995:68, para 109 and Case T-14/89 Montedipe v 
Commission ECLI:EU:T:1992:36, para 265. 
241 See Case C-551/03 P General Motors ECLI:EU:C:2006:229, para 78; Case T-472/13 Lundbeck v 
Commission, EU:T:2016:449, para 523 and Case T-450/05 Automobiles Peugeot SA, and Peugeot Nederland 
NV v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2009:262, para 168.  
242 Cf Case C-209/07 Beef Industry Development Society and Barry Brothers ECLI:EU:C:2008:643, para 16; 
Joined Cases C-501/06 P GlaxoSmithKline and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2009:610, para 55; and Case 
C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands ECLI:EU:C:2009:343, para 29. See also, the Commission’s ‘Guidelines on the 
Application of Ex Article 81(3) of the Treaty, now 101(3) TFEU’ [2004] OJ C101/8, paras 21–23 and European 
Commission, ‘Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union to Horizontal Co-operation Agreements’ (n 204) paras 24–25. 
243 See eg Albertina Albors-Llorens, EC Competition Law and Policy (William Publishing 2002) 34. 
[Hereinafter: Albertina Albors-Llorens, EC Competition Law and Policy].  
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analyzed,244 it is clear that its object and effect245 were contrary to the competition rules in 
force, specifically Article 3 of the Law on Competition. Given the fact that the prices of 
insurance policies were identical as a consequence of this agreement, it is more than clear that 
negative effects were created by the agreement in the relevant market. 
The insurance companies assumed that the tariffs in the insurance policies were determined 
by the Central Bank of Kosovo and asserted that: ‘these tariffs were not identical among 
insurance companies’.246 
The companies’ own declarations, in which they acknowledged that different prices for 
insurance policies were determined by the Central Bank of Kosovo, clearly showed the anti-
competitive nature of the disputed agreement.247 This is because despite the fact that the 
Central Bank of Kosovo had approved different tariffs for the insurance companies, thus 
creating the possibility for competition in the relevant market, the disputed agreement denied 
such an opportunity—setting identical prices for all insurance companies—thus entirely 
negating competition in the relevant market. 
In support of their assertions, the insurance companies contested the reasoning behind the 
Authority’s decision and stated that the Authority’s decision did not contain a notification to 
the parties of the right of review or the right to appeal through administrative or judicial 
procedure, and that the legal guidance given in the decision was not as required by law, as it 
did not notify the parties of the right to appeal the decision through administrative bodies or 
the courts.248 
During this phase, the new Law on Protection of Competition249, which did not provide for a 
legal review of decisions of the Authority, entered into force. Consequently, the Authority’s 
rulings could only be challenged directly in court, and the Authority notified the companies 
accordingly. 
 
                                                 
244 See Joined Cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C-519/06 P GlaxoSmithKline Services and Others 
v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2009:610, para 58. 
245 See Case 56/65 Société Technique Minière and Maschinenbau Ulm ECLI:EU:C:1966:38 249 (‘Finally, for 
the agreement at issue to be caught by the prohibition contained in Article 85 (1) it must have as its object or 
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common Market’). 
246 Request for a Review of the Authority’s Decisions (n 230) 3. 
247 According to settled EU case law, in order to assess the anti-competitive nature of an agreement, regard must 
be had, inter alia, to the content of its provisions, the objectives it seeks to attain and the economic and legal 
context of which it forms a part. See in particular Joined Cases C-519/ 06 P, C-501/ 06 P, C-513/ 06 P, C-515/ 
06 P, and C-519/ 06 P GlaxoSmithKline Services v Commission and Others ECLI:EU:C:2009:610, para 58, and 
the case law cited. 
248 Request for a Review of the Authority’s Decisions (n 230) 4. 
249 See n 24. 
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7.6 The Authority’s Conclusion Notifying the Insurance Companies of the New 
Appeal Procedures 
 
After accepting the request for review of the rulings imposing fines on the insurance 
companies, the Authority issued a conclusion250 notifying the insurance companies with the 
new appeal procedures regarding the imposed fines. This was due to the fact that the new 
Law on the Protection of Competition had entered into force, and according to Article 69251 
of that law, the previous Law on Competition was repealed. In addition, the Authority 
highlighted in this conclusion that: 
‘Since the imposition of this administrative fine on the insurance companies was based 
on the provisions of the old law, which are more favourable to the parties, the disposition 
of the rulings still applies [based on the old law] whereas the procedures will continue 
based on the new law’.252 
The conclusion of the Authority that in the appeal against its decisions the provisions of both 
the old and the new law would apply might be considered inconsistent and contrary to well-
established practice in the field of competition law. According to the EU jurisprudence ‘…in 
an action for annulment, the legality of the contested measure must be assessed on the basis 
of the facts and the law as they stood at the time when the measure was adopted’.253 In 
addition, the legality of the Authority’s decision should have been assessed both 
procedurally254 and substantively based on the law in force when the decision was adopted.255 
                                                 
250 Kosovo Competition Authority, Conclusion, no 5/1, 24 January 2011; Kosovo Competition Authority, 
Conclusion, no 5/2, 24 January 2011; Kosovo Competition Authority, Conclusion, no 5/3, 24 January 2011; 
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in contradiction to this law’. 
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212/80 to 217/80 Meridionale Industria Salumi and Others ECLI:EU:C:1981:270, para 9; Case C-201/04 
Molenbergnatie ECLI:EU:C:2006:136, para 31; Joined Cases C-121/91 and C-122/91 CT Control(Rotterdam) 
and JCT Benelux v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1993:285, para 22; Case C-61/98 De Haan ECLI:EU:C:1999:393, 
para 13; Case C-251/00 Ilumitrónica ECLI:EU:C:2002:655, para 29; Case C-352/09 P ThyssenKrupp Nirosta v 
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According to settled EU case law, substantive rules cannot in principle be applied 
retroactively.256 
 
7.7 Lawsuits Against the Authority’s Decisions 
 
The insurance companies, dissatisfied with the decisions of the Authority imposing fines for 
the signing of the contested agreement and the denial of appeal before the Authority, initiated 
lawsuits257 in court258 under the provisions of Article 62(1)259 of the Law on Protection of 
Competition. 
The applicants sought annulment of the contested decisions, alleging that the challenged 
rulings were issued in violation of the procedural and substantive laws. 
The applicants, inter alia, asserted that: 
                                                                                                                                                        
Commission ECLI:EU:C:2011:191, para 88; Case C-610/10 Commission v Spain, EU:C:2012:781, para 45 and 
Case C-89/15 P Riva Fire v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2017:713, para 28.  
255 See in that regard settled EU case law, Joined Cases 15 and 16/76 France v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:1979:29, para 7; Case C-449/98 P IECC v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2001:275, para 87; Joined 
Cases C-133/93, C-300/93 and C-362/93 Crispoltoni and Others ECLI:EU:C:1994:364, para 43; Case 40–72 
Schroeder v Germany ECLI:EU:C:1973:14, para 14; Joined Cases C-267/88 to C-285/88 Wuidart and Others v 
Laiterie Coopérative Eupenoise ECLI:EU:C:1990:79, para 14; Case C-375/96 Zaninotto ECLI:EU:C:1998:517, 
para 66; Case T-384/02 Valenzuela Marzo v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2004:239, para 98; and Case T-339/04 
France Télécom v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2007:80, para 54. 
256 See in that regard Cases 212–217/80 Meridionale Industria Salumi ECLI:EU:C:1981:270, para 9; Case C-
201/04 Molenbergnatie ECLI:EU:C:2006:136 para 31; Case C-450/06 Varec ECLI:EU:C:2008:91, para27; 
Case C-61/98 De Haan ECLI:EU:C:1999:393, para 13; Case C-251/00 Ilumitrónica ECLI:EU:C:2002:655, para 
29; Case C-120/08 Bavaria ECLI:EU:C:2010:798, paras 40 and 41; and Case C-17/10 Toshiba Corporation 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:72, para 50. 
257 Sigma, Administrative suit, Supreme Court of Kosovo, 10 February 2011; Dardania, Administrative suit, 
Supreme Court of Kosovo, 21 February 2011; Kosova e Re, Administrative suit, Supreme Court of Kosovo, 21 
February 2011; Grawe Elsig, Administrative suit, Supreme Court of Kosovo, 22 February 2011; Croatia 
Sigurimi, Administrative suit, Supreme Court of Kosovo, 22 February 2011; Siguria, Administrative suit, 
Supreme Court of Kosovo, 23 February 2011; Illyria, Administrative suit, Supreme Court of Kosovo, 27 January 
2011 and Insig, Administrative suit, Supreme Court of Kosovo, 28 February 2011. [Hereinafter: The Lawsuits].  
258 Initially the lawsuits were lodged in the Supreme Court under the Law on Competition. However, the Law on 
Protection of Competition stipulated that lawsuits against the Authority’s decisions should be filed before the 
competent court. Since the Authority’s decisions are administrative decisions in nature, they were then ex officio 
transferred to the Court of First Instance-Administrative Department. 
259 ‘An appeal is not permitted against the decision of the Authority which ascertains violations of this law and 
pronounces punitive measures, and the decision which terminates the procedure due to previous issues; 
however, the party, within a period of thirty (30) days, may initiate an administrative conflict by filing a lawsuit 
in the competent court of Kosovo’. 
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‘The Authority’s decisions were based on a non-existent (fictitious) document both as 
regards form and content; the photocopy of the document presented by the Authority did 
not prove a link between the agreement and the insurance companies or the plaintiffs; 
and the persons who signed on behalf of the plaintiffs are unknown.260 The Authority’s 
decisions were taken in violation of the law and procedures, since a copy of the 
agreement presented by the Authority did not prove such an agreement between the 
insurance companies. The agreement did not contain the names of the persons who 
signed it and as a result they are not known. Furthermore, the agreement is neither sealed 
nor protocolled by the plaintiffs. Even if the contested agreement was an agreement 
signed in a regular manner, it in no way conflicted with the content of Article 3 of the 
Law on Competition, because nowhere is price-fixing mentioned, but the agreement 
concerns the protection of the insurance market and respect for the legal rules set by the 
supervisory body for insurance companies, the Central Bank’.261 
According to the applicants’ assertions, in order for an agreement to be considered a price-
fixing agreement, it must be given this name, its form must be standardized, and the original 
and not a copy must be produced.262  Based on the EU caw law ‘for the purposes of Article 
81(1) EC the concept of ‘agreement’, as interpreted by the case-law, centres on the existence 
of a concurrence of wills between at least two parties, the form in which it is manifested 
being unimportant so long as it constitutes the faithful expression of the parties’ intention’263 
However, Article 3 of the Law on Competition covers any agreement having as its object or 
effect264 restriction265 or distortion of competition. The contested agreement is a perfect 
example of such an agreement; it restricts competition among insurance companies by setting 
identical prices, thus depriving consumers of the benefits a competitive market provides.266 
                                                 
260 See Case T-41/96 Bayer v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2000:242, para 52 (‘An agreement within the meaning of 
Article 85(1) of the Treaty requires only that the two parties have an interest in its being concluded, without 
there being any need for that interest to be identical’). 
261 The Lawsuits (257). 
262 See eg Joined Cases T-68/89, T-77/89 and T-78/89 SIV and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1992:38, para 
238. 
263 See Case C-74/04 P Commission v Volkswagen AG ECLI:EU:C:2006:460, para 12) and Case T-41/96 Bayer 
v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2000:242, para 69. 
264 See Case C-551/03 P General Motors v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2006:229, para 64. See also Joined Cases 
96–102, 104, 105, 108 and 110/82 IAZ International Belgium and others v Commission ECLI: 
ECLI:EU:C:1983:310, para 25; Case C-235/92 P Montecatini v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1999:362, para 122; 
and Joined Cases C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P 
Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2002:582, para 491. See also Walter 
Frenz, Handbook of EU Competition Law (n 217) 253. 
265 See also European Commission, ‘Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to Horizontal Co-operation Agreements’ (n 202) Art 27. 
266 See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Mel Marquis (eds) European Competition Law Annual 2007; A Reformed 
Approach to Article 82 EC (Hart Publishing 2008) 5. [Hereinafter: Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Mel Marquis 
(eds) European Competition Law Annual 2007; A Reformed Approach to Article 82 EC]. 
53 
 
7.8 The Court Procedures in the Insurance Company Cases 
7.8.1 The Hearings 
 
During the litigation, hearings were held before the Court of First Instance, giving an 
opportunity to the parties to present their views and arguments. It must be noted, however, 
that in some judicial sessions the representatives of the Authority, despite the fact that they 
had been summoned by the court, did not appear to represent the Authority.267 In such 
circumstances, regardless of the Authority’s absence, under the provisions of Article 41268 of 
the Law on Administrative Conflicts the conditions for holding the hearing were met.269 
In order for the Authority to successfully defend the legality of its decisions, it must be 
present at all court hearings.270 It is the duty and responsibility of the Authority to defend and 
argue the legality of its decisions in the courts. This is necessary not only so that the 
Authority can defend and advocate for its work, but also so that it can guide the courts, which 
lack significant knowledge in the field of competition, in properly enforcing competition law 
in Kosovo. In addition, the CJEU ruled that, in order for Article 101 and 102 to be enforced 
effectively, the competition Authority should appear in the courtrooms to justify as well as 
defence its decisions.271   
 
7.8.2 The Second Main Hearing 
 
                                                 
267 Basic Court of Pristina – Administrative Department, Preliminary Hearing Minutes, 19 May 2015. 
[Hereinafter: First Preliminary Hearing in the Elsig case]. 
268 The Law on Administrative Conflicts (n 306) Art 41 reads: ‘The absence of the party from the verbal review 
shall not cancel the work of the court. If the party is absent from the verbal review, it cannot be concluded that it 
has disclaimed its requests, and its submissions shall be read. In case both the claimant and the indicted party are 
absent from the review, but the review is not postponed, the court shall review the conflict in the absence of the 
parties’. 
269 First Preliminary Hearing in the Elsig case (n 267). 
270 See eg Adriana Almășan and Peter Whelan (eds) The Consistent Application of EU Competition Law: 
Substantive and Procedural Challenges (Springer 2017) 201. [Hereinafter: Adriana Almășan and Peter Whelan 
(eds) The Consistent Application of EU Competition Law: Substantive and Procedural Challenges] and  See 
also Wouter PJ Wils, ‘The Increased Level of EU Antitrust Fines, Judicial Review and the ECHR’ (2010) 33(1) 
World Competition 5. 
271 Case C-439/08, VEBIC, ECLI:EU:C:2010:739 paras 59 and 61. See also Joanna Goyder, ‘‘VEBIC’: The 
Role of National Authorities in Appeals against their own Decisions’ (2011) 2(3) Journal of European 
Competition Law & Practice 238 and Nicolas Petit, ‘The Judgment of the European Court of Justice in VEBIC: 
Filling a Gap in Regulation 1/2003’ (2011) 2( 4) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 340.  
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In the second main hearing in the case272 the Authority provided a copy of the report273 of the 
Forensic Agency of Kosovo to the court and to the Elsig company. According to the findings 
of the Forensics Report, the persons who signed the contested agreement on behalf of Elsig 
and on behalf of the other insurance companies were employees of the fined parties. Since 
Elsig’s representative received the Forensics Report during the court hearing, and it was 
impossible for them to challenge it because insufficient time was available, the court decided 
to adjourn the hearing. Elsig challenged the Forensics Report through a written submission to 
the court.274 Elsig argued that the Authority’s inability to provide other evidence such as the 
original agreement was indicative that the evidence in question did not exist at the time of the 
issuance of the contested decision. Furthermore, it requested the court not to accept as 
evidence the photocopy275 of the contested agreement in place of the original,276 given the 
technological developments making it possible for ‘any’ document to be manipulated.277 
However, in the last hearing in this particular case,278 Elsig’s representative stated that it 
reaffirmed entirely the statements made in the previous sessions, and repeated its request for 
its plea to be approved as grounded, and for the decision of the Authority to be annulled as 
unlawful. The representative of the Authority stated that it continued to support the decision 
of the Authority as grounded and lawful, and that it rejected the appeal suit as ungrounded.279 
In this session, the court decided to conduct an examination of the evidence in order to decide 
the case.280 
 
                                                 
272 Basic Court of Pristina – Administrative Department, Grawe Elsig case, Second Main Hearing Minutes, 3 
September 2015. [Hereinafter: Second Main Hearing Minutes].  
273 Kosovo Forensic Agency, Report, No 234/15–02, 30 July 2015. [Hereinafter: Forensics Report]. 
274 Grawe Elsig, Submissions for the Court of First Instance, 14 September 2015. [Hereinafter: Elsig’s 
Submissions].  
275 See Joined Cases T-68/89, T-77/89 and T-78/89 SIV and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1992:38, para 
238.  
276 See Case T-41/96 Bayer v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2000:242 para 68 (‘As regards the form in which that 
common intention is expressed, it is sufficient for a stipulation to be the expression of the parties' intention to 
behave in the market in accordance with its terms … without its having to constitute a valid and binding contract 
under national law’).  
277 Elsig’s Submissions (n 274). 
278 Basic Court of Pristina – Administrative Department, Grawe Elsig case, Main Hearing Minutes, 25 
September 2015. 
279 Ibid. 
280 Authority’s Ruling No 5/7, 27.12.2009; Authority’s Conclusion No 5/7, 24.01.2011; Minutes of the 
Authority’s hearings 13.09.2010 and 22.10.2010; the agreement signed in Gjakova, 03.07.2009; the Request of 
the insurance company Elsig for Review of the Authority’s Ruling; the Expert Report of Kosovo’s Forensic 
Agency 30.06.2015; Elsig’s lawsuit; the response to the lawsuit from the Authority; the answer of Kosovo’s 
Civil Registration Agency 08.07.2015; the answer of the Kosovo Tax Administration 19.05.2015; the Court of 
Appeal Judgement Anr. 364/2014, 21.10.2014. 
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7.9 The Court of First Instance Approach Regarding Anti-Competitive Agreements 
 
As already observed, the epilogue of the insurance companies’ case in the Court of First 
Instance encompasses two sides of the same coin. The court upheld a few of the Authority’s 
decisions as grounded and lawful.281 The rest were set aside on the grounds that they were 
made in breach of procedural and substantive law,282 inter alia, on the grounds of 
misinterpretation of the disputed agreement; wrongful assessment of the factual situation; 
contradictory and insufficient reasoning; failure to provide a concise legal basis for the 
decisions and so on.  
The insurance company Siguria was among the signatory companies of the anti-competitive 
agreement in Gjakova, and as a result was investigated and fined by the Authority for 
restriction and distortion of competition in the relevant market.283 Most of the procedures 
were the same as those for the other companies, starting with the Authority’s decision,284 an 
appeal against the decision of the Authority,285 the conclusion286 of the Authority informing 
the parties that after the entry into force of the Law on Protection of Competition an appeal 
was not allowed, and a lawsuit.287 
This case is distinguished from the stage when the Court of First Instance issued a judgment 
rejecting Siguria’s claim as ungrounded and confirming the decision of the Authority as 
lawful and grounded, utterly different to most of the decisions of the Court of First Instance 
in the insurance company cases. It should be borne in mind, however, that the Authority’s 
decision in this case also had procedural flows. ‘In its review of legality, the Court of First 
Instance held, first of all, at paragraph 112 of the judgment under appeal, that there was an 
inadequate statement of reasons in respect of one of the criteria used by the Commission to 
determine the gravity of an infringement of Article 81 EC for the purposes of calculating the 
fine, namely the criterion of the actual impact of the infringement on the market. Given the 
number of criteria which, as observed at paragraph 54 of the present judgment, the 
Commission may use to determine the gravity of an infringement of competition rules for the 
purposes of setting the fine, the Court of First Instance did not err in law in holding that its 
                                                 
281 The Court of First Instance initially upheld the Authority’s decisions in the Siguria and Kosova Re cases. 
282 Seven out of ten of the Authority’s decisions in the insurance company cases were set aside at the first 
juridical review. Sigal still be before the Court of First Instance.  
283 See the Authority’s Decisions (n 220).  
284 Ibid. 
285 Request for a Review of the Authority’s decisions (n 230).  
286 The Authority’s Conclusions (n 250). 
287 The Lawsuits (n 257).  
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finding in relation to just one of those criteria did not automatically entail the annulment – 
even in part – of the decision at issue’.288 
The following analysis will shed light on how the same court issued two contradictory and 
opposite judgments on the same issue. Moreover, it will be shown how the judgment, which 
was based on the provisions of the Law on Competition and which took into consideration 
the goals of the law in question, was annulled by the Court of Appeal. As a result, the 
enforcement of competition law is in stalemate, not only in the case of insurance companies, 
but also in other competition cases, for the foreseeable future. 
Compared to other verdicts in the insurance company cases, this verdict was the most 
grounded, and the only one taken in the light of the provisions of the Law on Competition. It 
must be noted that, the Siguria case, was the first to be adjudicated by the Court of First 
Instance. As a rule, the court has the authority to annul the Authority’s decisions if it is 
proven that they have been made in violation of the provisions of procedural or substantive 
law. However, the reasoning in the appeal court judgments is largely inconsistent,289 since it 
argues neither breach of material law nor procedural rules. 
 
7.9.1 Judgments of the Court of First Instance Upholding the Authority’s Decisions 
 
In reviewing the legality of the Authority’s decision in the Siguria case, the court referred to 
the provisions of the Law on Competition, specifically Article 3, which stipulates that an 
agreement between undertakings is prohibited if it has as its object or effect an appreciable 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition in Kosovo.290 The Court of First Instance, 
upon deliberating on the case, found that the lawsuit of Siguria was ungrounded.291 
However, this is an exceptional case among the insurance company cases, with the court 
referring to Article 3 of the Law on Competition and to the disputed agreement in assessing 
the legality of the Authority’s decision. This should have been done by the courts in all the 
insurance company cases in order to accurately assess the object and effect of the agreement, 
and consequently, to effectively enforce competition legislation.292 
                                                 
288 See Case C-354/07 P Prym and Prym Consumer v Commission ECLI: EU:C:2009:505 para 87. 
289 See eg Ariel Ezrachi, ‘Sponge’ (n 3) 50 (‘Competition policy should be applied consistently, objectively, 
accurately, and fairly’).  
290 Basic Court of Pristina – Administrative Department, Siguria Ruling, no A180/11, 17 January 2014. 
[Hereinafter: Siguria First Instance Ruling]. 
291 Ibid. 
292 In contrast, in most of the other cases, the courts scrutinized the disputed agreement without reference to the 
provisions of Art 3 of the Law on Competition. 
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From the facts established in the administrative procedure, particularly the minutes of the 
first293 and second294 hearings, the court noted that during the investigation of the agreement, 
the Authority heard the statements of representatives of the insurance companies, including 
Siguria, with the representative of Siguria stating: 
‘This agreement has to do with policy sales at the approved price and avoiding enormous 
discounts, which frequently happens’.295 
The court, after examining the evidence in the administrative dispute, considered that: 
‘The Authority acted correctly when it assessed the disputed agreement to be prohibited 
by Article 3 of the Law on Competition. The court accepts the findings of the Authority 
that the agreement in question restricts and distorts competition and as such conflicts 
with the law. Regarding the claims mentioned in the lawsuit and the trial sessions, the 
representative of Siguria has given statements conflicting with the minutes of the 
hearings before the Authority, thus attempting to avoid responsibility regarding the 
signing of the agreement in question. The court also assesses, based on the provisions of 
the Law on Competition, that the competent authority for the imposition of fines is the 
Authority and not, as the plaintiff claims, the Central Bank’.296 
The Court of First Instance decided to reject the claim as unfounded since the plaintiff had 
not provided evidence of a different factual state from that found by the Authority. 
The judgment of the Court of First Instance in the Siguria case, being the first case, should 
have been taken as the paradigm for the other cases.297 This judgment is the only one to 
assess the decision of the Authority and the agreement in the light of the Law on Competition 
objectives. The judgment concisely summarized and elaborated all essential facts and 
evidence, including the assessment of the disputed agreement under Article 3 of the Law on 
Competition, the claims of the Siguria representative in hearings within the Authority, and 
the identity of the body responsible for the supervision and enforcement of competition rules. 
This judgment, as will be shown, not only was not followed in similar cases, but was 
annulled by the Court of Appeal based on reasoning that is ungrounded and contrary to the 
goals of the Law on Competition. 
 
                                                 
293 Records of the First Hearing (n 190). 
294 Records of the Second Hearing (n 193).  
295 Siguria First Instance Ruling (n 290) 2.  
296 Ibid 3. 
297 The Kosova Re case was decided on the same basis. Kosova Re, dissatisfied with the decision of the 
Authority, filed a lawsuit requiring annulment of the Authority’s decision. However, the Court rejected the 
claim as ungrounded and supported the decision of the Authority as legitimate. The reasoning of the Court of 
First Instance is identical to that in the case of Siguria. Kosova Re failed to go to the Court of Appeal for 
procedural reasons, eg non-payment of the court fee. 
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7.9.2 Judgments of the Court of First Instance Setting Aside the Authority’s Decisions 
 
Contrary to the two aforementioned judgments,298 the same court then issued judgments 
approving the insurance companies’ lawsuits as grounded299 and annulling the Authority’s 
decisions as baseless and unlawful for reasons of procedural and substantive lapses. The 
research and legal analysis conducted in this dissertation shall highlight that the courts erred 
in law in their adjudication on competition cases. This was commenced by the Court of First 
Instance in the Dardania case,300 and furthered by the Court of Appeal in the same case. 
After the Court of First Instance assessed the legality of the challenged ruling301 in the 
Dardania case, and with evidence302 administered in the main hearing sessions, the lawsuit 
was accepted as grounded, and the Authority’s decision set aside as unlawful and the 
company exempted from the fines303 imposed.304 The Court of First Instance stated305 that the 
legality of the Authority’s decision was assessed based on the Law on Administrative 
Conflicts306 and the Law on Administrative Procedure.307 
                                                 
298 Siguria and Kosova Re judgments. See ibid.  
299 Lawsuits of Dardania; Sigma, Elsig; Croatia Sigurimi; Illyria; Insig; Sigal and Sigkos.  
300 The Court of First Instance in the Dardania case for the first time upheld the company’s lawsuit as grounded 
and set aside the Authority’s decision. 
301 See the Authority’s Decisions (n 220). 
302 In the Dardania case the Court evaluated the following evidence: the Authority’s Ruling no 10/5; the 
Authority’s Conclusion no 10/5, 24.01.2011; Minutes of the Authority’s hearings, 13.09.2010 and 22.10.2010; 
the Request of the Insurance Company Dardania for Review of the Authority’s Ruling; the agreement signed in 
Gjakova on 03.07.2009; Dardania’s lawsuit; and the response to the lawsuit from the Authority. 
303 Cf Jose Carlos Laguna de Paz, ‘Understanding the Limits of Judicial Review in European Competition Law’ 
(2014) 2(1) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 203, 218. [Hereinafter: Jose Carlos Laguna de Paz, 
‘Understanding the Limits of Judicial Review in European Competition Law’]. See also Case T-214/06 Imperial 
Chemical Industries v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2012:275, para 292 (‘It must be recalled that, in the present 
case, the Court has unlimited jurisdiction, under Article 31 of Regulation No 1/2003, pursuant to Article 261 
TFEU, and that the applicant claims that the Court should exercise that unlimited jurisdiction’); Joined Cases 
C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P Limburgse Vinyl 
Maatschappij and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2002:582, para 692; Joined Cases T-67/00, T-68/00, 
T-71/00 and T-78/00 JFE Engineering and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2004:221, para 577; and Case 
C-534/07 P Prym and Prym Consumer v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2009:505, para 86. 
304 Basic Court of Pristina – Administrative Department, Ruling on the Dardania Case, no A183/2011, 16 July 
2014. [Hereinafter: Dardania First Instance Ruling]. 
305 Ibid.  
306 Law No 03/L-202 on Administrative Conflicts (Official Gazette 82/2010, 21.10.2010) Available at 
http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/ligjet/2010–202-eng.pdf. Last accessed on 8 July 2017. 
[Hereinafter: Law on Administrative Conflicts]. 
307 Law on Administrative Procedure (n 185). 
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It is important to stress that, in order for the Court of First Instance to ensure observance of 
the principles of legal certainty308 when adjudicating on competition cases, the legality of the 
Authority’s decisions must be assessed based on the same legal test and legal basis. The 
picture that emerges from the two abovementioned judgments is inconsistent. The Siguria 
case shows that the legality of the Authority’s decision was assessed based on the Law on 
Competition, whereas in this present case the decision was based on the Law on 
Administrative Conflicts309 and the Law on Administrative Procedure.310 Accordingly, apart 
from inconsistent assessment, this leads to inconsistent outcomes. 
In its justification, inter alia, the court found that: 
‘The challenged ruling contains such errors as make its legal evaluation impossible. 
These errors are in important violations of the Law on Administrative Procedure. The 
important violations of these provisions consist of: lack of a clear statement of the legal 
basis on which the act is based; insufficient reasoning, as the ruling’s disposition and 
reasoning were inconsistent’.311 
The court noted the Authority’s inability to provide evidence to establish Law on 
Competition breach. 
It is a legal imperative for the Authority to strictly adhere to and respect the administrative 
procedure312 and the substantive law. It is likely that, during judicial review, a finding that the 
administrative procedure has been breached during the decision-making process313 is 
sufficient to annul the contested decision, without assessment of its substantive parts. 
‘Judicial review is limited to verifying whether the Commission complied with the relevant 
rules governing procedure and the statement of reasons, whether there was any error of law, 
whether the facts on which the contested finding was based have been accurately stated and 
                                                 
308 See n 223.  
309 See Law on Administrative Conflicts (n 306). 
310 See Law on Administrative Procedure (n 185).  
311 Dardania First Instance Ruling (n 304). 
312 The EU courts have pointed out that the procedure before the Commission is merely administrative in nature. 
Joined Cases C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P Aalborg Portland 
and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2004:6, para 200; Joined Cases T-25/95, T-26/95, T-30/95, T-31/95, T-
32/95, T-34/95, T-35/95, T-36/95, T-37/95, T-38/95, T-39/95, T-42/95, T-43/95, T-44/95, T-45/95, T-46/95, T-
48/95, T-50/95, T-51/95, T-52/95, T-53/95, T-54/95, T-55/95, T-56/95, T-57/95, T-58/95, T-59/95, T-60/95, T-
61/95, T-62/95, T-63/95, T-64/95, T-65/95, T-68/95, T-69/95, T-70/95, T-71/95, T-87/95, T-88/95, T-103/95 
and T-104/95 Cimenteries CBR and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2000:77, paras 717–718 and Case T-
99/04 AC-Treuhand v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2008:256, para 113.  
313 See William E Kovacic, ‘Getting Started: Creating New Competition Policy Institutions in Transition 
Economies’ (n 67) 432 (‘In anticipating the possibility of litigation, the new competition agency would be wise 
to ensure that its first initiatives comply perfectly with procedural requirements and administrative formalities. 
Early, extensive involvement by lawyers specializing in administrative law and civil procedure is necessary to 
achieve this end’). 
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whether there has been any manifest error of assessment of those facts or any misuse of 
powers’.314 This includes, inter alia, the legal basis and the reasoning315 of the ruling.316 The 
same applies in an analogous manner in other jurisdictions.317 
The Court of First Instance further noted: 
‘The Authority issued the challenged ruling based on a copy of the Agreement the 
authenticity, source, and signatories of which are unknown, and, most importantly, how 
the agreement was acquired and whether an original copy existed. The Authority, by 
omitting the legal procedures, issued the challenged ruling based on this single piece of 
evidence, without attempting to verify the validity of that evidence, thus violating the 
procedural provisions by issuing a ruling without verifying the factual state at all’.318 
If the Law on Competition has been infringed and that is supported by direct evidence, as in 
this particular case (which is not often the case), the formof the agreement and the number of 
pieces of evidence are irrelevant. Andrej Fatur, Klemen Podobnik & Ana Vlahek emphasise 
that ‘similar to EU competition law, the notion of agreement is interpreted very broadly.  It 
may take written or oral form and covers all forms of consensus reached by 
entrepreneurs…resulting in eliminating or distortion of competition. Parties to the 
agreement…enjoy extra profit. Those profits are earned because of the absence of effective 
competition. To arrive at an understanding or to conclude an agreement it is not necessary for 
anything to be written down. In fact, such agreements are often not put into writing. Nothing 
need even be expressed — a ‘nod and wink’ is sufficient’.319 In this regard, it must be 
observed that the EU courts on many occasions have pointed out that ‘there is no principle of 
Community law which precludes the Commission from relying on a single piece of evidence 
in order to conclude that Article 101(1) of the TFEU has been infringed, provided that its 
evidential value is undoubted and that the evidence itself definitely attests to the existence of 
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315 See Case 18–57 Nold v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1959:6 52; Joined Cases 209 to 215 and 218/78 Heintz van 
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the infringement in question’.320 In addition, Fernando Castillo and Eric Gippini note that 
‘documents do not need to come from individuals personally involved in the infringement by 
attending cartel meetings, for example’.321 
The court further notated that: 
‘The only way that an agreement can create effects between legal entities is for it to be 
signed by authorized people. In this case it was not at all clear who had signed the 
disputed agreement; therefore, as long as the agreement did not contain the signatures of 
persons authorized by the claimant, such agreement did not create a legal effect against 
the claimant’.322 
As a result of such an approach, it is easy for specific undertakings to enter into anti-
competitive agreements which restrict or distort competition without being caught by 
competition law provisions. This approach would lead to a situation where anti-competitive 
agreements would be signed by officers of lowest standing within an undertaking, and if they 
were to be revealed by the Authority, the undertakings would claim, similar to the claim 
made in the insurance company cases, that the agreement was not signed by the competent 
person within the undertaking’s hierarchy. The courts would have to accept equivalent 
arguments to those made in this case323 without determining either the impact324 of the 
agreement325 in the relevant market or its object. ‘In deciding whether an agreement is 
prohibited by Article 81(1) EC, there is therefore no need to take account of its actual effects 
once it appears that its object is to prevent, restrict or distort competition within the common 
market’.326 
According to EU case law, for an agreement to be caught under Article 101(1) TFEU, not 
only is the form of the agreement unimportant,327 it is sufficient if the existence of a 
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concurrence of wills between at least two parties is proven, as long as this constitutes the 
faithful expression of the parties’ intention.328 
The court continued: 
‘The fact that at the end of the agreement it is noted that, should one of the companies 
not adhere to the agreement, then they will address the Central Bank, clearly shows the 
legality of the contested agreement’.329 
It is clear that the court did not have the least awareness or understanding of competition 
rules, the object of which is at trial in this case. It is clear that the insurance companies agreed 
not to have disparity in the prices of insurance policies, although this is allowed even by 
Central Bank rules, up to 8% of the price. It is precisely the fact that the Central Bank had 
allowed differences in prices between insurance companies which prompted the companies to 
reach the anti-competitive agreement to eliminate the difference in the prices offered in the 
relevant market. The court, however, did not consider this fact significant or directly 
connected to the distortion of competition and violation of competition law, but considered 
the fact that the parties had agreed to address the Central Bank as more important. The court 
consciously or unconsciously fell into an erroneous interpretation of an expression used in the 
disputed agreement. The court therefore entirely avoided assessing the negative impact330 of 
the agreement on consumers.331 
Additionally, the court asked: 
‘Even if this agreement exists, what makes it unlawful?’.332 
When the court asks such a question it clearly shows that this is a case in which elementary 
rules of competition law were not taken into consideration, and consequently the issue was 
treated and judged contrary to how it should have been. Frank H Easterbrook note that ‘all 
judges follow a simple rule: when the statute is clear, apply it. But people rarely come to 
court with clear cases. Why waste time and money? People come to court when the texts are 
ambiguous, or conflict, or are so old that a once-clear meaning has been lost because of 
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changes in the language or legal culture’.333 The answer from the point of view of the 
objectives334 of the Law on Competition is clear enough — what makes it illegal are the 
object335 and potential336 negative effects produced in the relevant market. ‘In order to be 
prohibited as being incompatible with the Common Market under Article 85 (1) of the 
Treaty, an agreement between undertakings must fulfil certain conditions depending less on 
the legal nature of the agreement than on its effects on 'trade between Member States' and its 
effects on competition’.337 
The agreement has the object and effect of restricting and distorting competition by 
eliminating it in its entirety.338 These effects are confirmed in the relevant market by the fact 
that all insurance policies have identical prices. If this is allowed by the courts based on the 
rules of the Central Bank, then this is in violation of the Law on Competition, which prevails 
against any law or regulation contradictory to it. 
The court considered the justification for the challenged ruling in recital V as abstract: 
‘Findings from the justification for the ruling are not in accordance with the declarations 
of the representatives of the insurance companies recorded in the hearings of 13.09.2010 
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and 22.10.2010. In those declarations the representatives gave explanations regarding the 
contents of the text of the agreement and the laws and rules in force which regulate the 
insurance sector, but no declaration of any of the representatives confirmed entering the 
contested agreement’.339 
If the statements of the insurance companies’ representatives in the second hearing340 are 
read and analyzed carefully, an outcome contrary to that of the Court of First Instance is 
found. Apart from the representatives of Croatia Sigurimi, the representatives of the other 
insurance companies not only did not repudiate the existence of the agreement in question, 
but attempted to justify it as lawful once it did not cause any legal problems in relation to 
their supervisory body, the Central Bank of Kosovo. Not only can this be construed as an 
affirmation by the insurance companies that the agreement exists, but they go beyond that, 
and their statements can also be construed as confirming that the head offices were always 
aware of it, a fact which was denied in the later court proceedings. 
It follows from foregoing that the Court of First Instance adjudicated the case neither 
according to the principle of objectivity341 nor with thoroughness. The EU courts has ruled 
that ‘not only must those Courts establish, among other things, whether the evidence relied on 
is factually accurate, reliable and consistent but also whether that evidence contains all the 
information which must be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation and 
whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it. The scope of review by 
the Court, it should be recalled that according to settled case law, where the Court is faced 
with an application for the annulment of a decision applying Article 81(1) EC, it undertakes a 
comprehensive review generally of the question whether or not the conditions for the 
application of Article 81(1) EC are met’.342 
Throughout the court examination in the insurance cases, the Court of First Instance asked 
the Authority to verify how the disputed agreement was acquired and to produce the original 
agreement.343 The Authority provided the court with the Forensics Report,344 which 
confirmed that the signatories to the agreement were employees of the insurance 
companies.345 However, the Authority could not provide the original agreement. 
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Since the Authority could not provide the original agreement, the Court of First Instance in 
the Elsig346 case stated: 
‘The Authority has not been able to justify the challenged decision,347 because it has 
failed to provide the required evidence, inter alia: the original agreement, how it had 
obtained the agreement, the effects of the agreement, that the agreement had been sealed 
and that it followed protocol’.348 
The request to provide the original agreement349 should have been challenged by the 
Authority, arguing that instead the applicants should be required to challenge the agreement’s 
existence.350 The existence of such an agreement was confirmed both by its object and its 
effect on the relevant market. ‘The sole important factor when examining an agreement is a 
common plan to distort competition. In order to consent, one of the parties to the contract 
must only have requested to achieve an anti-competitive objective in common whether tacitly 
or implicitly. At this level, what is important is whether a joint desire has been expressed 
externally and has been “faithfully” realised in the corresponding measure, ie in accordance 
with the intended objective. The intended distortion of competition must thus have had a 
direct effect so that the corresponding intent may be presumed. This may also take the form 
of a “gentlemen’s agreement” or a recommendation’.351 
The insistence of the court that the Authority provide the original sealed agreement and its 
protocols for it to qualify as an agreement that violated the Law on Competition provisions is 
ungrounded and contrary to competition law goals.352 Michal S Gal argues that if the 
                                                 
346 Basic Court of Pristina – Administrative Department, Grawe Elsig Ruling, no Anr. 173/11, 25 September 
2015. [Hereinafter: Elsig First Instance Ruling].  
347 See Case 18–57 Nold v Commission; Joined Cases 209 to 215 and 218/78 Heintz van Landewyck SARL and 
others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1980:248; Joined Cases 240, 241, 242, 261, 262, 268 and 269/82 Stichting 
Sigarettenindustrie and others v Commission and Case T-15/89 Chemie Linz v Commission cited in (n 312). 
348 Elsig First Instance Ruling (n 346). 
349 See eg Joined Cases C-403/04 P and C-405/04 P Sumitomo Metal Industries Ltd v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:2007:52 para 51; Case T-54/03 Lafarge v Commission, EU:T:2008:255, para 452; Case T-110/07 
Siemens AG v Commission, EU:T:2011:68, para 53 and Case T-195/06 Solvay Solexis v Commission, 
EU:T:2011:280, para 67.  
350 See in that regard Joined Cases T-305/94 to T-307/94, T-313/94 to T-316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328/94, 
T-329/94 and T-335/94 Limburgse Vinyl Maatschaapij and Others v Commission (‘PVC II’) 
ECLI:EU:T:1999:80, para 728 (‘In those circumstances, the burden is on the applicants not merely to submit an 
alleged alternative explanation for the facts found by the Commission but to challenge the existence of those 
facts established on the basis of the documents produced by the Commission’).  
351 Walter Frenz, Handbook of EU Competition Law (n 217) 247. See also Case T-450/05 Automobiles Peugeot 
SA and Peugeot Nederland v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2009:262 para 43 and Case C-209/07 Beef Industry 
Development Society and Barry Brothers ECLI:EU:C:2008:643, para 15.  
352 The stated goal of the Law on Competition was to ensure a sound market economy by prohibiting acts that 
restrict, suppress or distort competition. See Art 1 of the Law on Competition. See to the same effect Case 
337/82 St Nikolaus Brennerei und Likörfabrik v Hauptzollamt Krefeld ECLI:EU:C:1984:69, para 10 (‘In view 
66 
 
‘competition law does not achieve its goals, [it] instead may create negative reaction to its 
enforcement among the general public and in other arms of government’.353 In addition, the 
EU competition law provisions do not stipulate explicit objectives; therefore they are 
interpreted by the CJEU based on general objectives of EU law.354 
The court has fallen ‘victim’ to irrelevant355 claims and has not judged according to the 
objectives356 of the Law on Competition, which encompasses any agreement which distorts 
or restricts competition and where a common intention of the parties to do so has been 
sufficiently expressed.  ‘It must be recalled, first of all, that the Commission was fully 
entitled to take into account the applicants’ intention at the time the agreements at issue were 
concluded, since the case-law recognizes that the parties’ intention may be a relevant factor 
for the purpose of establishing the existence of a restriction by object within the meaning of 
Article 101(1) TFEU’.357 
Thus, the primary task of the courts in this case and similar ones is to assess the object and 
effect of the contested agreements358 in the light of the objectives of the Law on Competition 
— which are to protect competitors and consumers by means of undistorted competition. This 
was disregarded where the contested agreement was concerned. In addition, Fernando 
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Castillo and Eric Gippini note that in order to ascertain breach of competition rules, ‘it does 
not matter where the evidence is found’.359 
In such a case, where an agreement was reached between ten parties, it was not practical for it 
to be sealed with the standard stamps of ten companies, as the court required. Such a 
requirement is even more unusual because the parties were aware that such an agreement was 
not legal. ‘Because cartels are covert, and are known to go to great lengths to avoid detection, 
information about them is hard to come by’.360 Even if the agreement did not violate the Law 
on Competition because it was not enforced, such an agreement could breach the rules of the 
Central Bank, the body which licenses, supervises, and approves the tariffs of insurance 
companies.361 Given these circumstances, it would be almost impossible to find an original 
agreementwhich is sealed and protocolled by all the parties in a standard way. ‘Firms can be 
devious. They may well have colluded, but they may have destroyed all paper evidence, or 
never have committed anything to paper at all’.362  ‘Furthermore, it is normal for the 
activities entailed by anti-competitive practices and agreements to take place clandestinely, 
for meetings to be held in secret and for the associated documentation to be reduced to a 
minimum’.363 
The Court of First Instance further asked: 
‘[w]hether the signatory to the disputed agreement was a representative of the insurance 
company or only of its branch in Gjakova?’.364 
The agreement was signed in the names of and on behalf of the companies, and as a result 
was the direct responsibility of the undertakings. ‘The actions of an undertaking’s executive 
bodies are attributed to it. In particular, the management board is obliged to manage and 
structure the undertaking in such a manner so as to avoid infringements of competition 
law’.365 A branch is legally responsible and is supervised by its headquarters.366 Competition 
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provisions apply to every legal entity engaged in economic activity.367 Even if the restriction 
on or distortion of competition occurred within only part of Kosovo’s territory, such a 
restriction or distortion also breaches the provisions of the Law on Competition. The 
Authority concluded in its decision that the geographic market affected by the agreement was 
the entire territory of Kosovo, without conducting and providing an analysis of the 
geographic market. The Authority did not explain or demonstrate the effect of the agreement 
throughout the territory. If the geographic market had been articulated more clearly in the 
Authority’s arguments, the court probably would not have raised the issue of whether the 
agreement was signed only for the branch in Gjakova. Defining the relevant market and the 
geographic market is necessary in order to determine dominant position. ‘To apply 
competition law, markets have to be defined, both in the product space and in the 
geographical space’.368 The Authority should have argued before the court that where the 
agreement was signed was not important. As such, the signing could even have occurred 
abroad. The Authority needed to convince the court that the place of signing was not relevant 
in determining whether or not the agreement was contrary to the Law on Competition. 
Further the court stated that: 
‘It did not assess the contested agreement because the Authority failed to prove in court 
that the same was signed by persons authorized by the plaintiffs’.369 
Thus, it is legitimate to ask the following question: What then was evaluated and judged by 
this court? To ensure observance of the principles of legal certainty the court must assess370 
carefully each piece of evidence, including in this case the contested agreement, which was 
the most relevant piece of evidence in the case. The EU courts have ruled in many occasions 
that ‘...the rights guaranteed by the Community legal order in administrative procedures 
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include, in particular, that principle, to which is linked the duty of the competent institution to 
examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects in the individual case’371 
Such conclusions by the court are a clear indication of how competition cases are 
adjudicated. This finding contradicts recital IV of the same judgment, where the court itself 
listed the evidence administered at the main hearing, among which the disputed agreement 
was listed as evidence examined and scrutinized by the court.372 
In the Elsig case and the other cases involving the insurance companies, initially the strongest 
objection was that the companies did not recognize the signatories of the Gjakova agreement. 
Once the Authority proved the contrary, the courts continued to consider irrelevant arguments 
such as whether the person concerned had the authorization to sign. The Authority should 
have insisted and argued at all levels of the judicial review that almost all the representatives 
of the insurance companies, with the exception of the representative of Croatia Insurance, 
acknowledged in the second hearing373 that such an agreement existed, but tried to justify it 
as lawful. This was the essential fact that the Authority needed to establish — to convince the 
courts that, apart from the existence of the contested agreement, by its negative effects in the 
relevant market, the insurance companies’ headquarters were aware of it. 
The court needed to assess whether the observations made by the Authority in its decisions 
were sufficient to prove the existence of the alleged infringement.374 
In light of the foregoing, it is clear that it is almost impossible that a business enterprise 
involved in an anti-competitive agreement would formally accept it, and even less possible 
that a business reaching such an agreement would comply with its standard procedures, 
including formal authorization. If the Authority was not able persuade the courts of a breach 
of the Law on Competition with the support of the direct evidence of a copy of a written 
agreement375 which clearly established that its object and effects were in violation of the Law 
on Competition, then the following question arises: How could the Authority have proved an 
                                                 
371 Case T-39/07 Eni v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2011:356, para 103; Case T-44/90 ECLI:EU:T:1992:5 La Cinq 
v Commission, para 86; Case T-31/99 ABB Asea Brown Boveri v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2002:77, para 99; and 
Joined Cases T-528/93, T-542/93, T-543/93 and T-546/93 Métropole television v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:1996:99, para 93. 
372 Elsig First Instance Ruling (n 346). 
373 Records of the Second Hearing (n 193). 
374 See in that regard Joined Cases T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 and T-78/00 JFE Engineering and Others v 
Commission ECLI:EU:T:2004:221, para 175; Joined Cases T-305/94, T-306/94, T-307/94, T-313/94 to T-
316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328/94, T-329/94 and T-335/94 Limburgse Vinyl Maatschaapij and Others v 
Commission (‘PVC II’) v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1999:80, para 891 and Case T-141/08 EON Energie v 
European Commission ECLI:EU:T:2010:516, para 50.  
375 Cf Case C-411/04 P Salzgitter Mannesmann v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2007:54, para 42 (‘In Community 
competition law cases, oral evidence plays only a minor role, whereas written documents play a central role’). 
70 
 
informal agreement376 (gentleman’s agreement)377 which restricted or distorted competition?  
‘In most cases, the existence of an anti-competitive practice or agreement must be inferred 
from a number of coincidences and indicia which, taken together, may, in the absence of 
another plausible explanation, constitute evidence of an infringement of the competition 
rules’.378 
In the Sigma case, the court noted that: 
‘As regards the manner of obtaining the evidence, the court found that this is laid down 
in Articles 38 to 45 of the Law on Protection of Competition. The court assessed the 
legality of the contested decision in accordance with Article 69379 of the Law on 
Protection of Competition’.380 
For the most part the Court of First Instance has not referred to the Law on Competition 
provisions when adjudicating on competition cases. When the court did so in this case, it did 
so erroneously. For example, Articles 38 to 45, to which the court made reference, lay down 
the procedure for obtaining evidence, but these were not in force when the insurance 
companies were investigated and fined. The court’s reference to Article 69 of the Law on 
Protection of Competition is also unfounded and irrelevant, because this Article concerns 
repeal of the old Law on Competition. It is not clear what purpose this provision actually 
served for the court in assessing the legality of the contested decisions. The assessment of the 
legality of the decision of the Authority must have been based on Article 3 of the Law on 
Competition, despite the fact that this law had been repealed at the time of the trial. 
According to EU competition law enforcement practice, the legality of an EU measure must 
be assessed on the basis of the facts and the law as they stood at the time when the measure 
was adopted. 381 
                                                 
376 The Law on Competition (n 17) Art 3(1) states: ‘The prohibition of this Art … applies equally to all such 
agreements, decisions and practices, whether written or not’.  
377 See Case 41/69 ACF Chemiefarma v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1970:71, paras 110–114 and Case T-141/89 
Tréfileurope Sales SARL v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1995:62, para 96. 
378 See Case T-45/07 Unipetrol v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2011:359 para 49. See also Joined Cases C-204/00 P, 
C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:2004:6 paras 55–57; Joined Cases C-403/04 P and C-405/04 P Sumitomo Metal Industries and 
Nippon Steel v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2007:52 para 51; Case T-54/03 Lafarge v Commission, EU:T:2008:255, 
para 452; Case T-110/07 Siemens v Commission, EU:T:2011:68, para 53 and Case T-195/06 Solvay Solexis v 
Commission, EU:T:2011:280, para 67.  
379 The Law on Protection of Competition (n 22) Art 69 stipulates: ‘Entrance into force of this law repeals Law 
on Competition No 2004/36 and all sub-legal acts that are in contradiction to this law’. 
380 Basic Court of Pristina – Administrative Department, Sigma Ruling, no A132/2011 17 July 2014. 
[Hereinafter: Sigma First Instance Ruling]. 
381 See to that effect Case C-309/10 Agrana Zucker ECLI:EU:C:2011:531, para 31; Case C-501/11 P; Joined 
Cases 15/76 and 16/76; Case C-449/98 P, Joined Cases C-133/93, C-300/93 and C-362/93; Joined Cases 15 and 
16/76; Case C-449/98 P; Case 40–72; Joined Cases C-267/88 to C-285/88; Case C-375/96; Cases 212–217/80; 
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The reasoning of the judgment creates the impression that the court lacked knowledge of 
competition law,382 and had neither read nor analyzed the Law on Competition in its entirety, 
nor even the content of Article 3, within whose scope the disputed agreement falls. 
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal in this case referred to the Law on Consumer Protection, 
despite the fact that the Authority always maintained that the alleged agreement was contrary 
to Article 3 of the Law on Competition, the only law which the Authority is legally entitled to 
enforce. Perhaps this fact, which cannot be regarded as a ‘technical flaw’, is the best indicator 
of the level of attention and commitment given by the courts to competition cases. 
If viewed and analyzed carefully, the judgment in the Sigma case383 is identical to the 
Dardania first instance judgment. It can be observed that in the present case, none of the case 
files, the provisions of the Law on Competition, or the parties’ pleas submitted in writing or 
in hearings before the court, are considered and analyzed in order to assess whether the 
insurance company had violated the law. Since the judgment in the Sigma case already 
existed, this judgment appears to copy from the Dardania judgment. This can be confirmed 
by the fact that the court states that: 
‘Based on the records of the hearing, none of the insurance companies declared that they 
entered into the disputed agreement’.384 
However, if the records are read, it is more than clear that nine out of ten of the insurance 
companies accepted the existence of the agreement.385 
As a rule, judicial practice within a jurisdiction should be uniform, with no differences or 
contradictions regarding the same issues. However, each individual case has its own 
essentials, and as such all relevant aspects of a particular case must be judged carefully and 
impartially. According to the EU case law, ‘the guarantees afforded by the Community legal 
order in administrative proceedings include, in particular, the principle of sound 
administration, which entails the duty of the competent institution to examine carefully and 
impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case’.386 Judges use their discretion387 to 
decide individual cases. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Case C-201/04; Case C-450/06; Case C-61/98; Case C-251/00; Case C-120/08; Case C-17/10; Case T-384/02 
and Case T-339/04, cited in nn 254, 255 and 256. 
382 See Neil Komesar, ‘Stranger in a Strange Land: An Outsider’s View of Antitrust and the Courts’ (2010) 
41(3) Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 443, 444. [Hereinafter: Neil Komesar, ‘Stranger in a Strange 
Land: An Outsider’s View of Antitrust and the Courts’] (‘Generalist appellate court judges, trial court judges, 
and especially juries, lack training and experience when compared to agency employed specialists’). 
383 Sigma First Instance Ruling (380). 
384 Ibid. 
385 Records of the Second Hearing (n 193). 
386 Case T-339/04 France Télécom v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2007:80, para 94. See to that effect, Case C-
269/90 Hauptzollamt München-Mitte ν Technische Universität München ECLI:EU:C:1991:438, para 14; Case 
T-7/92 Asia Motor France and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1993:52, para 34; Case T-44/90 La Cinq v 
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During the court procedures, the representative of Croatia Insurance stated that: 
‘Even if this copy was an agreement signed in a correct manner, such an agreement does 
not distort or restrict competition, but only requires respect for the rules. In case of 
conflict between the Law on Competition and regulations of the Central Bank, this issue 
should be resolved at institutional level, since insurance companies are obliged to respect 
the rules of the Central Bank’.388 
Where Central Bank regulations are in conflict with the Law on Competition, the provisions 
of law prevail and Central Bank regulations must be adapted to the Law on Competition. In 
addition, the problem with the agreement does not lie in the rules of the Central Bank but in 
the object and effect of the agreement. The Central Bank regulations allowed prices to vary 
by up to 8%. The agreement, eliminating competition among insurance companies, was 
therefore contrary to Law on Competition and the rules of the Central Bank. It is more than 
clear that neither the Law on Competition nor the regulations of the Central Bank troubled 
the insurance companies. 
The court assessed elements that are not relevant in the field of competition law. However, 
the core role and mandate of this court was to evaluate whether the agreement in question 
violated the Law on Competition, and as such, restricted or distorted competition. The 
foundation for such assessment should have been the object389 of the agreement and, in 
particular, the effect of the agreement in the relevant market, although proof of effect390 is not 
necessary when it is clear that the object is contrary to competition rules.391 
                                                                                                                                                        
Commission ECLI:EU:T:1992:5, para 86; Joined Cases T-528/93, T-542/93, T-543/93 and T-546/93 Métropole 
Télévision and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1996:99, para 93 Case T-31/99 ABB Asea Brown Boveri v 
Commission ECLI:EU:T:2002:77, para 99; Joined Cases T-191/98 and T-212/98 to T-214/98 Atlantic Container 
Line and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2003:245, para 404 and Case T-339/04 France Télécom v 
Commission ECLI:EU:T:2007:80, para 94. 
387 See generally, Kent Greenawalt, ‘Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters That 
Bind Judges’ (1975) 75(2) Columbia Law Review 359 and KE Himma, ‘Judicial Discretion and the Concept of 
Law’ (1999) 19(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 71.  
388 Basic Court of Pristina – Administrative Department, Croatia Sigurimi Ruling, no A172/2011, 24 September 
2014. [Hereinafter: Croatia Sigurimi First Instance Ruling]. 
389 See Case 123/83 BNIC v Clair ECLI:EU:C:1985:33, para 22 (‘it must be pointed out in that respect that for 
the purposes of Article 85 (1) it is unnecessary to take account of the actual effects of an agreement where its 
object is to restrict, prevent or distort competition’). 
390 The identical prices in the relevant market confirm beyond doubt that the agreement in question had a direct 
impact on competition. 
391 Case T-14/89 Montedipe v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1992:36, para 264 (‘It should be recalled that the 
Commission has proved to the requisite legal standard that the agreements and concerted practices held to have 
existed had an anti-competitive object for the purposes of Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty. The question 
whether they were anti-competitive in effect is therefore relevant only to assessment of the amount of the fine, 
and must accordingly be examined along with that issue’).  
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Similar to the other insurance company cases, including Insig392 and Illyria,393 once it was 
proved based on the Forensics Report that the signatories to the contested agreement were 
employees of Insig and Illyria, which had previously been denied, the court continued to err 
in law by requiring the original agreement. The Authority was wrongly directed by the court 
to prove two irrelevant and almost impossible394 facts — providing the original of the 
agreement and proving whether the signatory was competent or authorized for such signature. 
In order to establish a particular agreement’s breach of competition law, it is sufficient that 
the agreement has adverse effects in the relevant market. The Gjakova agreement clearly had 
such negative effect, since it set identical prices,395 thereby completely excluding competition 
in the motor insurance market. The copy of the agreement, the text of the agreement, and the 
identical prices in the market not only confirmed the existence of the agreement but also its 
implementation and the negative effects it had produced in the market. 
According to the assessment of the Court of First Instance in the Croatia Sigurimi396 case, the 
use of the expression ‘makes us understand’ by the Authority in its rulings, in reference to the 
disputed agreement, shows an approach by the Authority that was not objective, and that was 
an indication that the decision was taken on the basis of assumptions and not on the basis of 
established facts and evidence.397 According to the court, the Authority’s decision was taken 
in breach of Articles 53 and 55 of the Law on Administrative Procedure, provisions which 
require the administrative organ, in this case the Authority, to observe the objectivity 
principle, evaluating both aggravating and mitigating circumstances for the party.398 
In this case it was crucial for the court to assess whether the contested agreement was in 
breach of the Law on Competition or not, rather than assessing the wording of the sentence 
used by the Authority regarding the agreement. Since a textual interpretation of the 
Authority’s decision was not requested, in this the court went beyond its legal mandate. 
In light of all of the foregoing, the Court of First Instance considered that the contested 
decisions were issued in violation of the Law on Administrative Procedure.399 This is because 
an administrative act, in this case the Authority’s decisions, must include, inter alia, a 
                                                 
392 Basic Court of Pristina – Administrative Department, Insig Ruling, no A198/11, 05 November 2015. 
[Hereinafter: Insig First Instance Ruling]. 
393 Basic Court of Pristina – Administrative Department, Illyria Ruling, no A96/2011, 04 November 2015. 
[Hereinafter: Illyria First Instance Ruling]. 
394 Cf Case C-652/11 P, Mindo v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2013:229 para 54, where the CJEU annulled the GC 
judgment, partially because it placed an impossible burden of proof on the claimant.  
395 See Fernando Castillo de la Torre and Eric Gippini Fournier, Evidence, ‘Proof and Judicial Review in EU 
Competition Law’ (n 139) 11 (‘Article 101 TFEU seeks to ensure that each economic operator determines its 
commercial policy in the market-place independently’).  
396 Croatia Sigurimi First Instance Ruling (n 388). 
397 Ibid. 
398 This was repeated in the Dardania case. 
399 Law on Administrative Procedure (n 185). 
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summary of the factual findings and a statement of the legal basis on which the act is based. 
In addition, the decision must be justified, as provided in Article 85. Law on Administrative 
Procedure in Article 85 states: ‘In addition to the legal requirement to provide the rationale 
set out by the Law, a rationale shall also be provided for acts which partially or entirely: 
deny, abolish, restrict or otherwise affect legal rights and interests or cite obligations or fines; 
constitute a decision related to a request for the redress of an appeal; constitute a decision 
which is contrary to the claims of the interested parties or is contrary to an official 
information or proposal; constitute a deviation from the usual practice for the resolution of 
similar cases; revoke, annul, modify or supersede an earlier act’.400 In this case the contested 
decision was legally unclear because its disposition and reasoning were inconsistent; the 
reasoning did not include the crucial facts that influenced the opposed decision and as a result 
was insufficient; and the court noted that the Authority was unable to provide evidence to 
establish the Law on Competition breach.401 
According to the Court of First Instance, the abovementioned errors were such that they 
prevented evaluation of the legality of the challenged ruling, and as a result the court 
compelled the Authority to act in its new procedure according to the objections set out in this 
judgment.402 After removing the stated errors, the Authority should issue a correct ruling 
based on the law.403 The noted errors applied to the Authority based on Article 65 of the Law 
on Administrative Conflict.404 Based on the abovementioned findings, the court approved the 
claims of the claimants, annulled the Authority’s rulings, and referred the cases back to the 
Authority for adjudication on the matters which it had not resolved. 
At the very least, despite its lack of knowledge of the Law on Competition, the court should 
have read the text of the agreement405 in light of the objective of Article 3 of the Law on 
Competition.406 The court should then have made an objective assessment of whether the 
agreement was contrary to the Law on Competition provisions. In this regard, the CJEU ruled 
that ‘to determine whether an agreement comes within the prohibition laid down in Article 
101(1) TFEU, close regard must be paid to the wording of its provisions and to the objectives 
which it is intended to attain’.407 
                                                 
400 Law on Administrative Procedure (n 185) Art 85 states: 
401 The same conclusion arose in all the Court of First Instance decisions annulling the Authority’s rulings. 
402 Initially this was noted by the Court of First Instance in the Dardania First Instance Ruling (n 304)  
and then followed in other first instance judgments. 
403 Ibid. 
404 Law on Administrative Conflicts (n 306). 
405 During judicial review, in most of the rulings, neither the provisions of the Law on Competition nor the text 
of the disputed agreement were referenced in any paragraph of the courts’ judgments. 
406 See eg Harry First and Spencer Weber Waller, ‘Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit’ (n 136) 2572.  
407 Case C-209/07 Beef Industry Development Society and Barry Brothers ECLI:EU:C:2008:643, para 21. 
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The reasoning of the judgments of the Courts of First Instance which confirmed the claims of 
the insurance companies as grounded and set aside the decisions of the Authority has in most 
of the cases been similar, giving the impression that the judgements follow each other.  
 
7.10 Complaints to the Court of Appeal 
 
The Authority filed an appeal against the judgments of the Court of First Instance in the 
Court of Appeal.408 In the appeal, the Authority seeks to set aside the judgments of the Court 
of First Instance and refer the case back to the latter for adjudication. The plea was divided 
into two main limbs, first, alleging that the judgments of the Court of First Instance 
incorrectly applied the substantive law, and second, that the judgements were groundless and 
unlawful due to violation of the provisions applicable to contested procedure. As shall be 
shown, in justifying its appeals the Authority did not provide persuasive reasons to convince 
the Court of Appeal to set aside the first instance verdicts, merely repeating the same 
assertions already made during the court trials. 
In furtherance of the appeal in the Elsig case, the Authority noted that: 
‘The Authority, ex officio and on the basis of information obtained from the public, 
decided to initiate an in-depth investigation into the insurance companies operating in the 
territory of Kosovo’.409 
The Authority’s statement that its investigation, decision, and imposition of a fine were based 
on information obtained from the public was not considered relevant and was not legally 
accepted by the Court of First Instance. The Authority’s insistence on and repetition of this 
phrase to try to convince the Court of Appeal to decide the case in its favour was ineffective. 
Moreover, other than the repetition of words such as ‘information obtained from the public’, 
the Authority provided no argument or explanation of what it meant by such a statement. 
Such claims have not only been ignored by the Court of First Instance, but are primary 
reasons the Authority’s decisions have been declared unlawful. 
The Authority, in its complaints to the Court of Appeal regarding the assessment of the Court 
of First Instance that the Authority’s decision lacked essential elements required by Articles 
84.2,410 85411 and 86412 of the Law on Administrative Procedure, argued as follow: 
                                                 
408 The Authority lodged appeals against all the Court of First Instance judgments setting aside the Authority’s 
rulings. [Hereinafter: the Appeals]. 
409 Ibid. 
410 The Law on Administrative Procedure (n 185) Art 84(2) states that the administrative act, in this case the 
Authority’s decision, shall contain the following information: ‘the name of the public administration body that 
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‘The Kosovo Competition Authority has its own way of functioning, and consequently, 
its own form of the documents or acts to be issued’.413 
Such reasoning addressed to the Court of Appeal in an effort to set aside the decision of the 
Court of First Instance was ungrounded and insufficient.414 It is a legal obligation for each 
administrative body in Kosovo, including the Authority,415 when issuing an administrative 
act (ruling) to comply with the prescribed elements of Articles 84, 85 and 86 of the Law on 
Administrative Procedure.416 These includes, inter alia, a clear statement of the legal basis, 
an adequate statement of reasons, consistency between disposition and reasoning, a summary 
of factual findings, and appropriate legal advice for the parties in the procedure. 
If a court, in particular the administrative court, initially notes that the decision under judicial 
review is flawed or contrary to the abovementioned provisions, this is sufficient reason to 
                                                                                                                                                        
issued the act, the reference number, the date of issuance, and any delegation of competences, on the basis of 
which the act was issued; the identity of the party to whom the act is addressed; a summary of the factual 
findings based on the evidence submitted during the administrative proceeding or otherwise provided by the 
administration; a statement of the legal basis on which the act is drawn; an explanation of the practical 
consequences of the act for the parties to the administrative proceeding; a reminder to the parties of their right to 
seek redress; a reminder that the parties have the right to appeal the decision through the administrative bodies 
or through the court; a reminder of the timeframes the parties must observe if they wish to file a request for 
redress or an administrative or court appeal; the date when the act shall enter into effect; the signature of the 
manager of the administrative body issuing the act or the manager of the collective body’. 
411 Ibid Art 85 reads: ‘In addition to the legal requirement to provide the rationale set out by the Law, the 
rationale shall also be provided for acts which, partially or entirely; deny, abolish, restrict or otherwise affect 
legal rights and interests or cite obligations or fines; constitute a decision related to requests for redress of 
appeal; constitute a decision which is contrary to the claims of the interested parties or contrary to an official 
information or proposal; constitute a deviation from the usual practice for the resolution of similar cases; revoke, 
annul, modify or supersede an earlier act. Unless otherwise provided for by the Law, the acts ratifying decisions 
issued by boards, juries, or committees established by an administration, and managers’ orders relating to 
internal issues, do not require a rationale’. 
412 Ibid Art 86 requires that: ‘A rationale shall be clearly formulated and shall include an explanation of the legal 
and factual basis of the act. When a rationale is prepared on earlier information or proposals, their endorsement 
may constitute the only rationale for reaching a final decision by the responsible body. In such cases, such 
earlier information and proposals shall constitute an integral part of the act. A rationale with unclear, 
contradictory or inaccurate data is equal to the lack of a rationale and in cases with analogous issues, earlier 
precedents may be used, provided that the position of the interested parties is not aggravated’. 
413 The Appeals (n 408). 
414 See eg Case C-280/08 P Deutsche Telecom v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2010:603 para 25 (‘Indeed, if an 
appellant could not thus base his appeal on pleas in law and arguments already relied on before the General 
Court, an appeal would be deprived of part of its purpose’) and Case C-321/99 P ARAP and Others v 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:2002:292, para 49. 
415 See n 136.  
416 See eg Harry First and Spencer Weber Waller, ‘Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit’ (n 136) 2572 
(‘Administrative law is the body of law that controls the procedures of governmental decision making. 
Normally, it requires appropriate notice, the right to be heard, fair procedures, protection of fundamental rights, 
and judicial review of the resulting decision’). 
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annul it as unlawful. Regrettably, this has been proven in most of the cases involving 
decisions of the Authority, and as a consequence, the Authority must seriously consider this 
issue. The courts’ practice, as a rule, is to initially assess the procedural aspects of any 
decision subject to judicial review before proceeding to the content and legality of the 
appealed decision. As such, it is exceedingly important for the Authority to respect the 
procedural legal provisions when deciding competition cases. 
In the final part of the complaint, the Authority emphasized that it acted in full compliance 
with the Law on Protection of Competition, specifically Article 66, which provides that the 
implementation of the law should be in conformity with the EU Directives on competition.417 
The reference by the Authority to this Article, which has more to do with the commitment, or 
at least the declaration, of the state of Kosovo that it will take European legislation into 
account in its enforcement of the Law on Protection of Competition, is not relevant to the 
reasoning in the complaint. This matter was neither mentioned previously at the Court of 
First Instance, nor could it enhance the Authority’s argument or suggest to the Court of 
Appeal any important element that could influence its decision whether to annul the first 
instance judgment. Bases on the EU case law ‘the Court’s jurisdiction in an appeal is 
confined to a review of the findings of law on the pleas argued before the General Court. A 
party may not, therefore, put forward for the first time before the Court of Justice a plea in 
law which it has not raised before the General Court, since to do so would be to allow it to 
bring before the Court of Justice, whose jurisdiction in appeals is limited, a case of wider 
ambit than that which came before the General Court’.418 
The Authority, however, should have presented grounded arguments to the Court of Appeal 
regarding why the contested agreement was contrary to the provisions of the Law on 
Competition, specifically Article 3.2(ii), which prohibits any agreement between 
undertakings which has as its object or effect an appreciable prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition. It is clear from the text of the agreement that its intended object 
was the restriction of competition. In addition, its effect419 on the relevant market supported 
the same conclusion. As a result of the agreement, competition in the relevant market was 
completely eliminated420 because the prices of the policies were identical. This caused harm 
                                                 
417 See Law on Protection of Competition (n 22) Art 66. 
418 C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2010:603 para 34; See to that effect, in particular, 
Case C-136/92 P Commission v Brazzelli Lualdi and Others ECLI:EU:C:1994:21, para 59; Case C-564/08 P 
SGL Carbon v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2009:703, para 22 and Case C-68/05 P Koninklijke Coöperatie Cosun v 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:2006:674, para 96. 
419 See Case 23/67 SA Brasserie de Haecht v Consorts Wilkin-Janssen ECLI:EU:C:1967:54, 415; Cases C-7/95 
P Deere v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1998:256, para 76; Case C-8/95 New Holland Ford v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:1998:257, para 91; Case C-215/96 and C-216/96 Bagnasco and Others ECLI:EU:C:1999:12, para 
33; Case 56/65 Société Technique Minière ECLI:EU:C:1966:38, 250 and Case 31/80 L'Oréal v De Nieuwe 
AMCK ECLI:EU:C:1980:289, para 19. 
420 See Joined Cases T-25/95, T-26/95, T-30/95, T-31/95, T-32/95, T-34/95, T-35/95, T-36/95, T-37/95, T-
38/95, T-39/95, T-42/95, T-43/95, T-44/95, T-45/95, T-46/95, T-48/95, T-50/95, T-51/95, T-52/95, T-53/95, T-
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to customers by precluding them from obtaining better services and lower prices, which is in 
breach of the Law on Competition goals. 
Moreover, the Authority should have opposed the court’s requirement that it provide certain 
evidence on the basis that such a requirement was inconsistent with the provisions of the Law 
on Administrative Procedure. Pursuant to that law, the burden of proof falls on the parties 
who initiate the administrative proceedings, in this case the insurance companies.421 Even 
though EU legislation, more precisely Article 2 of EU Regulation 1/2003, requires that the 
burden of proving an infringement of Article 101(1) or 102 of the TFEU shall rest on the 
party alleging the infringement (in this case the Commission),422 on the other hand the party 
raising the plea must support it with arguments and evidence.423 In addition, if an undertaking 
claims the benefits of Article 101(3), it shall bear the burden of proof.424 Fernando and Eric 
note ‘[the] principle that the legal burden of proof is for the Commission does not imply that 
the accused may remain passive, or that the Commission needs to prove each and every fact 
mentioned in its decision’.425  
                                                                                                                                                        
54/95, T-55/95, T-56/95, T-57/95, T-58/95, T-59/95, T-60/95, T-61/95, T-62/95, T-63/95, T-64/95, T-65/95, T-
68/95, T-69/95, T-70/95, T-71/95, T-87/95, T-88/95, T-103/95 and T-104/95 Cimenteries CBR and Others v 
Commission ECLI:EU:T:2000:77, para 1088. 
421 Law on Administrative Procedure (n 185) Art 56. For example, in the Dukagjini case, initially the Court of 
Appeal and then the Court of First Instance placed the burden of proof on Dukagjini, as the party that initiated 
the administrative conflict through its lawsuit. Ana Vlahek, Challenges of Private Enforcement of Antitrust in 
Slovenia, Mitja Kovač & Ann-Sophie Vandenberghe (eds.), Economic Evidence in EU Competition Law, 
(Intersentia- Cambridge – Antwerp – Portland, 2016) 387. [Hereinafter: Ana Vlahek, Challenges of Private 
Enforcement of Antitrust in Slovenia]. ‘Under Slovenian rules of civil procedure, the burden of proof (onus 
probandi) rests upon the party raising an issue (more precisely, the party obliged to raise an issue – onus 
proferendi)’. 
422 EU case law supports this. See to that effect Case T-120/04 Peróxidos Orgánicos v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2006:350, para 50; Case C-49/92 P Commission v Anic, EU:C:1999:356, para 86; Case T-201/04 
Microsoft v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2007:289, para 688; Cases C-2/01 P and C-3/01 P BAI and Commission v 
Bayer ECLI:EU:C:2004:2, para 62; Case C-89/11 P EON Energie v Commission, EU:C:2012:738, para 71; Case 
T-442/08 CISAC v Commission, EU:T:2013:188, para 91; Case T-59/07 Polimeri Europa v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2011:361, para 50; Case T-439/07 Coats Holdings v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2012:320, para 38 
and Case T-370/09 GDF Suez v Commission, EU:T:2012:333, para 335. 
423 Case T-201/04 Microsoft v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2007:289, para 688 and Case T-301/04 Clearstream v 
Commission ECLI:EU:T:2009:317, para 185. 
424 See Joined Cases 43/82 and 63/82 VBVB and VBBB v Commission ECLI: ECLI:EU:C:1984:9, para 52; 
Joined Cases C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P Aalborg Portland 
and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2004:6, para 78; Case T-132/07 Fuji Electric v Commission, 
EU:T:2011:344, para 84 and Case T-168/01 GlaxoSmithKline Services v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2006:265, 
para 235 (‘Consequently, a person who relies on Article 81(3) EC must demonstrate that those conditions are 
satisfied, by means of convincing arguments and evidence’). 
425 Fernando Castillo de la Torre and Eric Gippini Fournier, ‘Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review in EU 
Competition Law’ (n 139) 33. See also to that effect Case T-339/04 France Télécom v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2007:80, para 105 (‘Having regard to the presumption of lawfulness attaching to acts of the 
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Summing up, the appeals did not adduce sound legal arguments in support of the pleas, 
simply repeating those arguments already submitted to the Court of First Instance, resulting 
in failure of the appeals. ‘An appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the 
judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside, and also the legal arguments 
specifically advanced in support of the appeal’.426 It must be noted, however, that even where 
appeals were upheld by the Court of Appeal, this was not the result of reasoning and evidence 
adduced by the Authority, but of the Court of Appeal’s erroneous approach to competition 
law. As shall be shown, the approval of the Authority's complaint in the Dardania case has 
caused long-standing dilemmas in the enforcement of competition law. Thus, as a final 
outcome, all the insurance companies’ lawsuits were approved by the Court of First Instance, 
despite the fact that some were initially rejected by the same court. 
 
7.11 The Court of Appeal Approach to Competition Law Enforcement in the Insurance 
Company Cases 
 
The Court of Appeal, like the Court of First Instance, has a two-sided approach when it 
comes to competition law enforcement, on one side approving the Court of First Instance’s 
legal position as lawful and grounded, and on the other side setting aside Court of First 
Instance judgments as unfounded due to oversights in administrative procedure. What the two 
courts have in common is a misunderstanding of the competition rules in general, and more 
specifically the Law on Competition. 
 
7.11.1 Court of Appeal Judgments Setting Aside Court of First Instance Judgments 
 
Challenging the judgment of the Court of First Instance in the Dardania case, the Authority 
lodged an appeal to the Court of Appeal contesting the legality of the judgment for reasons of 
violations of contested procedure rules; wrongful findings of fact (since the reasoning of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Community institutions which means that it is for the person claiming that such an act is unlawful to provide 
evidence that it is’). See also generally, Sandra Marco Colino, Competition Law of the EU and UK (n 358) 75.  
426 Joined Cases C-280/99 P, C-281/99 P and C-282/99 P Moccia Irme and Others v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:348, para 35; Case C-652/11 P, Mindo v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2013:229 para 21 and 
Joined Cases C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P Aalborg Portland 
and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2004:6, para 51. 
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judgment conflicted with the evidence in the case); and wrongful application of substantive 
law.427 
The Court of Appeal analyzed the court records, the challenged judgment, and the pleas of 
the parties, finding that the Authority’s appeal was legally sound.428 
The Court of Appeal concluded that: 
‘Legal aspects of the judgement of the Court of First Instance are not sustainable and not 
based on evidence and law, and as such the court cannot regard them as correct. [We] 
found that the challenged judgment contains essential violations of contested procedure 
provisions, and as such is not complete. The justification for the judgment is unclear, and 
contrary to the crucial facts of the issue under deliberation’.429 
The Court of Appeal found that the Court of First Instance, in the first main deliberation 
session in the presence of the parties, did not analyze the evidence in a complete and 
comprehensive manner during the assessment of the legality of the Authority’s ruling and the 
agreement upon which this ruling was based. There were discrepancies in the judgment, 
where it gave contradictory findings while interpreting the agreement in different ways, 
finding sometimes that the agreement existed and sometimes that it did not, and in one part of 
the judgment giving inconsistent conclusions about whether or not it was illegal, known to 
the parties, or signed by their representatives.430 
For these reasons, the Court of Appeal concluded that: 
‘These discrepancies noted by the Court of First Instance should have been clarified in 
the main verbal deliberation session, and the factual state verified, and the evidence of 
the parties to the litigation reviewed adequately regarding: who had signed the agreement 
on behalf of Dardania; identification of the person by name and surname; whether the 
person was employed and what kind of position the person had in the insurance 
company; on behalf of whom the person acted; whether the person was authorized or was 
a representative of the Gjakova branch; whether the agreement intended to inflict harm 
on other companies or certain people; whether the agreement was enforced in practice, 
and what were the consequences of it, or whether it was just an agreement on paper’.431 
                                                 
427 Kosovo Competition Authority, Appeal to the Appeal Court of Pristina – Administrative Department against 
Ruling no A183/2014, 30 July 2014. [Hereinafter: The Appeal in the Dardania case]. 
428 Pristina Court of Appeal – Administrative Department, Ruling on the Dardania Case, no AA364/2014 
Dardania, 21 October 2014. [Hereinafter: The Dardania Appeal Ruling]. 
429 Ibid 2.  
430 Ibid. 
431 Ibid 3–4. 
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The appeal in this particular case led to a ‘reformatio in peius’.432 The Court of Appeal in this 
case erred in law by adopting a legally incorrect test in respect of the objectives of 
competition law433 and the assessment of the adduced evidence. In this regard, the CJEU 
noted that ‘it is for the Court of First Instance alone to assess the value which should be 
attached to the evidence produced to it and not for the Appellate Court’.434 Furthermore, the 
appraisal of the Court of Appeal regarding whether the agreement caused harm to other 
companies or persons was not sustainable either, because the Law on Competition prohibits 
any kind of agreement which intends or has the effect of the restriction or distortion of 
competition.435 In addition, the Court of Appeal is bound to acknowledge the limits of 
applicant’s assertions and not invoke new gounds of appeal. Andrej Fatur, Klemen Podobnik 
& Ana Vlahek  note that ‘according to Article 58 of the PRCA-1, the review court is limited 
to testing the CPA’s decision/order within the limits of the claim and within the limits of the 
ground stated in the action…The court cannot, therefore, deliberate on other infringements, 
albeit existent, where they not claimed by the applicant’.436 In the case in question, however, 
the companies offered the same services, therefore they could not have been harmed, since all 
of them agreed on price-fixing and benefited from it.437 Such an agreement harms 
competition and consumer welfare438 by depriving consumers of low prices439 and choice,440 
                                                 
432 Not for the parties in the procedure, but for the competition law enforcement in Kosovo. The EU courts apply 
reformatio in peius to make changes with regard to the amount of a fine, based on Art 31 of Regulation 1/2003 
(‘The Court of Justice shall have unlimited jurisdiction to review decisions whereby the Commission has fixed a 
fine or periodic penalty payment. It may cancel, reduce or increase the fine or periodic penalty payment 
imposed’). See Joined Cases T-101/05 and T-111/05 BASF and UCB v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2007:380, 
paras 212–23; Case C-386/10 P Chalkor AE Epexergasias Metallon v Commission para 63 and Joined Cases 
C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P Limburgse Vinyl 
Maatschappij and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2002:582, para 692.  
433 See eg Case C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2010:603 para 53; Case C-95/04 P 
British Airways v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2007:166 para 78; Case C-113/04 P Technische Unie v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:593 para 83. 
434  See to that effect Case C-19/95 P San Marco v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1996:331, para 40; Case C-185/95 
P Baustahlgewebe v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1998:608, para 24; Case C-551/03 P General Motors 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:229, para 52; Case C-113/04 P Technische Unie v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2006:593, para 
83; Case C-95/04 P British Airways v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2007:166 para 78 and Case C-280/08 P 
Deutsche Telekom v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2010:603 para 53. 
435 See to the same effect, Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands and Others ECLI:EU:C:2009:343, para 24.  
436 Andrej Fatur, Klemen Podobnik & Ana Vlahek, Competition Law in Slovenia (n 19) 217.  
437 See Jonathan B Baker, ‘Preserving A Political Bargain: The Political Economy of the Non-Interventionist 
Challenge to Monopolization Enforcement’ (n 203) 56. 
438 See eg John B Kirkwood, ‘The Essence of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers and Small Suppliers from 
Anticompetitive Conduct’ (2013) 81(5) Fordham Law Review 2425, 2426. [Hereinafter: John B Kirkwood, 
‘The Essence of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers and Small Suppliers from Anticompetitive Conduct’]; Herbert 
Hovenkamp, ‘Implementing Antitrust’s Welfare Goals’ (2013) 81(5) Fordham Law Review 2471,  2477 
(arguing that ‘consumer welfare emerges as the most practical goal of antitrust enforcement’) and Ariel Ezrachi, 
‘EU Competition Law Goals and The Digital Economy’ (2018) Working Paper 1, 4 (‘The promotion of 
consumer well-being and the prevention of consumer harm have long been established as the prime goals of 
competition law’). 
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since it negates competition between insurance companies by the setting of identical prices441 
in the relevant market.442 The Court of Appeal did not find this fact sufficient to evidence the 
agreement’s effect in practice,443 which it had asked for. However, under EU case law, even 
agreements which are no longer in force are caught by Article 101 TFEU. ‘Moreover, Article 
85 would also be applicable if parallel conduct on the part of publishers were continued after 
the termination of the former agreement and in the absence of its replacement by a new 
agreement. ...it is sufficient, for Article 85 to be applicable, that they continue to produce 
their effects after they have formally ceased to be in force’.444 In this regard, Laurence Boy 
notes that ‘consumers are a principal actor in competition law’.445 
The Court of Appeal continued by noting that after eliminating the doubt regarding the 
existence of the agreement, if it was eventually confirmed that the agreement existed, then the 
court could have given its assessment as to whether or not it was unlawful.446 
According to the Court of Appeal, because of the lack of appraisal of the issue in its entirety 
and in a comprehensive manner, the Court of First Instance issued the challenged judgment 
with an unclear justification and pro et contra arguments regarding the disputed agreement. 
Where there is doubt, however, the benefit must be given to the undertaking alleging 
                                                                                                                                                        
439 See Herbert Hovenkamp, ‘Is Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle Imperiled?’ (2018) University of 
Pennsylvania Law School, Research Paper No 18-15, 1 (‘Antitrust’s consumer welfare principle stands for the 
proposition that antitrust policy should encourage markets to produce output as high as is consistent with 
sustainable competition, and prices that are accordingly as low’) and Barak Orbach, ‘How Antitrust Lost Its 
Goal’ (n 15) 2262 (‘The drafters of the Sherman Act were convinced that the United States would do better 
without them because of the beliefs that in a state of competition, where there are many businesses, prices are 
low and production is high’). 
440 See (n 212).  
441 See (n 395).  
442 Case C-67/13 P, CB v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2204 para 51.  
443 See Fernando Castillo de la Torre and Eric Gippini Fournier, ‘Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review in EU 
Competition Law’ (n 139) 11 (‘An agreement within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU can be regarded as 
having been concluded where there is a concurrence of wills on the very principle of a restriction of 
competition, even if the specific features of the restrictions envisaged are still under negotiation’) and Albertina 
Albors-Llorens, EC Competition Law and Policy (n 243) 19. See also, Case T-9/99 HFB Holding für 
Fernwärmetechnik Beteiligungsgesellschaft v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2002:70, para 206; Case T-186/06 
Solvay SA v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2011:276 para 86; Case T-240/07 Heineken Nederland v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2011:284, para 45; and Case T-83/08 Denki Kagaku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha and Denka 
Chemicals v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2012:48, para 186.  
444 Case 243/83 SA Binon & Cie and SA Agence et messageries de la presse ECLI:EU:C:1985:284, para 17 As 
the Court emphasized in its judgments of 15 June 1976 in Cases 51, 86 and 96/75 (EMI Records Limited v CBS 
United Kingdom Limited, CBS Grammofon A/S and CBS Schallplatten GmbH respectively, [1976] ECR 811, 
871 and 913). 
445 Hanns Ullrich (ed) The Evolution of European Competition Law: Whose Regulation, Which Competition? 
(Edward Elgar 2006) 221. [Hereinafter: Hanns Ullrich (ed) The Evolution of European Competition Law: Whose 
Regulation, Which Competition?]. 
446 The Dardania Appeal Ruling (n 428) 3. 
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infringement of competition law provisions.447 Based on the abovementioned arguments the 
Court of Appeal decided to approve the Authority’s appeal and to set aside the judgment of 
the Court of First Instance, and referred the case back to the latter to adjudicate. 448 
The appeal judgment and the Court of Appeal approach is vitiated by an error of law ― since 
it relied on incorrect legal criteria to assess the legality of the Authority’s decision and the 
evidence adduced by the Authority.449 This caused extensive harm, not only as regards the 
insurance company cases, but to the enforcement of competition law in general. 
In the other insurance company cases, the requirements arising from this judgment became 
mandatory. In most of the Court of First Instance judgments reference was made to this 
particular Court of Appeal judgment. ‘It is true that the Court of Justice and the General 
Court as regards its own caselaw rarely makes a clear break from its previous line of case-
law. But, in our system, past decisions are authoritative as a model and source of inspiration 
that guarantees a line of continuity and coherence indispensable for legal certainty’.450 Albeit 
the fact that these requirements may be considered not in keeping with the effective 
enforcement of the Law on Competition.451 For this reason, it is essential that the Authority 
change its way of arguing before the courts. Such competition cases should not be based on 
the established way of doing things. 
In the Siguria case, roughly on the same grounds as the Dardania case, the Court of Appeal 
upheld the company’s appeal.452 The plea was divided into three limbs, alleging: first, 
substantial violation of provisions regarding contested procedure; second, erroneous and 
incomplete findings regarding the factual situation; and third, erroneous application of 
substantive law. In addition, the applicant asserted that: 
                                                 
447 See eg Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1978:22, para 265; Joined Cases T-67/00, T-
68/00, T-71/00 and T-78/00 JFE Engineering and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2004:221, para 177; Case 
T-141/08 EON Energie v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2010:516, para 51 and Case T-348/08 Aragonesas Industrias 
y Energía v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2011:621, para 93.  
448 The Dardania Appeal Ruling (n 428) 4. In re-procedure the Court of First Instance upheld the lawsuit of 
Drdania and annulled the Authority’s decision.   Basic Court of Pristina – Administrative Department, Dardania 
Ruling, no A.2417/14, 30 November 2017. 
449 See Case C-113/04 P Technische Unie v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2006:593, para 161.  
450 José Luís da Cruz Vilaça, ‘The Intensity of Judicial Review in Complex Economic Matters—Recent 
Competition Law Judgments of the Court of Justice of the EU’ (2018) 6(2) Oxford Journal of Antitrust 
Enforcement  173, 179. [Hereinafter: ‘The Intensity of Judicial Review in Complex Economic Matters—Recent 
Competition Law Judgments of the Court of Justice of the EU’].  
451 See eg Roger D Blair and Daniel D Sokol, ‘Welfare Standards in US and EU Antitrust Enforcement’ (2013) 
81(5) Fordham Law Review 2497, 2501 (‘Consequently, a number of factors are at play regarding antitrust 
convergence. Law matters, macro level political economy factors matter, as do the quality and ability of courts 
and agencies to shape doctrine into policy’). 
452 Pristina Court of Appeal – Administrative Department, Ruling on the Siguria Case, no AA108/2014, 21 
October 2014. [Hereinafter: The Siguria Appeal Ruling]. 
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‘The agreement because of which the company was fined is non-existent, the company 
has not been informed about this agreement and it is not signed by authorized 
persons’.453 
The Court of Appeal, after examining the case file, the appealed judgment, and the 
applicant’s assertions, confirmed that the company’s appeal was grounded. The Court of 
Appeal concluded that: 
‘The legal approach of the Court of First Instance is not sustainable and not based on 
evidence and the law, and as such, is not deemed lawful. [The panel] finds that the 
challenged judgement was issued in violation of the provisions on contested procedure, 
particularly Article 182(2)(n)454 and Article 183(1),455 and as a result is incomplete. The 
reasoning of the judgment is ambiguous and contradictory regarding the crucial facts 
concerning the case. At the main hearing in the presence of the parties, the Court of First 
Instance did not administer and review the evidence in a full and comprehensive manner 
when assessing the legality of the decision of the Authority and the agreement on which 
the decision was based. There are unproven crucial facts regarding the existence of the 
agreement under which Siguria was fined, and the reasoning is unclear. Regarding the 
contested agreement, crucial evidence proving the signature of the plaintiff company, and 
the identity of the signatory, was not provided. In the event that the contested agreement 
was confirmed, then the Court of First Instance should have provided an assessment of 
whether the agreement was illegal456 or not’.457 
The Court of Appeal judgment annulling the first instance judgment is unfounded. To some 
extent, it can even be considered arbitrary, since it annulled a reasonable and grounded 
judgment that was based on the evidence and the relevant legal provisions in force.458 
In addition, the evidence adduced had been reviewed more comprehensively459 in terms of 
the Law on Competition provisions by the Court of First Instance than it was by the Court of 
                                                 
453 Ibid.  
454 See n 787. 
455 The Law on Contested Procedure (n 472) Art 183(1) reads: ‘There is a wrong or incomplete ascertainment 
regarding the factual state when the court has wrongly verified a crucial fact’. 
456 Walter Frenz, Handbook of EU Competition Law (n 217) 246 (‘What is decisive is the agreement as such, not 
its form or degree of explicitness or the question of its binding character’).  
457 The Siguria Appeal Ruling (452). 
458 See eg Mitsuo Matsushita, ‘Reforming the Enforcement of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law’ (n 341) 529 (‘In 
addition, courts generally lack expertise in competition law and tend to adhere to Japanese Fair Trade 
Commission decisions. Accordingly, in the majority of past cases where decisions of the JFTC were subject to 
judicial review, courts have generally upheld decisions of the JFTC’). During judicial review of competition 
cases in Kosovo, what happened was the opposite of this. Despite the fact that Kosovo’s courts appeared to lack 
knowledge and experience in the field of competition, they did not uphold the Authority’s decisions. In re-
procedure the Court of First Instance upheld the lawsuit of Siguria and annulled the Authority’s decision.   Basic 
Court of Pristina – Administrative Department, Siguria Ruling, no A.2578/14, 13 February 2018. 
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Appeal. Furthermore, by analogy, the existence of an anti-competitive agreement in the 
enforcement of EU competition rules is usually proved based on its object or effect.460 Thus, 
even intention461 to conduct an anti-competitive agreement is sufficient to prove that the 
same falls under Article 101(1) TFEU.462 In the present case, apart from its anti-competitive 
nature as regards its object and effect, which is revealed prima facie, a copy of the agreement 
was provided. In such circumstances, one may ask: What more is needed for the Court of 
Appeal to accept the existence and the anti-competitive nature of the contested agreement? 
The appeal judgment at no point refers to the provisions of the Law on Competition, which is 
the essence of the case. Neither does it refer to or claim violation of the Law on 
Administrative Procedure. This judgment is not based on any legal provision nor is any 
grounded justification provided for annulment of the first instance verdict. No justifying 
reasons or facts are given that could compel such an outcome, apart from a conjecture based 
on the example of the Dardania case, which can be understood on the basis of a single 
paragraph of this verdict. It would have been more acceptable if the court had cited or used 
the Dardania case as a reference, at least procedurally, since substantively it was not relevant 
in view of the fact that the questions as to who signed the agreement and whether this person 
was competent are entirely inappropriate in the field of competition law. 
No paragraph or sentence of this judgment gives a justification as to why the findings of the 
Court of First Instance are ungrounded and not based on the law. None of the essential 
elements presented in this case, elaborated in the first instance judgment discussed above, are 
proved otherwise by the Court of Appeal. Therefore, the Court of Appeal by the annulment of 
the judgment of first instance in this case erred in law. 
On the other hand, the first instance verdict in this case was the rare one463 which clearly took 
into consideration the minutes of the initial hearing as one of the main pieces of evidence. 
Instead in the other cases only a declarative approach was taken. This fact was decisive for 
the insurance company cases, since, at the hearing, with the exception of Croatia Sigurimi, all 
the representatives of the insurance companies accepted the existence464 of the agreement. It 
                                                                                                                                                        
459 See eg Case T-18/03 CD-Contact Data v Commission, EU:T:2009:132, para 50; Case T-325/01 
DaimlerChrysler v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2005:322, para 81; Case 42/84 Remia and Others v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:1985:327, para 34, and Joined Cases 142/84 and 156/84 BAT and Reynolds v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:1987:490, para 62.  
460 See nn 204, 205. 
461 See eg Case C-551/03 P General Motors v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2006:229, paras 77–78; Case T-133/07 
Mitsubishi Electric Corp v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2011:345, para 231 and Case T-472/13 H Lundbeck A/S 
and Lundbeck v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2016:449, para 523. 
462 See Joined Cases 209 to 215 and 218/78 Heintz van Landewyck SARL and Others v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:1980:248 para 86. 
463 Together with the Kosova Re case. 
464 See Joined Cases T-236/01, T-239/01, T-244/01 to T-246/01, T-251/01 and T-252/01 and Case T-224/00 
cited above.   
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is very important that the courts consider this fact more thoroughly, since the insurance 
companies denied awareness of the existence of the deal at later stages. As a result, the court 
made an aberration by accepting such claims as grounded. ‘While it is not for the Court to 
substitute its economic appraisal for the Commission’s, it is under a duty not only to establish 
whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and consistent but also to 
examine whether that evidence contains all the information which must be taken into account 
in order to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the 
conclusions drawn from it’.465 
The Court of Appeal set aside the judgment of the Court of First Instance in the Sigma case 
too and referred the case back for adjudication.466 However, the justification given in the 
judgment of the appeal was oddly like that given in the Siguria case. 
The Sigma and Siguria first instance verdicts were annulled based on the same justification, 
despite the fact that they were decided in opposite ways in the Court of First Instance. 
William E Kovacic arges that ‘establishing a competition policy system in formerly socialist 
or communist nations entails far reaching changes. These include drafting and enacting new 
legislation; forming new government institutions; educating business managers, government 
administrators, judges, and the public about the role of competition in a market system; and, 
in some instances, even so basic a step as creating a new vocabulary to describe market 
phenomena and concepts central to competition policy analysis’.467 In the Siguria case, the 
Court of First Instance upheld the Authority’s decision and refused the lawsuit of the 
insurance company. On the other hand, in the Sigma case it annulled the decision of the 
Authority as unlawful. Despite the essential differences, the Court of Appeal annulled both 
decisions on the same grounds. The fact that two opposing judgments were annulled for the 
                                                 
465 Cases T-44/02OP, T-54/02OP, T-56/02OP, T-60/02OP and T-61/02OP Dresdner Bank and Others v 
Commission, EU:T:2006:271, para 67; Case C-272/09 P KME Germany and Others v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:810, para 94; Case C-12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval ECLI:EU:C:2005:87, para 39; Case 
C-525/04 P Spain v Lenzing ECLI:EU:C:2007:698, para 57; Case C-326/05 P Industrias Químicas del Vallés v 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:2007:443, para 76; and Case C-16/90 Nölle v Hauptzollamt Bremen-Freihafen 
ECLI:EU:C:1991:402, para 12.  
466 Pristina Court of Appeal – Administrative Department, Ruling on the Sigma Case, no AA347/2014, 21 
October 2014. [Hereinafter: The Sigma Appeal Ruling]. The Authority, dissatisfied with the judgment of first 
instance, appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal. The appeal pleas were divided into three main limbs: 
alleging that the judgment of the Court of First Instance incorrectly applied the material law; alleging violations 
of the contested procedure provisions; and alleging that the reasoning of the contested judgment was 
inconsistent with the case files. In re-procedure the Court of First Instance upheld the lawsuit of Siguria and 
annulled the Authority’s decision.   Basic Court of Pristina – Administrative Department, Sigma Ruling, no 
A2415/14, 03 May 2018.  
467 See William E Kovacic, ‘Designing and Implementing Competition and Consumer Protection Reforms in 
Transitional Economies: Perspectives from Mongolia, Nepal, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe’ (1995) 44(4) DePaul 
Law Review 1197, 1198  
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same reasons is the foremost indicator of how the court hierarchy has treated competition 
cases inconsistently468 in Kosovo.469  
The outcome of these particular cases, reveal a fundamental flow on the rules of allocation in 
courts and that is should remedied by applying  joinder of cases, which it could be the much 
efficient and consistent of judicial review. Thus, two or more cases of the same issue 
concerning the same subject-matter are joined in the same judicial procedure.  
 
7.11.2 The Court of Appeal Judgment Upholding the Court of First Instance 
Judgments 
 
In light of the Authority’s appeal in the Elsig case seeking to set aside the judgment of the 
Court of First Instance and refer the case back to that court for adjudication, alleging 
incorrect application of material law and breach of the contested procedure provisions, the 
Court of Appeal reviewed the case files, the appealed judgment, and the claims, reaching the 
conclusion that the appeal was not grounded.470 The examination was based on Article 
49(1)471 of the Law on Administrative Conflict and Article 194 of the Law on Contested 
Procedure.472 
The Court of Appeal upon evaluating the main evidence473 concluded that: 
‘The legal position of the Court of First Instance was grounded because the challenged 
judgment did not contain violations of the provisions of the Law on Administrative 
                                                 
468 Eg the provisions of EU Regulation 1/2003, in particular Arts 15 and 16, are meant to ensure the consistent 
enforcement of European competition law, namely Arts 101 and 102 of the TFEU. See more generally, Adriana 
Almășan and Peter Whelan (eds) The Consistent Application of EU Competition Law: Substantive and 
Procedural Challenges (n 270) and Wolf Sauter, Coherence in EU Competition Law (n 16). 
469 Ariel Ezrachi notes that ‘competition policy should be applied consistently, objectively, accurately, and 
fairly’. See Ariel Ezrachi, ‘Sponge’ (n 3) 50.  
470 Pristina Court of Appeal – Administrative Department, Ruling on the Elsig Case, no AA40/2016, 07 June 
2016. [Hereinafter: The Elsig Appeal Ruling]. 
471 The Law on Administrative Conflicts (n 306) Art 49(1) reads: ‘Appeal against the court decision is submitted 
to the competent court in the manner determined in Article 28 of this law’. 
472 Law No 03/L-006 on Contested Procedure (Official Gazette 38/2008, 20.09.2008). Available at 
http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/ligjet/Ligji-eng.pdf. Last accessed on 17 March 2017. 
[Hereinafter: Law on Contested Procedure]. 
473 In the Elsig case, the Court of Appeal evaluated the following evidence: Authority’s Ruling No 5/7, 
PA/V/10/2010; Authority’s Conclusion No 5/7, 24.01.2011; Minutes of the Authority’s hearings 13.09.2010 and 
22.10.2010; the request of insurance company Elsig for Review of the Authority’s Ruling; the agreement signed 
in Gjakova on 03.07.2009; the Expert Report of Kosovo’s Forensic Agency 30.07.2015; the Elsig lawsuit; and 
the response to the lawsuit by the Authority; the answer of Kosovo’s Civil Registration Agency 08.07.2015; the 
answer of the Kosovo Tax Administration 19.05.2015 and other related documents within the case file. 
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Conflicts. In addition, the claim that the Court of First Instance violated the procedural 
provisions was not accurate. [The panel] of the Court of Appeal found that the Court of 
First Instance, based on the evidence provided, concluded that the Authority fined Elsig 
despite having no proof of the following: the original agreement and verification of 
whether the plaintiff’s employee was authorized to sign that agreement or was merely a 
representative of the Gjakova branch. Therefore, because the respondent failed to prove 
in court that the said agreement was signed by a person authorized by Elsig, the Court of 
Appeal found that the Court of First Instance had correctly decided the case. As a result, 
the court dismissed the Authority’s appeal and confirmed the first instance judgment’.474 
One of the most controversial issues was the contention that the people who signed the 
agreement were unknown475 to the insurance companies and that there was a risk that certain 
persons with dire intentions presented the agreement. However, although the Authority, 
utilizing the Forensics Report,476 managed to prove that the person who signed the agreement 
on behalf of Elsig was an employee of the latter, the court accepted the company’s claims 
that this person was not authorized to sign such an agreement. This conclusion, however, was 
irrelevant in the context of the effective enforcement of competition law. 
In the Insig case the Court of Appeal established that: 
‘The Authority imposed a fine without possessing evidence of whether the plaintiff’s 
employee was authorized or was a branch representative in Gjakova’.477 
The Court of Appeal never acknowledged the fact that the statement of objection was, 
therefore, addressed to the headquarters of the undertakings in question478 and not to their 
branches in Gjakova.479 ‘Under EU competition law, the unlawful conduct of a subsidiary 
may in certain circumstances be imputed to the parent company without it being necessary to 
establish direct involvement of the latter in that same infringement. This is particularly the 
case when, although having a separate legal personality, the subsidiary does not 
independently determine its own conduct on the market but carries out, in all material 
                                                 
474 The Elsig Appeal Ruling (n 470).  
475 EU courts have ruled that even anonymous evidence can be admissible. However, the probative value has to 
be determined. See in that regard Case C-411/04 P Salzgitter Mannesmann v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2007:54, 
paras 46–50. 
476 Forensics Report (n 273). 
477 Pristina Court of Appeal – Administrative Department, Ruling on the Insig Case, no AA24/2016, 7 June 
2016. [Hereinafter: The Insig Appeal Ruling]. 
478 See eg Case T-39/07 Eni v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2011:356, para 60 at seq. 
479 Under EU case law, even expert-level meetings constitute breach of antitrust law if proved to have 
anticompetitive intention. See Case T-15/89 Chemie Linz AG v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1992:37, II-1325. ‘(the 
Court finds that since the applicant participated in both the EATP meeting of 22 November 1977 and the system 
of 'bosses’ and 'experts’ meetings the Commission was entitled to take the view that the applicant had 
participated in the meetings in 1978 which constituted for the producers a continuation of their statements made 
at the meeting of 22 November 1977 and enabled them to institute the system of 'bosses’ and 'experts’ 
meetings’). 
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respects, the instructions given to it by the parent, and therefore forms a single economic unit 
with the latter’.480 Even in a case where the subsidiary (in this case branches in Gjakova) 
have a seperate legal responsibility, should not give immunity of imputing its conduct to the 
parent company. According to the settle EU case law, ‘the fact that a subsidiary has separate 
legal personality is not sufficient to exclude the possibility of imputing its conduct to the 
parent company, in particular where the subsidiary does not decide independently upon its 
own conduct on the market, but carries out, in all material respects, the instructions given to it 
by the parent company.481 The structure of the insurance companies, from a legal, 
organisational and economic standpoints, between headquarters and branches, forms a single 
economic entity. Branches are supervised and report its work to the managing boards and as a 
result, branches cannot decide independently upon their conducts on the market. ‘A parent 
company may be held liable for the anticompetitive practices implemented by its subsidiary, 
where the latter does not independently decide its own conduct on the market, but essentially 
carries out the instructions given to it by its parent’).482  
In addition, the Court of Appeal contested the form of the contested agreement. Concerning 
the form of the agreement,483 the Court of Appeal at no point referred to its anti-competitive 
nature in relation to the Law on Competition,484 but asked whether it was illegal or not. This 
is a far wider concept than having anti-competitive object or effect, which is the essence of 
the present case. Walter Frenz notes that the ‘form of the agreement and circumstance that a 
contract is not valid under national law is irrelevant. Not only do legally-binding 
standardisation agreements fall within the prohibition of cartels, but rather legally non-
binding recommendations may have a significant non-competitive effect if they are in fact 
complied with subject to an underlying understanding’.485 
                                                 
480 Antoine Winckler, ‘Parent’s Liability: New Case Extending the Presumption of Liability of a Parent 
Company For the Conduct of Its Wholly Owned Subsidiary (2011) 2( 3) Journal of European Competition Law 
& Practice 231. 
481 See in that effect Case C-90/09 P General Química  and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2011:21 para 12; 
Case 107/82 AEG-Telefunken v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1983:293 para 49 and Case C-286/98 P Stora 
Kopparbergs Bergslags v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2000:630 para 26.   
482 Jens Peter Schmidt, ‘Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission: When Can Parent Companies be Liable for the 
Acts of Subsidiaries Even if Action Against the Subsidiary is Time-barred?’ (2018) 9(1) Journal of European 
Competition Law & Practice 31 and Sebastian Felix Janka, ‘Parent Company Liability in German and EU 
Competition Law: Two Worlds Apart?’ (2016) 7(9) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 614.  
483 This proved to be irrelevant in adjudicating competition cases. See n 319. 
484 See Case T-450/05 Automobiles Peugeot SA and Peugeot Nederland NV v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2009:262 para 170; Case C-74/04 P Commission v Volkswagen ECLI:EU:C:2006:460, para 37 and 
Case T-41/96 Bayer v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2000:242 para 69 (‘It follows that the concept of an agreement 
within the meaning of Article 85( 1 ) of the Treaty, as interpreted by the case-law, centres around the existence 
of a concurrence of wills between at least two parties, the form in which it is manifested being unimportant so 
long as it constitutes the faithful expression of the parties' intention’). 
485 See Walter Frenz, Handbook of EU Competition Law (n 217) 247. 
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Thus, it is nearly impossible for any undertaking to be fined for an anti-competitive 
agreement that restricts or distorts competition, because the same justification will be 
accepted by the courts.486 For comparison reasons, the EU General Court accepts as evidence 
not only documents but also information.487 Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca note that ‘if the 
competition rules operated only when an explicit, formal agreement was made they would be 
of little practical use, since undertakings would achieve their anti-competitive goals in less 
formal ways. It is therefore necessary to have provisions to catch less formal special 
agreements.’488 
The concept of agreement in competition law should not be considered in the light of contract 
law.489 This is because, in the field of competition law, it is sufficient that there is 
concurrence of will and faithful expression between at least two parties, the form being 
unimportant.490 In addition, according to the EU courts, the important point is not the 
documents as such but the conclusions which the Commission has drawn from them.491 
The Authority should have argued492 that the purpose of the Law on Competition, with regard 
to prohibited agreements, applies to all agreements that have as their object493 or effect 
                                                 
486 See Joined Cases C-204/00 P C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P Aalborg 
Portland and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2004:6, para 55 and Case T-448/07 YKK and Others v 
Commission ECLI:EU:T:2012:322, para 80. 
487 See in that regard Case T-15/02 BASF v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2006:74, paras 496–498 and Joined Cases 
T-236/01, T-239/01, T-244/01 to T-246/01, T-251/01 and T-252/01 Tokai Carbon and Others v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2004:118, para 431. 
488 Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials (n 362) 962. See also Case 41/69 ACF 
Chemiefarma NV v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1970:71, paras 110–124.  
489 Cf Andrej Fatur, Klemen Podobnik & Ana Vlahek, Competition Law in Slovenia (n 19) 57. (‘Even actions 
that would not be perceived as agreements in civil (contract) law (e.g., gentlement’s agreements) can be 
interpreted as agreements in light of Article 6 of the PRCA-1’) and Ioannis Lianos, ‘Collusion in Vertical 
Relations Under Article 81 EC’ (2008) 45(4) Common Market Law Review 1027, 1028.  
490 Case C-74/04 P Commission v Volkswagen AG ECLI:EU:C:2006:460 para 12  and Joined Cases 209 to 215 
and 218/78 Heintz van Landewyck SARL and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1980:248 para 86. 
491 Case T-15/89 Chemie Linz v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1992:37, para 36 and Case 107/82 Allgemeine 
Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft AEG-Telefunken v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1983:293, para 27. 
492 See Case T-450/05 Automobiles Peugeot and Peugeot Nederland v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2009:262, para 
175; Case C-29/83 CRAM v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1984:130, para 20; Case C-185/95 P Baustahlgewebe v 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:1998:608, para 58; Case C-49/92 P Commission v Anic Partecipazioni 
ECLI:EU:C:1999:356, para 86; Joined Cases T-185/96, T-189/96 and T-190/96 Riviera Auto Service and 
Others v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1999:8, para 47; Case T-379/06 Kaimer and Others v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2011:110, para 47 (in German) and Case T-38/02 Groupe Danone v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2005:367, para 215.  
493 See Case T-450/05 Automobiles Peugeot and Peugeot Nederland v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2009:262, para 
257. See also Case C-407/04 Dalmine v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2007:53 para 84; Case T-322/01 Roquette 
Frères v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2006:267 para 201; Case C-49/92 P Commission v Anic Partecipazioni 
ECLI:EU:C:1999:356, para 99; Case C-199/92 P Hüls v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1999:358, para 178; and 
Joined Cases T-39/92 and T-40/92 CB and Europay v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1994:20, para 87.  
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distortion or restriction of competition.494 The actual text of the disputed agreement and its 
effect on the relevant market make clear that the two essential elements for proving that it 
was inconsistent with the provisions of the Law on Competition are present. In terms of 
competition law, who signed the agreement is neither significant nor relevant, nor is the 
question whether it was authorized or not, if one out of two decisive elements is proven. At 
the same time, the Authority should have argued that, based on the last sentence of Article 
3(1), such prohibition applies equally to all agreements whether written or not. Thus, the 
form, the signatory’s official position within the undertaking’s hierarchy, and how the 
Authority became aware of the existence of such an agreement are all irrelevant. 
The court’s requirement that the Authority prove these numerous facts was not an easy ask, 
since the insurance companies were not willing to cooperate with the Authority, as evidenced 
by the Elsig case. Although the Authority requested495 data on Elsig’s employees, Elsig 
refused496 to provide such information. 
Regarding the duty to cooperate,497 the Authority did not take any of the measures provided 
for in the case of lack of cooperation by a party to the procedure, although under the Law on 
Protection of Competition cooperation is mandatory for the parties under investigation to 
enable the Authority to bring to light an infringement of competition legislation.498 Under the 
provisions of Article 38 of the Law on Protection of Competition such a request shall contain 
a legal basis, the subject matter and objective, an implementation deadline, and a warning to 
the parties and to other natural or legal entities that if they do not comply with the request, 
punitive measures shall be pronounced against them in conformity with the law. However, 
the request of the Authority, apart from a reference to Article 38 of the Law on Protection of 
Competition and the three-day deadline, did not contain the other legally required 
information, including the subject matter, the objective, and the warning. In its request, the 
Authority was required to conform to all the requirements of the Law on Protection of 
Competition, and in particular, the warning to the parties about non-compliance with the 
request. It was essential to make clear that if the parties refused to cooperate with the 
Authority, the latter would ascertain a violation of the law and pronounce a punitive measure 
in conformity with the provisions of the law.499 
However, it was the duty and responsibility of the Authority to convince the courts that the 
allegations raised were not relevant in the light of competition law, and to persuade the court 
to enforce competition law in a way similar to European and regional best practice as well as 
                                                 
494 See Case C-226/11 Expedia v Autorité de la concurrence and Others ECLI: ECLI:EU:C:2012:795, para 15 
and Case C-67/13 P, CB v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2204 para 42.  
495 Authority’s request (n 146). 
496 Elsig’s response (n 147). 
497 See Walter Frenz, Handbook of EU Competition Law (n 217) 882. 
498 See eg Case 374/87 Orkem v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1989:387, para 15. 
499 See eg EU Regulation 1/2003, Art 18 paras 2–3.  
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principles laid down in Law on Competition.500 Thus, it would have avoided the 
establishment of harmful precedents that would impede the effective enforcement of 
competition law in the future. 
 
7.12 Requests for Extraordinary Review of the Appeal Judgments by the Supreme 
Court 
 
The Authority, dissatisfied with the judgments of the Court of Appeal rejecting the appeals of 
the Authority as unfounded and confirming the judgments of first instance, requested an 
extraordinary review of the decisions by the Supreme Court.501 According to the Authority’s 
pleas in its request for extraordinary review in the Elsig case, inter alia:502 
‘Neither the Court of Appeal nor the Court of First Instance was able to indicate which of 
the essential procedural elements were absent from the Authority’s decisions’.503 
This approach was insufficient and did not provide adequate grounds to convince the 
Supreme Court to set aside the decisions of the Court of Appeal.504 Procedural flaws have 
been the reason for most of the Authority’s losses in court, with the exception of a few cases 
on substantive issues. In most of the cases, only the procedural errors made by the Authority 
were considered.505 Among other things, these included lack of a clear statement of the legal 
                                                 
500 Case C-67/13 P, CB v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2204 para 42. (‘In addition, it must be noted that, in 
accordance with the rules of the EU and FEU Treaties...it is for the Commission... to ensure application of the 
principles laid down in Articles 81 EC and 82 EC’).   
501 Kosovo Competition Authority, Request for Extraordinary Review Against the Judgements of the Court of 
Appeal. Such request was made in almost all the insurance company cases. [Hereinafter: Requests for 
Extraordinary Review]. 
502 Kosovo Competition Authority, Request for Extraordinary Review Against the Judgement of the Court of 
Appeal, No AA40/2016 in the Elsig case, for the Supreme Court of Kosovo, 28 July 2016. [Hereinafter: the 
Request for Extraordinary Review in the Elsig case].  
503 Ibid. 
504 See eg to that effect Case C-280/08 P Deutsche Telecom v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2010:603 para 24; Case 
C-352/98 P Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2000:361, paras 34–35; and Case C-76/01 P 
Eurocoton and Others v Council ECLI:EU:C:2003:511, paras 46–47. 
505 Under EU case law, the courts must establish, inter alia, whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate, 
reliable and consistent and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it. See to that 
effect Case C-272/09 P KME Germany and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2011:810, para 94; Case C-12/03 
P Commission v Tetra Laval ECLI:EU:C:2005:87, para 39; Case C-525/04 P Spain v Lenzing 
ECLI:EU:C:2007:698, para 57; Case C-326/05 P Industrias Químicas del Vallés v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:2007:443, para 76; and Case C-16/90, Nölle v Hauptzollamt Bremen-Freihafen 
ECLI:EU:C:1991:402, para 12.  
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basis and insufficient and contradictory reasoning.506 These have been assessed by the courts 
as the essential elements which were lacking in the Authority’s decisions. 
In its request, the Authority stressed that: 
‘The Court of First Instance committed a substantial violation of Article 182 of the Law 
on Contested Procedure,507 because that court did not analyze the evidence separately 
and the interrelationships between the items of evidence’.508 
This could be considered one of the most important weaknesses of the Authority’s claim, 
because the request for extraordinary review must oppose the ruling of the second court, in 
this case the judgment of the Court of Appeal, and not the first instance judgment. The 
Authority, aside from emphasizing in an abstract manner that the Court of First Instance 
made the aforementioned omissions in its decision-making, did not prove any other 
circumstances showing that such an error was actually made by the court.509 
The Authority’s request for an extraordinary review did not differ substantially from the 
objections sent to the Court of First Instance and to the Court of Appeal. There were no clear 
and legally sound arguments regarding the alleged violations of substantive law. Concerning 
the substantial violations of the procedural provisions of which the Authority requested a 
review, the Authority wrongly emphasized the provisions of the Law on Contested 
Procedure, because review of a final court judgment can occur only if the explicit conditions 
defined in Article 55510 of the Law on Administrative Conflicts511 are met. 
                                                 
506 See Koen Lenaerts, Ignace Maselis, and Kathleen Gutman, EU Procedural Law (n 218) 379 (‘The reasoning 
must be logically compatible with the content of measures’).  
507 Law on Contested Procedure (n 472).  
508 The Request for Extraordinary Review in the Elsig case (502). 
509 Under Art 169 of the consolidated version of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of 25 September 
2012, an appeal shall identify precisely those points in the grounds of the decision of the General Court which 
are contested. See Case C-248/99 P France v Monsanto and Commission ECLI:EU:C:2002:1, para 68 and Case 
C-41/00 P Interporc v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2003:125, para 15. See also Koen Lenaerts, Ignace Maselis, and 
Kathleen Gutman, EU Procedural Law (n 218) 645. 
510 Law on Administrative Conflicts (n 306) Art 55 reads ‘The interested party may request a review of the 
decision in effect when: the party is informed about new facts, or if it finds or creates opportunities to use new 
proof, on which basis the conflict would have been solved in a manner more favourable to it if this fact or proof 
had been raised or used in the previous court procedure; the court decision was a consequence of a judge’s penal 
act or that of a court employee or the decision was issued by the fraudulent act of the representatives or the 
authoriser of the party, his/her objector or representative or by the objector or authoriser, where this action is a 
penal act; the decision is based on an issued act or decision on a penal or civil matter, where this judgement was 
later annulled by a final court decision; the document on which the decision is based is falsified, or the witness, 
expert or party during the hearing before the court has given a mendacious declaration and the court decision 
was based on this declaration; the party finds or creates opportunities to use the previous decision issued in the 
same administrative conflict; and an interested person was not allowed to take part in the administrative 
conflict.’ 
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7.13 The Supreme Court Approach to Competition Law Enforcement in the Insurance 
Company Cases 
 
The Authority submitted a request to the Supreme Court for an extraordinary review of the 
Court of Appeal judgment, alleging violations of substantive and procedural law. The 
Supreme Court, after assessing the appealed judgment, the respondent’s request for an 
extraordinary review of the court decision, and the other records in the case, found that the 
claims were groundless.512 
The Supreme Court noted: 
‘After reviewing the contested judgment and the case files, it was found that the Court of 
Appeal acted correctly when the court has rejected the appeals of the Authority as 
ungrounded and upheld the judgments of the first instance court. [The court] confirms 
that the challenged judgment was founded and based on the legal provisions in force, 
since it did not violate the administrative procedure or substantive law provisions as the 
Authority claimed on appeal’.513 
Further, the Supreme Court concluded: 
‘The Authority’s request did not address the judgment of the Court of Appeal as the 
second instance court, but claimed substantial violations by the Court of First Instance. 
Under the provisions of Article 53 of the Law on Administrative Conflicts, the Supreme 
Court reviews requests for extraordinary review only within the limits specified for such 
requests. The Supreme Court panel determined that the claims of the Authority for 
violations of substantive law, in this case, the Law on Competition, were unfounded. 
Based on the evidence in the case file, there was no evidence that the Authority had 
proven that the disputed agreement had been implemented by the insurance companies, 
which was an essential condition for the imposition of the fine. Therefore, because the 
essential conditions for the fine were not met, the Supreme Court considered that, in this 
administrative dispute, there was no violation of substantive law’.514 
The Supreme Court held that the Authority had not made explicit claims515 regarding the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal as required. Under the provisions of Article 24516 of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
511 Law on Administrative Conflicts (n 306). 
512 See eg Supreme Court of Kosovo, Ruling on the Insig case, ARJ no 25/2016, 05 October 2016; Supreme 
Court of Kosovo, Ruling on the Grawe Elsig case, ARJ no 24/2016, 05 October 2016 and Supreme Court of 
Kosovo, Ruling on the Illyria case, ARJ no 38/2016, 23 January 2017. The same approach was taken by the 
Supreme Court in other insurance company cases. [Hereinafter: The Supreme Court Rulings]. 
513 Ibid 2. 
514 The Supreme Court Rulings (n 512). 
515 See eg Case C-8/95 P New Holland Ford v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1998:257, paras 23–24. 
516 Law on Administrative Conflicts (n 306) Art 24 stipulates as follows: ‘Against the final form decision of the 
Competent Court for administrative matters of second instance, the party may submit to the Supreme Court of 
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Law on Administrative Conflict, a party can submit a request for an extraordinary review of a 
court decision before the Supreme Court only against the final decision of the court of second 
instance, in this case the Court of Appeal. 
Based on the foregoing, the Supreme Court found that the court of  
Appeal had accurately applied the provisions on administrative procedure and the substantive 
law.517 
Unlike the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeal, which both adjudicated 
inconsistently in the insurance company cases, the Supreme Court’s approach proved to be 
‘one way’ — rejecting all the Authority’s requests for extraordinary review. 
It is sufficient to establish as a genuine fact that, in the insurance company cases, Kosovo’s 
courts have tended to adjudicate on the basis of the precedent set in the Dardania case,518 
although this is not common practice within the judicial system of Kosovo. The instructions 
of the Court of Appeal to the Court of First Instance in the Dardania case have been 
emphasized in all the judgments in cases involving other insurance companies and have been 
considered imperative. This goes beyond analogy; it is a legal doctrine allowed and practised 
in civil matters.  
In such a situation, the Authority should have insisted that the courts, as well as their legal 
obligation to ensure respect for administrative procedure, also have an obligation to consider 
the substantive law. The Supreme Court seems to have created a template regarding the 
review and settlement of these cases. However, it seems that the Authority contributed to this, 
as it did not come up with persuasive arguments519 as to why the Supreme Court should 
decide differently from the lower instance courts. In fact, the Authority must not only require 
the courts to enforce the Law on Competition in the light of its goals, it should also urge and 
convince the courts to do so. This is the legal mandate, and the core role, of the Authority. 
William E Kovacic notes that ‘particularly in its early years, the competition agency might be 
required to convince the courts that its cases are procedurally sound and substantively 
meritorious. It is vital that the agency be ready to prevail on such issues, as this will 
determine the breadth and scope of the legal basis for its future actions’.520 
                                                                                                                                                        
Kosovo the request for extraordinary review of the legal decision. The request under paragraph 1 of this Article 
may be submitted only in case of a violation of a material right or a violation of procedural provisions that may 
have an influence on solving the issue. The Supreme Court of Kosovo shall decide on the request for 
extraordinary review of the court decision’.  
517 The Supreme Court Rulings (n 512). 
518 See nn 171–172.  
519 See eg Case C-280/08 P para 24; Case C-352/98 P paras 34–35 and Case C-76/01 P, para 46–47, cited in n 
495.  
520 See William E Kovacic, ‘Getting Started: Creating New Competition Policy Institutions in Transition 
Economies’ (n 67) 431. 
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Summing up, the Authority has not provided influential arguments to convince the Supreme 
Court that the Authority’s decisions were grounded, not only in the request for extraordinary 
review but also in the conduct of proceedings in the lower instance courts. Instead, the 
Authority relied on ungrounded and irrelevant arguments or facts, resulting in the cases521 
being lost in the courts.522 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
521 The Sigkos and Sigal cases have not been the subject of as detailed an analysis as the other eight insurance 
cases, due to the fact that these two cases underwent court scrutiny later than the others. However, according to 
the Authority’s Annual Report 2017 (n 23), the Sigkos case was also lost in court. 
522 Case C-280/08 P Deutsche Telecom v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2010:603 para 24; Case C-352/98 P 
Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2000:361, paras 34–35; and Case C-76/01 P Eurocoton and 
Others v Council ECLI:EU:C:2003:511, paras 46 and 47.  
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7.14 The Insurance Company Cases: Conclusion 
 
By assessing whether the agreement was signed by competent persons, the courts erred in 
law. Added to the fact that the signatories were representatives of the Gjakova branches, the 
agreement was signed on behalf of the companies, and consequently direct responsibility fell 
on the companies,523 since the branch is a subsidiary524 of the company,525 and therefore not 
independent526 but constituting a single undertaking.527 
It must be recalled however, that when an undertaking is claiming independence from the 
parent company, it is for the latter to adduce evidence to establish such claim.528 According 
to settled EU case law, ‘the conduct of a subsidiary may be imputed to the parent company in 
particular when, although having a separate legal personality, that subsidiary does not decide 
independently upon its own conduct in the market’. In addition, the  EU courts recognized 
that ‘when a parent company holds 100% of the shares in a subsidiary which has been found 
guilty for breaching competition rules, there is a rebuttable presumption that the parent 
company actually exerted a decisive influence over its subsidiary’s conduct. In that situation, 
it is for the parent company to reverse that presumption by adducing evidence to establish 
that its subsidiary was independent’.529 In that regard, Kosovo’s courts erred in law in 
                                                 
523 See eg Case C-244/94 FFSA and others v Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche ECLI:EU:C:1995:392, 
para 14. 
524 See Case T-39/07 Eni v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2011:356, para 61 at seq. 
525 See Case T-112/05 Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2007:381, paras 57–65.  
526 See Eurofix-Bauco v Michelin Commission Decision 88/138/EEC [1998] OJ L65, para 54. 
527 See Case T-112/05 Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2007:381, para 58; Case T-203/01 
Michelin v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2003:250, para 290; Case T-65/89 BPB Industries and British Gypsum v 
Commission ECLI:EU:T:1993:31, para 149; and Joined Cases T-71/03, T-74/03, T-87/03 and T-91/03 Tokai 
Carbon and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2005:220 para 59.  
528 See in that regard Case T-314/01 Avebe v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2006:266, para 136; Case C-286/98 P 
Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2000:630, para 29; and Case T-112/05 Akzo Nobel and 
Others v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2007:381, para 60. 
529 See the relevant EU case law, in particular, Case T-372/10 Bolloré v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2012:325, para 
44; Case T-65/89 BPB Industries and British Gypsum v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1993:31, paras 149 and 150; 
Case T-203/01 Michelin v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2003:250, para 290; Case T-354/94 Stora Kopparbergs 
Bergslags v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1998:104, para 80; Case 170/83, Hydrotherm ECLI:EU:C:1984:271, para 
11; Joined Cases T-305/94 to T-307/94, T-313/94 to T-316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328/94, T-329/94 and 
T-335/94 Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1999:80, paras 960–961; Case 
T-102/92 Viho v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1995:3, para 50; Joined Cases T-71/03, T-74/03, T-87/03 and T-91/03 
Tokai Carbon and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2005:220, paras 58–60; Case 6/72 Europemballage 
Corporation and Continental Can Company v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1973:22, para 15; Case T-69/04 Schunk 
and Schunk Kohlenstoff-Technik v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2008:415, paras 56–58; Case T-325/01 
DaimlerChrysler v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2005:322, para 221; Case T-12/03 Itochu v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2009:130, paras 49–51; Case T-314/01, Avebe v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2006:266, para 136; Case 
T-330/01 Akzo Nobel v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2006:269, paras 81–83; Joined Cases 6/73 and 7/73 Istituto 
Chemioterapico Italiano and Commercial Solvents v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1974:18, paras 36–41; Case 
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deciding to confirm the applicants’ contention that the undertaking could not be deemed 
responsible for its subsidiary,530 even though according to applicable legal provisions in 
force,531 a parent company holds 100% of the capital of its subsidiary. The managing boards 
of the insurance companies did not include branch directors, thus proving that everything was 
managed and controlled by the headquarters of the enterprise.532 Furthermore the Authority is 
not prevented from imposing the fine solely on the subsidiary, solely on the parent company, 
or both.533 
The Authority found that the geographic market affected by this agreement was the whole 
territory of Kosovo. However, it did not sufficiently explain or argue whether the agreement 
had an effect on the whole territory of Kosovo or just on the city of Gjakova,534 in which it 
was signed.535 
In the light of the requirement to produce the original agreement, both the Authority and the 
courts should have assessed first what constitutes536 an anti-competitive agreement for the 
                                                                                                                                                        
T-43/02 Jungbunzlauer v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2006:270, para 125; and Case T-161/05 Hoechst v 
Commission ECLI:EU:T:2009:366, para 59.  
530 See to that effect Case T-372/10 Bolloré v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2012:325, paras 39–44; Case C-90/09 P 
General Química and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2011:21, para 37; Joined Cases C-201/09 P and 
C-216/09 P ArcelorMittal Luxembourg v Commission and Commission v ArcelorMittal Luxembourg and Others 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:190, para 96; and Case C-520/09 P Arkema v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2011:619, para 38.  
531 See Law No 02/L-123 on Business Organizations (Official Gazette no 39/01, 02.10.2008). Available at 
http://kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/ligjet/2007_02-L123_en.pdf.  
532 See eg the Managing Board of Elsig, available at: http://www.kselsig.com/bordi_drejtues (in Albania only). 
Last accessed on 3 March 2018. See also Andrej Fatur, Klemen Podobnik & Ana Vlahek, Competition Law in 
Slovenia (n 19) 56. (‘The presumption of economic unity undoubtedly stands in cases where the parent company 
controls 100% of its subsidiaries’ shares…’).  
533 See eg Case T-372/10 Bolloré v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2012:325, para 49. 
534 On the other hand, if the agreement was signed without the head office’s awareness, and the restriction or 
disruption of competition affected only one part of the territory of Kosovo, this also was unlawful and in 
violation of competition law. 
535 See EU case law in that regard, Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 paras 10 and 
11; Case 6/72 Continental Can v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1973:22, para 32; Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche 
ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 para 21. See also, Johannes Paha (ed) Competition Law Compliance Programmes: An 
Interdisciplinary Approach (Springer 2016) 118. [Hereinafter: Johannes Paha (ed) Competition Law 
Compliance Programmes: An Interdisciplinary Approach] (‘When the market is defined, the market share has to 
be calculated’). See also Christian A Conrad, Improving International Competition Order: An Institutional 
Approach (Palgrave Macmillan 2005) 61. [Hereinafter: Christian A Conrad, Improving International 
Competition Order: An Institutional Approach] (‘Market tests, in addition to determining the market share, are 
conducted in order to determine whether a market-dominating position exists’).  
536 See in this regard Case 28/77 Tepea v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1978:133, para 41 and Case T-18/03 CD-
Contact Data v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2009:132, paras 53–69. The Commission considers even protocols to 
constitute an agreement, and as a result, falling under Art 101. See HOV SVZ/MCN Commission Decision 
94/210/EC [1994] OJ L104/34. Also, an exchange of correspondence can constitute an agreement. See inter alia 
Commission Decisions COMP/35.587 PO Video Games; COMP/35.706 PO Nintendo Distribution; and 
COMP/36.321 Omega–Nintendo, 2003/675/EC, notified under document number C (2002) 4072, [2002] OJ 
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purpose of Law on Competition. If the Authority had been capable of arguing this in a 
persuasive manner, in the light of competition rules, the courts’ misunderstanding of 
competition rules vis-à-vis anti-competitive agreements may have been avoided. In failing to 
establish such a basic principle, both aforementioned institutions erred in law as regards the 
effective enforcement of competition law.537 
In addition, the court’s requirement as to evidence of where the contested agreement was 
obtained can be seen as inappropriate. Castillo and Gippini note that ‘it does not matter where 
the evidence is found. Even evidence which does not originate with any of the participants, 
such as correspondence between third parties, can be used as evidence’.538 In the same vain, 
the assessment of the contested agreement as to its form, in particular, the fact that it was not 
protocolled in a standard manner, is baseless.539 
Since the Authority’s case in the insurance company cases was supported by documentary 
evidence in support of the Authority’s allegations of the existence of an anti-competitive 
agreement, doubts have emerged as to whether the Authority is in a position to fulfil its legal 
mandate — to effectively enforce competition law in Kosovo and to create the necessary 
conditions for an effective540 and competitive economy.541 Such enforcement seems to be an 
‘impossible mission’ for the Authority, even in a case where direct evidence supported an 
allegation of breach of competition rules. Whereas, according to EU case law, an 
                                                                                                                                                        
L255/33. The fact that a formal agreement has not been concluded does not exclude a finding of an agreement. 
See in that regard Pre-Insulated Pipe Cartel Commission Decision 1999/60/EC [1998] OJ L24/1, para 134.  
537 Eg Ian S Forrester notes that ‘a primary purpose of the competition rules is the protection of society against 
damage caused by anti-competitive conduct. See Ian S Forrester, ‘Due Process in EC Competition Law: A 
Distinguished Institution with Flawed Procedure’ (2009) 34(6) Economic Law Review 817, 828.  
538 Fernando Castillo de la Torre and Eric Gippini Fournier, ‘Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review in EU 
Competition Law’ (n 139) 176. See to the same effect, Joined Cases 40 to 48, 50, 54 to 56, 111, 113 and 114–73 
Suiker Unie and others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1975:174, para 164 and Case T-56/99 Marlines v 
Commission ECLI:EU:T:2003:333, para 57.  
539 The EU courts accept even unsigned documents as evidence. See eg Joined Cases T-217/03 and T-245/03 
FNCBV and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2006:391, para 124; Case T-541/08 Sasol and Others v 
Commission ECLI:EU:T:2014:628, para 232 and Case T-655/11 FSL and Others v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2015:383, para 204. 
540 See eg Maurice E Stucke, ‘Should Competition Policy Promote Happiness?’ (2013) 81(5) Fordham Law 
Review 2575, 2580 (‘When the International Competition Network surveyed thirty-five of its member countries 
on the objectives of their monopoly laws, the most popular goal was ensuring an effective competitive process. 
Likewise, US courts have observed that the purpose of antitrust law, at least as articulated in the modern cases, 
is to protect the competitive process’).  
541 See eg Robert H Bork, ‘Goals of Antitrust: A Dialogue on Policy’ (n 331) 363 (referring to the US antitrust 
enforcement crisis, he noted that: ‘The continued acceptance and expansion of their doctrine, which today 
constitutes antitrust's growing edge, threaten within the foreseeable future to destroy the antitrust laws as 
guarantors of a competitive economy’). See also Donald F Turner, ‘The Durability, Relevance, and Future of 
American Antitrust Policy’ (1987) 75(3) California Law Review 797 (arguing that ‘American antitrust law … 
has made a significant contribution to the performance of the United States' economy’). 
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infringement of EU competition law may be proven not only by direct evidence, but also 
through indicia, provided that they are objective and consistent.542 
The fact that the Authority did not use the legal opportunity to correct its procedural and 
substantive errors when dealing with the ten insurance company cases could be considered 
another error. Such opportunity was given to the Authority by the Court of First Instance in 
the Dardania case and other cases. According to the procedural and substantive legal 
provisions in force, when the Court of First Instance sets aside the decision of any 
administrative organ, in this case the Authority, it refers the case back to the administrative 
organ for redecision, compelling the organ to take into account the court’s findings and 
remarks.  
The Court of First Instance annulled the Authority’s decision because of, inter alia, errors in 
the declaration of the legal basis, insufficient reasoning, and failure to adhere to the 
procedural requirements. However, instead of using the opportunity to issue another ruling 
based on the suggestions and remarks of the court, the Authority decided to challenge the 
court’s decision in the Court of Appeal. 
The Dardania case, which was one of the first cases decided by the Court of First Instance, 
was an exceptional opportunity for the Authority to obtain guidance on the subsequent 
insurance cases. However, as stated, the Authority instead decided to appeal the judgment, 
although the court found clear legal violations by the Authority in issuing the ruling, 
specifically in relation to the Law on Administrative Procedure. If the Authority had taken 
the chance to rectify the procedural omissions, especially after the Court of First Instance 
judgment, this would have reduced the Authority’s burden in the appeal, in that the Authority 
would have had to argue only on the basis of substantive law. 
If the Authority had decided to issue a new ruling in the Dardania case, as required by the 
Court of First Instance, not only would it have been easier for the Authority to decide the case 
correctly, but the involvement of the Court of Appeal and the court’s approach and the new 
requests and obligations which the Authority found impossible to fulfil would have been 
avoided. 
It can be concluded that, in these cases, from the initial investigation phase, procedural543 and 
substantive errors occurred. Flaws included: lack of express544 indication of the legal basis545 
                                                 
542 Case C-74/14 Eturas and Others ECLI:EU:C:2016:42, para 37. 
543 See to that effect Case C-286/95 P Commission v Imperial Chemical Industries ECLI:EU:C:2000:188, para 
41; Case C-137/92 P Commission v BASF and Others ECLI:EU:C:1994:247, para 76 and Joined Cases C-
287/95 P and C-288/95 P Commission v Solvay ECLI:EU:C:2000:189, para 45. 
544 See Case C-325/91 Franc v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1993:245, para 30.  
545 See Case T-14/89 Montedipe v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1992:36, para 324 (‘under Article 190 of the EEC 
Treaty the Commission is obliged to state the reasons on which its decisions are based, mentioning the factual 
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in a clear and concise manner; failure to specify which specific provisions of the Law on 
Competition were violated; insufficient and contradictory546 reasoning.547 According to EU 
jurisprudence on enforcement of EU competition rules, adopting an act without expressly 
indicating the relevant provision of EU law infringes the principle of legal certainty.548 The 
same flaws appear during the court litigation, where the Authority did not produce sufficiently 
precise and coherent grounds to justify its decisions.549 
                                                                                                                                                        
and legal elements which provide the legal basis for the measure and the considerations which have led it to 
adopt its decision’).  
546 See eg Koen Lenaerts, Ignace Maselis, and Kathleen Gutman, EU Procedural Law (n 218) 379. (‘A minimal, 
merely formal statement of reasons is not enough because it does not effectively enable interested parties and 
the Union judicature to verify the legality of the act’).  
547 See Case 18–57 Nold v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1959:6, 53; Case C-389/10P KME Germany and Others v 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:2011:816, para 128; Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2008:101 para 185; Case 42/84 Remia and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1985:327, para 34; 
Joined Cases 142/84 and 156/84 BAT and Reynolds v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1987:490, para 62; Case 255/84 
Nachi Fujikoshi v Council ECLI:EU:C:1987:203, para 39; Case T-249/06 Interpipe Niko Tube and Interpipe 
NTRP v Council ECLI:EU:T:2009:62, para 65; Case T-2/95 Industrie des poudres sphériques v Council 
ECLI:EU:T:1998:242, para 357; and Joined Cases T-466/93, T-469/93, T-473/93, T-474/93 and T-477/93 
O'Dwyer and Others ν Council ECLI:EU:T:1995:136, para 67. 
548 See Joined Cases 240 to 242, 261, 262, 268 and 269/82 Stichting Sigarettenindustrie ECLI:EU:C:1985:488, 
para, 88; C-325/91 Franc v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1993:245, para 30; Case C-370/07 Commission v Council 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:590, para 38 and Case T-14/89 Montedipe v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1992:36, para 324.  
549 See Joined Cases T-185/96, T-189/96 and T-190/96 Riviera Auto Service and Others v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:1999:8 para 47 and Case C-29/83 CRAM v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1984:130, para 20. 
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7.15 The Fiscal Cash Electronic Devices Cases: The Gekos Case 
7.15.1 Introduction 
 
In 2009, the Government of Kosovo decided to initiate a process of fiscalization for 
businesses registered and operating legally within the territory of Kosovo, in order to combat 
the informal economy. For that purpose, it took a decision to commence the implementation 
of fiscal cash registers for business enterprises operating in Kosovo.550 
The decision addressed certain issues related to the process of fiscalization, among them a 
timetable for the start of fiscalization, technical specifications of the cash registers, the list of 
enterprises required to be equipped with cash registers, and the issuance of by-laws. 
Based on the responsibilities defined in the aforementioned decision, the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance issued an Administrative Instruction on the use of Fiscal Electronic 
Devices (‘FEDs’).551 The Administrative Instruction establishes certain rules regarding 
selection, installation and use of FEDs during trade activity within the territory of Kosovo. 
The scope of the Administrative Instruction also includes the technical specifications of 
FEDs, rules pertaining to their use and maintenance during their supply by authorized 
persons, and the manner of connecting the FEDs with the Tax Administration of Kosovo552 
for the purpose of obtaining fiscal data from authorized persons.553 
Based on this Administrative Instruction, within the territory of Kosovo, no economic 
operator can sell, install or maintain cash registers without fulfilling the prescribed conditions 
and without being licensed by the Ministry of Economy and Finance. The Administrative 
Instruction states that: 
‘Once a model of fiscal electronic devices has successfully passed all tests, the 
Commission within the Ministry of Economy and Finance will issue and give to the 
requester a special protected licence number for the specific model of equipment. This 
licence will provide evidence to customers that the dealer is authorized to sell that 
specific model of equipment and that the model meets all specifications and criteria for 
                                                 
550 Government of Kosovo, Decision No 02/56 on the Implementation of Fiscal Cash Registers throughout 
Kosovo, 18 February 2009. Available at http://www.atk-ks.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/09/Vendimi_qeveris.pdf (in Albanian only). Last accessed on 6 January 2017.  
551 Administrative Instruction No 12/2009 on Amendment and Supplement of the Administrative Instruction No 
06/2009 on the Use of Fiscal Electronic Devices, 17 September 2009. Available at http://www.atk-ks.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/10/Udhezim_Administrativ_12_20091.pdf. Last accessed on 12 February 2018. 
[Hereinafter: the Administrative Instruction on FEDs].  
552 For more details see Tax Administration of Kosovo. Available at: http://www.atk-ks.org/en/about-us/. Last 
accessed on 21 June 2018. 
553 The Administrative Instruction on FEDs (n 551) Arts 1–2. 
103 
 
use as a Fiscal Electronic Device.554A licensed dealer must designate those persons who 
will be authorized to install or repair those FEDs which it is licensed to sell’.555 
In order to implement the Decision of the Government of Kosovo for the fiscalization of 
businesses in the entire territory of Kosovo, the Ministry of Economy and Finance established 
a Commissionfor licensing undertakings engaged in the sale, installation and maintenance of 
FEDs. The Commission, inter alia, was in charge of: ‘Developing and implementing the 
procedure for testing and approval of FEDs and other related equipment; reviewing 
prospective FED sellers or dealers to ensure that they meet criteria developed by the 
Commission for selling FEDs; and testing FED models proposed for use in Kosovo to ensure 
that they meet (comply with) the technical and functional specifications’.556 
Following the public announcement, more than ten companies expressed an interest in 
obtaining a licence. However, according to the Commission, only two undertakings met all 
the criteria to be licensed for the sale, installation and maintenance of FEDs within the 
territory of Kosovo. Those two undertakings were Gekos and Dukagjini. The analysis and 
discussion of the cases involving these two entities set out below will show that the sale, 
installation and maintenance of FEDs was mainly undertaken not by these two licensed 
undertakings, but by a third, unlicensed undertaking. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
554 Ibid Art 13. 
555 Ibid Art 15. 
556 The Administrative Instruction on FEDs (n 551) Art 11. 
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7.15.2 Facts of the Case 
 
As mentioned above, Gekos557 and Dukagjini558 were the only undertakings licensed by the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance for the sale, installation and maintenance of FEDs in 
Kosovo. The Decisions of the Ministry granting that licence contained the following: 
I. The economic operators, Gekos and Dukagjini, are selected to supply fiscal 
electronic devices; 
II. Gekos and Dukagjini will sell, install and maintain fiscal electronic devices in 
the entire territory of Kosovo; 
III. Each device will be licensed in the Centre for Certification of Fiscalization; 
IV. The decision is valid for the next four years; 
V. The decision may be revoked if the Gekos and Dukagjini undertakings do not 
respect the conditions set by the legislation in force; 
VI. The Commission on Fiscalization, the Tax Administration of Kosovo, and the 
Gekos and Dukagjini undertakings are responsible for the implementation of 
this decision; 
VII. This decision shall enter into force upon signature.559 
 
It must be reiterated that, despite the fact that only two560 undertakings had been licensed for 
the sale, installation and maintenance of FEDs, neither was providing such products and 
services to consumers, but were instead providing these for a third, unlicensed undertaking, 
called Enternet. This was not only in breach of competition rules, but also contrary to the 
point II of the licensing decision. 
In order to ensure observance of the competition rules, the Authority started an administrative 
investigation procedure concerning alleged infringements of the Law on Competition 
provisions. As the result, the Authority deduced that Gekos abused its dominant position, 
whereas Dukagjini engaged in concerted practice. Both undertakings were fined in the 
amount of one thousand hundred euro. However, Enternet was neither investigated nor fined. 
                                                 
557 Ministry of Economy and Finance, Decision No KAF-11/2009, 26 November 2009. 
558 Ministry of Economy and Finance, Decision No KAF-12/2009, 26 November 2009. 
559 Ibid.  
560 According to the assertion made by representatives of the two licensed companies during the respective 
trials, more than ten undertakings bid during the licensing process.  
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7.16 The Procedures Followed by the Authority in the Gekos Case 
7.16.1 Initiation of Investigation 
 
After the fiscalization process started, the Authority became aware that goods and services 
for which the two abovementioned undertakings were licensed were not being distributed by 
them, but that they had sub-contracted such services to a third company called Enternet. As a 
result, not only were the two undertakings not in competition with each other, but they had 
enabled a third company to become dominant in the relevant market. For these reasons the 
Authority issued a conclusion561 initiating the investigation into the undertakings Gekos and 
Dukagjini. 
 
7.16.2 The Hearing 
 
Following the Authority’s initiation of investigation, the undertakings were invited to a 
hearing. Both parties under investigation participated in the hearing.562 At the hearing, the 
Authority claimed that the sale of FEDs was not being done by the two undertakings licensed 
by the Ministry of Economy and Finance, but by a third undertaking called Enternet, 
evidence for which was the advertisement ‘Gekos-Enternet-Dukagjini’.563 
The representatives of Gekos asserted at this hearing inter alia: 
‘The company Enternet is the sister company of Gekos564 and works for the interests of 
Gekos’.565 
The representative of Dukagjini stated: 
‘Dukagjini had begun importing the first FEDs, which they were hoping to launch in the 
market in the following weeks.566 Dukagjini is planning to contract Enternet as its 
                                                 
561 Kosovo Competition Authority, Conclusion for initiating the investigation into the enterprises Gekos and 
Dukagjini, 9 July 2010. 
562 Kosovo Competition Authority, Records of hearings with the representatives of the enterprises Gekos and 
Dukagjini, at which they were present, 10 August 2010. [Hereinafter: Records of hearing]. 
563 Ibid. 
564 The owner of Enternet is the son of the owner of Gekos. 
565 Records of hearing (n 562). 
566 The licensing by the Ministry was done on 26 November 2009 and between then and the date of the hearing, 
10 August 2010, almost a year after the licensing date, Dukagjini had not sold a single fiscal cash register 
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operator in the market because of the network it had created and the professionalism that 
it possessed; however, they did not yet have a contract with them’.567 
The Authority had asked the Gekos representative whether they had a contract with Enternet. 
The Gekos representative affirmed the contract with Enternet for the sale, installation, and 
maintenance of FEDs.568 The Authority stated: 
‘We have noted that in addition to the two operators licensed by the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance, another third operator, which had not been licensed for such 
services, had appeared’.569 
None of the licensed undertakings objected to the Authority’s claim, since both already 
admitted that Enternet was doing business for them. 
 
7.17 The Authority’s Decision Imposing a Fine on Gekos 
 
After the hearing and investigations, the Authority took a decision570 to fine Gekos for abuse 
of a dominant position. In declaring the legal basis for the decision, the Authority stated 
Article 15 (b) and (e) of the Law on Competition 571 and Articles 13 and 17 of the Law on 
Administrative Procedure.572 
In the reasoning regarding determining the dominant position the Authority deduced: 
‘Despite the fact that the two abovementioned undertakings [Gekos and Dukagjini] are 
licensed for the sale, installation, and maintenance of FEDs, according to contract Nr. 
01/10 of 28.12.2009 for the sale, etc. of FEDs between Gekos and Enternet, sales are 
carried out by Enternet, with the logo ‘Dukagjini, Enternet, Gekos’. Dukagjini has not 
itself sold any FEDs at all, although it was licensed and had undertaken the obligation 
from the Ministry of Economy and Finance. This thereby enables Gekos to have a 
dominant position in the FED market in Kosovo, in breach of Article 14 of the Law on 
Competition’.573 
                                                 
567 Records of hearing (n 562). 
568 Ibid. 
569 Ibid 1–2. 
570 Kosovo Competition Authority, Decision on the concerted practice for the sale of fiscal cash electronic 
devices between enterprises Gekos and Dukagjini, 1 September 2010. [Hereinafter: The Authority’s Decision 
imposing a fine on Gekos]. 
571 See Law on Competition (n 17) Art 15.  
572 The Authority’s Decision imposing a fine on Gekos (n 570). 
573 Ibid 3. 
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According to the last sentence of the Authority’s reasoning, holding a dominant position can 
be unlawful per se. However, this is not the case, because having a dominant position is not 
per se against the law.574 It is the abuse of a dominant position that constitutes a violation of 
the Law on Competition. 
In defining a dominant position,575 the Authority should have determined and given grounded 
reasons as to why Gekos had a dominant position.576 The assessment of the dominant 
position should have been appraised more thoroughly under Article 14 of the Law on 
Competition,577 especially as regards the influence of Gekos’s actions in the relevant 
market.578 By reference to Article 14 para 1(a), it is clear that under this legal provision 
Gekos had a dominant position, because as a supplier of FEDs it was not subject to real 
competition.579 Also indicative was Gekos’s high market share in the relevant market. Article 
14(2) of the Law on Competition assesses every undertaking having above 40% of the market 
                                                 
574 See generally, Moritz Lorenz, An Introduction to EU Competition Law (n 209) 88 (‘A dominant company 
needs to abuse its position of economic strength to come under Article 82 EC’). 
575 See eg Giorgio Monti, EC Competition Law (1st edn, Cambridge University Press 2007) 127. [Hereinafter: 
Giorgio Monti, EC Competition Law] (‘In applying Article 82, and for most merger cases, the Commission must 
identify dominance’). 
576 Cf Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige ECLI:EU:C:2011:83 paras 23 and 79; Case 85/76 
Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1979:36, para 38, Case C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom v 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, para 170; Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 
para 65; Case 322/81 Michelin v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1983:313, para 29; Case 311/84 Centre belge d'études 
de marché – Télémarketing v Compagnie luxembourgeoise de télédiffusion and Information publicité Benelux 
ECLI:EU:C:1985:394, para 16; Joined Cases C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P Compagnie maritime belge transports 
and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2000:132, para 34; Case 30/87, Corinne Bodson v Pompes funèbres des 
régions libérées ECLI:EU:C:1988:225, para 26; Case T-340/03 France Télécom v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2007:22, para 99, upheld in case C-202/07 P France Télécom v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2009:214, 
para 103; Case T-65/98 Van den Bergh Foods v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2003:281, para 154; Case T-139/98 
Amministrazione Autonoma dei Monopoli di Stato v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2001:272, para 51; Case T-282/02 
Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v Commission, para 195; Case T-102/96 Gencor v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:1999:65, para 200; and Case T-321/05 AstraZeneca v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2010:266, para 239. 
See also, Mark-Oliver Mackenrodt, Beatriz Conde Gallego and Stefan Enchelmaier (eds) Abuse of Dominant 
Position: New Interpretation, New Enforcement Mechanisms? (Springer 2008) 74. [Hereinafter: Mark-Oliver 
Mackenrodt, Beatriz Conde Gallego and Stefan Enchelmaier (eds) Abuse of Dominant Position: New 
Interpretation, New Enforcement Mechanisms?] and William E Kovacic, ‘The Intellectual DNA of Modern US 
Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix’ (2007) 1(1) Columbia 
Business Law Review 1.  
577 See Law on Competition (n 17) Art 14. 
578 See Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2008:101 para 23; Case C-62/86 AKZO v 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:1991:286, para 189; Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:1979:36, para 91 and Case T-228/97 Irish Sugar v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1999:246, para 122. 
See also Caroline Cauffman and Qian Hao (eds) Procedural Rights in Competition Law in the EU and China (n 
135) 17 and 18; Nicola Giocoli, Predatory Pricing in Antitrust Law and Economics (Routledge 2014) 13; and 
Albertina Albors-Llorens, EC Competition Law and Policy (n 243) 75. 
579 See eg Joined Cases T-68/89, T-77/89 and T-78/89 Società Italiana Vetro SpA, Fabbrica Pisana SpA and 
PPG Vernante Pennitalia SpA v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1992:38, para 357. 
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share in the relevant market to be in a dominant position. In addition, the behaviour of Gekos 
was contrary to Article 14(3), because it did not prove to be in real competition with the other 
licensed undertaking, Dukagjini, nor determine independently its business policies and offers 
to consumers.580 As a consequence together they had superior power in the relevant market in 
FEDs. Therefore, the two undertakings are clearly able to prevent effective competition in the 
relevant market, in breach of competition rules.581 However, none of these essential elements 
was included or argued in the Authority’s ruling. 
 
7.17.1 Establishing the Abuse of a Dominant Position 
 
According to the findings of the Authority: 
‘Gekos, as the single operator for the sale, installation, and maintenance of FEDs in all 
the territory of Kosovo, had sold its products through the undertaking Enternet, under the 
logo ‘Dukagjini-Enternet-Gekos’. Enternet carries out the sales on behalf of Dukagjini, 
an act which is considered a concerted practice, contrary to Article 3 of the Law on 
Competition, thus abusing a dominating position, which is contrary to Article 15, paras 
(b) and (e)’.582 
There is currently no good definition of abuse of a dominant position.583 Abuse of a dominant 
position should be determined based on analysis and findings regarding the economic 
                                                 
580 See Joined Cases C-89/85, C-104/85, C-114/85, C-116/85, C-117/85 and C-125/85 to C-129/85 Ahlstrom v 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:1993:120, para 63 and Case C-7/95 P John Deere v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:1998:256, para 86.  
581 See Case 6/72 Continental Can v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1973:22, para 25 (‘Articles 85 and 86 seek to 
achieve the same aim on different levels, viz the maintenance of effective competition within the Common 
Market’). 
582 The Authority’s Decision imposing a fine on Gekos (n 570) 3. 
583 See in particular, Pranvera Kellezi, Bruce Kilpatrick and Pierre Kobel (eds) Abuse of Dominant Position and 
Globalization & Protection and Disclosure of Trade Secrets and Know-How (Springer 2017) 33. [Hereinafter: 
Pranvera Kellezi, Bruce Kilpatrick and Pierre Kobel (eds) Abuse of Dominant Position and Globalization & 
Protection and Disclosure of Trade Secrets and Know-How] and Johannes Paha (ed) Competition Law 
Compliance Programmes: An Interdisciplinary Approach (n 527) 107. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Isabela 
Atanasiu (eds) European Competition Law Annual 2003: What Is an Abuse of a Dominant Position? (Hart 
Publishing 2006). [Hereinafter: Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Isabela Atanasiu (eds) European Competition Law 
Annual 2003: What Is an Abuse of a Dominant Position?]; Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Mel Marquis (eds) 
European Competition Law Annual 2007; A Reformed Approach to Article 82 EC (n 266) 201 and more 
generally Giorgio Monti, ‘The Concept of Dominance in Article 82’ (2006) 2 European Competition Journal 31. 
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strength enjoyed by an undertaking, and its ability to hinder effective competition in the 
relevant market by acting independently of competitors and consumers.584 
A proper reading of the Authority’s reasoning determining the abuse of a dominant position 
is in stark contrast to the modus operandi established in the EU regarding defining 
dominance.585 Renato Nazzini argues that ‘dominance in general is defined as an 
undertaking’s ability to harm competition’.586 In addition, he notes that having defined 
dominance, ‘the three necessary elements of the dominance test should be examined: 
substantial and durable market power, the presence of dynamic barriers to entry, and the 
absence of countervailing buyer power’.587 In the same vain, he suggests that dominant 
undertakings ‘may harm competition in three ways, namely by exclusionary conduct,588 by 
exploitation of customers,589 or by discrimination’.590 
                                                 
584 See eg Hanns Ullrich (ed) The Evolution of European Competition Law: Whose Regulation, Which 
Competition? (n 445) 221 (‘Abusive behavior is thus prohibited from the moment that the interests of a 
consumer are damaged, whether or not a competing company has suffered a change in the conditions of 
competition’). 
585 See eg the interpretation of the concept of abuse of dominant position by the EU courts. Case 31/80 L’Ore´al 
ECLI:EU:C:1980:289 para 26; Case 322/81 Michelin v Commission ECLI:EU: C:1983:313 para 30; Case 
247/86 Alsatel ECLI:EU:C:1988:469 para 12; Case C-62/86 AKZO v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 para 
69; Case 85/76 ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission para 91; Case 27/76 United Brands v 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 paras 65 and 66; Case T-30/89 Hilti v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1991:70, para 
90; Case T-128/98 Ae’roports de Paris v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2000:290, para 147. See also in this regard 
the Commission interpretation: AKZO Commission Decision no 85/609/EEC [1985] OJ L374/1, para 67; BPB 
Industries pic Commission Decision no 89/22/EEC [1989] OJ L10/50, para 114; Soda/Solvay Commission 
Decision no 91/299/EEC [1991] OJ L152/21, para 40; Soda/ICI Commission Decision no 91/300/EEC [1991] 
OJ L152/40, para 41; Van den Bergh Foods Limited Commission Decision no 98/531/EC [1998] OJ L246/1, 
para 256; Virgin/British Airways Commission Decision no 2000/74/EC [2000] OJ L30/1, para 86 and Michelin 
Commission Decision no 2002/405/EC [2002] OJ L143/1, para 172.  
586 Renato Nazzini, The Foundation of European Competition Law: The Objective and Principles of Article 102 
(n 72) 328 and 329. 
587 Ibid 328. 
588 See to the same effect Case C-95/04 P British Airways v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2007:166, para 58; Case 
27/76 United Brands v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 paras 65 to 68; Case T-83/91 Tetra Pak International 
v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1994:246, para 137; Case T-203/01 Michelin v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2003:250, 
paras 197–199; Joined Cases 40/73 to 48/73, 50/73, 54/73 to 56/73, 111/73, 113/73 and 114/73 Suiker Unie and 
Others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1975:174, para 523; Case C-62/86 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:1991:286, para 149; and Case T-65/89 BPB Industries and British Gypsum ν Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:1993:31, para 68. 
589 See Case 395/87 Tournier ECLI:EU:C:1989:319, para 34; and Case 66/86 Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and 
Silver Line Reisebüro GmbH v Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs ECLI:EU:C:1989:140, para 
43.  
590 Ibid 329. 
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In the first years after the process of supplying businesses with FEDs started, there were 
numerous complaints by businesses591 that the prices were too high, and that the mandatory 
yearly maintenance and material was very costly.592 
It can be established as a genuine fact that the Authority did not examine the issue in the light 
of Article 15(e) either.593 This Article catches the case of any undertaking in a dominant 
position and establishes abuse if it is proved that a dominant undertaking used its dominance 
to establish another undertaking in the relevant market for privileged purposes. The Authority 
should have assessed the Enternet undertaking in light of these considerations, since it was 
created by a relative of Gekos’s owner and furthermore gained privileges in the relevant 
market in FEDs from Gekos. 
In light of the abovementioned, from substantive and procedural law aspects, the Authority’s 
findings cannot be regarded as founded. 
First, as regards the substantive aspects of the findings, apart from those already examined 
above, the Authority’s decision contains a number of contradictions which undermine the 
Authority’s reasoning. In the introduction to the Authority’s decision it was stated that there 
was a suspicion regarding concerted practice in the sale of FEDs by Gekos and Dukagjini. 
The suspicion of violations of the Law on Competition, however, should serve to prompt the 
Authority to initiate investigations, but not to make decisions. In order to make legitimate 
decisions, suspicions on the basis of which investigations have commenced must be proved 
and verified by the Authority based on sufficient and consistent evidence. ‘It follows from 
these examples that the Court of First Instance carried out its review in the manner required 
of it, as set out in paragraph 39 of this judgment. It explained and set out the reasons why the 
Commission's conclusions seemed to it to be inaccurate in that they were based on 
insufficient, incomplete, insignificant and inconsistent evidence’).594  The Authority must not 
                                                 
591 See http://energjia.al/2010/08/16/kosove-konkurrenca-ule-cmimet-e-arkave (in Albanian). Business owners 
noted that real competition in the relevant market was required for FED prices to decrease. 
592 See eg statement of the Kosovo Democratic League (one of the leading political parties) noting that the high 
price of FEDs had increased tax evasion and that businesses were claiming that the FEDs were unaffordable. In 
addition to the high cost of FEDs (from € 600 to € 1,300), businesses were also obliged to pay another € 200 
yearly subscription to the companies that sold them. Available at: http://www.ekonomia-
ks.com/?page=1,5,21324 (in Albania). Last accessed on 6 June 2018. 
593 See Law on Competition (n 17). 
594 C-12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval ECLI: ECLI:EU:C:2005:87, para 48; Case C-185/95 P Baustahlgewebe 
v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1998:608, para 58; Case C-49/92 P Commission v Anic Partecipazioni 
ECLI:EU:C:1999:356, para 86 and Joined Cases T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 and T-78/00 JFE Engineering v 
Commission ECLI:EU:T:2004:221, para 173. See also to that effect, Mónika Papp, ‘Application of EU 
Competition Law by the Hungarian Judiciary: Cooperation with the ECJ and Relying on the Case Law of the 
EctHR’ in Adriana Almășan and Peter Whelan (eds) The Consistent Application of EU Competition Law: 
Substantive and Procedural Challenges (n 270) 269 (‘in practice that the GVH has to rely on consistent and 
convergent evidence, not on speculations or hypothesis. The body of evidence cannot contain conflicting 
evidence; it should be consistent by nature’). 
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base its allegations on hypothetical factors,595 but its decisions must be made solely on the 
basis of the factual and legal grounds. 
Further, in the Authority's ruling it was stated: 
‘Dukagjini, even though licensed to sell FEDs, did not sell them, in this way restricting 
competition in the relevant market and enabling Gekos to have a dominant position, and 
by this coordinated practice violating Article 3.2 (b)596 and abusing its dominant position. 
Enternet, which carries out sales on behalf of Dukagjini, is considered to be involved in a 
concerted practice under Article 3 of the Law on Competition, and thus has abused a 
dominant position, something that is contrary to Article 15 paras (b) and (e)’.597 
The sentence makes it difficult to understand which undertaking violated which provisions of 
the Law on Competition.598 Based on the abovementioned recital, it is unclear which of the 
undertakings abused its dominant position — Gekos, Dukagjini, Enternet or the undertakings 
jointly. ‘There is nothing, in principle, to prevent two or more independent economic entities 
from being, on a specific market, united by such economic links that, by virtue of that fact, 
together they hold a dominant position vis-à-vis the other operators on the same market. This 
could be the case, for example, where two or more independent undertakings jointly have, 
through agreements or licences, a technological lead affording them the power to behave to 
an appreciable extent independently of their competitors, their customers and ultimately of 
their consumers’.599 The adoption of joint abusive conduct600 was never considered or even 
mentioned by the Authority. ‘Several undertakings may also perpetrate an abuse jointly. This 
is the case if they act together. It is sufficient if roles are assigned and the abuse occurs only 
through the combination of all behaviours’.601 
Furthermore, the Authority’s ruling is contradictory in relation to determining the abuse of a 
dominant position, since its reasoning in the same part sometimes claims abuse of a dominant 
position and sometimes concerted practice, despite the fact that the alleged infringement in 
                                                 
595 See Case T-374/00 DEP-Verband der freien Rohrwerke and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2003:188, 
para 170 and Case T-279/04 Éditions Odile Jacob v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2010:384, para 338 (in French).  
596 This Article deals with anti-competitive agreements and not abuse of a dominant position, which is the 
subject of the Authority’s ruling in this particular case.  
597 The Authority’s Decision imposing a fine on Gekos (n 570) 4. 
598 Case T-25/05 KME Germany and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2010:206, para 172 and Case T-446/05 
Amann & Söhne and Cousin Filterie v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2010:165, para 94.  
599 See Joined Cases T-68/89, T-77/89 and T-78/89 Società Italiana Vetro SpA, Fabbrica Pisana SpA and PPG 
Vernante Pennitalia SpA v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1992:38, para 358 and Joined Cases C-395/96 P and C-
396/96 P Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2000:132, para 36.  
600 Case C-393/92 Municipality of Almelo and others v NV Energiebedrijf Ijsselmij ECLI:EU:C:1994:171, para 
42 and Case C-96/94 Centro Servizi Spediporto Srl v Spedizioni Marittima del Golfo Srl ECLI:EU:C:1995:308, 
para 33.  
601 See Walter Frenz, Handbook of EU Competition Law (n 217) 807  and Moritz Lorenz, An Introduction to EU 
Competition Law (n 209) 208.  
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this case was abuse of a dominant position by Gekos. The Authority declares that sales of 
FEDs are based on formal contracts between the undertakings, copies of which the Authority 
possesses.602 This, however, apart from constituting insufficient reasoning, also precludes the 
Authority inferring that the case involved concerted practices. Under the provisions of the 
Law on Competition, a concerted practice consists of informal cooperation between 
enterprises, not written agreements, as in this case.603 
The foregoing is sufficient to establish as a genuine issue of fact that the only selling 
undertaking was Enternet, enjoying entire freedom of action, enabling it to restrict 
competition in the relevant market.604 This conduct may constitute abuse of a dominant 
position605 because it hinders freedom of choice606 and falls under provisions on exclusivity 
agreements.607 
It should be borne in mind that if the Authority decided to allege violation of Article 3.2(ii), 
this would have been legally correct and easily argued based on the contracts concluded 
between the undertakings and the selling price of FEDs. In this sense, the legal basis should 
have been stated as Article 3.2(ii),608 as the object or effect of the contracts or agreements are 
in open conflict with the provisions of the Law on Competition.609 It would have been easier 
for the Authority to justify and defend its case in court on this basis too. 
At least two activities that are contrary to the Law on Competition are apparent in the 
behaviour of Gekos and Dukagjini. The first is entering an agreement that it has as its object 
and effect elimination of competition610 in a market in which there is already little 
competition.611 and the second is to create a strong dominant position in the relevant market. 
According to the settle EU case law, ‘abuse may therefore occur if an undertaking in a 
dominant position strengthens such position in such a way that the degree of dominance 
reached substantially fetters competition, ie that only undertakings remain in the market 
whose behaviour depends on the dominant one’. In addition it is prohibited for a dominant 
undertaking to eliminate competitors ‘...and thereby strengthening its position by using 
                                                 
602 The Authority’s Decision imposing a fine on Gekos (n 570).  
603 See Law on Competition (n 17) Art 2(1). 
604 See in that regard Vitamins Commission Decision no 76/642/EEC [1976] OJ L223/27, para 21. 
[Hereinafter: Commission’s Decision on Vitamins]. 
605 See Case T-51/89 Tetra Pak Rausing v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1990:41, para 21. 
606 See Commission’s Decision on Vitamins (n 607), para 22. 
607 See in that regard Commission’s Decision on Vitamins (n 604) para 22. 
608 Cf Case 247/86 Alsatel v Novasam ECLI:EU:C:1988:469, para 20 (‘If the large share of the regional market 
held by the plaintiff was the result of an agreement between authorized installers to share out regional markets 
between them, such an agreement ought to be caught by Article 85 of the Treaty’).  
609 See Case 56/65 ECLI:EU:C:1966:38, para 20.  
610 See in this regard, Case 6/72 Continental Can v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1973:22, para 24. 
611 See in that regard, Joined Cases T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 and T-78/00 JFE Engineering v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2004:221, para 66. 
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methods other than those which come within the scope of competition on the basis of 
quality’.612  
With regard to the procedural aspect, similar to the majority of Authority rulings,613 the 
findings are not evidence based or well justified as required by procedural rules.614 It should 
be recalled that the Authority’s ruling was contradictory in its three main parts, namely 
disposition, reasoning and the final part imposing a fine. The disposition of the contested 
decision found concerted practice, the reasoning established abuse of a dominant position, 
whereas the part imposing the fine referred to both, even though it was ascertained that Gekos 
only abused its dominant position. As a result, it was fined for abuse of a dominant position. 
The Authority should have clearly lay out and justified the necessary elements for issuing its 
ruling by including all necessary explanations of the legal and factual basis of the decision. 
Law on Administrative Procedure states that the justification must be formulated clearly. Yet 
Koen Lenaerts, Ignace Maselis, and Kathleen Gutman note that ‘A minimal, merely formal 
statement of reasons is not enough because it does not effectively enable interested parties 
and the Union judicature to verify the legality of the act’.615  Such a requirement is applicable 
to any administrative decision, especially to those imposing fines. According to the EU 
courts, the penalties must have proper bases in law.616 
 
7.18 Gekos’s Lawsuits Against the Authority’s Decisions 
 
Gekos, dissatisfied with the decision of the Authority imposing a fine for abuse of a dominant 
position, lodged a suit.617 The applicant sought annulment of the contested decision, alleging 
that the challenged ruling was issued in violation of the procedural and substantive laws. In 
addition, it claimed lack of transparency by the Authority.618 
The applicant, inter alia, asserted: 
                                                 
612 Case 6/72 Continental Can v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1973:22, para 26; Case C-62/86 AKZO v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:1991:286, para 70  and Joined Cases 40 to 48, 50, 54 to 56, 111, 113, and 114–73 Suiker Unie and 
others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1975:174, paras. 526 and 527; Case C-209/10 Post Danmark 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:172, paras. 22–30; and Case T-111/96 ITT Promedia v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1998:183, 
para 139. 
613 Authority’s ruling in the insurance company cases.  
614 See e.g. Case T-30/05 Prym and Prym Consumer v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2007:267, para. 112 (German 
version); and Case 18–57 Nold v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1959:6, 51–52.  
615 Law on Administrative Procedure (n 185) Art 86(1). Koen Lenaerts, Ignace Maselis, and Kathleen Gutman, 
EU Procedural Law (n 218) 379.  
616 Case T-372/10 Bolloré v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2012:325, para. 33.  
617 Gekos, Administrative suit, Supreme Court of Kosovo, 22 February 2011. 
618 Ibid. 
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‘In the contested ruling, the Authority only paraphrased the legal provisions, without 
arguing how the undertaking restricted competition in the relevant market. The Authority 
wrongly concluded that Gekos was the single operator for the sale, installation, and 
maintenance of FEDs. This finding is contrary to recital I of the ruling, in which it is 
stated that the undertakings Gekos and Dukagjini were licensed by the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance. Nevertheless, it was not contested that the claimant had entered 
into an agreement for the sale, etc. of FEDs with Enternet. Furthermore, Enternet carries 
out the sale of FEDs for Dukagjini as well. This circumstance does not support 
coordinated practice, since Enternet as a separate legal entity has a right to enter into 
contractual agreements with other entities. As such Gekos did not abuse its dominant 
position. Regarding lack of transparency, the Authority breached it by the fact that it did 
not offer the claimant the records of the hearings, even though the reasoning of the 
contested decision is referenced in them. By denying Gekos access to such evidence, the 
Authority made it impossible to verify whether the records reflect what was actually 
asserted in the hearing’.619 
 
7.19 The Contract Between Gekos and Enternet 
 
Gekos, as one of the two undertakings licensed for the sale, etc. of FEDs, instead of offering 
such goods and services to end-users, chose to contract620 with Enternet for the distribution of 
FEDs.621 
The object of this contract was the distribution of FEDs. The rights and obligations of the 
contracting parties are regulated by this contract.622 According to the contract623 Enternet is 
bound to sell to the ultimate buyers of FEDs at the price set by Gekos. In addition, Gekos has 
the right to change the prices. Per the contract, Enternet gets a rebate on the amount of sales, 
and the rebate percentage is also part of the contract.624 The Authority, however, should have 
considered, if such an agreement could be qualified as an exclusive625 supply agreement626 
                                                 
619 Ibid. 
620 Gekos and Enternet, Contract No 01/10 for the Distribution of Fiscal Electronic Equipment, valid from the 3 
January 2010. [Hereinafter: Contract between Gekos and Enternet]. 
621 Ibid.  
622 Ibid., Art 1. 
623 Ibid., Art 6. 
624 Ibid., Art 7. 
625 See Douglas A Melamed, ‘Exclusive Dealing Agreements and Other Exclusionary Conduct—Are There 
Unifying Principles?’ (2006) 73 Antitrust Law Journal 375 (‘Exclusive dealing agreements are agreements in 
which one party promises to deal exclusively with another and, thus, not to deal with competitors of the other. 
Such agreements can raise issues under the antitrust laws because, by denying competitors access to the goods 
or services (inputs) offered by the promisor, they can exclude those competitors from the marketplace or 
materially handicap their ability to compete. These agreements are, therefore, a form of ‘exclusionary’ conduct 
in the sense that they can exclude or hinder competitors’). See also generally Andres V Lerner and Benjamin 
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which impairs competition627  and a determining circumstance in Gekos strengthening its 
dominant position and as a result harming consumer welfare.628 Thus, both are prohibited in 
parallel.629 Such an agreement restricts or entirely eliminates the trading opportunities of 
other undertakings and end-users’ freedom of choice.630 It also may constitute selective 
distribution, since both undertakings belong to the same group.631 Albertina Albors-Llorens 
notes that ‘even though the EU Treaty does not define the agreement for the purpose of 
Article 101 TFEU, a clear example of agreements would be written contracts’.632 
 
Table 1: Shows the percentage of the profit of the distributor (Enternet) in the sale of FEDs 
on behalf of Gekos 
                                                                                                                                                        
Klein, ‘The Expanded Economics of Free-Riding: How Exclusive Dealing Prevents Free-Riding and Creates 
Undivided Loyalty’ (2007) 74(2) Antitrust Law Journal 473 and Jonathan M Jacobson, ‘Exclusive Dealing, 
‘Foreclosure,’ and Consumer Harm’ (2002) 70 Antitrust Law Journal 311. 
626 See Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche ECLI:EU:C:1979:36, para 80; Case T-51/89 Tetra Pak I 
ECLI:EU:T:1990:41, para 24 (‘The additional element lies in the very context of the case—in the fact that Tetra 
Pak’s acquisition of the exclusive licence had the practical effect of precluding all competition in the relevant 
market’).  
627 According to Art 10 of the contract, Enternet is the exclusive distributor in the Kosovo market for the sale of 
FEDs.  
628 See eg Federico Etro and Cristina Caffarra, ‘On the Economics of the Android Case’ (2017) 13 European 
Competition Journal 282, 300 (arguing on the ‘potential harm for both rivals and consumers of exclusive dealing 
arrangements’). See also, Giacomo Calzolari and Vincenzo Denicolò, ‘Competition with Exclusive Contracts 
and Market-Share Discounts’ (2013) 103(6) American Economic Review 2384; Louis M Solomon and Robert D 
Joffe, ‘Exclusive Distribution and Antitrust’ (1984) 53(3) Fordham Law Review 491 and Patrick DeGraba, 
‘Naked Exclusion by a Dominant Input Supplier: Exclusive Contracting and Loyalty Discounts’ (2013) 31(5) 
International Journal of Industrial Organization 516. 
629 See eg Walter Frenz, Handbook of EU Competition Law (n 217) 652. See also to that effect Case 32/65 Italy 
v Council and Commission ECLI:EU:C:1966:42 407 and Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche ECLI:EU:C:1979:36, 
para 116. 
630 See in that regard Commission’s Decision on Vitamins (n 604), para 27. 
631 Selection of distribution systems must be provided on the bases of objective criteria and not selective. See eg 
Case 243/83 SA Binon & Cie and SA Agence et messageries de la presse ECLI:EU:C:1985:284, paras 35–37. 
632 Albertina Albors-Llorens, ‘EC Competition Law and Policy’ (n 243) 18.  
Amount (pcs) Rebate (%) 
0 – 100 4% 
100 – 500 6% 
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7.20 The Court Expert Report in the Gekos Case 
 
During the court examination of the Gekos case, the Court of First Instance ruled that a court 
expert633  be assigned in relation to the contested issues between the Authority and Gekos. In 
many cases the Kosovo courts required an expert opinion, especially when economic issues 
were involved. Lewis A Kaplan  notes that ‘antitrust cases often turn on economic evidence. 
Lawyers and judges alike feel ill-equipped to handle such issues alone, and it makes sense 
that they would look to experts for guidance’.634 I.e. the EU Courts are not entitled to 
substitute their own economic assessment.635 According to the court’s ruling, the expert had 
the task of verifying the business relationship between Gekos and Dukagjini regarding sales 
of FEDs, and investigating all the income and sales of FEDs for both undertakings during the 
period 09.06.2010–31.08.2010. The expert would also verify the business books in detail, and 
establish whether taxes had been paid on the declared sold goods.636 
Further to this, an expert provided the court with his findings.637 In this report the sale of 
FEDs by Gekos, Dukagjini and Enternet for the required period were presented. 
The report, inter alia, states: 
‘Gekos had offered to sell the Datecs brand of FED, which was accepted by the 
Commission. According to the terms of the licence, Gekos had to import, sell, install, and 
maintain the devices. Gekos, as one of the two licensed undertakings for the 
abovementioned services, signed the contract for the distribution of FEDs with Enternet. 
Dukagjini has also contracted638 the company Enternet for the distribution of FEDs, 
                                                 
633 Basic Court of Pristina – Administrative Department, Ruling Requesting a Court Expert Report in the 
contested issue between Gekos and the Authority, 20 November 2014. 
634 Lewis A Kaplan, ‘Experts in the Courthouse: Problems and Opportunities’ (2005) 2 Columbia Business Law 
Review 247, 248.  
635 Case C-323/00 P DSG v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2002:260, para 43, Joined Cases T-80/06 and T-182/09 
Budapesti Erőmű Zrt v European Commission, para 65; and Case T-196/04 Ryanair v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2008:585, para. 41. 
636 Ruling Requesting a Court Expert Report (n 633).  
637 Court Expert Report on Gekos case, prepared at the request of and for Basic Court of Pristina, by the court 
expert Sh. M, 16 December 2014. [Hereinafter: the Expert Report]. 
638 Dukagjini and Enternet, Contract No 04-a/10 for the Distribution of Fiscal Electronic Equipment, 6 
September 2010. 
500 – 1000 8% 
1000+ 10% 
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whereby sales and installation were carried out entirely by Enternet.639 The terms of the 
contract between Dukagjini and Enternet are the same as those between Gekos and 
Enternet’.640 
The tables below, based on data from the expert’s report, show the sales of FEDs by both the 
licensed undertakings, Gekos and Dukagjini, and the unlicensed undertaking, Enternet. 
Table 2: Shows sales of FEDs by Gekos for the requested period 
No Month Sales 
1 June 85,325.00 € 
2 July 468,036.64 € 
3 August 1,179,271.05 € 
Total 1,732,632.69 € 
 
Table 3: Shows sales of FEDs by Dukagjini for the requested period 
No Month Sales 
1 June 12,424.72 € 
2 July 0.00 € 
3 August 242,677.42 € 
Total 255,102.14 € 
 
                                                 
639 See Commission’s Decision on Vitamins (n 604), para. 24 (‘The fact of agreeing with purchasers that they 
will buy all or a very large proportion of their requirements from only one source by its very nature removes all 
freedom of choice from purchasers in their selection of sources of supply, and ties them to one supplier’).  
640 The Expert Report (n 637). 
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Table 4: Shows sales of FEDs by Enternet for the requested period 
No Month Sales 
1 June 517,304.51 € 
2 July 701,025.08 € 
3 August 1,240,245.15 € 
Total 2,458,574.74 € 
 
7.20.1 The Expert Report Findings 
 
The judicial expert: 
‘… expresses opinions and findings under assignment by the court, since the expert was 
tasked, based on the evidence of the case, to verify the business conduct of Gekos and 
Dukagjini regarding their sales activity in relation to FEDs, and investigating all income 
connected with FEDs and the sales at both companies during the period 09.06.2010–
31.08.2010. In addition, verifying the business books in detail and whether the taxes for 
goods declared as sold were paid. Based on the evidence offered by the parties, it is clear 
that undertakings Gekos and Dukagjini were licensed by the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance for the sale, etc. of FEDs from two manufacturers, Datecs (Gekos) and Casio 
(Dukagjini). Equipment from these two manufacturers were offered and the offers were 
accepted and certified by the Commission responsible for FEDs. For the period between 
June and August 2010, the transactions of both undertakings for FEDs are shown above, 
along with transactions for Enternet, the main contracted distributor of both economic 
operators, as the specialized distributor for the installation and maintenance of the 
equipment. Gekos, Dukagjini and the main contracted distributor Enternet have kept 
accounting records and have declared their tax obligations. The undertakings licensed by 
the Ministry of Economy and Finance carried out only the import of the FEDs, whereas 
the installation and maintenance of the electronic equipment for Gekos was carried out 
by Enternet, and for Dukagjini, was partly carried out by the company itself, with the 
majority carried out by Enternet. Finally, if a monopoly on the sale of FEDs was created, 
then this monopoly was caused by the licensor itself [the Ministry], in licensing only two 
economic operators …’641 
                                                 
641 The Expert Report (n 637) 5–7. 
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The Authority should have challenged the export report and was capable of vitiating the 
expert report findings by arguing that such findings are not consistent with the objectives of 
the Law on Competition, and that the intent of Article 13 of the Law on Competition is to 
prevent dominant undertakings using dishonest means which may impair competition in the 
relevant market,642 as was proved to be the case in this particular case. 
In addition, almost none of the findings made in this expert report analyze competition 
aspects, or more specifically, the distortion of competition. Marc Jaeger  suggests that ‘one 
should be wary not to put the resolution of the dispute into the hands of non-legal experts. 
Expertise, in economics and elsewhere, should have for its sole purpose giving assistance to 
the judge in performing the task that only he or she is solely in charge of: determining 
whether the law has been breached or not’.643 The conclusion of the court expert report that 
‘if a monopoly on the sale of FEDs was created, then this monopoly was caused by the 
[Ministry] itself by licensing only two undertakings’644 falls outside any economic645 logic of 
competition law.646 In addition, economics647 is widely considered to be increasingly648 
influential in the enforcement649 of European competition law650 as well as other 
jurisdictions.651 ‘Any modern antitrust practitioner would recognize the central role of 
                                                 
642 See generally, Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1979:36, para. 91. 
643 See Marc Jaeger, ‘The Standard of Review in Competition Cases Involving Complex Economic 
Assessments: Towards the Marginalisation of the Marginal Review?’ (n 116) 314. 
644 The Expert Report (n 640). 
645 See generally William E Kovacic, ‘The Influence of Economics in Antitrust Law’ (1992) 30(2) Economic 
Inquiry 294. 
646 See OECD, Latin American Competition Forum, The Role of Economic Analysis in Judicial Decisions—Note 
by the United States (OECD 2008) 1, 2. 
647 See generally, Richard A Posner, ‘The Law and Economics of the Economic Expert Witness’ (1999) 13(2) 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 91 and Daniel L Rubinfeld, ‘Econometrics in the Courtroom’ [1985] 
Columbia Law Review 1048. 
648 See generally, Richard A Posner, ‘Values and Consequences: An Introduction to Economic Analysis of Law’ 
(1998) Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics, Working Paper No 53.  
649 See eg Ariel Ezrachi, ‘Sponge’ (n 3) 59 (‘It is widely accepted that economics play a central and crucial role 
in shaping competition enforcement and intervention’); Marcus Glader, Innovation Markets and Competition 
Analysis (Edward Elgar 2006) 8–9. [Hereinafter: Marcus Glader, Innovation Markets and Competition 
Analysis]. See also more generally, Louis Kaplow, ‘Antitrust, Law & Economics, and the Courts’ (1987) 50(4) 
Law and Contemporary Problems 181. [Hereinafter: Louis Kaplow, ‘Antitrust, Law & Economics, and the 
Courts’]. 
650 Christopher Decker, Economics and the Enforcement of European Competition Law (Edward Elgar 2009) 1. 
See also, Anestis S Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy (1st edn, 
Cambridge University Press 2010), 18. 
651 See Mitja Kovač, Competition Law and Behavioural Evidence in a Courtroom?, Mitja Kovač & Ann-Sophie 
Vandenberghe (eds.), Economic Evidence in EU Competition Law, (Intersentia- Cambridge – Antwerp – 
Portland, 2016) 103. [Hereinafter: Mitja Kovač, Competition Law and Behavioural Evidence in a Courtroom?]. 
and Katarina Zajc, Law and Economics’ Evidence in Competition Law: Jurisprudence in Slovenia, Mitja Kovač 
& Ann-Sophie Vandenberghe (eds.), Economic Evidence in EU Competition Law, (Intersentia- Cambridge – 
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economics in competition policy and case evaluation’.652 This includes in particular market 
definition,653 market power654 and anti-competitive655 practices.656 
Imelda Maher notes that ‘one of the ideas behind EU competition law modernization was a 
new and more economic analysis approach when it comes to competition 
lawenforcement’.657In the same vain, the Authority’s work implies evaluation658 of 
economic659 matters660 while enforcing competition law provisions.661   
                                                                                                                                                        
Antwerp – Portland, 2016) 135. [Hereinafter: Katarina Zajc, Law and Economics’ Evidence in Competition 
Law: Jurisprudence in Slovenia].  
652 Jonathan B Baker, ‘Economics and Politics: Perspectives on the Goals and Future of Antitrust’ (2013) 81(5) 
Fordham Law Review 2175 and William E Kovacic, ‘The Influence of Economics on Antitrust Law’ (1992) 
30(2) Economic Inquiry 294. See also, Antitrust Modernization Commission, Report and Recommendations (n 
200) 3. 
653 Thomas E Kauper, ‘The Problem of Market Definition Under EC Competition Law’ (1997) 20(5) Fordham 
International Law Journal 1682; Patrick Massey, ‘Market Definition and Market Power in Competition 
Analysis: Some Practical Issues’ (2000) 31(4) Economic and Social Review 309; Jonathan B Baker, ‘Market 
Definition: An Analytical Overview’ (2007) 74 Antitrust Law Journal 129; and OECD (2012) Policy 
Roundtables: Market Definition. 
654 See Alessio D’Ignazio and Emanuele Giovannetti, ‘Antitrust Analysis For The Internet Upstream Market: A 
Border Gateway Protocol Approach’ (2006) 2(1) Journal of Competition Law and Economics 43 (‘Market 
power is usually associated with the ability of a firm to raise prices above marginal costs, or above their 
competitive level, without loss of profits’). 
655 See generally Daniel D Sokol, ‘Express Delivery and the Postal Sector in the Context of Public Sector Anti-
Competitive Practices’ (2003) 23 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 353; Anca D Chirita, 
‘Google’s Anti-Competitive and Unfair Practices in Digital Leisure Markets’ (2015) 11(1) Competition Law 
Review 109 and Hassan Qaqaya and George Lipimile (eds) The Effects of Anti-Competitive Business Practices 
on Developing Countries and Their Development Prospects (UNCTAD 2008). Available at 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/ditcclp20082_en.pdf. Last accessed on 14 Aug 2018. 
656 For example, Stephen Wilks notes that ‘implementation of competition policy, apart from legal analysis, also 
requires economic analysis’. Stephen Wilks, ‘Agencies, Networks, Discourses and the Trajectory of European 
Competition Enforcement’ [2007] European Competition Journal 415, 416. [Hereinafter: Stephen Wilks, 
‘Agencies, Networks, Discourses and the Trajectory of European Competition Enforcement’]. 
657 Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca (eds) The Evolution of EU Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2011) 
729. See also, Damien Geradin, ‘Competition Between Rules and Rules of Competition: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis of the Proposed Modernization of the Enforcement of EC Competition Law’ (2002) 9(1) Columbian 
Journal of European Law.  
658 For example, the European Union has established the so-called ‘Chief Competition Economist’ position, to 
assist DG Comp in evaluating the economic impact of its cases. For more information see 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/role_en.html. Last accessed on 3 March 2018.  
659 See inter alia, Mark-Oliver Mackenrodt, Beatriz Conde Gallego and Stefan Enchelmaier (eds) Abuse of 
Dominant Position: New Interpretation, New Enforcement Mechanisms? (n 570) 53 (‘As is well known, the 
European Commission has engaged in a long and substantial reform of EC competition laws in light of a more 
economics-based assessment’) and Frederic Jenny and Yannis Katsoulacos (eds) Competition Law Enforcement 
in the BRICS and in Developing Countries (n 73) 208. 
660 See UNCTAD, The Use of Economic Analysis in Competition Cases (UNCTAD 2009) 1, 3. [Hereinafter: 
UNCTAD, The Use of Economic Analysis in Competition Cases]. 
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The Ministry licensed two undertakings, and if these two operators had not agreed not to be 
in competition with each other,662 then there would be no monopoly situation. In the worst-
case scenario, there would have been a dominant position in the relevant market, but not a 
monopoly, as is stated by the expert report, because there was more than one licensed 
undertaking for the stated goods and services. Furthermore, the Ministry, at the time of 
licensing the two undertakings, did not give either of them the right to select a third company 
to provide such services on their behalf.663 
In addition, the focus on the imports of FEDs in the expert report is irrelevant, because the 
crucial aspects were the competition facets. In this regard, the fact is that, in the relevant 
market, there was only one seller, and that was Enternet. Analysis of who imported FEDs to 
Kosovo is irrelevant; what is particularly important is who provided them to the ultimate 
consumer, including the sales, installation and maintenance. 
Furthermore, the majority of the expert report was focused on whether the two companies, 
Gekos and Dukagjini, declared their tax obligations during the sale and purchase of the FEDs. 
This is not the purpose of the expert report, or at least should not have been. The purpose of 
the expert report is to reflect the factual state as to whether Gekos and Dukagjini distorted or 
restricted competition as a result of not competing in the relevant market and not providing to 
ultimate consumers goods and services for which they had been licensed. 
In light of those considerations, the court should not have based its findings entirely on the 
report. The EU courts have ruled that any external report, which may suggest not being an 
independent source, should not be taken into account.664 Courts in Kosovo, however, tend to 
assess expert reports665 as having very high probative value in almost all fields of law, 
including competition.666 It should be borne in mind that, since the field of competition is 
                                                                                                                                                        
661 Joined Cases 56 and 58–64 Grundig v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1966:41 347. 
662 For example, John Stuart Mill noted that ‘where competitors are so few, they always end up agreeing not to 
compete’: JS Mill Principles of Political Economy: With Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy 
(Longman Green & Co 1923) 143 and George J Stigler, ‘The Economists and the Problem of Monopoly’ (1983) 
University of Chicago Law Occasional Paper, No 19, 1, 4 (citing JS Mill). See also, Daniel A Crane and Herbert 
Hovenkamp (eds) The Making of Competition Policy Legal and Economic Sources (Oxford University Press 
2013). 
663 See point two of the Licensing decision.  
664 Case T-321/05 AstraZeneca v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2010:266, paras 78–79; Case T-10/89 Hoechst v 
Commission ECLI:EU:T:1992:32, para 164; Case T-112/07 Hitachi and Others v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2011:342, para 320. See also more generally, Case T-409/12 Mitsubishi Electric v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2016:17, para 173.  
665 As shall be shown, the courts decided this case based on the abovementioned expert report. 
666 See Ioannis Lianos, ‘“Judging” Economists. Economic Expertise in Competition Law Litigation. A European 
View’ (2009) University College of London Centre for Law and Economics Working Paper No 01–09, 1. Also 
Ioannis Lianos ‘“Judging Economists”: Economic expertise in competition litigation: a European view’ in I 
Lianos and I Kokkoris (eds) The Reform of EC Competition Law: New Challenges (Kluwer International 2010) 
185 and Michael R Baye and Joshua D Wright, ‘Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Generalist Judges? The 
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new in Kosovo, it is too risky for the court to rely fully on such reports;667 instead they 
should rely more on their own expertise. Although Art 25 of the Statute of the EUCJ allows 
the Court to ‘at any time entrust any individual, body, authority, committee or other 
organisation it chooses with the task of giving an expert opinion’, the EU court tends to act 
differently.668 Michael R Baye and Joshua D Wright note that ‘modern critiques of important 
antitrust decisions frequently amount to a claim that the judge misunderstood or misapplied 
the relevant economics, failed to recognize the critical economic issue, or relied on the 
opinions and analysis of the wrong expert’.669 
This enquiry should have been focused at least on the following pillars: 
 Did Gekos and Dukagjini have a right, as the only two undertakings licensed 
by the Ministry of Economy and Finance for the sale, etc. of FEDs, to transfer 
those rights and responsibilities to a third unlicensed company? 
 What was the motive and reasoning of Gekos and Dukagjini in selecting670 the 
same company to sell, install, etc. FEDs on their behalf, and what was the 
impact of this action on competitiveness in the relevant market? 
 Did such an agreement directly or indirectly set the sale or purchase price of 
FEDs within the meaning of Article 3 of the Law on Competition? 
 Through these agreements, was a dominant position created in the relevant 
market and consequently abused, within the meaning of Article 15 of the law? 
                                                                                                                                                        
Impact of Economic Complexity and Judicial Training on Appeals’ (2011) 54(1) Journal of Law & Economics 
1. [Hereinafter: Michael R Baye and Joshua D Wright, ‘Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Generalist Judges? 
The Impact of Economic Complexity and Judicial Training on Appeals’].  
667 See generally, Rebecca Haw, ‘Adversarial Economics in Antitrust Litigation: Losing Academic Consensus in 
the Battle of the Experts’ (2012) 106(3) Northwestern University Law Review 1261 and John E Lopatka & 
William H Page, ‘Economic Authority and the Limits of Expertise in Antitrust Cases’ (n 117). 
668 Fernando Castillo and Eric Gippini note that the commissioning of expert reports remains exceptional (‘In 
the practice of EU Courts, a study in 2008 mentions only 25 cases. The commissioning of an expert’s report by 
the EU Courts has been equally rare in competition cases’). 259. See in that regard, Case T-141/08 EON Energie 
v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2010:516, para 221 (‘In any event, as pointed out by the Commission, those expert 
opinions do indeed suffer from a number of shortcomings’); Case C-276/01 Steffensen ECLI:EU:C:2003:228, 
para 78. See also, Michael J Mandel, ‘Going for the Gold: Economists as Expert Witnesses’ (1999) 13(2) 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 113. [Hereinafter: Michael J Mandel, ‘Going for the Gold: Economists as 
Expert Witnesses’]. 
669 Michael R Baye and Joshua D Wright, ‘Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Generalist Judges? The Impact of 
Economic Complexity and Judicial Training on Appeals’ (n 666) 3. See also, John L Solow and Daniel Fletcher, 
‘Doing Good Economics in the Courtroom: Thoughts on Daubert and Expert Testimony in Antitrust’ [2005] 
Journal of Corporation Law 489. [Hereinafter: John L Solow and Daniel Fletcher, ‘Doing Good Economics in 
the Courtroom: Thoughts on Daubert and Expert Testimony in Antitrust’].  
670 See n 631.  
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 Did the contested agreement enhance the market power of the undertakings 
involved and as a result enable them to charge higher prices than would be 
possible in competitive markets? 
If this had been the main focus of the court expert report, the results and findings would have 
been entirely different, most likely leading to a different ruling by the court. This issue, 
however, should have been raised by the Authority, and the expert report in question strongly 
objected671 to, since it does not help the court to evaluate and decide whether Gekos and 
Dukagjini violated the Law on Competition. On the contrary, this expert report favours the 
undertakings in question. However, in the court hearing, not only did the Authority not 
oppose the report, it did the opposite — stating that it did not object to the expert report.672 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
671 See eg Opinion of the Advocate General Darmon in Joined Cases C-89/85, C-104/85, C-114/85, C-116/85, 
C-117/85 and C-125/85–C-129/85 Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1992:293, para 
335 (‘The Commission, both in its observations on the expert’s report—annexed to which is an opinion by 
Professor Neumann on which the defendant relies—and at the hearing, challenged the expert’s report and 
requested the Court not to accept its conclusions’). See also in that regard paras 337, 365, 366, 391 and 397.  
672 See n 671.  
124 
 
7.21 The Court Procedures in the Gekos Case 
7.21.1 The Hearing 
 
During the court trial in the Gekos case, the Court of First Instance held a hearing to listen to 
the claims of the parties in the procedure.673 At the hearing the representatives of Gekos 
asserted: 
‘The court expert report found that the two licensed undertakings carried out the sale of 
FEDs and confirmed that the undertakings paid their customs duties and taxes. The 
Authority’s findings that Dukagjini had not sold FEDs, thus enabling Gekos to have a 
dominant position, were unfounded. Based on the evidence presented in court, the ruling 
of the Authority was not founded on the provisions of the Law on Competition, 
respectively Articles 3 and 15. On the face of the evidence, particularly the court expert 
report, Gekos had no dominant position, since Dukagjini also sold FEDs during the 
contested period’.674 
Whereas, the Authority’s representatives stated: 
‘The contested ruling was made after the conclusion of the investigation, which was 
based on the suspicion that the undertakings in question acted in concert to create a 
monopoly in the relevant market. Dukagjini placed its own advertisements as a 
distributor at Enternet’s premises even though at that time it did not have FEDs for sale. 
Also, at that time it did not have a distribution contract with Enternet for the sale of 
FEDs. The Authority does not object to the court expert report findings. However, based 
on the expert report it was clear that Gekos showed purchases and imports of FEDs in the 
sum of 830,945.39 €, whereas Dukagjini showed purchases in the sum of 118,000.00 €. 
The Gekos sales were those of its distributor Enternet, in the sum of 4,191,207.43 €, and 
the sales of Dukagjini were 255,102.14 €, which shows that the market share of Gekos in 
the market for the sale of FEDs was 94%, and that the remainder was covered by 
Dukagjini’.675 
It is true that the expert report states that Dukagjini sold FEDs during the contested period. 
However, it is questionable how credible the expert report is, since during the hearing the 
representative of Dukagjini declared that they sold only 20 FEDs.676 According to Dukagjini’ 
s assertions, this was justified by the need for laboratory testing of the products, which should 
have lasted three to four hours, but the laboratory was not functioning for a month. The 
Authority should have insisted that the court confront these two extremely important facts 
                                                 
673 Basic Court of Pristina – Administrative Department, Hearing Minutes, 16 January 2015. [Hereinafter: 
Hearing Minutes in the Gekos case]. 
674 Ibid. 
675 Ibid.  
676 Records of hearing (n 562).  
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and decide after careful evaluation which prevailed over the other. However, even if 
Dukagjini sold a number of FEDs, this does not make much difference in the assessment of a 
dominant position, since the market share was over 90% for Gekos and less than 10% for 
Dukagjini.677 
On the other hand, as a result of the avoidance of competition between Dukagjini and Gekos, 
it was possible for Gekos and Enternet jointly678 to have a high market share and a strong 
dominant position. It is well known that in the relevant market initially the prices were too 
high,679 and this is a clear indication that that came about as a result of lack of competition in 
the FED market. Prices would most likely have been different in a competitive market. In 
addition, the Law on Competition requires that in order to determine abuse of a dominant 
position, payment demands that differ from those that would very likely prevail if effective 
competition existed should be taken into consideration, and the behaviour of an undertaking 
be assessed in comparison with undertakings in actively competitive markets.680 
 
7.22 The Court of First Instance Approach Regarding Abuse of a Dominant Position 
7.22.1 The Judgment of the Court of First Instance in the Gekos Case 
 
The Court of First Instance, in compliance with Article 44 of the Law on Administrative 
Conflicts,681 evaluated the legality of the Authority’s ruling.682 However, the court found that 
the Authority’s ruling contained such deficiencies that its legality could not be scrutinized, 
since it contained crucial violations of the provisions of the Law on Administrative 
Procedure.683 
According to the evaluation of the court: 
                                                 
677 Market share results according to the data presented in the expert report (n 637).  
678 Joined Cases T-68/89, T-77/89 and T-78/89, and Joined Cases C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P Compagnie 
Maritime Belge Transports and Others v Commission, cited above.  
679 See n 595. 
680 See Antitrust Modernization Commission, Report and Recommendations (n 200) 2 (‘In free markets, 
consumers determine which firms succeed. Consumers benefit as firms offer discounts, improve product 
reliability, or create new services, for example, to keep existing customers and attract new ones. The free-market 
mechanism generally provides greater success to those firms that are more efficient and whose products are 
most closely adapted to the wishes of consumers. Competitive markets also drive an economy’s resources 
toward their fullest and most efficient uses, thereby providing a fundamental basis for economic development’). 
681 See Law on Administrative Conflicts (n 306). 
682 Basic Court of Pristina – Administrative Department, Gekos Ruling, no A181/2011, 16 January 2015. 
[Hereinafter: Gekos First Instance Ruling]. 
683 Ibid. 
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‘The Authority’s ruling was legally unsustainable, and contradicted its justification. In its 
justification there are no reasons given for the decisive facts that compelled the issuing of 
the ruling in question. Recital I of the justification contains a general and abstract 
formulation. Also, in the ruling the concrete legal provisions of the relevant law that 
were violated were not specified by the Authority, but only general breaches of the 
provisions of the Law on Competition’.684 
Like most of the Authority’s decisions, this one also contained breaches of procedural 
requirements. These breaches consisted of, inter alia, insufficient reasons and inappropriate 
referencing of the legal basis.685 As a result, after assessing the evidence,686 the court 
concluded that the factual state was completely contrary to the findings of the Authority. 
According to the Court, the decision of the Authority was taken in violation of Articles 53 
and 55 of the Law on Administrative Procedure. These provisions require that the 
administrative organ, in this case the Authority, adhere to the objectivity principle by 
evaluating both facts that favour and disfavour a party, and verifying all evidence upon which 
its ruling is based using all methods allowed by law. According to the court, in the Gekos 
case, the Authority did not adhere to the abovementioned provisions, but instead based its 
decision on suspicions, suppositions, public opinions, declarations, etc. It is clear that the 
ruling was not based on facts and evidence. The Authority did not attempt to gather the 
evidence and verify the facts, thereby issued ruling without verifying the factual state.687 
Appropriate and sufficient reasoning, besides being a legal prerequisite for the Authority’s 
decisions, is also an institutional responsibility, because the Authority is the main promoter of 
a competitive market and competition law enforcement in Kosovo.688 
                                                 
684 Ibid., 2–3. 
685 See e.g. Case 18–57 Nold v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1959:6 53 (‘Decisions Nos 16/57, 17/57, 18/57 and 
19/57 accordingly infringe Article 15 of the ECSC Treaty since insufficient reasons are equivalent to absence of 
reasons. The decisions must accordingly be annulled in so far as they make the recognition of first-hand 
wholesalers dependent on their achieving certain minimum tonnages’); Case C-389/10P KME Germany and 
Others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2011:816, para. 128. 
686 The Authority’s contested ruling; Hearing records of 10.08.2010; Contract no 01/10 for the distribution of 
fiscal cash electronic devices between Gekos and Enternet, 28.12.2009; the Ministry of Economy and Finance’s 
ruling, no KAF-11/2009, 26.11.2009; the Authority’s Conclusion of 04.01.2011; Court Expert Report of the 
expert SM of 16.12.2014 together with the attached documents; Customs forms; VAT declaration forms; 
financial statements; proof of the payment of taxes; photo of the facilities of the enterprise Enternet and the 
logos of Gekos and Dukagjini. 
687 Gekos First Instance Ruling (n 682). 
688 See Joined Cases T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 and T-78/00 JFE Engineering v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2004:221, para 179 (‘the Commission must produce sufficiently precise and consistent evidence to 
support the firm conviction that the alleged infringement took place’). See also in this regard, Joined Cases 
29/83 and 30/83 CRAM and Rheinzink v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1984:130 para 20; Joined Cases C-89/85, C-
104/85, C-114/85, C-116/85, C-117/85, C-125/85, C-126/85, C-127/85, C-128/85 and C-129/85, Ahlström 
Osakeyhtiö and Others v Commission ('Woodpulp II') ECLI:EU:C:1993:120, para 127; Case T-62/98 
Volkswagen v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2000:180, paras 43 and 74; Joined Cases T-68/89, T-77/89 and T-78/89 
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Further, the Court of First Instance referred to the expert report, noting: 
‘According to the expert report, both undertakings, Gekos and Dukagjini, sold FEDs 
within the territory of Kosovo. Also, both undertakings had signed contracts with 
Enternet for the sale, installation and maintenance of FEDs, as a specialist 
undertaking’.689 
Dukagjini’s representative at the hearing before the Authority stated that they sold only 20 
FEDs.690 The court does not give further information about who these FEDs were sold to, 
whether to the end-users, Gekos, Enternet, or some other undertaking. The courts and the 
Authority should have assessed whether there was competition between the undertakings in 
question for sales of FEDs. If Dukagjini sold FEDs to Enternet, and the latter was the only 
undertaking supplying the market, the fact that Dukagjini sold FEDs is not important as 
regards competition. The court should never decline to assess whether the undertaking’s 
conduct has denied consumers competitive prices. According to Robert H Lande ‘...the 
primary goal of the antitrust statutes can, overall, best be described as a concern with the 
transfer effects of market power. Congress wanted consumers to be able to pay competitive 
prices—not supracompetitive prices—and condemned the use of market power to extract 
wealth ie, steal from consumers’.691 
However, the court findings appear to be unsustainable and in violation of the Law on 
Competition and competition policy, because they bypass the fact that Dukagjini sold only a 
small number of FEDs, with, as a result, its market share being negligible. This small number 
of sales by Dukagjini does not mean that Gekos was unable to have a dominant position in 
the relevant market. The court accepted the assertions of Gekos and Dukagjini that they could 
not be held responsible for the situation created in the relevant market, because such situation 
was caused by the Ministry of Economy and Finance, who had licensed only two operators. 
The high level of Gekos’s market share in the relevant market, according to the assessment of 
the court, was due to the circumstances existing in the disputed period, because it was 
immediately after the licensing of the two undertakings for the sale of FEDs.692 
In accepting such claims the court seems to have erred in law. This is because the Authority 
had not investigated nor found Gekos and Dukagjini in breach of the Law on Competition by 
virtue of the fact that they were the only two licensed undertakings. But because they should 
have conducted their business activities independently and on genuine competition principles, 
                                                                                                                                                        
SIV and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1992:38, paras 193–195, 198–202, 205–210, 220–232, 249–250 and 
322–328 Case T-45/07, Unipetrol v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2011:359, para 48.  
689 Gekos First Instance Ruling (n 682) 4. 
690 Records of hearing (n 562). 
691 Robert H Lande, ‘A Traditional and Textualist Analysis of the Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Preventing 
Theft From Consumers, and Consumer Choice’ (2013) 81(5) Fordham Law Review 2349, 2354.[Emphases 
added]. 
692 Gekos First Instance Ruling (n 682) 4. 
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avoiding anti-competitive behaviours or attempts to eliminate the little actual competition in 
the market.693 According to the settle EU case law, ‘each trader must determine 
independently the policy which he intends to adopt on the common market and the conditions 
which he intends to offer to his customers’.694 
Despite the fact that the Ministry had licensed only two operators in all of Kosovo’s territory, 
if these two undertakings did not decide to cooperate, and if they were true competitors in the 
relevant market, there would have been a different situation. The outcome would have been 
different from the competition aspect and much more favourable for businesses and ultimate 
consumers. The situation was worsened from the competition aspect since the ultimate 
consumer had only one seller; as a result, the buyer’s freedom was denied. ‘In order to 
determine whether the dominant undertaking has abused its position by the pricing practices 
it applies, it is necessary to consider all the circumstances and to investigate whether the 
practice tends to remove or restrict the buyer’s freedom to choose his sources of supply’.695 
The court should have taken such circumstances into account, assessing those facts of its own 
motion and on the evidence, and used them as a foundation for decision in the case.696 
 
7.22.2 Complaint in the Court of Appeal 
 
After the ruling of first instance confirmed Gekos’s lawsuit, setting aside the Authority’s 
decision, and exempting Gekos from the fine, the Authority appealed the judgment to the 
Court of Appeal.697 In its appeal, the Authority sought to set aside the judgment of the Court 
of First Instance and refer the case back to the latter for adjudication. The plea was divided 
                                                 
693 Cf Joined Cases T-25/95, T-26/95, T-30/95, T-31/95, T-32/95, T-34/95, T-35/95, T-36/95, T-37/95, T-38/95, 
T-39/95, T-42/95, T-43/95, T-44/95, T-45/95, T-46/95, T-48/95, T-50/95, T-51/95, T-52/95, T-53/95, T-54/95, 
T-55/95, T-56/95, T-57/95, T-58/95, T-59/95, T-60/95, T-61/95, T-62/95, T-63/95, T-64/95, T-65/95, T-68/95, 
T-69/95, T-70/95, T-71/95, T-87/95, T-88/95, T-103/95 and T-104/95 Cimenteries CBR and Others v 
Commission ECLI:EU:T:2000:77, para 1088.  
694 Case C-7/95 P John Deere v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1998:256, para 86; Joined Cases 40/73–48/73, 50/73, 
54/73–56/73, 111/73, 113/73 and 114/73 Suiker Unie and Others v Commission EU:C:1975:174, para 173; Case 
172/80 Zuchner v Bayerische Vereinsbank ECLI:EU:C:1981:178, para 13; Joined Cases C-89/85, C-104/85, C-
114/85, C-116/85, C-117/85 and C-125/85 to C-129/85 Ahlstrom v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1993:120, para 63 
and See also, Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition Law (n 71) 114. 
695 Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige ECLI:EU:C:2011:83 para 28; Case C-280/08 P 
Deutsche Telekom v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2010:603 para 175; Case 322/81 ECLI:EU:C:1983:313 
Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie-Michelin v Commission, para 73; Case C-95/04 P British Airways v 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:2007:166, para 67; and Case C-209/10 Post Danmark ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 para 26.  
696 See Case C-487/06 P British Aggregates ECLI:EU:C:2008:757, para 96. 
697 Kosovo Competition Authority, Appeal to the Appeal Court of Pristina – Administrative Department Against 
Ruling, no A181/2011, 9 Feb 2015. [Hereinafter: The Appeal in the Gekos case].  
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into three main limbs, alleging:698 first, that the judgment of the Court of First Instance 
incorrectly applied procedural law; second, wrongful application of contested procedure law; 
and finally, incorrect application of substantive law. 
The Authority contested the court assessment regarding the photo provided by the Authority, 
which, according to the Authority, proved that the three undertakings sold FEDs in the same 
premises. 
The Authority’s attempts to convince the Court of Appeal to accept as valid evidence the 
photo containing the logos of Gekos, Dukagjini and Enternet, displayed at points of sale, 
were not successful.699 On a closer look, it is clear that the Authority is repeating the same 
pleas previously submitted to the Court of First Instance.700 
If the existence of cooperation between two licensed undertakings, Gekos and Dukagjini, and 
one unlicensed undertaking, Enternet, is not established even by direct evidence, such as 
written contracts between the parties and the expert report, this begs the question: How can it 
be established based on a simple photo? In this regard, the Authority’s claims are insufficient 
and irrelevant. 
In light of the foregoing, it is clear and beyond doubt that Gekos and Dukagjini had an 
agreement to limit and control the relevant market. Both unequivocally engaged in anti-
competitive conduct. John B Kirkwood notes that ‘These sources imply that Congress’s most 
fundamental goal — its predominant purpose — was to protect consumers and small 
suppliers from anticompetitive conduct — conduct that creates market power, extracts wealth 
from consumers or small suppliers, and fails to provide them with compensating benefits’.701 
For this reason, the arguments and objections of the Authority should have been more 
substantial,702 focusing on the most relevant aspects of the case to convince the Court of 
Appeal that the Court of First Instance erred when, despite the fact that Gekos was involved 
in anti-competitive behaviour that breached the Law on Competition, that court set aside the 
Authority’s ruling. This would be an appropriate approach to competition cases. 
In addition, the Authority opposed the Court of First Instance findings as regards non-
compliance of the Authority’s ruling with the provisions of the Law on Administrative 
Procedure, stating that: 
                                                 
698 The Authority’s appeals in most of the cases appear to follow a template. 
699 See n 426. 
700 See to that effect, Case C-8/95 P New Holland Ford v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1998:257, paras 23–24. 
701 See eg John B Kirkwood, ‘The Essence of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers and Small Suppliers from 
Anticompetitive Conduct’ (n 438) 2468. 
702 See eg Joined Cases C-280/99 P C-281/99 P and C-282/99 P Moccia Irme and Others v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:348, para 35 (‘An appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment 
which the appellant seeks to have set aside, and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the 
appeal’) 
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‘The Authority has its own way of functioning and form of documents or acts. The 
objections of the Court of First Instance regarding the contents of the administrative act 
are totally incorrect and not adequately evaluated’.703 
However, the reasoning and objection of the Authority is neither sustainable nor convincing 
in the attempt to persuade the Court of Appeal to overrule the judgment of the Court of First 
Instance. The Authority, like all administrative institutions in Kosovo, is required to adhere to 
and respect the provisions and requirements of the Law on Administrative Procedure in their 
entirety. This is particularly the case since the Authority’s rulings are scrutinized and 
reviewed by the administrative court. Such omissions are repeatedly made in the Authority’s 
rulings, and appear to be one of the main reasons why the Authority’s rulings are annulled by 
the courts. The Authority should not try to change the rules by claiming that it has its own 
form of decision. It should avoid procedural errors that have a direct effect on the evaluation 
of the legality of its rulings. 
The Authority in its appeal had to argue clear legal grounds as to why the Court of Appeal 
should annul the Court of First Instance judgment, by producing sufficiently precise and 
consistent evidence to support the firm conviction that the alleged infringement took place.704 
The Authority is obliged to prove the facts which it alleges beyond reasonable doubt.705 
Where there is doubt, analogous to the approach of the EU courts, the benefit of that doubt 
must be given to the undertakings accused of infringement of competition rules.706 It must be 
stated that, based on the Authority’s assertions, it is clear that the Authority in its appeal was 
more concerned with circumstantial rather than substantive evidence and facts.707 
                                                 
703 The Appeal in the Gekos case (n 697). 
704 See Joined Cases 29/83 and 30/83 CRAM and Rheinzink v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1984:130 para 20; Joined 
Cases C-89/85, C-104/85, C-114/85, C-116/85, C-117/85, C-125/85, C-126/85, C-127/85, C-128/85 and C-
129/85 Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and Others v Commission ('Woodpulp II') ECLI:EU:C:1993:120, para 127; Case 
T-62/98 Volkswagen v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2000:180, paras 43 and 74; Joined Cases T-68/89, T-77/89 and 
T-78/89 SIV and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1992:38, paras 193–195, 198–202, 205–210, 220–232, 249–
250; and 322–328; Joined Cases T-185/96, T-189/96 and T-190/96 Riviera Auto Service and Others v 
Commission ECLI:EU:T:1999:8, para 47 and Joined Cases T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 and T-78/00 JFE 
Engineering v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2004:22, 1 para 179. 
705 See opinion of Advocate General Darmon in Joined Cases C-89/85, C-104/85, C-114/85, C-116/85, C-
117/85 and C-125/85 to C-129/85 Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and Others v Commission (‘Woodpulp II’) 
ECLI:EU:C:1993:120, point 195.  
706 See to that effect Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1978:22, para 265 and Joined Cases 
T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 and T-78/00, JFE Engineering v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2004:221, para 56. 
707 See eg Joined Cases C-280/99 P, C-281/99 P and C-282/99 P Moccia Irme and Others v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:348, para 35 (‘An appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment 
which the appellant seeks to have set aside, and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the 
appeal’) and Joined Cases T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 and T-78/00, JFE Engineering v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2004:221, para 58 (‘Furthermore, the evidence put forward must satisfy the criteria of precision and 
consistency … in relation to all the elements of the infringement, in particular, the identity of the parties and 
their involvement in the infringement’). 
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7.22.3 The Court of Appeal Judgment in the Gekos Case 
 
After evaluating the Authority’s complaint, the Court of Appeal, similar to the Court of First 
Instance, stated that the Authority did not properly justify its ruling since it had not specified 
the correct legal basis, but only stated that the ruling was supported by primary and secondary 
legislation. As a result, it rejected the appeal.708 
Further, the Court of Appeal noted: 
‘On the one hand, the Authority only mentioned the laws and did not specify or justify 
the crucial facts which compelled the issuing of the contested ruling. On the other hand, 
the Authority could not argue a different state of facts from that contained in the ruling, 
which was set aside by the Court of First Instance. The Authority’s ruling was not 
complete and contained fundamental errors, since it did not comply with the legal 
provisions of the Law on Administrative Procedure. The Court of Appeal cannot 
consider legally correct the Authority’s legal approach with regard to its reasoning. Such 
errors limit the assessment of the ruling’s legality by the Court of Appeal’.709 
A large part of the reasoning of the Court of Appeal dealt with the procedural violations in 
the Authority’s ruling against Gekos rather than assessment of the facts.710 For the 
Authority’s rulings to survive court scrutiny, the Authority must ensure that its rulings are 
procedurally as well as substantively sound. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
708 Pristina Court of Appeal – Administrative Department, Ruling on the Gekos case, no AAnr.93/2015, 22 
October 2015. [Hereinafter: The Gekos Appeal Ruling]. 
709 Ibid. 
710 Walter Frenz, Handbook of EU Competition Law (n 217) 1065 (‘Acting as a court of second instance, 
pursuant to Art. 256 (1) subparagraph 3163 (2) TFEU and Art. 58 (1) of the Statute of the Court, the ECJ 
examines not only points of law but also the legal weight of the facts presented and the legal consequences of 
acts of the court of first instance and thus is only authorised to exercise control’). See also case law in that 
regard, Case C-264/11 P Kaimer and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2012:498 para 22 (in German); C-47/10 
P Austria v Scheucher-Fleisch and Others ECLI:EU:C:2011:698, para 57; Case C-487/06 P British Aggregates 
v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2008:757, para 96; Case C-551/03 P General Motors v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:229, para 51; Case C-266/06 P Evonik Degussa v Commission and Council 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:295, para 72 (in German); and Case C-185/95 P Baustahlgewebe v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:1998:608, para 23. 
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7.23 The Authority’s Request for Extraordinary Review to the Supreme Court 
 
After the Court of Appeal rejected as unfounded Authority’s appeal, the latter requested 
extraordinary review by the Supreme Court.711 The extraordinary review was requested on 
the grounds that the Court of Appeal violated the substantive and procedural law. 
According to the Authority: 
‘The Court of Appeal did not adjudicate the Court of First Instance judgment thoroughly, 
but its judgment was based almost entirely on the first instance verdict. The Court of 
First Instance in its reasoning stated that the photo presented did not prove anything 
concrete in terms of violation of the Law on Competition. The Court of Appeal handled a 
subject area which it did not understand. Assessing anti-competitive behaviour of 
undertakings is mandated to the Authority’.712 
The Authority should have proved the infringements which it found by adducing evidence 
capable of demonstrating that Gekos’s actions, jointly with Dukagjini and Enternet, were 
inconsistent with the Law on Competition, for which reason the Authority was prompted to 
impose a fine on Gekos.713 It should not, however, have claimed that the court could not 
assess whether a particular behaviour by undertakings is incompatible with the Law on 
Competition. If this was the case, this begs the question: What is the purpose of appealing the 
Authority’s decisions to the courts? 
The Authority continued to insist in the request for extraordinary review that: 
‘Gekos by its anti-competitive behaviour violated the Law on Competition, specifically 
Articles 3 and 15 (b) and (e), since it could not prove a different factual situation from 
that confirmed by the Authority’.714 
Here it goes again: the Authority claimed breaches of the Law on Competition as regards 
anti-competitive agreements, within the meaning of Article 3, and abuse of dominant position 
within Article 15, whereas Gekos was fined for abuse of a dominant position only. 
 
 
                                                 
711 Kosovo Competition Authority, Request for Extraordinary Review Against the Judgement of the Court of 
Appeal, no AAnr.93/2015, in the Gekos case, for the Supreme Court of Kosovo, 8 December 2015. [Hereinafter: 
the Request for Extraordinary Review in the Gekos case]. 
712 Ibid 3. 
713 See Case T-45/07, Unipetrol v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2011:359, para 48.  
714 The Request for Extraordinary Review in the Gekos case (n 711) 3–4. 
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7.23.1 The Supreme Court Judgment in the Gekos Case 
 
After the Supreme Court assessed the Authority’s request, the contested judgment and other 
case files, it ruled that the request for extraordinary review was groundless.715 
According to the Supreme Court: 
‘Based on the court expert’s findings, the customs declaration, and the VAT tax audits, it 
was clear that during the disputed period two undertakings, Gekos and Dukagjini, 
imported goods from two different manufacturers, namely Datecs and Casio, and sold 
them in the Kosovo market. The courts of lower instance proved unequivocally that the 
two licensed undertakings carried out the import and that the sales, installation and 
maintenance were carried out by Enternet’.716 
The court’s conclusion that Gekos and Dukagjini imported FEDs from different 
manufacturers is inappropriate. This is especially so considering the fact that the importance 
of this particular case is not who imported but who sold FEDs in the relevant market. 
The Supreme Court judgment appears to be a dim copy of the preliminary judgment of the 
Court of Appeal, not offering any persuasive argument that Gekos did not violate the Law on 
Competition. On the contrary, the anti-competitive behaviour of Gekos is confirmed 
indisputably, based above all on the written contracts between Gekos and Enternet. Even if 
advanced knowledge of competition rules is lacking, a careful reading of Article 3 and 
assessment of the written contracts in that context, together with examination of the pricesof 
FEDs, should have been sufficient grounds to determine distortion and restriction of 
competition.717 ‘In order to prevent producers from charging too much for their products, and 
thus reducing consumer surplus, competition laws attempt to control market power-the ability 
of a firm to raise price above competitive level’.718 
In light of these considerations, it is not erroneous to argue that even if anti-competitive 
nature of ‘trust’ between rivals has occurred in this particular case, it was not sufficient for 
the Authority to pursue in the courts. John B Kirkwood notes  ‘as numerous scholars have 
recognized, Congress’s fundamental goal was to prevent firms from gaining market power 
                                                 
715 The Supreme Court of Kosovo, Ruling on the Gekos case, ARJ-UZVP-no 45/2015, 15 April 
2016.[Hereinafter: The Supreme Court Ruling in the Gekos case]. 
716 Ibid. 
717 See eg Robert H Bork, ‘Goals of Antitrust: A Dialogue on Policy’ (n 331) 365 (Noting that ‘when 
competitors agree on higher prices and put them into effect, they necessarily restrict output and so reduce total 
wealth’).  
718 Sandra Marco Colino, Vertical Agreements and Competition Law: Comparative Study of the EU and US 
Regimes (Hart Publishing 2010) 29. See in the same effect Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2008:101 para 44. See also with regard to business complaints concerning the high price of FEDs in 
the market nn 594, 595. 
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through anticompetitive means — combining rivals into trusts, for example, or driving out 
competitors through predation — and then using that power to charge higher prices, 
transferring wealth from consumers to the perpetrators of the conduct’.719 The Authority, by 
producing ample and consistent evidence which unequivocally demonstrates that the anti-
competitive behaviour occurred, would fulfil its ‘double role’, on the one hand effectively 
enforcing competition law, and on the other hand guiding and constraining the courts in the 
right direction when it comes to such enforcement. 
The consequences of the outcome of the Gekos case go beyond the loss of a standard case, 
since there are consequences for the future of competition law enforcement in Kosovo.720 As 
one of the first cases in the field of competition law it will affect and establish judicial 
practice for competition law enforcement, and serve as an adverse precedent. On the contrary, 
if this case had succeeded, it would have been a clear signal on enforcement policy to 
undertakings involved in anti-competitive behaviours. 
The Supreme Court was the court of last instance where the case could be judicially 
reviewed. Once the Supreme Court approved the preliminary judgments of the courts of 
lower instance, this was the final outcome of the case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
719 See eg John B Kirkwood, The Essence of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers and Small Suppliers from 
Anticompetitive Conduct (n 438) 2434. 
720 See C. Paul Rogers III, ‘Why Do Bad Antitrust Decisions Sometimes Make Good Law? The Alcoa and 
Brown Shoe Examples’ (2018) 71, SMU Law Review 97. 
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7.24 The Gekos Case: Conclusion 
 
Apart from the substantive aspects, the Authority’s decision in the Gekos case had procedural 
oversights too,721 as confirmed by the three levels of Kosovo courts. Procedural flaws, inter 
alia, consisted of insufficient reasoning and inaccurate statement of the legal basis. 
According to the settled EU case law, ‘...adopting an act intended to have legal effects 
without expressly indicating therein the provision of Community law from which it derives 
its binding force, the Commission has infringed the principle of legal certainty, which forms 
part of the general principles of Community law the observance of which is the Court’s task 
to ensure’.722 
Initially, the Authority did not clearly indicate the legal basis for the conclusion in the 
initiation of the investigation. The same error was repeated in the ruling imposing the fine. 
The Authority noted a legal basis concerning abuse of a dominant position and referred also 
to concerted practices and anti-competitive agreements. In addition, the statement of reasons 
was lacking and contradictory723 in not justifying the facts and circumstances which 
compelled the Authority to issue the ruling. According to EU case law, the statement of 
reasons must be appropriate to the nature of the measure in question, in a clear and 
unequivocal fashion.724 These preconditions should have been carefully respected by the 
Authority, so that the procedural aspect of its rulings at the very least could survive court 
scrutiny.725 
Such errors, apart from the harmful impact on the effective enforcement of competition law, 
may lead to the establishment of a negative judicial practice concerning competition cases. 
The present legal practice should not be binding for future competition cases and requires 
change.726 
                                                 
721 See Caroline Cauffman and Qian Hao (eds) Procedural Rights in Competition Law in the EU and China (n 
135) 1 (‘Procedural rights are an essential tool for guaranteeing that the rule of law is respected in competition 
cases’). 
722 Case C-325/91 Franc v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1993:245, para 30 and Case C-370/07 Commission v 
Council ECLI:EU:C:2009:590, para 38.  
723 See Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2008:101 para 284 and Case C-17/99 
France v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2001:178, para 35.  
724 Case 203/85 Nicolet Instrument v Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main-Flughafen ECLI:EU:C:1986:269, para 
10; Case T-48/96 Acme Industry v Council ECLI:EU:T:1999:251, para 141; Case 240/84 NTN Toyo Bearing 
and Others v Council ECLI:EU:C:1987:202, para 31 and Case T-164/94 Ferchimex v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:1995:173, para 118. 
725 Case T-339/04 France Télécom v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2007:80, para 105. 
726 Cf Jose Carlos Laguna de Paz, ‘Understanding the Limits of Judicial Review in European Competition Law’ 
(n 303) 220 (‘The Court has repeatedly held that the Commission’s practice in previous decisions is not binding 
for the Commission, since it is not part of the legal framework’). See also Case C-167/04 P JCB Service v 
Commission ECLI: ECLI:EU:C:2006:594, para 205 (‘it should be noted that JCB Service's arguments do not 
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Last but not least, the Authority could not produce sufficiently precise and consistent 
evidence before the courts.727 The appeals and claims of the Authority were circumstantial 
rather than substantive, and as a result there was difficulty persuading the courts that the 
Authority’s rulings were legally sound.728 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
seek to question the settled case-law of the Court of Justice that the Commission's practice in previous decisions 
does not itself serve as a legal framework for the fines imposed in competition matters and that decisions in 
other cases can give only an indication for the purpose of determining whether there is discrimination’); Joined 
Cases C-125/07 P, C-133/07 P, C-135/07 P and C-137/07 P Erste Group Bank and Others v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:576, para 233; Case C-549/10 P Tomra Systems and Others v Commission ECLI: 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:221, para 104; and Case C-389/10 P KME Germany v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2011:816, 
para 98 (‘the fact that in previous cases the Commission took account of the economic situation in the sector as 
an attenuating circumstance does not mean that it must necessarily continue to follow that practice’).  
727 See Case T-450/05, Automobiles Peugeot and Peugeot Nederland v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2009:262, para 
175 (‘it must be borne in mind that the Commission is required to produce sufficiently precise and consistent 
evidence to support the conviction that the alleged infringement took place’). See also in that regard Case C-
29/83 CRAM v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1984:130 para 20; Joined Cases T-185/96, T-189/96 and T-190/96 
Riviera Auto Service and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1999:8, para 47. 
728 See inter alia Case C-462/10 P Evropaiki Dynmaiki v European Environment Agency ECLI:EU:C:2012:14, 
para 19; Case C-352/98 P Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2000:361, para 34; Case C-41/00 P 
Interporc v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2003:125, para 15; and Case C-131/03 P Reynolds Tobacco and Others v 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:2006:541, para 49. 
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7.25 The Dukagjini Case: Introduction 
 
Although the two cases resemble each other in that they concern the two undertakings Gekos 
and Dukagjini, and were the subject of investigation by the Authority at the same time and 
for the same reasons, the decisions against the undertakings were made separately and based 
upon different violations of the Law on Competition. The most essential difference between 
the Authority’s decisions is that Gekos was found to have had a dominant position which it 
abused, whereas Dukagjini was found to have been involved in a concerted practice contrary 
to the Law on Competition. 
 
7.26 The Procedures Followed by the Authority in the Dukagjini Case 
7.26.1 The Authority’s Decision Imposing a Fine on Dukagjini 
 
Upon conducting an investigation and a hearing, which was held jointly with Gekos,729 the 
Authority found that Dukagjini violated the Law on Competition by anti-competitive 
conduct, due to its involvement in concerted practices.730 In stating the legal basis of the 
decision, the Authority referred to Articles 3(2) and 26(6) (b and e) of the Law on 
Competition.731 
According to the Authority, the possibility that FEDs would only be sold by Gekos 
potentially enabled the latter to gain a dominant position, which it subsequently abused. The 
main part of Authority’s decision in this case points out that: 
‘Despite the fact that the two undertakings are licensed for the sale, etc. of FEDs, 
Dukagjini had not sold any product in the relevant market. In this way, competition was 
restricted through concerted practice which enabled a dominant position for Gekos, in 
breach of the Law on Competition’.732 
Despite reaching the above conclusion, none of the Authority’s findings justified the alleged 
infringement as regards concerted practice for which Dukagjini was fined. 
The Law on Competition defines a concerted practice as: 
                                                 
729 See records of hearing (n 565). The same hearing was held for both Gekos and Dukagjini. 
730 Kosovo Competition Authority, Decision on the concerted practice for the sale of fiscal cash electronic 
devices between enterprises Dukagjini and Gekos, 1 September 2010. [Hereinafter: The Authority’s Decision 
imposing a fine on Dukagjini]. 
731 See Law on Competition (n 17). 
732 Ibid 3. 
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‘An activity that involves informal cooperation between or among undertakings and that 
is not based on a formal agreement or decision’.733 
Under EU law, concerted practices are defined as a form of coordination by undertakings. 
The Court has held in many occasions that such a practice ‘is a form of coordination between 
undertakings by which, without it having been taken to the stage where an agreement 
properly so-called has been concluded, practical cooperation between them is knowingly 
substituted for the risks of competition’. According to the EU courts, Concerted Practices are 
prohibited under EU law, regardless of their effect, when they have an anti-competitive 
object.734 
Indeed, the Authority’s decision is contradictory and unsubstantiated due to the fact that it 
refers to written contracts between Gekos, Dukagjini and Enternet. The finding legally and 
logically excludes concerted practices, seen with the lenses of Article 2(1) of the Law on 
Competition, for which Dukagjini was fined, although there is no doubt that Dukagjini was 
involved in anti-competitive conduct that restricted competition. The EU courts have required 
an attention and raise the awareness to distinct between these concepts, while enforcing 
competition rules. ‘Article 85 draws a distinction between the concept of 'concerted practices' 
and that of 'agreements between undertakings' or of 'decisions by associations of 
undertakings'; the object is to bring within the prohibition of that article a form of 
coordination between undertakings which, without having reached the stage where an 
agreement properly so-called has been concluded, knowingly substitutes practical 
cooperation between them for the risks of competition’.735 
Although the Authority was the main institution empowered and mandated to enforce the 
Law on Competition, when stating the legal basis for its decision736 the Authority referred to 
                                                 
733 See Law on Competition (n 17) Art 2(1).  
734 See Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands and Others ECLI:EU:C:2009:343, para 26; Joined Cases 40/73 to 
48/73, 50/73, 54/73 to 56/73, 111/73, 113/73 and 114/73 Suiker Unie and Others v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:1975:174, para 26; Joined Cases C-89/85, C-104/85, C-114/85, C-116/85, C-117/85 and C-125/85 
to C-129/85 Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1993:120, para 63; Case 48/69 ICI v 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:1972:70, para 64 ; Case C-235/92 P Montecatini v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1999:362, 
para 124; Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands and Others ECLI:EU:C:2009:343, para 31; Case C-199/92 P Hüls 
v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1999:358, para 165; Joined Cases 96/82 to 102/82, 104/82, 105/82, 108/82 and 
110/82 IAZ International Belgium and Others v Commission ECLI: ECLI:EU:C:1983:310, para 25 and Case C-
235/92 P Montecatini v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1999:362, para 125. See also, Albertina Albors-Llorens, EC 
Competition Law and Policy (n 243) 22.  
735 See eg Case 48–69 Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1972:70, para 64. See also Case 
C-49/92 P Commission v Anic Partecipazioni ECLI:EU:C:1999:356, para 118; Case C-199/92 P Hüls v 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:1999:358, para 161 and Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherland and Others 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:343, para 23. 
736 Cf Case T-14/89 Montedipe v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1992:36, para 324 (‘under Article 190 of the EEC 
Treaty the Commission is obliged to state the reasons on which its decisions are based, mentioning the factual 
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Article 3(2) (b) and (e) and Article 26(6) of the Law on Competition.737 Although the 
Authority in providing the legal basis738 cites Article 26(6), this provision is neither relevant 
nor appropriate because it relates to organization and voting within the Authority. Indeed, the 
Authority investigated and fined Dukagjini for engaging in a concerted practice, whereas the 
legal provision cited in the decision is Article 3(2) (b) and (e). These provisions relate to anti-
competitive agreements that are written, whereas informal cooperation was the form of 
concerted practice for which Dukagjini was actually fined. For example, the European 
Commission often specifies a dual qualification for a finding of breach of EU competition 
rules in the same case, but on the basis of different arguments, namely based on law and on 
the evidence. ‘On the basis of the above, the Commission considers that the arrangements 
between the undertakings involved constitute agreements and/or concerted practices in the 
sense of Article 81 of the Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement’.739 In recital IV of 
the Authority’s reasoning, it also referred to abuse of a dominant position, which is in 
complete contradiction to the alleged violations, its findings, the disposition of the decision 
and the final part of the decision imposing a fine. 
The picture that emerges from the foregoing illustrates how important it is for the Authority 
to thoroughly understand and enforce the law in a clear, coherent and consistent manner.740 It 
is imperative for the Authority to provide accurate statements of reasons741 and the legal basis 
for its decisions, and this applies not only to the substantive provisions of the Law on 
Competition but also to the Law on Administrative Procedure.742 
                                                                                                                                                        
and legal elements which provide the legal basis for the measure and the considerations which have led it to 
adopt its decision’). 
737 See Law on Competition (n 17). 
738 Case 73/74 Papiers peints de Belgique ECLI:EU:C:1975:160, para 30.  
739 See to this effect, Marine Hoses Commission Decision COMP/39406 [2009] OJ C168/6, para 272, 
Cartonboard Commission Decision no 94/601/EC [1994] OJ L243/1, para 128; Car glass Commission Decision 
COMP/39.125 [2009] OJ C-173/13, paras 121 and 486; and Marine Hoses Commission Decision COMP/39406 
[2009] OJ C168/6, para 272, 2009.  
740 See eg Ariel Ezrachi, ‘Sponge’ (n 3) 50 (noting that competition policy should be enforced accurately and 
consistently).  
741 See Case C-367/95 P Commission v Sytraval and Brink's France ECLI:EU:C:1998:154, para 63; Joined 
Cases 296/82 and 318/82 Netherlands and Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:1985:113, para 19; Case C-350/88 Delacre and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1990:71, para 
15; Case C-56/93 Belgium v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1996:64, para 86; Case C-466/93 Atlanta 
Fruchthandelsgesellschaft and Others v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft ECLI:EU:C:1995:370, 
para 16; Case 250/84 Eridania Zuccherifici Nazionali ν Cassa Conguaglio Zucchero ECLI:EU:C:1986:22, para 
37; Case C-478/93 Netherlands ν Commission ECLI:EU:C:1995:324, para 48; Case 73/74 Groupement des 
fabricants de papiers peints and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1975:160, para 31 and Case 108/81 Amylum 
v Council ECLI:EU:C:1982:322, para 19. 
742 See to that effect, Case C-325/91 Franc v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1993:245, para 30 and Case C-370/07 
Commission v Council ECLI:EU:C:2009:590, para 38.  
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The Authority’s decision must be based clearly on the relevant legal provisions alleged to 
have been violated, with sufficient legal reasoning to tie the facts to the law. It is meaningless 
for the Authority to impose a fine on Dukagjini in the midst of discussion of abuse of a 
dominant position while penalizing the undertaking for engaging in a concerted practice. 
Although Dukagjini was fined by the Authority for concerted practices, the ruling is not well- 
reasoned, since virtually no part of the decision justifies the alleged infringement. 
Conversely, the only ‘justification’ was as regards abuse of a dominant position, even though 
Dukagjini held no dominant position nor could it logically have abused it, because it was not 
active in the market. It is unclear why the Authority in the reasoning of its decision imposing 
a fine on Gekos referred to concerted practices, even though the alleged violation was abuse 
of a dominant position, and vice versa. 
 
7.27 Dukagjini’s Lawsuit Against the Authority’s Decision 
 
Dukagjini, displeased with the decision of the Authority imposing a fine for concerted 
practices, lodged a lawsuit against the Authority’s ruling.743 The plea was divided into three 
main limbs. The applicant sought annulment of the contested decision, alleging that the 
challenged rulings were issued in violation of material and procedural law, with inaccurate 
conclusions regarding the factual situation and lack of transparency.744 
The applicant, inter alia, asserted: 
‘The reasoning given by the Authority was unclear and directly contradicts Article 86(3) 
of the Law on Administrative Procedure.745 This provision clearly stipulates that any 
decision is considered to be void if contains unclear, contradictory or inaccurate 
reasoning. The Authority failed to explain the potential abuse of a dominant position by 
another licensed operator, Gekos, resulting from Dukagjini’s anti-competitive behaviour. 
The Authority only paraphrased the provisions of Article 3(2)(b) of the Law on 
Competition,746 without explaining how competition was distorted or production 
controlled in practice. Consequently, the Authority failed to provide sufficient 
justification for reaching its decision. The Authority—during the investigation and after 
the decision was taken—did not respect the procedures and standards of transparency. 
                                                 
743 Dukagjini, Administrative suit, Supreme Court of Kosovo, 24 February 2011. [Hereinafter: Dukagjini’s 
Administrative suit]. 
744 Ibid.  
745 See Law on Administrative Procedure (n 185). 
746 Law on Competition (n 17). 
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Minutes of the hearing747 of the case were not provided to the plaintiff. The minutes of 
the hearing contained arguments on which the Authority took its decision’.748 
7.28 The Judgment of the Court of First Instance in the Dukagjini Case 
 
The Court of First Instance in the Dukagjini case ruled in an opposite manner to its decision 
in the Gekos case, despite the fact that both cases were factually similar and were being 
judicially reviewed before the same court. 
After reviewing the evidence, the court found that the plaintiff’s claim was baseless, thus 
upholding the Authority’s decision.749 The court also upheld the fine against Dukagjini which 
had been imposed by the Authority. The court, referring to the provisions in force, 
specifically Articles 3, 14 and 15 of the Law on Competition, reviewed the legality of the 
contested decision. 
It can be stated as a fact that the Court of First Instance approach in reviewing competition 
cases tends to be inconsistent.750 On the one hand, in all cases where the court upheld the 
Authority’s rulings, including the insurance company cases, the judicial review was 
conducted according to the provisions of the Law on Competition. On the other hand, in all 
the other cases, the majority, the court’s approach in reviewing the legality of the Authority’s 
rulings was according to the Law on Administrative Procedure, the Law on Contested 
Procedure and the Law in Administrative Conflicts, thus ignoring the Law on Competition 
provisions in their entirety. 
In this case, the court relied on the direct evidence751 including the minutes of the hearing, 
noting that the representative of Dukagjini did not adduce factual evidence that it had begun 
selling FEDs, and the court also considered the evidence offered by the Authority which 
showed that in the same premises the logos of both Gekos and Dukagjini were displayed, 
both of which were licensed to provide the same products and services. 
 
In this regard, the court noted: 
                                                 
747 Records of hearing (n 562). 
748 Dukagjini’s Administrative suit (n 743).  
749 Basic Court of Pristina – Administrative Department, Dukagjini Ruling, no A184/11, 17 January 2014. 
[Hereinafter: Dukagjini First Instance Ruling].  
750 See (n 468).  
751 See EU case law referring to direct evidence or direct documentary evidence. Joined Cases T-44/02 OP, T-
54/02 OP, T-56/02 OP, T-60/02 OP and T-61/02 OP Dresdner Bank and Others v Commission, EU:T:2006:271, 
paras 82 and 117; Case T-213/00 CMA CGM and Others v Commission, EU:T:2003:76, para 141; Case T-66/99 
Minoan Lines v Commission, EU:T:2003:337, para 242; Case T-149/89 Sotralentz v Commission, 
EU:T:1995:69, para 44; and Case T-18/03 CD-Contact Data v Commission, EU:T:2009:132, para 54. 
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‘Since Dukagjini did not provide any product in the relevant market, it had restricted 
competition and enabled Gekos to establish a dominant position, thus supposedly 
establishing the claim that Dukagjini had engaged in concerted practices. The Authority 
acted correctly when it decided to impose a fine on Dukagjini, since failure to comply 
with the conditions in the licence adversely affected the competitiveness of the market. 
The court accepted the findings of the Authority that Dukagjini violated the Law on 
Competition because it was not competing in the relevant market. Regarding the 
allegations in Dukagjini’s lawsuit that the Authority had conducted an investigation but 
was unable to prove violations of the Law on Competition, the court held that there was 
sufficient evidence to prove that the plaintiff did not compete752 in the relevant market. 
Furthermore, Dukagjini did not provide any evidence to prove the opposite of these 
findings. In addition, according to the provisions of Article 56(1) of the Law on 
Administrative Procedure,753 the burden of proof for the facts alleged in this case falls on 
the plaintiff, that is, the party who filed the lawsuit initiating the administrative 
proceedings’.754 
In light of those considerations, at least two opposing conclusions are present in this 
judgment, compared with other competition cases seeking judicial review. The first finding of 
the court, that Dukagjini did not sell FEDs, is contrary to the finding made by the same court 
in the Gekos case. The Gekos judgment concluded that Dukagjini also sold FEDs, separately 
from Gekos. However, the judgment in the Dukagjini case concluded the opposite. Second, 
based on the findings of this court, Dukagjini could not produce sufficiently precise and 
consistent evidence to prove the opposite, namely the sale of FEDs, since the burden of proof 
is on the plaintiff (that is Dukagjini). The opposite occurred in relation to the insurance 
companies, where the Court of Appeal in the Dardania case held that the burden of proof was 
on the Authority, as regards, inter alia, acquiring the original agreement, proving whether 
signatories were competent and authorized for such signature, and so forth.755 
The Authority should have used this judgment as an argument in the Gekos case to 
convince756 the court that a similar decision must be taken by this court. The Gekos case was 
analogous — it was reviewed by the same court — on the basis of similar facts and 
allegations. Thus, the Authority ought to have argued that it was inconsistent for the same 
court to reach entirely dissimilar judgments in two similar cases. For the sake of consistency, 
                                                 
752 See eg Barak Orbach, ‘How Antitrust Lost Its Goal’ (n 15) 2255 (‘The broad understanding, however, had 
been that competition was the original and practical goal of US competition laws, that is, antitrust’). 
753 Law on Administrative Procedure (n 185). 
754 Dukagjini First Instance Ruling (n 749). 
755 See Joined Cases 43/82 and 63/82 VBVB and VBBB v Commission; Joined Cases C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-
211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission; Case T-201/04 
Microsoft v Commission; Case T-301/04 Clearstream v Commission; Case T-132/07 Fuji Electric v Commission 
and Case T-168/01 GlaxoSmithKline Services v Commission, cited in (nn 420–421).  
756 See eg Michal S Gal, ‘When the Going Gets Tight: Institutional Solutions when Antitrust Enforcement 
Resources are Scarce’ (n 89) 424 (‘Particularly in its early years, the antitrust agency might be required to 
convince the courts, and the general public, that its cases are procedurally sound and substantively meritorious’).  
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the courts must have the possibility to do a rejoinder of similar cases, reviewing all lawsuits 
or appeals of the same matter in one procedure. Thus, all the similar cases would be heard by 
the same judges and unified conclusions would be drawn. In the same vein, Andrej Fatur, 
Klemen Podobnik & Ana Vlahek notes that ‘the legal order in [Slovenia] is based on the 
continental law system, thus the statutes represent the primary source of law. Therefore, 
precedents are not deemd an official source of law in Slovenian legal order. However, taking 
into account the principle of legal certainity, courts and administrative bodies must assess 
similar situations equally’.757 
 
7.29 Complaint in the Court of Appeal 
 
Dukagjini disagreed with the Court of First Instance verdict and filed an appeal to the Court 
of Appeal contesting the Court of First Instance judgment. According to Dukagjini, the 
contested judgment was vitiated by an error of law due to violations of procedural law and 
substantive law and incorrect verification of the factual state.758 
Dukagjini, inter alia, asserted that: 
‘The Court of First Instance violated the procedural provisions regarding notification of 
participation in the session. The Court of First Instance in its decision concluded that 
although it held the hearing in the absence of the claimant, this was acceptable because 
Dukagjini’s authorized representatives were notified of the court proceedings in a timely 
fashion. The representatives of the claimant and plaintiff never received any timely 
invitation to appear in court in this case. Consequently, the court acted against the 
provisions of Article 35759 of the Law on the Administrative Conflicts’.760 
In addition, Dukagjini alleged that in no paragraph of its decision did the Court of First 
Instance examine Dukagjini’s allegation regarding the legality of the decision. Dukagjini 
alleged that the entire contested judgment was based on the court’s finding that the plaintiff 
had failed to prove that it started selling FEDs on the basis of a licence. It is submitted that 
the Court of First Instance misconstrued the facts and subsequently reached an incorrect 
                                                 
757 See Andrej Fatur, Klemen Podobnik & Ana Vlahek, Competition Law in Slovenia (n 19) 36. 
758 Kosovo Competition Authority, Appeal to the Appeal Court of Pristina – Administrative Department, 
Against Ruling no A184/11, 26 February 2014. [Hereinafter: The Appeal in the Dukagjini case]. 
759 The Law on Administrative Conflicts (n 306) Art 35 stipulates as follows: ‘If the court does not throw out the 
indictment based on paragraph 2 of Article 33, or based on Article 34 of this law, whereas it concludes that the 
contested administrative act contains such essential inaccuracies that interfere with the appraisal of the legality 
of the act, with the judgment annuls the administrative act without sending the indictment for reply.’ 
760 The Appeal in the Dukagjini case (n 758).  
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conclusion on the factual situation underpinning its legal analysis. As Dukagjini explained in 
its appeal, the reason for the delay was product certification procedures. 
According to Dukagjini: 
‘Given the fact that the claimant had not sold FEDs without being certified, it appears 
that the Court of First Instance reached a decision based on an error of fact. In other 
words, its decision was not based on the proven facts and evidence which were attached 
to the lawsuit’.761 
In addition, Dukagjini alleged that: 
‘The court wrongly concluded that the evidence offered by the defendant [the Authority] 
proved that Dukagjini and Gekos were located in the same building. The court reached 
this conclusion without giving the plaintiff [Dukagjini] the opportunity to respond to this 
claim, and such determination was made without well-established facts. It is true that 
sales of FEDs take place in the same building belonging to the plaintiff and to Gekos, but 
these sales are conducted by a third undertaking called Enternet, which is the authorized 
distributor of Gekos and Dukagjini. Two licensed undertakings sell FEDs through their 
authorized distributor, although they are different types of FEDs. Distribution of these 
goods from the same distributor to the buyer does not constitute a violation of the Law 
on Competition. In the same store, the buyer has the opportunity to choose the type of 
FED that he/she wants to buy, and this proves the existence of competition’.762 
As regards Dukagjini’s argument that there is competition in the relevant market if 
consumers can choose between two or more products, this case shows that in practice there 
are significant gaps in the parties’ understanding of competition rules. The goals of 
competition will be fulfilled only if: consumers have at the least more than one seller to 
choose from; there are differences in the sale prices; the prices are comparable to those in 
competitive markets; and after-sales services are neither mandatory nor too costly. In 
addition, according to competition policies, each undertaking is required to operate and 
determine its business policy independently in the relevant market.763 In the present case the 
contrary has happened. 
The Authority and the courts must pursue competition policies based on consumer welfare 
goals to a greater extent,764 and they are not excluded from an active role in regulatory 
                                                 
761 Ibid 3. 
762 Ibid 4. 
763 See to the same effect, Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands and Others ECLI:EU:C:2009:343, para 32. 
764 See eg Daniel A Crane, commenting on Robert Bork’s contribution in the field of antitrust, noting that ‘the 
antitrust laws would only be sensible and workable as a body if courts pursued solely a consumer welfare 
objective’. Daniel A Crane, ‘The Tempting of Antitrust: Robert Bork and the Goals of Antitrust Policy’ (2014) 
79 Antitrust Law Journal 835; Steven C Salop, ‘Question: What Is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare 
Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard’ (2010) 22(3) Loyola Consumer Law Review 336. 
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issues,765 since one of the Law on Competition objectives in establishing the Authority was to 
promote consumer welfare. I.e. Andrej Fatur, Klemen Podobnik & Ana Vlahek, noting that 
‘the main goal and task of any competition policy is ensuring the highest possible level of 
consumer welfare. Primarily, competition law serves as a guarantor of consumer welfare, 
attaining this goal by preventing restrictive anti-competitive behaviour in the market’.766 One 
way to promote and advance consumer welfare is by means of undistorted competition.767 
The agreement between Dukagjini and Gekos to sell their products through Enternet, as 
described in Dukagjini’s own pleadings, did not meet the criteria of competition rules, among 
them that each undertaking must operate its business policies independently, allowing 
undistorted competition. 
 
7.30 The Court of First Instance Ruling Rejecting the Complaint of Dukagjini 
 
The Court of First Instance declared the Dukagjini complaint inadmissible because it was 
lodged after the legal deadline.768 According to the court, and after reviewing the claimant’s 
case files, the claim could not proceed by means of the plaintiff ― appellant’s complaint, 
since the complaint had been filed after expiry of the legal time limit.769 
 
7.31 The Court of First Instance Ruling Refusing the Proposal for a ‘Return to 
Previous Situation’ in the Dukagjini Case 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Ariel Ezrachi, ‘Cross Border Transfer of Wealth – Reflections on Competition Law and Developing Economies’ 
The University of Oxford Centre for Competition Law and Policy Working Paper CCLP (L) 32  1. (‘Protection 
of consumer welfare is a central pillar of competition law enforcement’) and Herbert Hovenkamp, 
‘Implementing Antitrust’s Welfare Goals’ (n 438) (arguing that ‘antitrust policy in the United States follows a 
consumer welfare approach’). 
765 See Neil Komesar, ‘Stranger in a Strange Land: An Outsider’s View of Antitrust and the Courts’ (n 382) 447 
(‘There is certainly a very large group that is unlikely to take an active role in the antitrust regulatory process: 
consumers’). 
766 Andrej Fatur, Klemen Podobnik & Ana Vlahek, Competition Law in Slovenia (n 19) 59. See also Law on 
Competition (n 17) Art 20(1). 
767 See in that regard, Case C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, para 180. (‘It is 
true … that Article 82 EC aims, in particular, to protect consumers by means of undistorted competition’) and 
Joined Cases C-468/06 to C-478/06 Sot. Lélos kai Siaand Others, ECLI:EU:C:2008:504, para 68 (‘Furthermore, 
in the light of the Treaty objectives to protect consumers by means of undistorted competition’). 
768 Basic Court of Pristina – Administrative Department, Ruling Refusing the Complaint of Dukagjini, no 
A184/11, 5 March 2014. 
769 Ibid. 
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Dukagjini’s filed a proposal in the Court of First Instance for an order to ‘return the case to 
previous situation’, asserting that the claimant had not received the Court of First Instance 
verdict on time. However, the request was rejected by the court, on the grounds that the latter 
had sent the contested judgment to the authorized representative of the plaintiff in accordance 
with the legal provisions in force, specifically Article 110(1)770 of the Law on Contested 
Procedure.771 
The court held that the case file provided evidence that the applicant’s authorized 
representative had in fact received the contested judgment. Considering that an authorized 
representative had signed the confirmation of delivery of the judgment, the court found that 
there were no reasonable grounds for granting Dukagjini’s request for a return to the previous 
state of this case.772 
Given that the Court of First Instance rejected the claim of Dukagjini as unfounded, and 
given that Dukagjini had failed to exercise its right to appeal within the time limit, the 
Authority considered that the decision was final. Therefore, it began enforcement 
proceedings to collect from Dukagjini the fine it had imposed.773 Enforcement procedures 
commenced pursuant to the Law on Enforcement Procedure.774 Although enforcement 
proceedings were initiated by the Authority, those same procedures were suspended when the 
Supreme Court annulled the decisions of the lower courts, and the issue was returned to the 
Court of First Instance for reconsideration. 
 
7.32 The Court of Appeal Judgment in the Dukagjini Case 
 
Dukagjini, dissatisfied with both decisions of the Court of First Instance, appealed to the 
Court of Appeal, claiming a violation of the provisions on procedure and the incorrectness of 
the ascertainment of the factual situation.775 In essence, Dukagjini’s appeal was a two-
pronged attack on the lower courts’ decisions: first, it put forward procedural arguments 
regarding the timeliness of the appeal and the lack of notification to appear in the original 
case before the Court of First Instance; secondly, it put forward arguments based on the 
merits of the case wherein it alleged errors of both fact and law by the lower court. After 
                                                 
770 See Law on Contested Procedure (n 472).  
771 Basic Court of Pristina – Administrative Department, Ruling Refusing the Request of Dukagjini for Return to 
Previous Situation, no A184/11, 29 January 2015. 
772 Ibid. 
773 Kosovo Competition Authority, Proposal for Enforcement against the Debtor Dukagjini, 5 February 2015. 
774 Law on Enforcement Procedure, Law No 04/L-139 on Enforcement Procedure (Official Gazette 3/2013, 
31.01.2013). 
775 Dukagjini, Appeal to the Appeal Court of Pristine – Administrative Department against the Court of First 
Instance Ruling, no A184/2011, 25 February 2014. 
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reviewing the case file the Court of Appeal dismissed Dukagjini’s appeal since it was filed 
outside the deadline.776 
 
7.33 Dukagjini’s Request for Extraordinary Review to the Supreme Court 
 
After Dukagjini’s appeal was rejected due to non-compliance with the legal deadlines, it 
made a request for extraordinary review in the Supreme Court.777 Dukagjini asserted that the 
previous decisions were taken against the provisions of the Law on Administrative Conflicts, 
the Law on Contested Procedure and the Law on Administrative Procedure.778 
 
7.34 The Supreme Court Judgment in the Dukagjini Case 
 
The Supreme Court, after examination of the contested decisions and after assessing the 
claim for extraordinary review, ruled that the request for extraordinary review was 
grounded.779 
According to the Supreme Court: 
‘It cannot accept as legally sustainable the rulings of the lower courts, which were made 
in violation of applicable provisions of the Law on the Contested Procedure. The courts 
of lower instance have violated fundamental provisions of Article 182.2(n)780 of the Law 
on Contested Procedure. The violation of essential provisions during the contested 
procedure lies in the fact that the courts of lower instance did not point out in their 
decisions the crucial facts upon which the ultimate decisions were based. Facts that are 
                                                 
776 Pristina Court of Appeal – Administrative Department, Ruling on the Dukagjini case, no AA97/2015, 22 
October 2015. [Hereinafter: the Dukagjini Appeal Ruling].  
777Dukagjini, Request for Extraordinary Review Against the Judgment of the Court of Appeal, no AA97/2015, 
for the Supreme Court of Kosovo, 22 October 2015. [Hereinafter: the Request for Extraordinary Review in the 
Dukagjini case]. 
778 Ibid. 
779 The Supreme Court of Kosovo, Ruling in the Dukagjini case, ARJ-UZVP no 50/2015, 27 April 2016. 
[Hereinafter: The Supreme Court Rulings in the Dukagjini case]. 
780 Law on Contested Procedure (n 472) Art 182.2(n) provides as follows: ‘If the decision has leaks due to 
which it’ can’t be examined, especially if the disposition of the decision is not understandable or contradictory 
in itself with the reasoning of the verdict, or when the verdict has no reason or which gives no justification for 
the final facts, or which reasoning are unclear, contradictory, or if in the final facts there are contradictions 
between what is said in the verdict, the main document or the procedural records and of the document or the 
minutes of the proceedings’. 
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presented are vague and contradictory. In addition, there are contradictions between the 
reasoning and the content of the reviewed judgments. Also, it was not clear whether the 
plaintiff’s appeal was unfounded or whether it was rejected because it was submitted 
beyond the legal deadline’.781 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated that: 
‘The final judgment of the Court of First Instance accepted as grounded the claim of 
Gekos for annulment of the decision of the Authority. This judgment was confirmed by 
the Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court. In this regard, the Supreme Court asks the 
Court of First Instance to have regard to the facts of the Gekos case in the case of 
Dukagjini during restoration. Both cases, Dukagjini and Gekos, are directly related to 
each other. So, if there is no legal violation of the Law on Competition by Gekos, which 
was confirmed by the court by a final decision, there is no violation of the Law on 
Competition by Dukagjini either. The Supreme Court finds that it is legally untenable for 
the same court in two cases with the same legal basis and with a similar factual situation 
to arrive at two completely opposite decisions. The Court of First Instance is obliged 
during the retrial to eliminate these flaws and to establish the facts and evidence related 
to the claims at the plaintiff’s request. During the retrial, the Court of First Instance 
should refer to the findings and expert opinion given in court in the Gekos case’.782 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
781 The Supreme Court rulings in the Dukagjini case (n 779) 3. 
782 Ibid 3–4. 
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7.35 The Dukagjini Case: Conclusion 
 
The reasoning given by the Supreme Court in the Dukagjini case is neither legally justified 
nor grounded in reason, and as a result not in conformity with the principle of effective 
judicial protection.783 It is contended that the Supreme Court’s reference to Article 
182.2(n)784 of the Law on Contested Procedure in issuing its ruling is erroneous. None of the 
requirements set forth in this provision were present, nor were they even specifically argued 
as the basis for the Supreme Court’s decision when it gave its reasons for annulling the lower 
instance courts’ judgments. This provision in the Law on Contested Procedure requires that 
court decisions should be annulled if no justification is given, when the crucial facts are 
unclear and contradictory to each other, or when there are contradictions between the 
disposition and reasoning. 
By reviewing the previous decisions of the lower courts in this case, it is apparent that none 
of the aforementioned legal criteria were met. Initially, the Court of First Instance issued a 
decision to reject the lawsuit of Dukagjini as ungrounded. In its decision the court elaborated 
and justified the facts, which makes this one of the rare court decisions in Kosovo that took 
into account the provisions of the Law on Competition. Afterwards, the same court rejected 
the appeal of the plaintiff as having exceeded the time limitations and the court did not allow 
a return to a previous situation, finding that there were no legal grounds to justify such a 
decision. Among the crucial facts for that refusal was that the representative of Dukagjini had 
indeed received on time the Court of First Instance’s judgment, based on the post office 
notification signed by Dukagjini’s legal representative. All these legal grounds and 
circumstances found by the Court of First Instance were accepted and upheld by the Court of 
Appeal. 
In principle, the Supreme Court’s conclusion that similar cases must be decided in a similar 
way with consistent785 judicial reasoning is sustainable. According to EU case law, however, 
the principle of equal treatment requires that comparable situations must not be treated 
differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way.786 However, in 
the Gekos and Dukagjini cases the argument does not stand. It is not accurate to state that 
Gekos and Dukagjini were fined by the Authority for the same breach of the Law on 
                                                 
783 See in that regard, Case C-386/10 P Chalkor v Commission, EU:C:2011:815, para 52; Case C-457/09 
Chartry ECLI:EU:C:2011:101, para 25; and Case C-67/13 P CB v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2014:2204, para 43.  
784 See n 780.  
785 See generally, Douglas H Ginsburg, ‘Originalism and Economic Analysis: Two Case Studies of Consistency 
and Coherence in Supreme Court Decision Making’ (2010) 33(1) Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 217.  
786 Case C-174/89 Hoche v Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung ECLI:EU:C:1990:270, para 
25; Case T-372/10 Bolloré v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2012:325, para 85; Case 106/83 Sermide v Cassa 
Conguaglio Zucchero and Others ECLI:EU:C:1984:394, para 28; and Case T-311/94 BPB Kartonfabriek de 
Eendracht v Commission, para 309.  
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Competition. Gekos was fined for abuse of a dominant position while Dukagjini was fined 
for being involved in concerted practices. It must be recalled that, contrary to the court’s 
contention, competition cases must be subject of case-by-case examination and not be 
decided in a ‘copy-paste’ fashion from each other, without taking proper account of the 
merits of each individual case, unless they are rejoinder. At least that is the impression in this 
case. The Authority must examine carefully all the relevant aspects of the each individual 
case.787 
It may be observed that the main reason for the Supreme Court’s annulment of the lower 
courts’ judgments was not because Dukagjini’s claims had been verified or because the court 
had upheld procedural violations. On the contrary, the main reason appears to have been the 
Supreme Court’s desire for unification of the Gekos and Dukagjini cases. The Supreme Court 
concluded that as there was no violation of the Law on Competition in the Gekos case, for the 
sake of consistency, there should also be no such violation in the Dukagjini case. 
Unification of the judicial decisions would have been useful if the alleged violations were 
proven and the provisions of Law on Competition were accurately applied. Thus the Gekos 
case should have been decided in accordance with the findings established in the Dukagjini 
judgment of the Court of First Instance, and not vice versa.  
The negative impacts of the approach of the Supreme Court and the other courts that have 
been reviewed in this chapter are immense and will reverberate for a significant period of 
time. This is because they are the first cases in the field of competition law in Kosovo, and as 
such, they will have a direct impact on the establishment of judicial practice in the field. 
William E Kovacic notes ‘because the outcome of the first litigated cases can have lasting 
effects on the agency's reputation and effectiveness, it is vital that the agency be ready to 
address and prevail on these issues from the very start’.788 Rather than setting forth a system 
of clear and coherent enforcement of the law, the court’s approach is found to have suffered 
from a variety of defects in legal understanding of competition rules. This does not bode well 
for the future of competition law in Kosovo.  
                                                 
787 See to that effect, Joined cases T-191/98, T-212/98 to T-214/98, Atlantic Container Line v Commission, 
ECLI:EU:T:2003:245 para 404 and Case T-339/04 France Télécom v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2007:80 para 
94.  
788 William E Kovacic, ‘Getting Started: Creating New Competition Policy Institutions in Transition 
Economies’ (n 67) 431. 
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7.36 The SharrCem Case 
 
7.36.1 The SharrCem Case: Introduction 
 
The SharrCem789 case is concerned not only with an undertaking’s anti-competitive 
behaviour, but also with anti-competitive policies and measures of public bodies. First, an 
overview will be provided of SharrCem’s request790 to restrict competition in the relevant 
market. This was part of the enterprise’s strategy to limit competition and avoid competing 
with its competitors on its merits, and to completely eliminate them from the market. Second, 
part of the analysis shall look at the decision of the Ministry of Trade and Industry to approve 
such request, together with the negative consequences this produced in terms of 
competitiveness. And third, all the phases of the procedures developed by the Authority in 
this case will be the subject of critical assessment. This analysis will show that in this case, as 
well as SharrCem and the Ministry of Trade and Industry having acted contrary to the Law on 
Protection of Competition, the Authority did so also, acting contrary to its own findings and 
to its institutional mandate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
789 The SharrCem factory was founded in 1936 at the southern border of Kosovo with Macedonia, in Hani Elezit 
city. This is the only manufacturer of cement in Kosovo. Like many socially owned enterprises in Kosovo, 
SharrCem has undergone privatization. This factory was privatized in 2010 by the Titan Group for the sum of 31 
million euros, which is considered one of the biggest privatizations in Kosovo. Privatization of the plant was 
carried out under special conditions, including: specification of the amount to be invested, the total number of 
factory workers to remain static for at least three years and limitations on the right to change the factory’s 
business activity. 
790 SharrCem-Titan Group Company, Request for Initiation of the Investigatory Procedure and the Placing of 
Safeguard Measures for the Cement Production Industry in Kosovo, sent to the Ministry of Trade and Industry, 
7 May 2012. [Hereinafter: SharrCem’s Request for Safeguard Measures]. 
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7.36.2 Facts of the Case 
 
SharrCem, struggling to maintain a dominant position in the relevant market of imported 
cement, called on state institutions to take measures791 to protect domestic products by 
placing an additional tax on cement products imported into Kosovo, even though the 
undertaking had some advantages792 in the relevant market as a result of being a local 
producer. SharrCem requested the Ministry of Trade and Industry to undertake the following 
safeguard measures: to begin an investigation regarding import practices which put the 
cement industry in Kosovo at risk, in compliance with Article 8 of the Law on Safeguard 
Measures; to place temporary safeguard measures by means of 15% to 40% additional tax on 
the sale of Albanian and Italian cement, with the purpose of protecting cement prices for 
2009 and preventing further losses in the cement industry in Kosovo until the conclusion of 
the investigation, in compliance with Article 19 of the Law on Safeguard Measures; and to 
place final safeguard measures by continuing the temporary measures specified above for a 
four-year (4) period, in compliance with Articles 4 and 22 of the Law on Safeguard 
Measures.793 
In its request,794 SharrCem admits that it is not able to compete in the relevant market, despite 
being the sole cement producer in Kosovo and having a dominant and privileged inherited 
position. The EU court have repeatedly held that ‘Article 82 EC prohibits a dominant 
undertaking from, inter alia, adopting pricing practices which have an exclusionary effect on 
its equally efficient actual or potential competitors … thereby strengthening its dominant 
position by using methods other than those which come within the scope of competition on 
the merits’.795 Such request was made based on the Law on Safeguard Measures on 
Imports,796 specifically Article 7 of the law.797 
 SharrCem’s request798 was approved by the Ministry of Trade and Industry, which imposed 
an additional tax of 35% on cement products imported into Kosovo. Following approval of 
the request, constituting an almost total blockade on imports of cement in Kosovo, the 
                                                 
791 Ibid. 
792 In many campaigns organized either by public institutions or various business chambers, local products are 
promoted ahead of those imported from abroad. As a result, SharrCem should have not faced difficulties 
regarding competition from imports. 
793 SharrCem’s Request for Safeguard Measures (n 790). 
794 SharrCem’s Request for Safeguard Measures (n 790).  
795 Case C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, para 177. 
796 Law No 04/L-047 on Safeguard Measures on Imports (Official Gazette no 17/2011, 16.09.2011). Available 
at 
http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/ligjet/Law%20on%20safeguard%20measures%20on%20imports
.pdf. Last accessed on 17 June 2017. 
797 Ibid. 
798 SharrCem’s Request for Safeguard Measures (n 790). 
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Authority initiated investigations. Despite the fact that the findings of the Authority’s 
investigation established that SharrCem had a dominant position in the relevant market, 
which it had abused, the Authority did not fine SharrCem. 
 
7.37 SharrCem’s Justification of Its Request for Safeguard Measures 
 
SharrCem justified its request inter alia on the following grounds: that it is one of the biggest 
manufactory employers in Kosovo; its contributions as a taxpayer; environmental protection 
investments;799 service as a conscious corporate citizen;800 investment required by the 
privatization process; and losses as a result of the continuous increase in cement imports from 
Albania and Italy.801 
 
7.37.1 SharrCem’s Status as a Taxpayer 
 
According to SharrCem’s request,802 the latter was awarded a distinguished taxpayer award 
in the previous three years by the Tax Administration of Kosovo.803 The tax contributions on 
SharrCem’s corporate income for the years 2008–2011 are presented in the following table: 
                                                 
799 According to SharrCem, in 2012 the undertaking completed an investment of over eight (8) million euros in 
environmental protection equipment. In addition, SharrCem applied for an integrated pollution prevention and 
control licence (hereinafter IPPC) and is expected to be the first company in Kosovo to obtain such a licence. 
An IPPC licence is granted in respect of an integrated system that handles the entire factory environmental plan, 
including a follow-up plan and continuous monitoring and reduction of environmental pollutants. 
800 SharrCem claims to be an active corporate citizen and to be committed to corporate social responsibility 
initiatives and to contributing to the development of the region, acting along three priority lines as follows: 
employment, including the investment programme to modernize in order to achieve a sustainable level of cost 
efficiency; education, health, and safety, with regard to internal and regional needs; environment, to eliminate 
sources of pollution and to contribute to cultural change concerning environmental protection. 
801 Privatization of SharrCem was carried out under special conditions, including specification of the amount to 
be invested, the total number of factory workers to remain static for at least three years and limitations on the 
right to change the factory’s business activity. However, this was one of the privatization forms applied in 
Kosovo by the Kosovo Privatization Agency. For more information relating to Kosovo Privatization Agency, 
see http://www.pak-ks.org/page.aspx?id=2. 
802 SharrCem’s Request for Safeguard Measures (n 790).  
803 For more information relating to the Kosovo Tax Administration, see: http://www.atk-ks.org/en/.  
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Table 5: Corporate income tax payable by SharrCem from 2008–2011 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Tax on Corporate 
Income 
1,679,939.00 €€ 2,112,979.00 € 1,220,000.00 € 920,000.00 € 
 
7.37.2 The Legal Position of SharrCem in Submitting the Request for Safeguard 
Measures 
 
The table below shows the legal position of SharrCem as in the request. 
Table 6: General view of the key information regarding the legal position of SharrCem in 
submitting the application for commencement of the investigatory procedure and placement 
of safeguard measures for the cement production industry in Kosovo 
 
Name of Undertaking SharrCem LLC 
Present number of employees (2011) 491 
Current volume of yearly cement production (2011) 535, 000.00 tons 
Installed cement production capacity 800, 000.00 tons 
Current percentage of cement production capacity in Kosovo (2011) 100% 
Current market percentage of the sale of cement (2011) 47.31% 
Primary registered activity of the business  2651 – Cement Production 
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7.37.3 SharrCem’s Losses 
 
SharrCem claimed that since 2010 it faced substantial losses as a result of the continuous 
increase in cement imports from other countries, but especially from Albania and Italy. 
According to SharrCem: 
‘If no action is taken by the public authorities to protect SharrCem from the continuous 
increase in imports of cement, losses are unavoidable and will affect the future of the 
factory in Kosovo. According to the Titan804 industrial plan, with investment in 
technology, quality, efficiency and a structure to improve cost efficiency, the factory can 
achieve production of over 800,000.00 tons of cement per year. This plan can be 
implemented for a period of five to seven years, given stable market conditions in the 
context of the demand for and the price of cement. If the current situation continues, the 
ability to finance the company will be hindered and the factory compelled to reduce 
production as a result of lower investment. This current situation will compromise the 
competitive ability of SharrCem and in the end cause the factory to become 
unsustainable. Consequently, Titan will consider supplying the Kosovo market through 
its companies in Macedonia and Albania, since this will be the only way to compete with 
imports from Albania and Italy’.805 
 
7.37.4 General Market Overview 
Table 7: According to the data provided by SharrCem in its request, the percentages of 
imports from 2009–2011 
 
 
 2009 2010 2011 
Yearly demand 1,040,000.00 tons 1,025,000.00 tons 1,131,000.00 tons 
Imports 41.12% 49.05% 52.69% 
Exports - - 1.3% 
                                                 
804 Titan is the mother company of SharrCem.  
805 SharrCem’s Request for Safeguard Measures (n 790) 5.  
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7.37.5 Market Share 
 
The cement market in Kosovo was primarily supplied by the following companies: SharrCem 
(Kosovo), Fushë Krujë (Albania), Colacem (Italy), Holcim (Serbia), and Usje (Macedonia). 
Importers of occasional lower volume include: Titan/Kosjeriq (Serbia), Ecotech (Italy) and 
Nexe Cement (Croatia). The tables below present the market share of the main undertakings 
operating in the relevant market of cement.806 
Table 8: Market share of the main competitors in the relevant market between 2009–2011 
 
Market share 
2009 2010 2011 
January–
December 
January–
April 
May–
December January–December 
1. SharrCem 58.88% 58.68% 48.97% 47.31% 
2. Imports from 
Albania and Italy: 
2.1 Fushë Krujë 
2.2 Colacem 
1.60% 3.61% 12.73% 22.28% 
1.60% 3.61% 12.13% 18.76% 
0.00% 0.00% 0.60% 3.52% 
3. Imports from 
Macedonia (Usje) 31.05% 29.49% 25.38% 
4. Imports from Serbia 
(Holcim) 7.38% 7.80% 4.9% 
 
 
                                                 
806 Data from the investigative file in the SharrCem case. 
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Table 9: The decrease in market share 
Undertaking Decrease in market share 
2009–2011 
Increase in market share 
2009–2011 
SharrCem 11.57% N/A 
Imports from Albania and 
Italy N/A 20.68% 
Imports from Macedonia 5.67% N/A 
Imports from Serbia 2.48% N/A 
Total 19.72% 20.68% 
 
7.37.6 Actual Losses 
 
According to SharrCem’s request,807 the increase in imports from Albania and Italy caused 
considerable losses to it. To date, SharrCem has suffered losses of 18,705,706.00 euros.808 
Table 10: General view of losses incurred by SharrCem as a result of the increased imports 
from Albania and Italy 
 
                                                 
807 SharrCem’s Request for Safeguard Measures (n 790) 11. 
808 Ibid. 
Source of loss 2010 2011 Total losses (euro) 
1. Fall in price 
N/A 1.1 Fall in price (€) 3.27 8.42 
1.2 Sales volume (tons) 522,547.00 535,404.00 
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Table 11: SharrCem’s volume of sales, revenues and net profit 
 
Category 2009 2010 2011 Summary of losses (2009–2011) 
Volume of 
sales 
(tons) 
613,087.00 522,547.00 535,404.00 -12.67% 
Revenues 
(Euros) 
45,512,548.00 37,086,016.00 36,295,602.00 -20.25% 
Net profit 
(Euros) 
18,742,956.00 12,800,405.00 8,804,075.00 -53.02% 
 
In the light of the foregoing arguments, SharrCem requested the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry to approve its request for additional tax on cement imports. 
Sub-total (€): 1,708,729.00 4,508,202.00 6,216,830.00 
2. Volume reduction N/A 
2.1 Volume reduction (tons) 90,540.00 77,683.00 
 
2.2 Price (€) 74.24 74.24 
Sub-total (€) 6, 721,690.00 5,767,186.00 12,488,876.00 
Overall total of loss (€) 18,705,706.00  
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SharrCem was requesting restriction of the import of cement to Kosovo due to SharrCem’s 
inefficiency and inability to compete809 with the importers in the relevant market, even 
though dominant undertakings are expected to compete on the merits. According to the settle 
EU case law, ‘it is in no way the purpose of Article 82 EC to prevent an undertaking from 
acquiring, on its own merits, the dominant position on a market. Nor does that provision seek 
to ensure that competitors less efficient than the undertaking with the dominant position 
should remain on the market. Article 82 EC prohibits a dominant undertaking from, inter alia, 
adopting pricing practices which have an exclusionary effect on its equally efficient actual or 
potential competitors … thereby strengthening its dominant position by using methods other 
than those which come within the scope of competition on the merits’.810 
Since SharrCem was unable to compete with the cement imports, it is clear why a request to 
impose restriction on imports was made instead of improving its competitive ability—it was 
simply the easiest and most convenient way for the undertaking to proceed, at least in the 
short term. In the long term, SharrCem could focus on improving its competitive ability in the 
market on its merits, such as price, quality and choice.811 The purpose of the law is not to 
place safeguard measures on imports in cases where strong and effective competition is 
present in the relevant market, especially when the request comes from an undertaking which 
has a dominant position in that market. It is clear from the request that SharrCem admits 
being unable to compete with importers in the cement market. It sees the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry as its saviour in its ability to impose restrictions or total bans through approved 
measures on cement imports. When an undertaking for whatever internal reasons becomes 
unable to face market competition, then the solution should be sought within the undertaking, 
and not by requests to public bodies to restrict competition by eliminating competitors,812 as a 
result producing anti-competitive813 effects in the market.814 
                                                 
809 Cf ECS/AKZO Commission Decision no 85/609 [1985] OJ L374/1, para 81; Herbert Hovenkamp, ‘The 
Monopolization Offense’ (2000) 61(3) Ohio State Law Journal 1035, 1040 (‘Our concern about monopoly and 
the opportunities of rivals should not obscure the objective of antitrust law which seeks to protect the process of 
competition on the merits and the beneficial results associated with it’); and more generally, Alan J Meese, 
‘Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 of the Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us a Total 
Welfare Standard and Why We Should Keep It’ (2010) 85(3) New York University Law Review 659.  
810 Case C-209/10 Post Danmark ECLI:EU:C:2012:172, para 21 and Case C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom v 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, para 177. 
811 See eg Case C-209/10 Post Danmark ECLI:EU:C:2012:172, para 22 (‘Competition on the merits may, by 
definition, lead to the departure from the market or the marginalisation of competitors that are less efficient and 
so less attractive to consumers from the point of view of, among other things, price, choice, quality or 
innovation’). 
812 Cf Case C-62/86 AKZO Chemie v Commission ECLI: EU:C:1991:286 para 70 (‘It follows that Article 86 
prohibits a dominant undertaking from eliminating a competitor and thereby strengthening its position by using 
methods other than those which come within the scope of competition on the basis of quality’).  
813 See eg Barak Orbach, ‘How Antitrust Lost Its Goal’ (n 15) 2254 (‘Indeed, antitrust inquiries have always 
focused on competitive effects, or at least this has been their perceived intent’). 
814 Cf Case C‑52/ 09 Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, para 64. 
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Taken as a whole, SharrCem’s initiative815 can be understood as an admission that it was not 
able to compete and to maintain its dominant position in the cement market in the territory of 
Kosovo, and as part of its strategy816 it requested restriction of competition by the placing of 
safeguard measures on cement imports.817 In such a situation, besides the losses that would 
be suffered by the importing undertakings as a result of restricted trading opportunities,818 the 
ultimate consumer would also be harmed,819 as they would have to pay more for the same or 
lower-quality goods, and would thus be deprived of their right to choose. Giorgio Monti notes 
that ‘consumers dictate what goods and services are provided’.820 This strategy of SharrCem 
can be interpreted as a way of differentiating itself from undertakings operating under normal 
competition conditions and weakening its competitors. ‘The concept of abuse is an objective 
concept relating to the behaviour of an undertaking in a dominant position which is such as to 
influence the structure of a market where, as a result of the very presence of the undertaking 
in question, the degree of competition is weakened and which, through recourse to methods 
different from those which condition normal competition in products or services on the basis 
                                                 
815 Cf Case C‑52/ 09 Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, para 49 (‘it must be borne 
in mind that Article 102 TFEU applies only to anti-competitive conduct engaged in by undertakings on their 
own initiative’); Joined Cases C-359/95 P and C-379/95 P Commission and French v Ladbroke Racing 
ECLI:EU:C:1997:531, para 33; Case C-18/88 Régie des Télégraphes et des Téléphones and GB-Inno-BM SA 
ECLI:EU:C:1991:474, para 20 and Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2008:101, para 
85.  
816 See Krystyna Kowalik-Bańczyk, ‘The Application of EU Competition Law in Poland’ in Adriana Almășan 
and Peter Whelan (eds) The Consistent Application of EU Competition Law: Substantive and Procedural 
Challenges (n 270) (‘All activities forming part of a general strategy adopted by the entity dominating the 
market should be assessed in light of the effects brought by the strategy as a whole. If a dominant entity adopts 
different practices, all bound to achieve the same aim for instance, the elimination of competitors, in order to 
apply Article 102 TFEU it is sufficient that at least one of the practices can affect trade between Member 
States’). 
817 See eg Barak Orbach, ‘Antitrust Populism’ (2017) 14(1) New York University Journal of Law & Business 1, 
13 (arguing that ‘the transition from the ‘old economy’ to the ‘new economy’ produced considerable 
efficiencies, but is unfavorable to large segments of society’). 
818 See Commission’s Decision on Vitamins (n 607) para 27 (‘The conduct in question is likely to affect trade 
between Member States in that it restricts the trading opportunities of users and suppliers of bulk vitamins in 
different Member States and this has a direct influence on the patterns of trade between Member States so as to 
impede the attainment of the objectives of a single market’).  
819 Based on EU settled case law, one of the fundamental principles of EU competition law is to prevent 
consumer harm. See in particular, Case C-209/10 Post Danmark ECLI:EU:C:2012:172, para 20; Case C-52/09 
TeliaSonera Sverige ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, para 24; Joined Cases C-468/06 to C-478/06 Sot. Lélos kai Sia and 
Others ECLI:EU:C:2008:504, para 68 Case C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, para 176 and Case C-202/07 P France Télécom v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2009:214, 
para 105. See also, Ioannis Lionas and Damien Geradin, Handbook on European Competition Law: Substantive 
Aspects (Edward Elgar 2013) 19. [Hereinafter: Ioannis Lionas and Damien Geradin, Handbook on European 
Competition Law: Substantive Aspects].  
820 Giorgio Monti, EC Competition Law (n 575) 2. 
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of the transactions of commercial operators, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of 
the degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of that competition’. 821 
Such a strategy might even work in the short term, but the vision and mission of the 
undertaking in the long term must focus on competing with imports or other manufacturers, 
based on quality, low price and delivery of good services to consumers,822 and not on 
attempting to maintain its dominant position within the relevant market through anti-
competitive practices or strategies.823 
Considering that SharrCem is the only producer of cement in the entire territory of Kosovo, 
competitiveness in normal circumstances should not pose a difficulty. However, SharrCem’s 
request was similar to the creation of a monopoly situation in the market,824 and as such  
contrary to the provisions of the Law on Protection of Competition825 and the Constitution of 
Kosovo.826 
 
7.38 The Decision of the Ministry of Trade and Industry in the SharrCem Case 
 
After reviewing SharrCem’s request, the Ministry of Trade and Industry decided to approve it 
and placed temporary safeguard measures on the import of cement for all countries with the 
additional customs tariff of 35%.827 
                                                 
821 See Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1979:36, para 91. 
822 See George L Priest, ‘The Abiding Influence of the Antitrust Paradox’ (2008) 32(1) Harvard Journal of Law 
& Public Policy 455, 457 (‘Put conversely, if a firm's practices did not provide value to consumers, the firm 
would fail in the competitive battle’). 
823 See eg Carl Shapiro and Hal R Varian, Carl Shapiro and Hal R Varian, ‘Information Rules: A Strategic 
Guide to the Network Economy’ ( 1999) Harvard Business School Press, 303 (‘monopolists are prohibited from 
employing certain strategies’). 
824 See Barak Orbach, ‘The Antitrust Curse of Bigness’ (2012) 85 Southern California Law Review 605, 655 
(‘Although “business size” is not and never has been a stated concern of antitrust, in many ways it has shaped 
the development of antitrust laws. The fear of size was the catalyst for the birth of competition laws in the 
United States and has always been part of antitrust laws, whether as a defined element, a narrative, or a lingering 
shadow of the past. American competition laws were born with the curse of bigness’). 
825 See eg Thomas J Horton, ‘The Coming Extinction of Homo Economicus and the Eclipse of the Chicago 
School of Antitrust: Applying Evolutionary Biology to Structural and Behavioral Antitrust Analysis’ (2011) 
42(3) Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 469, 484 (arguing that ‘monopolies and dominant firms threaten 
the economy’). 
826 Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo (n 24) Art 10 reads: ‘A market economy with free competition is the 
basis of the economic order of the Republic of Kosovo’.  
827 Ministry of Trade and Industry, Decision placing temporary safeguard measures on the import of cement, no 
01/4508/2012, 11 June 2012. [Hereinafter: Ministry’s Decision for safeguard measures].  
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However, the Ministry of Trade and Industry did not give any justification for its decision to 
impose an additional tax of 35% on all imports of cement. The Ministry referred only to the 
report dated 08.06.2012 assessing the measures.828 
On the other hand, the decision sparked negative reaction from the general public and the 
Government of Kosovo.829 The latter had stated that the decision was taken by the Ministry 
without prior consultation with the Government. The public reaction related more to the fact 
that the main cement imports were from Albania, and this measure was disapprovingly 
understood as a measure against the Albanian state rather than against the product in 
question. In this regard, any barrier to mutual imports between the two countries required 
consideration in other dimensions, including the political and socio-economic, apart from the 
competition aspects.830 
One of the reasons which could have led the Ministry to such a decision may have been the 
employment offered by SharrCem. However, this is not the sole goal of competition 
legislation.831 The Ministry must not take measures which ‘encourage’ a dominant 
undertaking to abuse its dominant position.832 
 
7.38.1 Complaints Against the Ministry’s Decision from a Stakeholder in the Relevant 
Market 
 
The contested decision produced complaints and requests for review. Such requests were sent 
to both the Ministry of Trade and Industry and to the Authority as the guardian of 
competition.833 
                                                 
828 This report, however, has not been made available, despite the fact that it has been officially requested for 
research purposes and by the Authority. 
829 See (n 838 and 839).  
830 See media reports on that regard https://indeksonline.net/nga-patatja-tek-birra-produktet-qe-e-ndajne-
kosoven-me-shqiperine/.  
831 See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Laraine L Laudati (eds) European Competition Law Annual1997: The 
Objectives of Competition Policy (n 68) 78 (‘Political and social goals, such as protecting weak firms or 
maintaining levels of employment, should not be competition policy objectives’). 
832 Cf Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Isabela Atanasiu (eds) European Competition Law Annual 2003: What Is an 
Abuse of a Dominant Position? (n 583) 6 (‘Article 86 EC, read in conjunction with Article 82 EC, prohibits 
Member States from adopting measures which lead a dominant firm to abuse its dominant position’). See also to 
that effect, Portuguese Airports Commission Decision IV/35.703 [1999] OJ L69/31. 
833 Request for review of the Ruling of the Ministry of Trade and Industry sent to the Kosovo Competition 
Authority by Cement Factory Fushë Krujë-Albania and Besimi Commerce-Kosovo—which is the main importer 
of cement from Albania to Kosovo, 3 July 2012. [Hereinafter: The importers’ request].  
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The importers voiced their concern and complained that they were aware that SharrCem had 
made the request for temporary safeguard measures. In addition, the importers requested 
access to the Ministry of Trade and Industry report based on which the measures were taken, 
but they never received the requested report. Clarification was also requested from the 
Authority as to why the reports related to this case and based on which the Ministry had 
decided were not being made public. 
In its request, inter alia, the importers claimed: 
‘The measures were not sustainable, even in the sense of Article 19(1)834 of the Law on 
Safeguard Measures on Imports. To make a decision based on this Article the Ministry 
should have found that these preconditions and circumstances were fulfilled, in 
particular, the existence of critical circumstances and evident facts on the causation or 
the risk of threat of serious injury to Kosovo businesses. Not a single fact for the 
existence of these conditions was presented. Therefore it cannot be understood which 
facts the Ministry used to ground its decision when it cited Article 19 of the law’.835 
Serious injury and threat of serious injury under Article 3 (1.6) and (1.8) of the law836 is 
present in cases where significant overall impairment in the position of producers of like or 
identical products in Kosovo is clearly predictable or imminent. In the case at hand neither 
serious injury nor serious harm was clearly predictable or imminent, but only the assumption 
of SharrCem that there was a threat. Neither the local producer (SharrCem) nor the Ministry 
could provide any evidence to argue the existence of the abovementioned circumstances. 
Furthermore, the law does not explain the phrase ‘critical circumstances’, which must exist 
for an action to be taken under Article 19, which the Ministry’s ruling was based on. 
According to the importers’ claim, SharrCem’s request for safeguard measure did not have 
any legal basis, and could not be understood any differently from a request for a monopolistic 
position in the Kosovo cement market. 
In this regard, the cement importers noted that the Ministry of Trade and Industry: 
‘Favours SharrCem by closing the market, because the 35% additional customs tax 
makes cement import impossible. In this way, the market shall have a single operator’.837 
                                                 
834 The Law on Safeguard Measures on Imports (n 796) Art 19(1) reads: ‘Provisional safeguard measures shall 
be established by the decision of the Minister if recommended by the Ministry immediately after the initiation of 
the investigation and shall be applied only in critical circumstances when there are evident facts that 
demonstrate that increased imports of the investigated product have caused or threatened to cause serious injury 
to the producer or producers in Kosovo, when such rapid action is required for prevention or compensation’. 
835 The importers’ request (n 833). 
836 Law on Safeguard Measures on Imports (n 796).  
837 The importers’ request (n 833) 2–3. 
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In support of its assertion, the importers’ requested the Authority, in compliance with Article 
10 of the Law on Protection of Competition, to examine the dominant position of SharrCem 
in the cement market, and establish whether there was an abuse of dominant position by the 
latter. 
 
7.38.2 Revocation of the Decision by the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
 
After pressure from large public and civil society associations,838 and reaction from the 
Government itself,839 the Ministry of Trade and Industry on 01.08.2012 decided to revoke its 
decision.840 The Ministry justified the revocation on the basis that the imposed temporary 
measures had achieved their purpose and prevented the uncontrolled influx of cement 
imports, especially during the construction season. They had also ensured stability for the 
local producer and enabled an increase in local capacities in the construction industry.841 
The contested decision, apart from being in breach of the Law on Protection of Competition, 
can also be considered contrary to Article 4 of the Law on External Trade,842 which regulates 
the primacy of free trade. 
The Article provides that: 
‘Public authority or normative acts cannot impose restrictions, prohibitions or conditions 
on any external trade activity, or damage or impose conditions on the ability or the right 
of every resident or non-resident to conclude or perform external trade activities, unless 
in cases specifically defined by this law or otherwise allowed. Furthermore, a public 
                                                 
838 See eg media campaigns opposing the Ministry’s decision: Available (in 
Albanian):http://www.gazetatema.net/2012/06/14/kusari-lila-cimentoja-shqiptare-vjen-nga-italia-serbia-e-
greqia/; https://telegrafi.com/po-mbyllemi/; http://shqiptarja.com/lajm/media-ccedil-imentoja-e-fush-euml-kruj-
euml-s-br-p-euml-rdoret-n-euml-nd-euml-rtimin-e-autostrad-euml-s?r=app. Last accessed on 21 June 2018.  
839 The Minister was threatened with dismissal by the Government if the contested decision was not revoked. 
This option was discussed in the Assembly. See media reports in that regard (in Albanian): 
http://www.monitor.al/kusari-lila-ne-prag-te-shkarkimit/ and https://telegrafi.com/mimoza-ne-prag-te-
shkarkimit/.  
840 This decision was not published, only the press release. 
841 The Ministry of Trade and Industry in the press release stated that: ‘it will continue together with other 
ministries within the Government, to look for and find ways to ensure a better operating environment for all 
manufacturing companies, regardless of where they come from and in whose ownership they are. Despite the 
protest created by the individual designated to serve personal interests, the Ministry believes that the process 
was in full conformity with the Law on Safeguard Measures. It has shown that the Government is committed to 
helping local manufacturers in order to ensure sustainable economic development of the country’. 
842 Law No 04/L-048 on External Trade (Official Gazette No 28/2011, 16.12.2011). Available at 
http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/ligjet/Law%20on%20external%20trade.pdf. Last accessed on 14 
May 2018.  
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authority or normative act cannot impose measures that produce specific restricting and 
prohibiting effects, unless defined specifically by this law or otherwise allowed’.843 
When the Ministry attempts to enforce a specific law, it should take into consideration other 
laws that directly or indirectly affect the same issue. In particular, the Ministry should have 
taken into account the Law on Protection of Competition; the Law on Consumer 
Protection;844 and the Law on External Trade. In addition, mutual trade agreements between 
Kosovo and Albania should have been considered. 
It must be recalled that the Ministry should not take measures which are likely to facilitate 
abuse of a dominant position845 by an undertaking holding such a position.846 In addition, it 
should be borne in mind that the freedom to compete is a distinct aim of competition law.847 
Carl Shapiro and Hal R Varian note that governments demand that powerful monopolies 
must be held accountable under antitrust law.848 
 
7.39 The Procedures Followed by the Authority in the SharrCem Case 
7.39.1 Investigative Report of the Authority in the SharrCem Case 
 
Following the decision of the Ministry and the negative reaction that the decision produced, 
the Authority prepared a monitoring report regarding the cement industry in Kosovo,849 even 
                                                 
843 Ibid. 
844 Law No 04/L-121, on Consumer Protection (Official Gazette No 32/12, 20.11.2012).  
845 See eg Case C-18/93 Corsica Ferries Italia Srl v Corpo dei Piloti del Porto di Genova 
ECLI:EU:C:1994:195, para 43; Case C-163/96 Raso and Others ECLI:EU:C:1998:54, para 27; Case C-41/90 
Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v Macrotron ECLI:EU:C:1991:161, para 29; Case C-260/89 Elliniki Radiophonia 
Tiléorassi AE and Panellinia Omospondia Syllogon Prossopikou v Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios 
Kouvelas and Nicolaos Avdellas and others ECLI:EU:C:1991:254, para 37; Case C-179/90 Merci convenzionali 
porto di Genova v Siderurgica Gabrielli ECLI:EU:C:1991:464, para 17; and Case C-323/93 Société Civile 
Agricole du Centre d'Insémination de la Crespelle v Coopérative d'Elevage et d'Insémination Artificielle du 
Département de la Mayenne ECLI:EU:C:1994:368, para 18. 
846 See Case C-179/90 Genova ECLI:EU:C:1991:464 para 21 and Case 13/77 INNO v ATAB 
ECLI:EU:C:1977:185, para 35.  
847 See eg Ioannis Lionas and Damien Geradin, Handbook on European Competition Law: Substantive Aspects 
(n 830) 30 and Pınar Akman, ‘The Role of ‘Freedom’ in EU Competition Law’ [2013] Legal Studies. 
848 Carl Shapiro and Hal R Varian, Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy (Harvard 
Business School Press 1999) 1 and Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism (University of California, 
Berkeley-Haas School of Business 2017) 1. Published also in the International Journal of Industrial 
Organization (2018). 
849 Kosovo Competition Authority, Monitoring Report on Cement Industry, No DMT/APD-006/2012, 1, 12 July 
2013. [Hereinafter: The Monitoring Report in the SharrCem case]. 
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though this was not a formal initiation of investigation in this particular case.850 The scope of 
the monitoring according to the Authority was abuse of a dominant position by SharrCem. In 
this regard, Authority authorized the Department for Market Supervision to monitor, 
investigate, collect and compare data regarding the cement market within the territory of 
Kosovo. The Authority determined the investigation period as the years 2010, 2011 and 
2012.851 
 
7.39.2 Relevant Market 
 
The following products852 were subject to investigation: 
1. Cem 32.5853 
2. Cem 42.5854 
3. Cem 52.5855 
4. Sharrmall.856 
 
7.39.3 Challenges Faced by the Authority During the Investigation Process 
 
According to the Authority, it faced challenges during the investigation process as regards 
gathering the necessary data, data verification and cooperation from other institutions. In light 
of the foregoing, the Authority stated: 
                                                 
850 Sometimes the Authority referred to it as an ‘investigative report’.  
851 Ibid.  
852 See in general, Wolf Sauter, Coherence in EU Competition Law (n 16) 29 (‘Dominance must always be 
assessed in relation to a specific product and geographic market’). 
853 CEM 32.5 is Portland cement. The product is for smaller jobs such as foundations, slabs and columns for 
individual houses and for masonry applications. 
854 CEM 42.5 is also Portland cement. According to SharrCem, it is one of the most widely used basic building 
materials in Kosovo because it is durable, cost-effective and suitable for a variety of concrete construction 
applications.  
855 CEM 52.5 is also Portland composite cement. According to SharrCem, the product is suited for jobs where a 
structure must put into place quickly or when forms need to be removed as soon as possible, such as pre-cast 
elements. 
856 Sharrmall is a hydraulic binder. According to SharrCem, it is used for masonry mortars, rendering mortars, 
and for internal and external plastering. It is the best product for efficient and low-cost brick laying and plaster 
work. 
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‘The Ministry of Trade and Industry did not respond to the Authority’s requests for 
disclosure of information to show how the Ministry came to the conclusion concerning 
safeguard measures. Specifically, an internal report on the Ministry investigation, which 
was mentioned in the Ministry’s decision, was requested. However, this report has never 
been given to the Authority, despite the fact that the Ministry has a legal obligation to do 
so. The Authority could not obtain the report from any party involved in the case. Also, a 
challenge for the Authority in investigating this case was the unwillingness of the 
Kosovo Tax Administration to cooperate with the Authority. This agency did not supply 
official data regarding the production of cement by SharrCem for the periods 2010, 2011 
and January to July 2012’. 857 
 
7.39.4 Findings of the Report 
 
The most relevant parts of the monitoring report shall be presented and discussed below. 
The Authority’s report, inter alia, stated: 
‘On 09.04.2012 SharrCem notified customers of a new pricelist for cement products. On 
07.05.2012, a month after the increase in prices, SharrCem applied to the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry for the imposition of safeguard measures for cement imports in 
Kosovo. The preliminary research found that before submitting the application and 
during the review of the request by the MTI, SharrCem notified customers that prices 
would go up’.858 
 
7.39.5 Imports and Production of Cement in Kosovo 
Table 12: Shows cement imports for 2010, 2011 and until 30.10.2012 
 
Years Cement imports 
2010 525,181,644.00 ton 
2011 612,799,974.00 ton 
                                                 
857 The Monitoring Report in the SharrCem case (n 849) 5. 
858 Ibid. 
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01.01.2012–
30.10.2012 560,570,700.00 ton 
 
From data provided by the Authority, the annual output of SharrCem for the years under 
investigation was as shown in the following tables. 
Table 13: Shows SharrCem’s production for 2010, 2011 and until 30.10.2012 
Years SharrCem’s production 
2010 526,792.400.00 ton 
2011 552,068.066.00 ton 
01.01.2012–
30.10.2012 434,211.900.00 ton 
Table 14: Cement needs according to the Authority’s assessment for 2010, 2011 and until 
30.10.2012 
Years Cement needs 
2010 1, 051,974.044.00 ton 
2011 1,164,868.040.00 ton 
01.01.2012–
30.10.2012 994,782.600.00 ton 
Figure 1: Percentage of domestic and imported cement in the Kosovo market for 2010 
No. Total imports for 2010 SharrCem production for 2010 Total 
1. 525,181,644.00 ton 526.792,400.00 ton 1,051.974,044. ton 
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2. 49.92% 50.08% 100% 
 
 
Table 15: Domestic production and cement imports for the year 2011 
 
No Total imports for 2011 SharrCem production for 2011 Total 
1. 612.799,974.00 ton 552,068,066.00 ton 1,164,868,040.00 ton 
2. 52.61% 47.39% 100% 
 
 
 
 
50.08%49.92%
SharrCem
Imports
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Figure 2: Percentage of domestic and imported cement in the Kosovo market for the year 
2011 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 16: Domestic production and cement imports for the year 2012, until 30.10.2012 
 
No Total imports 01.01.2012–30.10.2012 
SharrCem production 01.01.2012–30.10 
2012 Total 
1. 560,570,700.00 ton 434,211,900.00 ton 
994,782,600.
00 ton 
2. 56.35% 43.65% 100% 
47.39%52.61%
SharrCem
Imports
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Figure 3: Percentage of domestic and imported cement in the Kosovo market for the year 
2012, until 30.10.2012 
 
 
 
7.39.5.1 Price Index859 for the Years 2010, 2011 and 2012 
Table 17: Shows the SharrCem pricelist for the year 2010 
 
 
Nr. 
 
Date 
 
Price (Cem 
32.5 in 
sacks) 
without 
VAT 
 
Price (Cem 
42.5 in 
sacks) 
without 
VAT 
 
Price (Cem 
42.5 in 
bulk) 
without 
VAT 
 
Price (Cem 
52.5 in 
bulk) 
without 
VAT 
 
Price 
(Sharrmall) 
without 
VAT 
1. 09.04.2010 70.60 76.45 72.25 84.05 63.36 
                                                 
859 According to the Authority’s declaration, this pricelist was provided by SharrCem. 
43.65%56.35%
SharrCem
Imports
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Table 18: Shows the SharrCem pricelist for the year 2011 
 
 
Nr. 
 
Date 
 
Price (Cem 
32.5 in 
sacks) 
without 
VAT 
 
Price (Cem 
42.5 in 
sacks) 
without 
VAT 
 
Price (Cem 
42.5 in 
bulk) 
without 
VAT 
 
Price (Cem 
52.5 in 
bulk) 
without 
VAT 
 
Price 
(Sharrmall) 
without 
VAT 
1. 08.04.2011 70.60 76.45 72.25 84.05 63.36 
 
7.39.5.2 Prices Increases Imposed by SharrCem During 2012 
 
Based on the Authority’s report,860 SharrCem’s price changes during 2012 were as follows: 
 
Nr. Date Price (Cem 
32.5 in 
sacks) 
without VAT 
Price (Cem 
42.5 in sacks) 
without VAT 
Price (Cem 
42.5 in 
bulk) 
without 
VAT 
Price (Cem 
52.5 in 
bulk) 
without 
VAT 
Price 
(Sharrmall) 
without 
VAT 
1. 13.02.2012 70.60 75.61 70.59 80.60 63.36 
 
Nr. Date Price (Cem 
32.5 in 
sacks) 
without 
Price (Cem 
42.5 in sacks) 
without VAT 
Price (Cem 
42.5 in bulk) 
without VAT 
Price (Cem 
52.5 in 
bulk) 
without 
Price 
(Sharrmall) 
without 
                                                 
860 The Monitoring Report in the SharrCem case (n 849) 13–14. 
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VAT VAT VAT 
2. 09.04.2012 80.00 84.30 78.80 89.40 72.90 
 
Nr. Date Price (Cem 
32.5 in 
sacks) 
without VAT 
Price (Cem 
42.5 in 
sacks) 
without 
VAT 
Price (Cem 
42.5 in 
bulk) 
without 
VAT 
Price (Cem 
52.5 in 
bulk) 
without 
VAT 
Price 
(Sharrmall) 
without VAT 
3. 03.09.2012 69.00 73.30 66.00 78.40 63.40 
 
Nr. Date Price (Cem 
32.5 in 
sacks) 
without 
VAT 
Price (Cem 
42.5 in sacks) 
without VAT 
Price (Cem 
42.5 in bulk) 
without 
VAT 
Price (Cem 
52.5 in 
bulk) 
without 
VAT 
Price 
(Sharrmall) 
without VAT 
4. 07.09.2012 66.00 70.00 65.00 78.40 63.40 
 
The above shows that SharrCem kept the same prices in 2010 and 2011. Growth is observed 
only in 2012, the year in which the request for safeguard measures was made by SharrCem 
and approved by the Ministry. This is a clear indication that SharrCem’s pricelist and the 
request for safeguard measures were coordinated. 
Figure 7: Shows stable prices for the years 2010–2011, whereas there were price increases 
and decreases during 2012 for the product Cem 32.5 in sacks 
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Figure 8: Shows stable prices for the years 2010–2011, whereas there were price increases 
and decreases during 2012 for the product Cem 42.5 in sacks 
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Figure 9: Shows stable prices for the years 2010–2011, whereas there were price increases 
and decreases during 2012 for the product Cem 42.5 in bulk 
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Figure 10: Shows stable prices for the years 2010–2011, whereas there were price increases 
and decreases during 2012 for the product Cem 52.5 in bulk 
 
Figure 11: Shows stable prices for the years 2010–2011, whereas there were increases and 
decreases during 2012 for the product Sharrmall 
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As can be seen from the above figures, SharrCem prices during 2010 and 2011 were stable. 
Changes in prices were made only in 2012, the year in which SharrCem initiated safeguard 
measures, as a result of which the only participant in the relevant market for a few months 
was SharrCem. As can be observed from the above data, during 2010, 2011 and 2012 
SharrCem had been in a dominant position in the relevant market. On 09.04.2012 SharrCem 
significantly increased cement prices from 70.60 € to 80.00 €. Following withdrawal of the 
decision it considerably decreased prices, from 80.00 € to 60.00 € per ton for the product 
Cem 32.5. There was an increase for Cem 42.5 from 75.61 € to 84.30 €. After withdrawal of 
the decision a significant price decrease from 84.30 € to 66.00 € was made. 
Considering that price movements only occurred in 2012, it is beyond reasonable doubt that 
SharrCem initially planned restriction of competition, and then increased prices for its cement 
products. 
According to the Authority’s data861 the sale volume of cement products by SharrCem for the 
period investigated (April–August of the years 2010, 2011 and 2012) compared to previous 
years remains the same, but the essential difference is in the price. As a result SharrCem 
generated additional revenues as described below. 
Table 19: Shows additional SharrCem revenues as a result of price increases 
 
Product SharrCem’s additional revenues 
Cem in sacks – 32.5 356,020.00 € 
Cem in sacks – 42.5 607,064.05 € 
Cem in bulk – 42.5 994,113.15 € 
Cem in sacks – 52.5 87,766.75 € 
Total 2,044,963.95 € 
 
 
                                                 
861 To which the author had access. 
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7.39.5.3 Comparison of Cement Prices with Countries in the Region 
 
Data from the SharrCem investigative file also included comparative analyses of cement 
prices in other countries in the region, such as Albania.862 
 
Table 20: Represents the price difference between Kosovo and Albania for 2011 and 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
862According to the Authority, the official data were received from the Albanian Competition Authority. 
  
2011 2012 
Nr.  Products Albania Kosovo Albania Kosovo 
1 Cement bulk 42.5  53.66 € 72.25 € 53.91 € 71.80 € 
2 Cement in sacks 42.5  60.61 € 76.45 € 60.32 € 77.74 € 
3 Cement in sacks 32.5  50.75 € 70.60 € 54.21 € 73.20 € 
4 Average price  55.01 € 73.10 € 56.14 € 74.25 € 
5 Differentiation in euros 2011/12 18.09 € 18.11 € 
6 Differentiation in percentage 2011/12 24.75% 24.39% 
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The Authority’s findings in deducing abuse of a dominant position included the following 
aggravating circumstances: 
‘Shortage of cement in warehouses during the application of protective measures; 
SharrCem customers having to wait more than 24 hours for supply of cement; 
undertakings selling imported cement having serious problems in implementing contracts 
concluded earlier; SharrCem’s regular customers being concerned that the measures, 
apart from distorting competition, conferred on SharrCem power to determine prices and 
supply; based on data from the investigation, failure on the part of SharrCem to supply 
the Kosovo market with cement; suspicion that the quality of the cement produced by 
SharrCem was poor as a result of the elimination of competition and the demand for 
cement during that period of the year; prices elsewhere in the region being significantly 
cheaper; and the drastic discount in prices by SharrCem on 03.09.2012 and 
07.09.2012’.863 
 
7.40 The Final Findings and the Recommendations of the Authority’s Report 
 
Based on the findings presented above and their analysis, the Authority deduced that 
SharrCem had a dominant position, which it abused. As a result, the Department of Market 
Supervision within the Authority recommended to the decision-making body, in this case the 
Commission of the Authority, to fine SharrCem for abuse of a dominant position in the 
amount of 8% of revenues for the first six months of 2012.864 
 
7.40.1 The Calculation of the Fine on the SharrCem Undertaking 
 
According to the report,865 the Market Supervision Department calculated and proposed a 
penalty of 8% of the undertaking’s revenues for the period April to September 2012—
turnover for the six months was 25,582,737.00 €, therefore the amount of the fine 
recommended was 2,046,619.00 €. 
 
 
                                                 
863 The Monitoring Report in the SharrCem case (n 849) 24. 
864 Ibid 25. 
865 Ibid. 
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Table 21: SharrCem’s turnover during the period April to September 2012 
 
Month Turnover without VAT Tax on profit 
Amount for 
calculation of 
fine 
Percenta
ge of 
fine 
Fine 
April 3,620,145.59 € 84,366.67 € 3,535,778.92 € 8% 282,862.31 € 
May 3,293,663.95 € 84,366.67 € 3,209,297.28 € 8% 256,743.78 € 
June 6,748,516.88 € 84,366.67 € 6,664,150.21 € 8% 533,132.02 € 
July 7,883,580.31 € 84,366.67 € 7,799,213.64 € 8% 623,937.09 € 
August 1,325,567.06 € 84,366.67 € 1,241,200.39 € 8% 99,296.03 € 
September 3,217,462.76 € 84,366.67 € 3,133,096.09 € 8% 250,647.69 € 
Total 26,088,937 € 506,200.00 € 25,582,737.00 € 8% 2,046,619.00 € 
 
As will be seen from the analysis of the case, the report’s findings and recommendations and 
the final decision of the Authority contradict each other. The Market Supervision Department 
which monitored the cement market during the investigation provided sufficient arguments 
and clear recommendations that SharrCem had a dominant position in the relevant market 
which it had abused. 
Such conclusion is strengthened by the fact that it was SharrCem that initiated restrictions on 
cement imports—through the request to the Ministry of Trade and Industry. As a direct 
consequence of the approval of such request, SharrCem’s competitors were at a disadvantage. 
Competition rules aim to ensure equal opportunity for all undertakings active in the 
market.866 
                                                 
866 See eg Case C-462/99 Connect Austria ECLI:EU:C:2003:297, para 83; Joined Cases C-327/03 and C-328/03 
ISIS Multimedia and Firma ECLI:EU:C:2005:622, para 39; Case C-202/88 France v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:1990:64, para 51; Case C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, para 
230; Case C-49/07 Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados (MOTOE) v Elliniko Dimosio, ECLI:EU:C:2008:376, 
para 51 and Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2008:101, para 198 (‘However, a 
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SharrCem’s initiative867 after removal of the safeguard measures to decrease prices 
drastically shows that the main intention of the request was not to protect local producers but 
to influence the structure of the marketby eliminating competition in the market.868 ‘The 
expected positive consequences ensured through the processes of effective competition can 
be seen as resulting from special market structure caused by competition rivalry, where the 
fight for buyers is forcing companies to higher efficiency. Effective competition can also be 
defined as a competitive environment not allowing any single undertaking to influence 
market prices’.869 
In such circumstances, not only did SharrCem’s competitors suffer as a result of the 
safeguard measures but consumers870 also.871 The negative impact, which cannot be 
denied,872 flowed on to consumers,873 who were deprived of: choice;874 innovation;875 
                                                                                                                                                        
system of undistorted competition … can be guaranteed only if equality of opportunity is secured as between the 
various economic operators’). 
867 See Case C‑52/ 09 Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, para 49 (‘it must be borne 
in mind that Article 102 TFEU applies only to anti-competitive conduct engaged in by undertakings on their 
own initiative’); Joined Cases C-359/95 P and C-379/95 P Commission and French v Ladbroke Racing 
ECLI:EU:C:1997:531 para 33; Case C-18/88 Régie des Télégraphes et des Téléphones and GB-Inno-BM SA 
ECLI:EU:C:1991:474, para 20 and Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2008:101 para 
85.  
868 See eg Case 6/72 Continental Can v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1973:22, para 24 (‘But if Article 3 (f) provides 
for the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the Common Market is not distorted, then it requires 
a fortiori that competition must not be eliminated’).  
869 Andrej Fatur, Klemen Podobnik & Ana Vlahek, Competition Law in Slovenia (n 19) 71. See in the same 
effect, Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2008:101, para 233; Case 85/76 Hoffmann-
La Roche v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1979:36, para 91; Case C-62/86 AKZO v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 para 189; and Case T-228/97 Irish Sugar v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1999:246 para 122.  
870 See eg Ariel Ezrachi, ‘Sponge’ (n 3) 53 (‘EU competition law may be applied and developed in the light of 
other policy concerns such as … consumer protection’). See also in that regard, Art 12 TFEU and Art 38 Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C364/01. 
871 Case C-209/10 Post Danmark ECLI:EU:C:2012:172, para 24; Case C-62/86 AKZO v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:1991:286, para 69; Case C-202/07 P France Télécom v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2009:214 paras 
104–105; and Case C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, paras 174–176. 
872 See Case C-209/10 Post Danmark ECLI:EU:C:2012:172, para 44; Case C-95/04 P British Airways 
ECLI:EU:C:2007:166, para 86; Case C-52/09 TeliaSonera Sverige ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, para 76; and 
Commission Guidance on the enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive 
exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C45/7 para 28. 
873 See eg David A Hyman and William E Kovacic, Institutional Design, Agency Life Cycle, and the Goals of 
Competition Law (n 30) 2163 (‘Post–Chicago School enthusiasts accept the importance of efficiency but argue 
that the antitrust laws also exist to achieve other economic ends, including the protection of consumer choice’). 
874 See in that regard Commission’s Decision on Vitamins (n 607) para 22 (‘The conduct of Roche described 
above paragraphs 10 to 18 constitutes an abuse of a dominant position, because by its nature it hampers the 
freedom of choice’).  
875 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution (n 15) 2 (‘Today antitrust policy 
generally defines “competitive” in the economic coin of low prices, high output, and maximum room for 
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quality876 and service.877 These are fundamentals of a competitive market878 and of the role of 
the Authority. ‘A general indicator of substantive results is that an agency is performing its 
duties capably if its activities improve economic performance and consumer well-being, for 
example, by reducing costs, raising productivity, depressing prices and stimulating 
innovation’.879 Eleanor M Fox notes that ‘[the] operational goal [of competition law] is to let 
business be free … unless its acts will decrease aggregate consumer surpluses’.880 
 
7.41 Authority’s Conclusion to Initiate Investigation in SharrCem Case 
 
Although the Authority referred to the monitoring report time after time as an investigative 
report, the official investigation into SharrCem began only after the findings of that report 
were revealed.881 
In the reasoning of the Conclusion the Authority stated that: 
‘Based on the finding of the preliminary investigation report, distortion of the cement 
market in Kosovo is noted. Distortion occurred inter alia because of: price increases for 
cement products; the absence of such products in the relevant market since July 2012; 
and lack of imports by other undertakings after the decision by the Ministry. There is 
suspicion that SharrCem has a dominant position within the meaning of Article 10 and 
that this position creates opportunities for abuse.’882 
The Authority, however, should not be prejudiced against a particular undertaking having a 
dominant position — because this is not unlawful per se. ‘The concept of per se 
infringements is not directly applicable to the Slovenian legal system. According to 
provisions of the General Administrative Procedure Act, the body which is conducting the 
                                                                                                                                                        
innovation’) and Jonathan Baker, ‘Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation’(2007) 74 
Antitrust Law Journal 575. 
876 One of the findings of the investigative report was as follows: ‘the quality of the cement produced by 
SharrCem was suspected to be of poor quality as a result of the elimination of competition and the demand for 
cement during that period of the year’.  
877 For example, Robert H Bork notes that ‘when we talk of the desirability of competition we ordinarily have in 
mind … low prices, innovation, choice’. Robert H Bork, ‘The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy At War With Itself’ 
(1978) 61. 
878 See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Isabela Atanasiu (eds) European Competition Law Annual 2003: What Is 
an Abuse of a Dominant Position (583) 135.  
879 See eg William E Kovacic, Hugh M Hollman and Patricia Grant, ‘How Does Your Competition Agency 
Measure Up?’ (n 76) 30. 
880 Eleanor M Fox, ‘Against Goals’ (n 15) 2159. 
881 Kosovo Competition Authority, Conclusion to Initiate Investigation in SharrCem Case, 26 July 2012. 
[Hereinafter: Conclusion to Initiate Investigation in SharrCem Case]. 
882 Ibid. 
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administrative procedure has to find the material truth, which basically prevents the CPO 
from finding certain infringements as per se illegal’.883 Craig and de Búrca note that ‘Article 
102 does not, however, prohibit market power per se. It would therefore be odd if the winner 
were legally penalized, since it may be more efficient that the competitors.’884 The Authority 
should focus on determining whether the undertaking in a dominant position has abused it.885 
In its conclusion886 the Authority asked SharrCem to submit its comments within 15 days as 
regards the Authority’s conclusion to initiate investigations. 
 
7.41.1 SharrCem’s Request to Extend the Deadline for Commenting on the Authority’s 
Conclusion 
 
Upon receipt of the conclusion to initiate an investigation by the Authority, SharrCem 
requested an extension of the deadline for commenting on the Authority’s conclusion. 
SharrCem’s request for an extension was not justified by way of legal provisions or 
arguments, but it was noted that most of the high-level factory officials were not present in 
Kosovo. After reviewing SharrCem’s request, the Authority approved the request to extend 
the deadline for 30 days.887 
 
7.41.2 SharrCem’s Request for Access to the Records 
 
During the investigation period, SharrCem requested access to the records of the case.888 In 
the same application, SharrCem stated that after receipt of the files, it would submit written 
comments on the conclusion of the Authority. The Authority issued a conclusion refusing 
                                                 
883 Andrej Fatur, Klemen Podobnik & Ana Vlahek, Competition Law in Slovenia (n 19) 45. See generally, Case 
322/81 Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1983:313, para 57; Joined Cases 
C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports and others v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:132, para 37 and Case C-209/10 Post Danmark ECLI:EU:C:2012:172, para 21 (‘It is settled 
case-law that a finding that an undertaking has such a dominant position is not in itself a ground of criticism of 
the undertaking concerned’).  
884 Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials (n 362) 1011.  
885 See eg Josef Drexl (ed) Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Competition Law (Edward Elgar 
2008) 22 (‘Article 82 EC prohibits undertakings with a dominant position on the relevant market from abusing 
their market position’). 
886 Conclusion to Initiate Investigation in SharrCem Case (n 881).  
887 Kosovo Competition Authority, Decision to extend the deadline for SharrCem to submit comments against 
Conclusion to initiate investigation, 3 August 2012. 
888 SharrCem, Request for Access to Records, 12 December 2012. [Hereinafter: Request for Access to Records].  
186 
 
SharrCem access to the records.889 The Authority based the refusal on Article 44(5) and (9) 
and Article 45(2) of the Law890 on Protection of Competition.891 
The Authority relied on the wrong legal provisions in deciding to refuse SharrCem access to 
the records. In its justification for refusal, the Authority did not give any persuasive or legally 
based justification, but only cited Article 44(5) of the Law on Protection of Competition.892 
Article 44(1) ensures that the parties shall have access to the records upon receiving the 
notice for established facts in the procedure. 893 The Authority’s refusal to allow access to the 
records is in violation of Article 44, paras 1 and 3.894 In its conclusion refusing access, the 
Authority incorrectly based the decision on paras 5 and 9 of Article 44. Para 5 specifies 
precisely which documents cannot be viewed by the parties. However, the majority of these 
documents were not included in SharrCem’s request.895 
In order for the undertaking under investigation to prepare an effective legal defence,896 it 
should be aware of all the established facts in the procedure. In addition, Article 45(10) 
provides: 
‘The Authority cannot base its decisionon facts and circumstances which the parties to 
the procedure have not been granted the opportunity to challenge’. 
                                                 
889 Kosovo Competition Authority, Conclusion to Refuse SharrCem’s Request for Access to Records, 17 
December 2012. [Hereinafter: Refusal of SharrCem’s Request for Access to Records]. 
890 See Law on Protection of Competition (n 22). 
891 See generally, David Anderson and Rachel Cuff, ‘Cartels in the European Union: Procedural Fairness for 
Defendants and Claimants’ (2011) 34(3) Fordham International Law Journal 385, 388. [Hereinafter: David 
Anderson and Rachel Cuff, ‘Cartels in the European Union: Procedural Fairness for Defendants and Claimant’].  
892 See generally, Bruce Kilpatrick, Pierre Kobel and Pranvera Kellezi, ‘Compatibility of Transactional 
Resolutions of Antitrust Proceedings with Due Process and Fundamental Rights & Online Exhaustion of IP 
Rights’ (n 167) 376. 
893 Based on Law no 04/L-226 amending and supplementing Law no 03/L-229 on Protection of Competition (n 
24) Art 44(2) has been changed and the paragraph now in force reads: ‘The party should be provided with all 
documents required by the Authority, established by this Law and the Law on Access to Public Documents’.  
894 See Law on Protection of Competition (n 22).  
895 Cf Case T-7/89 Hercules Chemicals v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1991:75, para 53 and Case T-65/ 89 BPB 
Industries and British Gypsum v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1993:31, para 29. 
896 See eg Case C-462/98 P Mediocurso v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2000:480, para 36; Case C-32/95 P 
Commission v Lisrestal and Others ECLI:EU:C:1996:402, para 21; Case C-349/07 Sopropé 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:746, para 36; Case C-277/11 M M v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform and 
Others ECLI:EU:C:2012:744, paras 81–87; Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P, and C-595/10 P Commission 
and Others v Kadi ECLI:EU:C:2013:518, para 112; Case C-109/10 P Solvay v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:686, para 57; Case C-199/99 P Corus UK v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2003:531, para 128; 
Case T-42/96 Eyckeler & Malt v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1998:40, para 80; Joined Cases C-238/99 P, C-244/99 
P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P; C-254/99 P, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:2002:582, para 318; and Case T-37/91 Imperial Chemical Industries ICI v 
Commission ECLI:EU:T:1995:119, paras 49–50. 
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Under EU case law, a decision on which a party is thus unable to state its view constitutes an 
infringement of fundamental principles of law. The party under investigation should be able, 
in keeping with respect for the rights of defence, to effectively make known their views prior 
to the decision.897 According to the EU law, ‘access to the file … is intended to enable the 
effective exercise of the rights of defence against the objections brought forward by the 
Commission. For this purpose, both in cases under Articles 81 and 82 EC and in cases under 
the Merger Regulation, access is granted, upon request, to the persons, undertakings or 
associations of undertakings, as the case may be, to which the Commission addresses its 
objections. The parties must be able to acquaint themselves with the information in the 
Commission's file, so that, on the basis of this information, they can effectively express their 
views on the preliminary conclusions reached by the Commission in its objections. Access to 
the file will be granted upon request … in order to ensure the principle of equality of arms 
and to protect their rights of defence. The right of access to the file means that the 
Commission must give the undertaking concerned the opportunity to examine all the 
documents in the investigation file which may be relevant for its defence. Those documents 
include both incriminating evidence and exculpatory evidence, save where the business 
secrets of other undertakings, the internal documents of the Commission or other confidential 
information are involved’.898 Andrej Fatur, Klemen Podobnik & Ana Vlahek emphasise that 
‘…it is explicitly forbidden to issue a decision based on facts and evidence in respect of 
which the undertaking against which proceedings have been initiated…have not given the 
opportunity to reply’899. 
The refusal to grant access to the records, access that is guaranteed by Article 44, clearly 
shows inappropriate application of competition provisions by the Authority and could be 
considered a denial of the right of a party to the procedure to state its views. The Authority’s 
                                                 
897 See in that regard Case C-480/99 P Plant and others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2002:8, para 24; Case 17/74 
Transocean Marine Paint v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1974:106, para 15; Case C-27/09P France v People’s 
Mojahedin Organization of Iran and Others ECLI:EU:C:2011:853, para 65; Case C-349/07 Sopropé 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:746, para 49; Case C-462/98 P Mediocurso v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2000:480, para 36; 
Case C-32/95 P Commission v Lisrestal and Others ECLI:EU:C:1996:402, para 21; Joined Cases C-48/90 and 
C-66/90 Netherlands and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1992:63, para 44; and Joined Cases T-186/97, T-
187/97, T-190/97 to T-192/97, T-210/97, T-211/97, T-216/97, T-217/97, T-218/97, T-279/97, T-280/97, T-
293/97 and T-147/99, Kaufring and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2001:133, para 134. 
898 See Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in cases pursuant to Articles 81 and 
82 of the EC Treaty, Articles 53, 54, and 57 of the EEA Agreement and Council Regulation (EC) No 139/ 2004 
[2005] OJ C325/7. See also, Case C-62/86 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1991:286, paras 23–
24; Joined Cases C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P Aalborg 
Portland and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2004:6, para 68; Case T-30/91 Solvay v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:1995:115, para 81 and Case T-38/02 Groupe Danone v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2005:367, para 34.  
899 Andrej Fatur, Klemen Podobnik & Ana Vlahek, Competition Law in Slovenia (n 19) 191.   See also Case C-
199/99 P Corus UK v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2003:531, paras 125–127. See also to the same effect, Case C-
51/92 P Hercules Chemicals v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1999:357, para 75 and 77; Joined Cases C-238/99 P, C-
244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij 
and Others ECLI:EU:C:2002:582, paras 315 and 317.  
188 
 
decisions, however, cannot be based on facts and circumstances which the parties have not 
been given an opportunity to defend themselves against. According to the EU case law 
‘access to the file in competition cases is intended, in particular, to enable the addressees of 
statements of objections to acquaint themselves with the evidence in the Commission's file so 
that, on the basis of that evidence, they can express their views effectively on the conclusions 
reached by the Commission in its statement of objections. The right of access to the 
Commission's file is therefore designed to ensure effective exercise of the rights of the 
defence. Failure to respect the right of access to the Commission's file during the procedure 
prior to adoption of a decision can, in principle, cause the decision to be annulled if the rights 
of defence of the undertaking concerned have been infringed’.900 
Documents in relation to which the undertaking under investigation has had no opportunity to 
be heard and which have not been communicated during the investigation phase cannot be 
used as evidence. As such, the Authority should not base its decisions on such evidence nor 
draw conclusions from it.901 
The Authority, in any case, including the particular one, should make available to the 
undertaking under investigation, all the documents from the investigation file, including both 
incriminating and exculpatory evidence. Otherwise, the undertaking’s procedural rights of an 
effective legal defence may be infringed. Especially if such documents may have a 
substantial as well an influential impact on the Authority’s decision-making process.902  
SharrCem, however, was deprived of its right to access the records, in breach of competition 
law provisions, through an unjustified and to some extent ‘arbitrary’ decision, since Article 
44 guarantees such right of access. These provisions must be interpreted correctly by the 
Authority, thus enabling the parties under investigation to establish an effective legal defence. 
                                                 
900 Case C-199/99 P Corus UK v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2003:531, paras 125–127. 
901 See inter alia Case C-62/86, AKZO v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1991:286, para 21; Case T-13/89 ICI v 
Commission ECLI:EU:T:1992:35, paras 34–35; Case T-11/89 Shell v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1992:33, para 
55;Case 107/82 AEG v Commission ECLI: EU:C:1983:293, paras 24–30; Case T-30/91, Solvayv Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:1995:115, para 58; Case T-37/91, ICI v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1995:119, para 71 and Case 
T-587/08 Fresh Del Monte Produce v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2013:129, para 666 (‘Since documents that have 
not been communicated to the undertakings concerned during the administrative procedure are not admissible 
evidence, it will be necessary to exclude those documents as evidence’).  
902 See Joint Case C-239/11 P, C-489/11 P and C-498/11 P, Siemans v Commission, EU:C:2013:866 paras 367-
368 and Case T-762/14,  Philips and Philips France v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2016:738 paras 271 and 273. 
See also Ingrid Vandenborre, Thorsten Goetz, & Andreas Kafetzopoulos, ‘Access to File and Confidentiality of 
Information under European Competition Law’ (2017) 8(9) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 
613 and Arianna Andreangeli, ‘Competition Law and Fundamental Rights’ (2017) 8(8) Journal of European 
Competition Law & Practice 524, 532.  
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In addition, Douglas Melamed suggests that ‘good process can promote good competition 
law enforcement only if the process is available to the defendant’. 903 
Such legal errors and procedural violations would be the first issues to be examined by a 
court, and would be enough for the court to rule infringement of essential procedure should 
the Authority’s rulings undergo court scrutiny. 
 
7.41.3 Authority’s Notification of Stated Facts Defined in the Procedure 
 
During the investigative procedure, the Authority notified SharrCem of the established facts 
defined in the procedure.904 In the notification for stated facts defined in the procedure, the 
Authority stated as follows: 
I. The undertaking SharrCem had a Dominant Position in the cement market for a 
duration of more than one year, 2011–2012; 
II. It was established that there was a significant distortion to the cement market in 
Kosovo during the year 2012; 
III. The undertaking SharrCem abused its dominant position in the cement market. 
 
As can be seen from the Authority’s findings, as well as SharrCem being in a dominant 
position, it also abused that position. The notification in the case was a one-page document 
without well reasoned and fact-based justification as regards SharrCem’s abuse of a dominant 
position. In addition, based on the Authority’s investigative report it was clear that SharrCem 
had a dominant position during the three years of the investigation — 2010, 2011 and 2012 
—  and not only in 2012, as the Authority stated in its notification. 
 
                                                 
903 Douglas Melamed, ‘Good Competition Law Enforcement Requires Good Process’ (2015) 11 Competition 
Law International 51, 58. [Hereinafter: Douglas Melamed, ‘Good Competition Law Enforcement Requires 
Good Process’]. See also Ingrid Vandenborre, Thorsten Goetz, & Andreas Kafetzopoulos, ‘Access to File and 
Confidentiality of Information under European Competition Law’ (2017) 8(9) Journal of European Competition 
Law & Practice 613 and Johannes Laitenberger Director-General for Competition ‘The Many Dividends of 
Keeping Markets Open, Fair and Contestable’ International Competition Law Forum St. Gallen, 27 April 2017. 
Available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2017_07_en.pdf. Last accessed on 5 December 
2018. (‘Access to file is a vital component of a company's rights of defence...).  
904 Kosovo Competition Authority, Notification of Stated Facts Defined in the Procedure, 11 December 2012. 
[Hereinafter: First Notification of Stated Facts Defined in the Procedure]. The Notification was repeated on 30 
April 2013. 
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7.41.4 The Hearing Session in the SharrCem Case 
 
During the investigatory procedure in the SharrCem case, the Authority held a hearing.905 In 
the opening remarks, the President of the Authority requested that all representatives of 
SharrCem who were going to speak in the session would state in what capacity they were 
participating in the hearing, and the lawyers were reminded that they needed to be authorized, 
registered, and licensed in Kosovo in order to participate. This was because of the fact that 
SharrCem was represented by international law firm White & Case in addition to local 
counsel. 
In this hearing session, the Authority’s market monitoring report906 on the SharrCem case 
was presented to SharrCem for the first time, which its representatives objected to. The 
representatives of SharrCem stated: 
‘We are aware that the Authority is at the early stages of its operation; however, such 
flagrant violations of the law can not be tolerated’.907 
The legal representatives of SharrCem stated that they would not comment on any 
information or evidence presented to them during the hearing which was not included in the 
Notification of Stated Facts Defined in the Procedure, 908 including the report.909 Some of the 
facts which were presented in this hearing were not included in the notification for 
establishing facts in the procedure. ‘The defendant must have an adequate opportunity to 
understand and respond to the legal theories asserted against it and to see and confront the 
evidence and witnesses against it. The opportunity to respond and confront would seem to be 
a fundamental component of fairness. More than that, however, it is an essential safeguard 
against erroneous competition law enforcement decisions’.910 
In addition, SharrCem requested that this hearing focus only on the facts included in the 
notification for stated facts defined in the procedure, which established a dominant position 
and its abuse. The Authority accepted the concerns of SharrCem’s legal representatives, and 
agreed to discuss only the facts of which SharrCem had been notified before the hearing. 911 
                                                 
905 Kosovo Competition Authority, Hearing records of the SharrCem case, 1, 27 February 2013. Hereinafter: 
[Hearing records of the SharrCem case]. Participants in the hearing, apart from the Managing Director of 
SharrCem, included two law firms, one from Kosovo and one international firm (White & Case). 
906 The Monitoring Report in the SharrCem case (n 849). 
907 Hearing records of the SharrCem case (n 905).  
908 See Art 27(1) of EU Regulation No 01/2003 (‘The Commission shall base its decisions only on objections on 
which the parties concerned have been able to comment’).  
909 Hearing records of the SharrCem case (n 905). 
910 See Douglas Melamed, ‘Good Competition Law Enforcement Requires Good Process’ (n 903) 54. 
911 See Douglas Melamed, ‘Good Competition Law Enforcement Requires Good Process’ (n 903) 54 (‘The 
government would run a greatly increased risk of enforcement errors if it were to make decisions in some kind 
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In this hearing session, the legal representatives of SharrCem, inter alia, asserted: 
‘After a short investigation, SharrCem received a notification in which the Authority’s 
findings claimed that the undertaking had abused its dominant position. The notification 
did not describe in detail the specific nature of the abusive practices in which SharrCem 
is claimed to have been involved. However, SharrCem asked the Authority to allow the 
latter to reply to the Notification of Stated Facts Defined in the Procedure in writing. The 
fact that SharrCem was not allowed access to the records made it impossible to 
effectively exercise the right to comment and to present an effective defence,912 because 
they could not comment on facts that the Authority possessed but that had not been 
notified to the undertaking’.913 
According to SharrCem’s defence, the investigations conducted into the SharrCem case were 
in complete violation of Kosovo legislation and basic European best standards and practices, 
as guaranteed by the European Convention914 on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms.915 
SharrCem claimed that: 
‘The Authority’s inspectors had illegally inspected SharrCem’s premises without any 
order for inspection by the competent court, as required by Article 39(1)916 of the Law on 
Protection of Competition’.917 
                                                                                                                                                        
of ex parte way, without meaningful input from the defendant. For its input to be meaningful, the defendant 
must thoroughly understand the government's legal and economic concerns and the facts and evidence on which 
they are based. And the defendant must be permitted to challenge and contradict those concerns and the 
evidence on which they are based’).  
912 See Douglas Melamed, ‘Good Competition Law Enforcement Requires Good Process’ (n 903) 54 (‘To make 
good decisions, decision-makers must be fully informed. And, for the same reason that good decisions require 
that the defendant has an opportunity to respond, good decisions require that the defendant be able to 
supplement the factual record with evidence relevant to its defence, including evidence that is not within the 
control of the defendant. Without such evidence, the record will be incomplete and the likelihood of a mistaken 
enforcement decision will increase. A record that does not include evidence sought by the defendant will be 
unbalanced and will tend to give excessive weight to matters brought to the agency's attention by complainants. 
Such a record will be biased in favour of evidence that supports the theories being explored by the enforcement 
agency’). 
913 Hearing records of the SharrCem case (n 905) 2–3. 
914 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
as amended by Protocols Nos 11 and 14, 4 November 1950.  
915 Ibid. 
916 Law on Protection of Competition (n 22) Art 39(1) reads: ‘Prior to performing an unannounced inspection of 
business premises, open depots and transportation means, the Authority shall request the district court to issue 
an order that authorizes the Authority's officials to enter, without prior notification or special permission, the 
premises or any other property or place of enterprise used to perform business activities, especially if there is a 
potential for evidence to be hidden or destroyed’. 
917 Hearing records of the SharrCem case (n 905) 3. 
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Under Article 39, prior to performing an inspection, the Authority should request the district 
court to issue an order authorizing the Authority’s officials to enter the business premises of 
any undertaking under investigation.918 If, during the investigative phase, the Authority did 
not initially provide an inspection order from a competent court, the undertaking may later 
argue that the evidence was taken unlawfully. This presents a high risk to the Authority’s 
work in terms of effective enforcement of competition law.919 The Authority should strictly 
observe the procedural legal provisions at all stages of the case, including investigations.920 
SharrCem’s defence also noted that the notice was so unclear that it was impossible for them 
to ascertain what exactly it was being accused of. 
‘The notice does not specify any legal provision which is claimed to have been violated, 
which is an essential element for an administrative act and for which the notice is 
presented; thus there is no identified legal basis, fact or justification which compelled the 
Authority to issue this administrative document’.921 
Walter Franz notes that the statement of objections ‘must include all material facts and must 
permit the undertaking to recognise the behaviour of which it is accused in order to enable it 
to mount an appropriate defence’. 922 The same approach is supported by the jurisprudence of 
the EU courts. ‘In the light of those arguments, it is necessary to ascertain whether in this 
instance the statement of objections was couched in terms that, albeit succinct, were 
sufficiently clear to enable the parties concerned properly to take cognizance of the conduct 
complained of by the Commission. It is only on that condition that the statement of objections 
could have fulfilled its function under the Community regulations of giving undertakings all 
the information necessary to enable them to defend themselves properly, before the 
Commission adopts a final decision’.923 In this regard, according to SharrCem, it was difficult 
to scrutinize the evidence gathered by the Authority, and in such circumstances it was 
impossible for SharrCem to prepare an effective defence. ‘In that regard, it should be noted 
first that the Commission is required to specify the subject-matter and purpose of the 
investigation. That obligation is a fundamental requirement not merely in order to show that 
the investigation to be carried out on the premises of the undertakings concerned is justified 
but also to enable those undertakings to assess the scope of their duty to cooperate while at 
                                                 
918 See in that regard, Commission Notice on the cooperation between the Commission and the courts of the EU 
Member States in the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC [2004] OJ C101/54, paras 38–41. 
919 See eg Case T-339/04 France Télécom v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2007:80, paras 58–60. 
920 See eg EU Regulation 1/2003, Art 20(3) and Case C-94/00 Roquette Freres ECLI:EU:C:2002:603, para 37.  
921 Hearing records of the SharrCem case (n 905). 
922 Walter Frenz, Handbook of EU Competition Law (n 217) 921. 
923 Joined Cases C-89/85, C-104/85, C-114/85, C-116/85, C-117/85 and C-125/85 to C-129/85 Ahlström v 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:1993:120, para 42. 
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the same time safeguarding the rights of the defence’.924 The undertaking under investigation 
should know the charges against it to allow it to present argument and an effective defence. 
Lastly, an international legal representative925 of SharrCem stated that: 
‘Taking into account that the Kosovo Competition Law is based on European principles 
of competition law, it will defend the present case as if it was before a European 
institution and according to European law. Based on the preliminary announcements of 
the facts found in the procedure, it would be quite clear that no abusive behaviour was 
identified and that there is no case at all. From examination of the facts presented it is 
very difficult to understand on the basis of which concrete action SharrCem had abused 
its dominant position. Regarding abuse of a dominant position, Article 102 of the TFEU 
states that the two main conditions which must be met for an undertaking to be 
considered to have infringed this Article are the possession of a dominant position and its 
abuse. Everyone is aware that the fact than an undertaking has a dominant position does 
not pose a problem and is not unlawful. In the document sent by the Authority to 
SharrCem, a large volume of imports was disclosed, an equal share of almost 50% to 
50% as between SharrCem and the importers. As a result, the legitimate question is: with 
this volume of imports how can the market be controlled by SharrCem?’.926 
However, SharrCem ignores the fact that the market would be controlled by it as a result of 
eliminating all cement imports from other countries and as a direct consequence 
strengthening its dominant position.927 Consequently, the only player remaining in the 
relevant market would be SharrCem. At this point, there is no doubt that it could control the 
market by setting high prices, producing poor quality goods, causing supply delays, and 
strengthening barriers to market entry for other competitors, since its intention is to drive 
                                                 
924 Joined Cases 46/87 and 227/88 Hoechst v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1989:337, para 29 and Case C-94/00 
Roquette Frères ECLI:EU:C:2002:603, para 47.  
925 AK from the White & Case law firm. 
926 Hearing records of the SharrCem case (n 905) 8. 
927 Case 6/72 Continental Can v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1973:22, para 26 (‘Abuse may therefore occur if an 
undertaking in a dominant position strengthens such position in such a way that the degree of dominance 
reached substantially fetters competition, ie that only undertakings remain in the market whose behaviour 
depends on the dominant one’); Joined Cases 40 to 48, 50, 54 to 56, 111, 113 and 114–73 Suiker Unie others v 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:1975:174, paras 526 and 527; Case C-62/86 AKZO v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:1991:286, para 70 (‘It follows that Article 86 prohibits a dominant undertaking from eliminating a 
competitor and thereby strengthening its position by using methods other than those which come within the 
scope of competition on the basis of quality’); Case C-209/10 Post Danmark ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 para 25; 
Case C-202/07 P France Télécom v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2009:214, para 106; Case C-280/08 P Deutsche 
Telekom v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, para 177 and Case T-111/96 ITT Promedia v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:1998:183, para 139.  
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competitors from the market.928 Herbert J. Hovenkamp note that ‘Antitrust law’s principal 
concern is with market power’.929  
The chairman from the Authority stated: 
‘The Authority has recommended the Ministry not to become the cause of such abuse930 
of a dominant position by SharrCem, because the decision in question is unlawful. The 
Authority is committed to providing equal conditions in the market for all 
competitors’.931 
At the same hearing, SharrCem’s representatives were asked by the Authority: 
‘How it is possible to increase and decrease prices over such a short time, exactly before 
and after the decision on protective measures?’.932 
SharrCem’s legal representatives did not state anything in reply to the question, pointing out 
that they would have to consult the undertaking. 
Finally, SharrCem claimed that it could not be held responsible for someone else’s actions, in 
this case the Minister of Trade and Industry, who issued a decision placing safeguard 
measures on cement imports.933 
                                                 
928 See generally, Nick Godfrey, Why Is Competition Important For Growth and Poverty Reduction? (OECD, 
Global Forum on International Investments 2008) 1. 
929 Herbert J. Hovenkamp, ‘Whatever Did Happen to the Antitrust Movement?’ (2018) University of 
Pennsylvania Law School, Research Paper No 18-7, 12. Also, Notre Dame Law Review (forthcoming). See also 
in the same effect, Louis Kaplow, ‘On the Relevance of Market Power’ (2017) 130(5) Harvard Law Review 
1303, 1405 (‘Market power is the most important consideration in competition law decisionmaking across the 
globe’); Thomas J. Horton, ‘Restoring American Antitrust's Moral Arc’ (2017) 62 South Dakota Law Review 
11, 16 (‘Our antitrust laws exist to protect the competitive process and to prevent and control large aggregations 
of economic power and their abuse’); Adi Ayal, ‘The Market For Bigness: Economic Power and Competition 
Agencies’ Duty To Curtail It’ (2013) 1(2) Oxford Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 221, 221-224 ( ‘Economic 
power is at the heart of antitrust. The most potent fear expressed when economic power is discussed, is that 
large firms influence politics, and that state government is captured by big business’) and Craig and de Búrca 
arguing that ‘the essence of Article 102 is to control the market power of a single firm or a number of firms (n 
46) 1011.  
930 See EU case law Case C-163/96 Raso and Others; Case C-41/90 Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v Macrotron; 
Case C-260/89 Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi AE and Panellinia Omospondia Syllogon Prossopikou v 
Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Nicolaos Avdellas and others; Case C-179/90 Merci 
convenzionali porto di Genova v Siderurgica Gabrielli; Case C-323/93 Société Civile Agricole du Centre 
d'Insémination de la Crespelle v Coopérative d'Elevage et d'Insémination Artificielle du Département de la 
Mayenne; Case C-18/93 Corsica Ferries Italia Srl v Corpo dei Piloti del Porto di Genova and Case C-179/90 
Genova, cited in (n 843–844). 
931 Hearing records of the SharrCem case (n 905) 10. 
932 Ibid. 
933 Ibid. 
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One of the main arguments put forward was that the undertaking cannot and should not be 
held responsible for the actions of someone else, in this case the Ministry. Contrary to the 
undertaking’s assertions, according to the jurisprudence of the EU courts, a dominant 
undertaking has a special responsibility regarding non-distortion of competition.934 
It could be argued that this was not the essence of the investigation in this particular case. The 
essence of the investigation was SharrCem’s anti-competitive strategy,935 as the holder of a 
dominant position, to strengthen its position. According to EU law such a strategy or action is 
considered to be an abuse of a dominant position, regardless of the means and procedure by 
which it is achieved.936 Such anti-competitive behaviour may include distortion and 
restriction of competition in the relevant market,937 thus driving out actual competitors and 
depriving potential competitors of access to the market. ‘In order to determine whether the 
undertaking in a dominant position has abused such a position by its pricing practices, it is 
necessary to consider all the circumstances and to investigate whether the practice tends to 
remove or restrict the buyer’s freedom to choose his sources of supply, to bar competitors 
from access to the market, to apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other 
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage, or to strengthen the 
dominant position by distorting competition’.938 
 
 
 
                                                 
934 See inter alia, Case 322/81 Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie-Michelin v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1983:313 
para 57; Case C-209/10 Post Danmark ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 para 23; Case C-202/07 P France Telecom v 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:2009:214 para 105; Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:83 paras 24, 44, 53 and 84; Case C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, paras 83, 176 and 203; Joined Cases C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P Compagnie Maritime 
Belge Transports and others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2000:132, paras 37 and 85; Case T-83/91 Tetra Pak II 
ECLI:EU:T:1994:246, para 114; Case C-62/86 AKZO v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1991:286, para 70 and Case T-
228/97 Irish Sugar v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1999:246, para 112. See also to the same effect, Deutsche 
Telecom Commission Decision No 2003/707/EC OJ L263/9, para 178 and Renato Nazzini, The Foundation of 
European Competition Law: The Objective and Principles of Article 102 (n 72) 174 and Claus-Dieter 
Ehlermann and Mel Marquis (eds) European Competition Law Annual 2007; A Reformed Approach to Article 
82 EC (n 266) 200. 
935 See Case C-549/10 P Tomra Systems v Commission, EU:C:2012:221, para 19 and Eurofix-Bauco v Michelin 
Commission Decision No 88/138/EEC (n 527). See also n 827. 
936 Case 6/72 Continental Can v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1973:22, para 27. 
937 See eg Case 322/81 Michelin v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1983:313 para 30. 
938 See Case C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, para 175 and Case C-95/04 P 
British Airways v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2007:166, para 67. 
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7.41.5 Authority’s Notification of Stated Facts Defined in the Procedure After a 
Hearing Session 
 
After the hearing, the Authority sent the second notification to SharrCem as regards the stated 
facts defined in the procedure.939 In this notification the Authority repeated the findings made 
in the first notification940 — concluding that SharrCem had a dominant position in the 
relevant market, which it abused. The Authority invited SharrCem to a second hearing 
session.941 
 
7.41.6 SharrCem’s Submission Against the Second Notification of the Facts Defined in 
the Procedure and the Main Hearing 
 
After the second notification regarding the facts defined in the procedure and the invitation to 
the second hearing, SharrCem delivered its submission to the Authority, rejecting the 
conclusions and findings of the Authority as regards abuse of a dominant position.942 
In this submission, SharrCem asserted that: 
‘Irrespective of the importance of the consequences arising from the findings made in the 
notification, the report referred to by the Authority and which is part of the SharrCem 
case file has not been made available to the enterprise. In addition, none of the findings 
made by the Authority refer to any action or inaction by SharrCem which would violate 
the provisions of the Law on Protection of Competition. Ascertaining abuse of a 
dominant position, the Authority has taken a decision which is manifestly wrong and 
contrary to the Law on Protection of Competition and the basic rules of competition law. 
The abovementioned violations are aggravated by the fact that the Authority, having 
failed to respect its obligation to provide SharrCem with access to the files, invited the 
latter to a hearing to discuss the conditions for the imposition of punitive measures, even 
though the Authority did not provide information that would allow the undertaking to 
present an effective defence at that hearing’.943 
According to SharrCem, although the Authority’s notice is titled ‘Notification of Stated Facts 
Defined in the Procedure’, it does not contain a single fact. None of the findings of the 
                                                 
939 Kosovo Competition Authority, Second Notification of Stated Facts Defined in the Procedure, 30 April 
2013. [Hereinafter: Second Notification of Stated Facts Defined in the Procedure].  
940 First Notification of Stated Facts Defined in the Procedure (n 904). 
941 Second Notification of Stated Facts Defined in the Procedure (n 939). 
942 SharrCem, Submissions Rejecting the Authority’s Conclusions Regarding the Facts Defined in the Procedure 
on its Second Notification, 1–5, 7 May 2013. [Hereinafter: SharrCem’s Submissions].  
943 Ibid 1. 
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Authority mentioned in the notification contains the essential requirements which would 
qualify them as relevant facts.944 
In its submission SharrCem noted that the Authority’s findings, such as that there was a 
significant shortage of cement in the sales depots, do not show an objective or professional 
approach. 
‘In order for this finding to qualify as a fact, the Authority should have evidenced at least 
the following: the exact figure for cement supply missing from the sales depots and the 
reference points for this finding, for example, the figure for the same period the previous 
year, and whether any other circumstance affected this fact; the location of the warehouse 
which the Authority inspected and the evaluation methodology used by the Authority; 
and other factors which affected the shortage of cement in the sales depots’.945 
SharrCem stated that the Authority’s finding that there was a shortage of cement products in 
the market suggested that the Authority relied on anonymous946 statements against SharrCem. 
According to SharrCem, as the Authority did not have any evidence to establish the abuse of 
a dominant position, the undertaking considered that the Authority’s findings had 
fundamental shortcomings and as a result: 
‘SharrCem is determined to pursue all legal, civil and criminal remedies available under 
applicable laws against the illegal actions of the Authority both for institutional and 
personal liability’.947 
 
7.41.7 The Authority’s Obligation After Notification of Stated Facts Defined in the 
Procedure 
 
It is a genuine issue of fact that the Authority’s findings in both notifications for stated facts 
defined in the procedure should have been the substantive basis for issuing the final ruling 
imposing a fine on SharrCem. To this end, as Article 49(1) of the Law on Protection of 
Competition948 stipulates: 
‘The Commission ascertains that the party to the procedure has disturbed market 
competition or has violated provisions of this law; the Authority shall deliver to the party 
the notification concerning the ascertainment of the factual situation related to the subject 
                                                 
944 Ibid 2. 
945 Ibid 3. 
946 See Case C-411/04 P Salzgitter Mannesmann v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2007:54, paras 32, 34, 46, 47 and 
49.  
947 SharrCem’s Submissions (n 942) 4–5. 
948 See Law on Protection of Competition (n 22). 
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matter and notification of the content of the decision of the Commission, which is based 
on the ascertainment of the factual situation’. 
Therefore, the conclusions contained in the Authority’s notifications, under the 
abovementioned legal provision, should define the Authority’s final ruling. Moreover, since 
there are no prevailing legal counter-arguments to these findings, the final ruling cannot and 
should not be different to the findings made by the Authority. 
 
7.42 The Authority’s Ruling Releasing SharrCem from the Fine 
 
Having conducted the investigatory procedure, held the hearing and issued the notifications 
for stated facts defined in the procedure by which the Authority found that SharrCem had 
held and abused a dominant position, in stark contrast and without sufficient justification, the 
Authority took a decision releasing SharrCem from any penalty.949 ‘Decisions by competition 
authorities should be based on objective evidence, that those authorities should maintain a 
consistent respect for market principles and that the decision-making process should be 
neutral and transparent. The reasoning behind this view is that sound policy outcomes are 
assured only when decisions by the competition authority are not politicized, discriminatory 
or implemented on the basis of narrow goals of interest groups’.950 As mentioned above, 
under Art 49(1) of the Law on Protection of Competition, the findings of the notification 
should be in the main part of the Authority’s final decision, which means that the final ruling 
in the SharrCem case should have been that this undertaking abused a dominant position, and 
that as a result a penalty was imposed on it. In the justification for the ruling, the Authority 
did not present any argument or legal circumstance which compelled it to decide otherwise 
than was previously found. 
Furthermore, in the reasoning the Authority continued to refer to its previous findings: 
‘During the investigative period the Authority noted: lack of cement products in the 
relevant market; poor quality; delays in supply; SharrCem’s pricing policy; the fact that 
the amount of SharrCem’s sales of cement was almost the same as in previous years; the 
fact that revenues were much higher as a result of price increases’.951 
It pointed out that all of this caused damage to consumers. In light of the foregoing, the only 
alteration of the Authority’s contested ruling was the following recital et seq. 
                                                 
949 Kosovo Competition Authority, Decision Releasing SharrCem from the Fine, 14 August 2013. [Hereinafter: 
Decision releasing SharrCem]. 
950 See eg UNCTAD, Independence and Accountability of Competition Authorities 1 (2008) 3. 
951 Decision releasing SharrCem (n 949).  
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‘Based on all the relevant existing circumstances, including the Ministry’s decision to 
impose safeguard measures of an additional 35% custom tax on cement imports, 
supported by the Law on Safeguard Measures, and the findings of the investigative 
report, the Authority has decided that there is not enough proof by which a violation of 
the provisions of the Law on Protection of Competition can be verified’.952 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
952 Decision releasing SharrCem (n 949). 
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7.43 The SharrCem Case: Conclusion 
 
The decision in the SharrCem case and the way in which it was justified is in itself 
contradictory, unfounded, and contrary to the law. It contains virtually no substantive change 
from the notifications for stated facts defined in the procedure, where it was found that 
SharrCem had a dominant position and had abused it. These findings should have been part 
of this decision, as long as there was no prevailing evidence that proved otherwise. Thus, the 
justification gives the impression of being the justification for a ruling imposing a fine for 
abuse of a dominant position rather than a ruling releasing a party from a penalty. The 
reasoning of the decision is not substantively different from the conclusion upon which the 
Authority had established that SharrCem had abused its dominant position. 
In addition, in the last recital et seq of the contested ruling’s reasoning, there is no factual 
justification based on evidence and law that compelled the Authority to decide in this way.953 
This recital is not in accordance with, and contradicts, the previous part of the justification. 
On a closer and objective look, however, it appears that the decision has been taken for 
purposes other than those stated. In such circumstances, one may even consider it a ‘misuse 
of powers’.954 In this regard, Dieter Wolf notes that ‘application of law is not a question of 
balance of interests’.955 
                                                 
953 See to that effect, Joined Cases T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 and T-78/00 JFE Engineering v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2004:221, para 411 (‘the Commission has a special obligation to give reasons for its decisions in 
cases where it decides to adopt a second, different decision on the basis of the same facts’). 
954 See in that regard, Case 69/83 Lux v Court of Auditors ECLI:EU:C:1984:225, para 30 (‘a decision may 
amount to a misuse of powers only if it appears, on the basis of objective, relevant and consistent, to have been 
taken for purposes other than those stated’); Case C-442/04 Spain v Council ECLI:EU:C:2008:276, para 49; 
Case C-331/88 The Queen v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and Secretary of State for Health, ex 
parte: Fedesa and Others ECLI:EU:C:1990:391, para 24; Case C-110/97 Netherlands v Council 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:620, para 137; Joined Cases 140, 146, 221 and 226/82 Walzstahl-Vereinigung and Thyssen v 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:1984:66, para 27; Case C-156/93 Parliament v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1995:238, 
para 31; Case C-400/99 Italy v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2005:275, para 38; Case C-248/89 Cargill ν 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:1991:264, para 26; Case C-48/96 P Windpark Grootbusen v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:1998:223, para 52; Case 817/79 Buyl and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1982:36, para 28; Case 
C-84/94 United Kingdom v Council ECLI:EU:C:1996:431, para 69; Case T-38/89 Hochbaum v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:1990:14, para 22; Case T-387/08 Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2010:377, para 
159; Case T-87/05 EDP v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2005:333, para 87; Case T-266/97 Vlaamse Televisie 
Maatschappij v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1999:144, para 131; Case T-143/89 Ferrierre Nord v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:1995:64, para 68 and Case T-169/08 Dimosia Epicheirisi Ilektrismou (DEI) v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2016:733, para 233. Decisions which are proven to have been taken by committing a misuse of 
power are declared void by the EU court. See in particular, Joined Cases 33, 44, 110, 226 and 285/86 
Stahlwerke Peine-Salzgitter and Hoogovens Groep v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1988:402, paras 27–28.  
955 Barry E Hawk (ed) Roundtable on Reform of EC Competition Law (Fordham Corporate Law Institute 1997) 
(remarks of Dieter Wolf) 198.  
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This is especially so since up to that point the justification examines the elements which 
determined SharrCem’s dominant position and abuse of that position. Thus, the principle that 
where there is doubt as to infringement of competition rules, this must operate to the 
advantage of the undertaking under investigation, is excluded.956 
The wording of the justification creates the impression that this decision was prepared with a 
completely contrary purpose in mind — that of imposing a fine on SharrCem. 
This is a clear indicator that the Authority in this case failed in its task, having failed to 
enforce competition law in compliance with its purpose and institutional mandate.957 To 
establish the value of its work, the Authority must execute its responsibilities appropriately. 
Even though the Authority has wide discretion when enforcing competition legislation, it 
may err in law, but not ‘misuse its power’. ‘Where it adopts a measure involving such 
assessments, the Commission has a wide discretion, and review of that measure by the courts 
must therefore be limited, as Article 33 of the ECSC Treaty shows, to checking that the rules 
of procedure and on the statement of reasons have been complied with, that the facts relied on 
in making the contested decision are accurate, and that there has been no obvious error in 
assessing those facts or any misuse of powers’.958 
This ruling is also contrary to Article 53 of the Law on Protection of Competition, which 
provides that the decision to ascertain abuse of a dominant position should be made within 
sixty days from the day on which all relevant facts have been verified, or, at the latest, sixty 
days from the end of the main session in the procedure. However, the only hearing which 
could be considered a main hearing was held on 27 February 2013.959 In addition, the second 
notification for stated facts defined in the procedure was submitted on 30 April 2013. 
However, the Authority’s decision was issued on 14 August 2013, which is considerably 
more than sixty days after these events. In this regard, the decision could also be considered 
to have breached the principle of reasonable time in administrative procedure.960 
The ruling was sent only to SharrCem and not to the other parties involved in the procedure. 
Article 55(1) of the law961 impels the Authority to send the ruling to the parties that instigated 
                                                 
956 See EU case law, Case T-44/07 Kaučuk v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2011:358, para 48 and Case T-38/02 
Groupe Danone v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2005:367, para 215.  
957 See eg Philip Lowe, ‘The Design of Competition Policy Institutions for the 21st Century—The Experience of 
the European Commission and DG Competition’ (n 165) 2 ‘[Competition law] enforcement must be—and be 
seen to be—subject to the rule of law’. 
958 See eg Case C-323/00 P DSG v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2002:260, para 43. 
959 See n 905. 
960 Cf Joined Cases C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P, C-252/99 P, and C-254/99 P, 
Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2002:582, para 169; Case C-282/95 P 
Guérin Automobiles v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1997:159, para 37 and Case T-67/01 JCB Service v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2004:3, para 36.  
961 Law on Protection of Competition (n 22).  
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the procedure at the same time as it is sent to the parties to the procedure. In this case, the 
Authority should have sent the ruling to the Fushë Krujë Cement Factory and Besimi 
Commerce, because they were the instigators of the investigation. In addition, it was not 
published962 on the Authority’s website as Article 55 of the Law on Protection of 
Competition requires.963 
Summing up, the Authority, in issuing the final decision, could have relied on Article 59, the 
easing circumstances,964 and applied the proportionality principle,965 since the market 
distortion caused by SharrCem was not of long duration. However, it should not have 
completely released SharrCem from the penalty, when it was clear that SharrCem’s intention 
was to restrict competition, due to its request having had an exclusionary effect on actual and 
potential competitors.966 Furthermore, being these the Authority’s own findings. 
  
                                                 
962 See eg William E Kovacic, Hugh M Hollman and Patricia Grant, ‘How Does Your Competition Agency 
Measure Up?’ (n 76) 40 (‘A competition agency that does not release meaningful information impedes the 
assessment of its work. Good disclosure is an essential ingredient of the transparency that holds government 
agencies accountable and promotes improvements in public policy. Thus, a key measure of the quality of an 
agency’s process is quality of disclosure’).  
963 Ana Vlahek, Challenges of Private Enforcement of Antitrust in Slovenia (n 421) 407. ‘It must be noted that 
Article 61.a of the PRCA-1 requesting the PAPC to publish on its website all judicial review decisions is still 
not applied by the PAPC…’. See also Sergio Garcia-Rodriguez, ‘Mexico's New Institutional Framework for 
Antitrust Enforcement’, (1995) 44(4) DePaul Law Review 1149, 1179 (noting and ‘criticising’ the fact that the 
Mexican Competition Commission in the first years of its operations did not publish its decisions). 
964 Cf Sergio Garcia-Rodriguez, ‘Mexico's New Institutional Framework for Antitrust Enforcement’ (n 963) 
1180 (‘The Commission chose not to levy significant fines against firms during the first year. However, at least 
in its first year, the Commission did not use its fining authority as a major enforcement tool’). 
965 See Regulation 1/2003, Art 23(3) (‘In fixing the amount of the fine, regard shall be had both to the gravity 
and to the duration of the infringement’). See also, Case C-386/10 P Chalkor v Commission, para 99; Case C-
210/00 Käserei Champignon Hofmeister v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas ECLI:EU:C:2002:440, para 52 (‘it is 
settled case law that provisions of Community law must comply with the principle of proportionality’); Case 
C-89/11 P EON Energie v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2012:738, para 126 and Case T-59/99 Ventouris v 
Commission ECLI:EU:T:2003:334, para 219. 
966 See Case C-280/08 Deutsche Telekom v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, para 177 (‘Article 82 EC 
prohibits a dominant undertaking from, inter alia, adopting pricing practices which have an exclusionary effect 
on its equally efficient actual or potential competitors, that is to say practices which are capable of making 
market entry very difficult or impossible for such competitors’ ) and Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v 
TeliaSonera Sverige ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, para 39.  
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8 Chapter: Findings and concluding remarks  
 
The research involved in this doctoral dissertation was demanding and challenging. This 
related particularly to the necessity to access confidential files and data, within the Authority 
and the courts, in order to undertake in-depth and complete research into the subject at hand. 
There were several refusals, and it took some time for the respective institutions to be 
convinced and to decide to grant me full access to their confidential files for the purposes of 
the research.967 
Nevertheless, the research has revealed that neither the Authority nor the courts have 
successfully fulfilled their focal mission to contribute to effective competition and an 
effective economy in Kosovo. These findings directly and unequivocally confirmed the 
author’s hypothesis asserting that neither the administrative nor judicial pillar has 
accomplished its tasks as regards the effective enforcement of competition law in Kosovo. 
Current trends in enforcement, within the Authority itself as guardian of competition and 
within the courts, suggest that major improvements are required as regards human capital 
within the Authority and at all levels of the court system in order for better understanding, 
interpretation and enforcement of competition policies in Kosovo to be achieved. Analyses 
and findings of the study suggest that competition law enforcement by the Authority and the 
courts is inconsistent, and even contradictory to the goals of the competition legislation in 
force, and consequently to the legislators’ intent.968 
The inefficient enforcement of competition law by the Authority and the courts has led to 
negative consequences and not achieving a functioning market economy in Kosovo, as stated 
on the Law on Competition goals.969 This has been confirmed from the European 
Commission report for Kosovo too.970 As a result, many sectors in Kosovo continue to suffer 
                                                 
967 See eg Ana Vlahek, Challenges of Private Enforcement of Antitrust in Slovenia (n 421) 407. ‘It is to be 
underscored that due to the lack of full and transparent database of case-law of Slovenian judiciary (as well as of 
the PAPC), information as to the selected case-law was partly gathered from publicly available press 
announcements and media news on the internet’ and Katarina Zajc, Law and Economics’ Evidence in 
Competition Law: Jurisprudence in Slovenia (n 651) 145. ‘Unfortunately, I did not get to inspect the files of 
individual cases, so I could only draw my own conclusions on the usage of various methods for defining the 
relevant market, unless they were expressly specified in the decision. The review is therefore inescapably 
incomplete, and can perhaps even be unfair and overly critical of certain Slovenian institutions.’ 
968 By ‘the legislators’ intent’ I mean the goals of competition law which may have been intended by the 
legislators, eg: effective competition in the market by successful challenging of anti-competitive agreements, 
abuses of a dominant position, concerted practices, and any other form that restricts or distorts competition; and 
enhancing consumer welfare. 
969 See (n) 18.  
970 European Commission, Kosovo Progress Report 2019 (2019) 44-49. (‘Kosovo has made some progress and 
is at an early stage of developing a functioning market economy. Kosovo ... is at an early stage in terms of 
capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces in the EU’). 
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from lack of competition, such as energy, telecommunications, derivatives, banking, and 
transport. In other sectors that appear competitive, there are allegations and suspicions of 
anti-competitive conduct among ‘rival’ undertakings. For example, with regard to the 
banking sector, there has been constant criticism and suspicion that banks in Kosovo may 
have price-fixing agreements in place to keep interest rates on loans as high as possible.971 In 
addition, Kosovo is undertaking a major energy investment project, known as ‘Kosova e Re’ 
and there is great criticism regarding the potential negative impact on this project from the 
competition point of view.972 The Authority has not demonstrated that it is willing to become 
involved in this matter, although it can act ex officio in this and similar cases under the Law 
on Protection of Competition. 
Based on the outcomes of the research, the main challenge and obstacle hindering the 
effective enforcement of competition law in Kosovo is seen to be the human capital. As the 
findings of the research suggest, the Authority has weak administrative capacity in terms of 
effectively enforcing competition rules, both from a procedural and substantive viewpoint. 
The rulings and case files of the Authority which were the subject of qualitative appraisal in 
this research (as comprehensively discussed in the main body of this thesis) support this 
argument. 
It is essential that the Authority improve its work, from both a procedural and a substantive 
point of view, in order to effectively enforce competition law. This improvement is required 
in all stages of the Authority’s work, from investigation to the imposition of fines and court 
litigation. As this research has shown, the work of the Authority in the past has been 
characterized by significant deficiencies at all stages. 
One of the key factors undermining the work of the Authority tends to be lack of or 
insufficient reasoning in its decisions. Most of the Authority’s decisions were set aside by the 
courts for that reason. An authoritative statement of reasons is a requirement not only in 
Kosovo but also in EU competition law enforcement. In addition, the obligation to provide an 
adequate statement of reasons in administrative procedures is considered of fundamental 
importance under EU law. The same legal approach is required by the Law on Administrative 
Procedure in Kosovo. For this reason, observance of procedural rules is revealed to be one of 
the most important matters that the courts assess during judicial review of the Authority’s 
decisions. The Authority must improve this aspect of its work if it is to succeed in its aim. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
971 See Radio Free Europe reporting on the same issue since 2011: https://www.evropaelire.org/a/2270903.html. 
Also other media reports in 2019 too: http://www.gazetadita.al/konkurrenca-heton-bankat-marreveshje-te-
fshehte-ne-kurriz-te-qytetareve/.  
972 European Commission, Kosovo Progress Report 2019 (n 970) 50 and 82. (‘The government has concluded a 
commercial agreement with the bidder on the construction of the Kosova e Re 500 MW lignite power plant, 
which is due to start in 2019, estimated EUR 1 billion. The contractual framework for the construction of the 
new plant, which involves designating a single buyer of the electricity it produces, could negatively impact the 
opening of the market’). 
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Another weakness observed is that the Authority has failed to indicate expressly in its 
decisions the legal provisions alleged to have been violated. According to the Law on 
Administrative Procedure Art 84(2)(d) every administrative decision must contain a clear 
statement of the legal basis. The courts’ approach, throughout the court hierarchy, has been 
that if the administrative decision does not state in a clear and unequivocal fashion the legal 
basis of the act, this is a sufficient ground to set it aside for non-compliance with procedural 
standards and requirements. Similar to the aforementioned challenge, this issue appears to be 
an important prerequisite for the Authority’s rulings to survive court scrutiny. 
In addition, it is the duty and responsibility of the Authority to appropriately and legally 
defend its decisions before the courts. In this way, as the main promoter of effective 
enforcement of competition law in Kosovo, the Authority can direct the courts in the 
handling of competition cases, given the courts’ lack of experience in the area. Since the 
courts have not been judging cases according to the intrinsic objectives of competition law, 
the Authority must persuasively argue these objectives, and thus prevent the courts from 
establishing inadequate judicial practice regarding enforcement of competition law. In the 
court cases examined, the appeals and claims of the Authority were circumstantial rather than 
substantive, and as a result there was difficulty persuading the courts that the Authority’s 
rulings were legally sound. 
During the investigative and decision-making processes of its first cases, the Authority 
needed to argue in a professional and legal manner why certain actions of business 
undertakings not only distort competition but also are punishable under competition law. This 
would have set an example not only for those undertakings that were fined by the Authority, 
but also for others involved in anti-competitive behaviours. It would also have ensured that 
both the undertakings and the courts involved would have understood more clearly the logic, 
philosophy and purpose of the appropriate enforcement of competition legislation. 
For the Authority itself, it was essential that the cases were presented with care and 
professionalism, from investigation stage to the final judicial stage. This was particularly so 
since the cases were the first in the field of competition in Kosovo, and future enforcement 
would inevitably be influenced by these cases, especially in the courts. 
The research also disclosed that the Authority in its appeals in the main repeated or 
reproduced allegations and arguments previously submitted to the Court of First Instance. 
Likewise, the Authority, instead of appealing second instance rulings to the Supreme Court, 
erroneously contested Court of First Instance verdicts.973 The Authority is not permitted in an 
appeal merely to repeat pleas previously submitted to the Court of First Instance, including 
those already rejected. According to settled EU case law, an appeal must indicate precisely 
the contested elements of the judgement which the appellant seeks to have set aside and also 
                                                 
973 See (n 508). 
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the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of that appeal.974 Failure to state 
precisely the contested elements and the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of 
the appeal leads to inadmissibility of appeals. Most importantly for the Authority, the 
ineffective use of appeal opportunities, apart from resulting in the loss of cases, led to an 
erroneous approach by the Court of Appeal975 and the establishment of inconsistent legal 
practice in the adjudication of competition cases. 
Investigations and the decision-making processes within the Authority must always be 
conducted in accordance with the legal provisions in force, not only the provisions of 
competition law but also of the Law on Administrative Procedure. This is particularly so 
since the Authority’s decisions are judicially reviewed before the administrative court, and 
consequently the first aspects to be considered are procedural aspects. Given that judges lack 
knowledge in the field of competition law, inevitably the courts tend to avoid the material law 
and judge on the basis of the provisions of the Law on Administrative Procedure. 
Among the most important of the mechanisms for the effective enforcement of competition 
law, apart from the Authority, is a well-functioning judicial system. At this stage, Kosovo’s 
courts are not primed to effectively enforce competition law. Judges tend to take seriously the 
role of safeguarding procedures but not the substantive aspects of competition law, avoiding 
examination of the merits of cases. A majority of the court judgements which have been the 
subject of qualitative assessment in this research suggest that courts in Kosovo not only are 
not facilitating the effective enforcement of competition rules but on the contrary are 
impeding such enforcement. Similar to the Authority, within the court hierarchy human 
capital appears to be the Achilles heel, with judges having misunderstood the goals and 
philosophy behind the competition legislation. As a result, the judiciary’s interpretation and 
enforcement of competition policies have been in stark contrast to the objectives of 
competition legislation. 
Courts should review competition case more comprehensively, and not limit their 
examination to procedural errors. In the insurance company cases, the courts did not assess to 
any extent the object of the contested agreement, which was unequivocally in breach of 
competition law provisions. Thus, it was not necessary to consider whether the agreement 
might have had an effect on the relevant market. In order to determine distortion or restriction 
of competition within the relevant market, the court in certain cases must assess the 
competition that would have existed in the absence of the contested decision or agreement. In 
addition, courts must establish whether the evidence put forward is factually accurate, reliable 
and consistent with the objectives of competition law. In this regard, courts shall have 
complete power in relation to the facts. The courts must assess whether the Authority has 
made a manifest error of assessment during proceedings in competition cases. 
                                                 
974 Case C-248/99 P France v Monsanto and Commission ECLI:EU:C:2002:1, para 68. 
975 The author is referring to the Dardania case.  
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One can also go a step further, arguing that the way in which competition law enforcement 
has been handled to date is anti-competitive in itself. An ‘amnesty’ given for current breaches 
of competition legislation may incentivize market players to engage in anti-competitive 
conduct in the future and promote ‘recidivism’ in anti-competitive behaviour. This is 
evidenced by the fact that in December 2016 the so-called ‘Swiss Diamond Agreement’ was 
reached among the same insurance companies as those involved in the price-fixing of 
insurance policies.976 Unlike the initial agreement, which was signed by branch directors in 
Gjakova, the latter agreement was signed by the directors general of the companies. If the 
Authority had successfully enforced the Law on Competition and persuaded the courts to 
decide competition cases mindful of the objectives of competition legislation, the insurance 
companies would have had to pay the fine for being involved in the Gjakova agreement. This 
would have discouraged the undertakings from entering future similar agreements, since 
recidivism is to be considered an aggravating circumstance. 
The Court of Appeal approach, initially in the Dardania case, ordering the Authority to 
provide, inter alia: (i) the original agreement; (ii) evidence that the agreement was signed by 
a competent person within the company’s hierarchy; and (iii) evidence of how the Authority 
became aware of the existence of such agreement, not only affected the final outcome of the 
insurance company cases, but also produced significant long-term negative consequences for 
the effective enforcement of competition law. 
For the sake of consistency, the courts must have the opportunity to join similar cases, 
reviewing all lawsuits and appeals concerning the same matter in one procedure. Thus, all 
connected cases would be heard by the same judges and unified conclusions drawn. 
Regrettably, for the courts involved in competition cases, it appears that almost any decision 
issued by the Authority was regarded as unlawful per se.977 However, it is the duty and 
responsibility of the Authority to ensure that its decisions survive judicial review, both in the 
procedural and substantive aspects. This is the only way for the Authority as guardian of 
competition law enforcement and as the body with responsibility for ensuring a competitive 
market in Kosovo to accomplish its legal and institutional mandate. 
Competition proceedings before the courts are taking many years to be resolved, to the extent 
that one may even argue that such ‘delays’ in proceedings might be considered breach of the 
principle that a decision should be available within a reasonable time.978 However, such 
                                                 
976 See media reports (in Albanian): http://gazetafjala.com/analiza/marreveshja-swiss-diamond-plani-sekret-i-
boseve-te-sigurimeve/ and http://www.ekonomiaonline.com/ekonomi/biznes/marreveshja-swiss-diamond-bqk-
mbron-boset-e-sigurimeve/.  
977 During the research activities, including those in the courts, the author noticed such bias existing in relation 
to the Authority’s work, with particular reference to its decisions. 
978 The Law on Courts Art 7(2) states that ‘every natural and legal person has the right to a fair trial within a 
reasonable timeframe’. Law No. 03/L-199 on Courts (Official Gazette 79/2010, 24.08.2010). Available at 
https://gzk.rks-gov.net/ActDetail.aspx?ActID=2700. Last accessed on 25 November 2018. 
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‘reasonable time’ is not clearly defined, inter alia because every case has its own particular 
circumstances, including procedural circumstances, and its own complexity from a merits 
standpoint. However, the CJEU has previously ruled that a period of more than four years 
which elapsed before the GC without any progress in the proceedings cannot be justified by 
either the complexity of the case nor its context.979 
It is essential that courts properly understand the goals of competition legislation. If this is not 
the case, even if the work of the Authority improves in the near future, such improvement is 
in permanent danger of being undermined by the courts’ misunderstanding of the competition 
law objectives. 
Most of the challenges that the research has identified lie in institutional arrangements rather 
than in legislative shortfalls. Kosovo’s competition legislation is based on and originates 
from the EU competition foundation. The fact that competition rules in Kosovo are largely 
aligned with those of the EU is continuously confirmed by the EU Commission in its 
Progress Reports for Kosovo. However, the legislative changes that needs to be made to the 
Law on Protection of Competition, it is particularly the stipulation that legal review of 
competition cases should be carried out by the Court of First Instance – Administrative 
Department. 
Currently this Department is within the Court of First Instance of Pristina. However, recently 
the Ministry of Justice has stated its commitment to establish a separate commercial court, 
with specific jurisdiction in commercial matters. This initiative, if implemented in practice, 
seems a good opportunity for advocates of the efficient enforcement of competition rules in 
Kosovo. Stakeholders should advocate for a specialized mandated and competent panel on 
competition policy within the new court980 for reviewing all competition cases.981 Thus, only 
judges with previous education in the competition field should be considered. The research 
has presented sufficient evidence as to why competition cases must not be reviewed by 
generalist judges. Furthermore, judges who have been involved in reviewing competition 
cases to date, with the exception of one, should not be considered for the new panel, as their 
experience in competition cases to date should be considered a negative circumstance rather 
than a positive, since they have demonstrated a lack of competence in the field of 
competition. 
                                                 
979 Case C-616/13 P, PROAS v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2016:415, paras 83–84.  
980 See Ana Vlahek petitioning for a similar court model to be established in Slovenia. Ana Vlahek, Challenges 
of Private Enforcement of Antitrust in Slovenia (n 421) 378. 
981 See Andrej Fatur, Klemen Podobnik and Ana Vlahek, Competition Law in Slovenia (n 19) 103. (‘In contrast 
to some other legal areas, there is also no specialized court in Slovenia assessing competition law issues. I 
would petition for such regulation coupled with a demand for guaranteeing that only judges proficient in 
competition law are appointed to assess competition law cases.’)  
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One of the most important tasks of the panel, apart from deciding new competition cases 
correctly, both procedurally and substantively, and in accordance with competition law 
objectives, is to change current judicial practice established by the administrative court in 
competition matters. This is because the administrative court has misinterpreted competition 
law provisions and established harmful precedents which will pose an obstacle to the efficient 
enforcement of competition policies in the near future if it remains unaltered. 
At present, within the Court of First Instance, which is the court most involved in the merits 
of cases, competition cases are reviewed and decided by one judge only. In both the Appeal 
Court and the Supreme Court, cases, including competition cases, are decided by a panel of 
three judges. Given that the Court of First Instance is the only court that hears the parties and 
allows them to present an oral defence and to submit evidence, and given the complexity of 
competition cases, it is submitted that the Court of First Instance should also be comprised of 
a panel of judges. 
As the situation stands, training in the field of competition law for judges of the 
Administrative Department alone may not be sufficient for the proper enforcement of 
competition law in the absence of a basic knowledge of economics, as evidenced by the 
judgement in the Gekos case. In this case it was obvious that the court could not distinguish 
between a monopoly and a dominant position in the market. 
Competition cases require economic judgement as they are of fundamental importance as 
regards maintaining effective competition in the market. Due to lack of experience in the 
competition field and the necessity to deal with cases that require economic analysis, the 
judiciary has issued rulings which are incompatible with the objectives of competition law 
and which resort to mere ‘technical’ review instead of determination of the merits of the case. 
The research has revealed that the judiciary is not conversant with competition principles, 
with this fact emerging as one of the main ‘bottlenecks’ in competition cases. 
The framework for competition law education in Kosovo does not look promising either. In 
the Faculty of Law at the University of Prishtina, which is the oldest and largest law school in 
Kosovo, competition law is an elective course taught only in the first year of bachelor studies. 
At master’s level it is not part of the syllabus.982 At the University of Prizren, the second-
largest public university, competition law is not part of any programme in the law faculty.983 
A similar situation appears to exist in the economics faculties at both universities. 
In order for Kosovo to advance swiftly and to circumvent the main challenges that the 
research has identified, some preconditions need to be met. Initially the responsible 
                                                 
982 See all subjects of Bachelor studies (in Albanian only). https://juridiku.uni-pr.edu/Departamentet-
(1)/Bacelor.aspx. Last accessed on 14 July 2019. 
983 See the timetable for subjects taught at the Faculty of Law (in Albanian only). https://uni-
prizren.com/sq/orari-i-ligjeratave-Juridik#breadcrumb. Last accessed on 14 July 2019. 
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institutions — the Government and the Assembly — should increase the remuneration of 
officials and judges responsible for enforcing competition policies. This would make the area 
attractive to some of the most well-trained jurists and economists in the field of competition 
from elite schools in the US and the EU. Better remuneration for these officials, besides 
attracting professionals, would at the same time greatly reduce the risk of corruption. The 
study’s examination of actual level of remuneration for officials of the Authority (appendix II 
and III) give unpromising findings. Staff in many similar agencies in Kosovo which have a 
more limited role in terms of creating the conditions for a competitive economy are much 
better paid than the Authority’s staff. The level of remuneration for top officials in the 
Authority is discouraging for many professionals. Another reason for raising salaries within 
the Authority is retention of qualified staff. One can argue that you will get in return 
depending on what you give. 
Although hypothetical, the theory that the low remuneration for staff at the Authority is 
deliberate cannot be excluded.  Strong interest groups which control very important economic 
sectors and which are associated with political parties may have influenced the neglecting of 
the Authority and the lack of improvement in its resourcing in pursuit of maintaining their 
monopolies, dominant positions and potential cartels.984 This view is based on the fact that 
the Authority was inactive for nearly three years (2013–2016) as the Government and 
Assembly did not appoint new commissioners when the existing ones were terminated. It is 
difficult to find a precedent for such an important state body being left paralyzed for so long 
without any persuasive reason. 
The research having established the numerous shortfalls and inefficiencies in the Authority’s 
work, change is urgently needed to ensure appropriate and effective enforcement of 
competition law in Kosovo. The decision-making autonomy of the Authority must be 
ensured, with the prerequisite for such independence being the appointment of professional 
and non-political staff to the Authority. The professional capacity of the permanent 
professional staff within the Authority must be advanced through training programmes 
offered by the EU in Kosovo and by the Authority itself. 
                                                 
984 The Assembly of Kosovo, held an extraordinary session in June 2019, with only one item on the agenda: the 
abolition of the monopoly over the car homologation service. Devolli Corporation holds a monopoly on car 
homologation in Kosovo, and for this has been permanent criticism as well as allegations for having close ties 
with political parties, which help this Corporation to maintain its monopoly. See Transcript of records of the 
Assembly of Kosovo, date 28 June 2019, (in Albanina) available: 
http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/proc/trans__2019_06_28_10_8122_al.pdf. Also the European 
Union Office in Kosovo raises its concern against this monopoly, as being against EU competition rules and 
Kosovo commitments during the accession process. See the EU Office statement, available: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo/64368/eu-raises-concern-economic-committee-over-homologation-
monopoly-causing-undue-cost-kosovo_en.  
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Ensuring professional autonomy985 and the appointment of professionally competent 
personnel within the decision-making body should also change the internal structure of the 
Authority. As regards the Authority’s structure, the Commission should remain the decision-
making body. Separate units should be created with specific tasks and responsibilities 
regarding: (i) abuse of a dominant position; (ii) anti-competitive agreements; (iii) 
concentration of enterprises; and (iv) administrative procedures and litigation. In this manner 
each unit would be specialized and supported by staff professionally trained for specific 
work. This particularly applies to administrative procedures and litigation, since the prior 
work of the Authority demonstrated numerous procedural shortfalls, as evidenced by the 
cases analyzed. At present the Authority is represented at court by inspectors986 while the 
Market Supervision Department is in charge of almost ‘everything’ including: anti-
competitive agreements, abuse of a dominant position, concerted practices, mergers and 
litigation. 
The proposed new structure does not necessarily mean creation of a large number of new 
positions within the Authority, but that the existing human capital be reorganized into up to 
four or five staff in separate and more specialized units. Thus, each unit is mainly focused on 
the subject it covers. If the situation is encountered that one case involves allegations of 
breach of two different competition provisions, e.g. anti-competitive agreements and abuse of 
a dominant position, the two relevant units must cooperate. At the end of the day it is 
irrelevant from which unit the case comes; it has to be considered and finally decided by the 
Commission, as the decision-making body within the Authority. Ultimately the Commission 
acts as an umbrella over all of the different units operating within the Authority. 
The main reason for this proposal for a new structure for the Authority lies in the fact that up 
to now in most of its rulings the Authority was incapable of clearly defining and justifying 
separately allegations of anti-competitive agreements and abuse of a dominant position. 
Assessing the matter through this prism the courts overturned such rulings inter alia on the 
ground of contradictory reasoning. Thus, it is expected that such separation of units would 
have a positive impact on the quality of the Authority’s decisions. 
Notwithstanding criticism of the work of the Authority and the courts for the period this 
research has covered, hope emerges. With support and funding from the EU a new project 
has begun to support the work of the Authority.987 It is currently at an initial phase and is due 
to last for at least three years. This project, in addition to training and advising the Authority, 
also includes participation in the work of the Authority by experts from EU countries. In this 
                                                 
985 By ‘with professional autonomy’ I mean the non-interference of politics in the decision-making processes of 
the Authority. 
986 This is based on court judgements and the Authority’s submissions. Inspectors are part of the Market 
Supervision Department.  
987 European Union IPA Programme, EU Support to the Kosovo Competition Authority and State Aid 
Commission, EuropeAid/139447/DH/SER/XK, 2019-2022.  
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way the Authority will be assisted and advised by EU experts in its investigations for at least 
three years. This is expected to be a great help to the Authority not only in investigating and 
fining undertakings that are proven to have breached competition rules, but it is also likely to 
enhance the credibility of the Authority in the eyes of the public and institutions such as the 
Government. As planned this project will at a later stage be expanded to the courts involved 
in the judicial review of competition cases. However, its impact remains to be assessed by 
future research. 
Similar projects have been financed and implemented by the EU in different countries 
wishing to join the EU, such as Slovenia,988 Croatia989 and Albania.990 In most of these 
countries the beneficiaries were also the respective competition authorities. Most of these 
projects, such as those in Croatia and Albania, had ensuring a competitive environment as the 
focal objective. This was to be achieved by: ensuring further alignment of legislation with the 
acquis communautaire; screening legislation that may have an adverse effect on competition; 
clarifying and advancing the competition authorities’ procedures in order to safeguard full 
respect for the parties’ rights to a fair process; enhancing enforcement effectiveness; raising 
awareness about the benefits that citizens may obtain as a result of fair competition; public 
advocacy as a mode of strengthening competition culture; training of target groups such as 
authorities, officials, judges and others stakeholders. The competition agencies of both 
countries are asserted to have greatly benefited from such EU support991 as regards advancing 
and achieving competition law objectives. 
All of these countries, only a few years before joining the EU, encountered similar 
challenges, especially on the institutional side as regards the effective enforcement of the 
competition rules and ensuring the conditions for a competitive economy at national level. 
Kosovo is not likely to be an exception. Many scholars argue that in the early years of the 
enforcement of competition rules even the EU itself faced challenges.992 To overcome these 
                                                 
988 Ana Vlahek, Challenges of Private Enforcement of Antitrust in Slovenia (n 421) 406. ‘In order to handle 
competition law cases efficiently and with confidence, some of the judges have in the last couple of years been 
taking part in competition law education and training programmes supported financially by the European 
Commission and organized by various institutions throughout the Member States. In Slovenia, Institute for 
Comparative Law at the Faculty of Law in Ljubljana has thus far been successful organizing workshops, 
seminars and conferences for Slovenian and Croatian judges applying national and European antitrust.’ 
989 European Union, EU Assistance Programme 2007, Implementing Croatian Competition and State Aid 
policies, accomplished in 2011. Croatia benefited greatly from many EU-supported projects in the field of 
competition.  
990 European Union IPA Programme, Supporting the Albanian Competition Authority and State Aid Department, 
EuropeAid/128368/C/SER/AL, 2011.  
991 For more information see Croatian Competition Agency’s annual reports http://www.aztn.hr/en/annual-
reports/. Last accessed on 13 July 2019. See also Albanian Agency’s annual reports (in Albanian only) 
http://www.caa.gov.al/publications/list/category/1/page/1. Last accessed on 13 July 2019.  
992 Damien Geradin, Competition Law, in Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Jan M. Smits (ed) (Edward 
Elgar 2006) 172. 
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difficulties in the 1960s, the EU benefited from best practice in relation to the enforcement of 
competition rules on the other side of the Atlantic, in the US. The EU also benefited from 
joint fora and sharing of experiences and from sending staff for training in the field of 
antitrust at American schools. 
Many countries, such as Slovenia, Bulgaria and Croatia, only a few years prior to EU 
accession had similar challenges as regards human capital within their competition 
authorities and the courts, as well as legislative deficiencies. 
According to the EU Commission Opinion of 1997993 Slovenia faced legislative as well as 
institutional challenges when it came to public enforcement of competition rules.994 The 
Commission took the view that in order for Slovenia to effectively enforce competition 
policies its existing competition legislation should be further aligned with EU competition 
legislation, and that the administrative capacities within the Competition Protection Office 
needed to be strengthened since the staffing and technical qualifications were inadequate to 
ensure effective implementation of the acquis. 
At this time, the banking sector in Slovenia was criticized for lack of competition995 and high 
operational cost levels. Banks in Slovenia at that time had an interest rate arrangement 
(cartel) setting the maximum rates on deposits, which was approved by the Antimonopoly 
Office.996 Among other things the Commission stated that in order for Slovenia to 
demonstrate credible enforcement of competition rules, both administrative and judicial staff 
involved in enforcement must have a sufficient understanding of competition law and policy. 
In its assessment of 1998, the EU Commission repeated that the financial sector is still far 
from being competitive. Apart from non-privatization of two state-owned banks the insurance 
sector needed major efforts in order to become competitive. Although it was recognized that 
Slovenia can be regarded as a functioning market economy, on the other hand it was stressed 
that there is room for additional progress in that the state remains heavily involved in the 
running of the economy.997 In addition the EU concluded that Slovenian competition 
legislation still has major shortcomings and that the very low staff levels and administrative 
deficiencies within the Competition Protection Office pose a challenge when it comes to 
effective enforcement of competition law.998 
                                                 
993 European Commission, Agenda 2000 – Commission Opinion on Slovenia’s Application for Membership of 
the European Union (1997).  
994 The same applies to private antitrust enforcement in Slovenia. See to the same effect, Ana Vlahek, 
Challenges of Private Enforcement of Antitrust in Slovenia (n 421). 
995 Other sectors, such as insurance, energy, telecommunications and transport, also faced lack of competition.  
996 Agenda 2000 - Commission Opinion on Slovenia’s Application for Membership of the European Union (n 
993) 31.  
997 European Commission, Regular Report on Slovenia’s Progress Towards Accession (1998) 17. 
998 Ibid, 23. 
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In 2000, the EU measured the lack of competition in financial markets in Slovenia, assessing 
this as a gap in efficiency as regards monetary policy instruments. At the same time, it 
required the improvement of competitiveness in all parts of the financial markets.999 
According to the EU assessment, the insurance sector at this time in Slovenia faced little 
foreign competition exerting pressure to improve efficiency. In addition the EU told Slovenia 
than in order for the country to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the 
EU it must increase competition in the economy and that one way to do this would be to 
reduce the role of the state in the economy. 
In its progress report of 2002, the EU recognized the significance of the judiciary as an 
important component as regards effective enforcement of competition law in Slovenia. As 
such it suggested that in order for the courts to play their role in an effective way, training 
should be developed for the judiciary.1000 
According to the last assessment of the EU before Slovenia became an EU Member State 
effective enforcement of competition rules had not been achieved even at this stage. As a 
result, the EU requested Slovenia to prioritize strengthening the administrative capacity of the 
competition authority and ensuring its independence. In addition, special training for judges 
was mandatory, according to the EU’s assessment.1001 
In the same vein, in its early assessment the EU emphasized that in order for Bulgaria to 
effectively enforce its competition rules the administrative capacities within the competition 
authority should be reinforced. In addition it suggested financial aid to provide specific 
training for staff.1002 In its subsequent assessment, apart from recognizing the progress made 
in the effective enforcement of competition rules in Bulgaria, the EU considered that 
administrative capacities within the competition agency still needed to be strengthened in 
terms of both numbers and quality.1003 However, apart from administrative difficulties the EU 
concluded that the judiciary needed a better understanding of competition rules in order for 
Bulgaria to achieve sufficient enforcement of competition legislation.1004 This supports the 
notion that administrative and judicial professional capacities must be advanced in parallel to 
achieve proper understanding and enforcement of competition policies. If one branch of the 
system fails, the other cannot achieve competition law objectives on its own. For this reason 
                                                 
999 European Commission, Regular Report on Slovenia’s Progress Towards Accession (2000) 23. 
1000 European Commission, Regular Report on Slovenia’s Progress Towards Accession (2002) 53. 
1001 European Commission, Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Slovenia’s Preparations for Membership 
(2003) 22. 
1002 European Commission, Regular Report from the Commission on Bulgaria’s Progress Towards Accession 
(1998) 23–24. 
1003 European Commission, Regular Report from the Commission on Bulgaria’s Progress Towards Accession 
(1999) 31. 
1004 European Commission, Regular Report from the Commission on Bulgaria’s Progress Towards Accession 
(2000) 43. 
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in its assessment of 2002 the EU requested training for the judiciary.1005 Such training for 
judges was reported to have occurred in 2003.1006 Bulgaria was a rare case in that a few years 
prior to accession the EU concluded that the overall assessment as regards antitrust was 
positive.1007 Training activities have continued since 2004.1008 Although the EU recognized 
the progress made by Bulgaria it considered that apart from training, one way to continue 
strengthening the effective enforcement of competition law was to provide the competition 
agency with an increased budget and its staff with higher salaries.1009 
In 2007, Croatia had different shortcomings hindering the effective enforcement of 
competition legislation, according to the EU assessment. These shortcomings lay in 
legislative, deficient administrative capacities within the competition authority and low 
budgetary allocation. In particular, the Law on Administrative Procedure in Croatia was 
considered to be an obstacle because it allowed the Government to overturn antitrust 
decisions.1010 In 2008 the EU assessed that Croatia had made no progress as regards aligning 
legislation with the acquis in the field of antitrust. The need to increase the Agency’s 
administrative capacity was also repeated.1011 In 2009 the gas and electricity markets were 
considered to lack effective competition since both markets were dominated by single 
suppliers.1012 In addition state intervention in the enterprise sector was considered high, in 
particular due to anti-recession measures. Only in 2009 did Croatia enact its Competition Act 
in line with the acquis; this entered into force in October 2010.1013 At this stage the EU 
considered that significant progress had been made by Croatia because according to this law 
the competition authority was empowered to impose fines and to conduct a leniency 
programme. This strengthened the rights of defence since the law introduced the obligation 
for the Agency to submit statements of objection to the parties under investigation and made 
the Agency’s decision subject to judicial review before the High Administrative Court. In 
2011, with a total of 55 employees the competition agency was assessed as having good 
administrative capacity, even though the EU suggested that in order for it to be further 
strengthened and to effectively enforce competition rules, staff needed training in the field of 
                                                 
1005 European Commission, Regular Report from the Commission on Bulgaria’s Progress Towards Accession 
(2002) 62. 
1006 European Commission, Regular Report from the Commission on Bulgaria’s Progress Towards Accession 
(2003) 53. 
1007 European Commission, Regular Report from the Commission on Bulgaria’s Progress Towards Accession 
(2003) 54. 
1008 European Commission, Regular Report from the Commission on Bulgaria’s Progress Towards Accession 
(2003) 59. 
1009 European Commission, Comprehensive Monitoring Report, (2005) 35. 
1010 European Commission, Croatia 2007 Progress Report (2007) 23, 31–32.  
1011 European Commission, Croatia 2008 Progress Report (2008) 34. 
1012 European Commission, Croatia 2009 Progress Report (2009) 25. In the accession process for Croatia, the 
shipbuilding sector was considered a key element of the accession negotiations and as a result special attention 
was paid to this sector.  
1013 European Commission, Croatia 2010 Progress Report (2010), 33.  
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cartels and abuse of a dominant position.1014 In the last assessment the EU concluded that 
Croatia had largely aligned its legislation in the field of antitrust with the acquis and achieved 
a positive enforcement record, and that the competition agency was fulfilling its duties and 
responsibilities in line with the legislation in force. 
Effective enforcement of competition rules by both the administrative and judicial pillars ― 
to create the necessary conditions for effective competition among rival undertakings ― is a 
pre-condition for national economies to successfully cope with the competitive pressure upon 
EU membership. The competitive pressure for all EU Member States is twofold. The first 
comes from foreign enterprises that compete with local businesses as a result of unification 
within a single market and the second is the ability of domestic enterprises to successfully 
compete with foreign companies active in the EU single market. For countries wishing to join 
the EU, to successfully enforce competition rules is challenging. 
As can be understood from the experiences of other countries that have commenced the EU 
accession process, there are generally three main challenges in the field of competition that 
need to be overcome. The first is legislative in nature ― meaning that the competition laws 
need to be harmonized with those of the EU as a prerequisite for membership. The second 
challenge is creating sufficient administrative capacity within the enforcement agencies to 
prioritize and successfully combat cases concerning the most serious distortions of 
competition. The third challenge is lack of knowledge among the judiciary as regards the 
competition law objectives, and the lack of enforcement of competition law in accordance 
with its inherent goals. 
On the journey to EU accession and the achievement of efficient enforcement of competition 
policies, almost all countries have faced similar challenges to those faced by Kosovo. The 
most common challenges for all countries lay in legislative shortfalls, deficient administrative 
capacity within enforcement agencies, and the courts’ lack of understanding of and failure to 
effectively enforce competition rules. 
Kosovo should therefore learn lessons from other countries that have managed to successfully 
overcome similar challenges as regards the enforcement of competition legislation and the 
creation of the necessary conditions for a competitive economy. Kosovo's long-term goal 
should be to advance and improve the enforcement of competition rules with reference to the 
EU’s already consolidated practice in this area. 
In so doing Kosovo does not have the luxury to wait decades for slow progress towards 
efficient enforcement of competition rules both at the administrative and judicial levels. 
Kosovo needs immediate substantive steps toward the enforcement of competition law in 
accordance with its goals and best practices established elsewhere, such as within the EU. In 
this respect among other things Kosovo needs ‘new blood’ as regards the human capital in 
                                                 
1014 European Commission, Croatia 2011 Progress Report (2011), 31.  
217 
 
key positions related to competition policies and their enforcement in both the administrative 
and judicial arenas, together with a substantial increase in salaries. It is necessary, however, 
that both the administrative and judicial pillars advance in parallel ― as one alone cannot 
support the process of change ― nor achieve the goals of competition legislation in force. 
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8.1 Povzetek  
 
Raziskava v okviru doktorske disertacije je bila zahtevna in polna izzivov, kar je bilo 
povezano zlasti s potrebo po dostopanju do zaupnih dokumentov in podatkov pristojnega 
organa za varstvo konkurence in sodišč, na podlagi katerih je bilo mogoče opraviti 
poglobljeno in celovito raziskavo obravnavane teme. Doživel sem nekaj zavrnitev in trajalo 
je kar nekaj časa, preden sem pristojne ustanove prepričal, da mi za namene pričujoče 
raziskave omogočijo neomejen dostop do zaupnih dokumentov. 
Raziskava je pokazala, da niti pristojni organ za varstvo konkurence niti sodišča niso uspešno 
uresničili svojega ključnega poslanstva prispevati k učinkoviti konkurenci in gospodarstvu na 
Kosovu. Te ugotovitve so neposredno in nedvoumno potrdile avtorjevo hipotezo, da niti 
upravna niti sodna veja nista opravili svojih nalog na področju učinkovitega uveljavljanja 
konkurenčnega prava na Kosovu.  
Trenutni trendi pri uveljavljanju zakonov v okviru pristojnega organa kot varuha konkurence 
in v okviru sodišč kažejo, da so znotraj pristojnega organa in na vseh ravneh sodnega sistema 
potrebne korenite izboljšave človeškega kapitala, ki bodo omogočale boljše razumevanje, 
interpretacijo in izvajanje politike konkurence na Kosovu. Analize in ugotovitve študije 
kažejo, da pristojni organ in sodišča konkurenčnega prava ne uveljavljajo dosledno in da pri 
tem celo ravnajo v nasprotju s cilji veljavne konkurenčnopravne zakonodaje in posledično 
tudi v nasprotju z namenom zakonodajalca. 
Neučinkovito uveljavljanje konkurenčnega prava s strani pristojnega organa in sodišč je 
privedlo do negativnih posledic in do nedelujočega tržnega gospodarstva na Kosovu v 
nasprotju s cilji, navedenimi v Zakonu o varstvu konkurence. To je v svojem poročilu za 
Kosovo potrdila tudi Evropska komisija. Posledica tega je dejstvo, da se številne panoge na 
Kosovu še naprej soočajo s pomanjkanjem konkurence. Med njimi so, na primer, energetika, 
telekomunikacije, izvedeni finančni inštrumenti, bančništvo in promet. V drugih panogah, ki 
se zdijo konkurenčne, pa se med ‘rivalskimi’ družbami pojavljajo obtožbe in sumi 
protikonkurenčnega ravnanja. Tako se, na primer, v bančnem sektorju pojavljajo nenehne 
kritike in sum, da imajo banke na Kosovu sklenjene sporazume o določanju cen, s čimer 
ohranjajo obrestne mere za posojila čim višje. Poleg tega na Kosovu poteka pomemben 
projekt energetske naložbe, imenovan ‘Kosova e Re’, ob katerem se pojavljajo kritike o 
negativnih vplivih na ta projekt z vidika konkurence. Pristojni organ za varstvo konkurence ni 
pokazal pripravljenosti, da se vplete v ta projekt, čeprav bi lahko to v tem in podobnih 
primerih storil po uradni dolžnosti skladno z Zakonom o varstvu konkurence. 
Na osnovi izsledkov raziskave se zdi, da je glavni izziv in ovira, ki preprečuje učinkovito 
uveljavljanje konkurenčnega prava na Kosovu, človeški kapital. Kot kažejo ugotovitve 
raziskave, ima pristojni organ pri učinkovitem uveljavljanju pravil o konkurenci šibke 
upravne zmogljivosti, tako s postopkovnega kot tudi vsebinskega vidika. Odločbe in spisi 
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pristojnega organa, ki so bili predmet kvalitativne presoje pričujoče raziskave (ki je 
podrobneje obravnavana v jedru disertacije), to trditev potrjujejo. 
Da bi pristojni organ lahko učinkovito uveljavljal konkurenčno pravo, mora izboljšati svoje 
delo tako na postopkovni kot tudi na vsebinski ravni. Te izboljšave so potrebne v vseh fazah 
dela pristojnega organa, od preiskav do nalaganja glob, pa tudi v sodnih postopkih. Kot je 
pokazala raziskava, je bilo delo pristojnega organa v preteklosti zaznamovano s precejšnjimi 
pomanjkljivostmi na vseh ravneh. 
Kaže, da je eden od ključnih dejavnikov, ki spodkopavajo delo organa za varstvo konkurence, 
pomanjkanje obrazložitev oziroma nezadostna utemeljitev odločb. Večino odločb pristojnega 
organa so sodišča zato razveljavila. Verodostojna utemeljitev odločb ni zahtevana le na 
Kosovu, temveč tudi pri izvajanju konkurenčnega prava po vsej EU. Poleg tega je obveznost 
zagotavljanja verodostojnih obrazložitev v upravnih postopkih po pravu EU ključnega 
pomena. Enak pravni pristop se na Kosovu zahteva v okviru Zakona o splošnem upravnem 
postopku. Upoštevanje postopkovnih pravil se je tako pokazalo kot eden od najpomembnejših 
vidikov, ki jih sodišča upoštevajo pri sodni presoji odločb pristojnega organa. Če želi ta 
uspešno uresničevati svoje cilje, mora ta vidik svojega dela izboljšati. 
Druga zaznana slabost je dejstvo, da pristojni organ v svojih odločbah ni izrecno navedel, 
katere zakonske določbe naj bi bile kršene. Po členu 84(2)(d) Zakona o splošnem upravnem 
postopku mora vsaka upravna odločba vsebovati jasno pravno podlago. Pristop sodišč po 
celotni hierarhiji je takšen, da vsako upravno odločbo, ki pravne podlage akta ne navaja jasno 
in nedvoumno, razveljavijo, pri čemer kot razlog za to navajajo neupoštevanje postopkovnih 
standardov. Podobno kot v zgoraj omenjenem primeru je ta vidik pomemben predpogoj, da 
odločbe pristojnega organa prestanejo presojo sodišča.  
Poleg tega je dolžnost in odgovornost pristojnega organa, da svoje odločbe pred sodišči 
zagovarja na ustrezen pravni način. Tako lahko kot glavni zagovornik učinkovitega izvajanja 
konkurenčnega prava na Kosovu usmerja sodišča pri obravnavi zadev s področja konkurence, 
kjer sodišča nimajo izkušenj,  in s tem prepreči, da bi sodišča pri uveljavljanju 
konkurenčnega prava vzpostavila pomanjkljivo sodno prakso.  
Za pristojni organ je bilo ključnega pomena, da je zadeve od faze preiskovanja do končne 
faze sodnega postopka predstavil skrbno in strokovno. To je bilo še toliko bolj pomembno, 
ker je šlo za prve zadeve na področju konkurence na Kosovu in ker bi te zadeve nedvomno 
vplivale na uveljavljanje pravil v prihodnosti, zlasti pred sodišči. 
Eden od najpomembnejših mehanizmov za učinkovito izvajanje konkurenčnega prava je tudi 
dobro delujoč pravosodni sistem. V tem trenutku sodišča na Kosovu niso pripravljena na 
učinkovito uveljavljanje konkurenčnega prava. Sodniki jemljejo svojo vlogo varuhov 
postopkov zelo resno, pri tem pa pozabljajo na vsebinske vidike konkurenčnega prava in ne 
ocenjujejo bistva zadev. Večina razsodb, ki so bile v okviru te raziskave predmet kvalitativne 
ocene, ne kaže le na to, da sodišča na Kosovu ne spodbujajo učinkovitega uveljavljanja pravil 
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o konkurenci, temveč ga pravzaprav zavirajo. Zdi se, da je Ahilova peta, tako kot pri 
pristojnem organu, človeški kapital. Sodniki namreč ne razumejo dobro ciljev in filozofije 
konkurenčnopravne zakonodaje. To je tudi razlog, da sta sodna interpretacija in uveljavljanje 
konkurenčne politike v velikem nasprotju s cilji konkurenčne zakonodaje.  
Sodišča bi morala zadeve s področja konkurence obravnavati obširneje in se ne omejevati 
zgolj na postopkovne kršitve. Pristop pritožbenega sodišča, sprva v zadevi Dardania, ki je 
pristojnemu organu med drugim odredilo, da mora predložiti: (i) izvorno pogodbo; (ii) 
dokazila, da je pogodbo podpisala pooblaščena oseba znotraj hierarhije podjetja; in (iii) 
dokazila o tem, kako je pristojni organ izvedel za obstoj takšne pogodbe, ni le vplival na 
končni izid zavarovalniških primerov, temveč je tudi imel pomembne dolgoročne negativne 
posledice za učinkovito izvajanje konkurenčnega prava. Sodišča morajo imeti možnost, da 
združijo podobne primere, pri čemer lahko v enem sodnem postopku obravnavajo vse tožbe 
in pritožbe, povezane z isto zadevo. Tako bi vse povezane primere lahko obravnaval en 
sodnik, sprejeti zaključki pa bi bili enotni. Pomembno je seveda tudi, da sodišča ustrezno 
razumejo namen konkurenčne zakonodaje. Če tega ne razumejo, potem bo tudi v primeru, da 
se delo pristojnega organa v bližnji prihodnosti izboljša, le-to v stalni nevarnosti, da ga bodo 
sodišča spodkopavala zaradi napačnega razumevanja načel konkurenčnega gospodarstva v 
odnosu do ciljev konkurenčnega prava. 
Večina izzivov, ki so bili prepoznani v okviru raziskave, se skriva predvsem v 
institucionalnih ureditvah, manj pa v zakonodajnih pomanjkljivostih. Konkurenčna 
zakonodaja Kosova temelji na in izhaja iz temeljev konkurenčnega prava EU. Dejstvo, da so 
pravila o konkurenci na Kosovu v veliki meri usklajena s pravili EU, nenehno potrjuje tudi 
Evropska komisija v svojih Poročilih o napredku Kosova. Vendar pa rezultati raziskave 
kažejo, da med zakonodajnimi spremembami Zakona o varstvu konkurence zlasti izstopa 
določba, ki opredeljuje, da bi moralo zadeve s področja konkurence obravnavati sodišče prve 
stopnje - upravni oddelek. 
Ta oddelek trenutno deluje v okviru sodišča prve stopnje v Prištini. Pravosodno ministrstvo je 
pred kratkim izrazilo zavezo, da bo ustanovilo ločeno gospodarsko sodišče, ki bo v 
gospodarskih zadevah imelo posebne pristojnosti. Ta pobuda, če bo tudi uresničena v praksi, 
bi lahko bila dobra priložnost za zagovornike učinkovitega izvajanja pravil o konkurenci na 
Kosovu. Interesne skupine bi se morale zavzemati za vzpostavitev specializiranega 
pooblaščenega senata, pristojnega za konkurenčnopravne zadeve, ki bi deloval v okviru 
novega sodišča in bi obravnaval vse zadeve s področja konkurence. Zato bi v senatu lahko 
delovali le sodniki, ki imajo na področju prava konkurence predhodno izobrazbo. Raziskava 
je predstavila zadostne dokaze o tem, zakaj zadev s področja konkurence ne smejo 
obravnavati splošni sodniki. Poleg tega pa sodniki, ki so doslej sodelovali pri obravnavi 
zadev s področja konkurence, z izjemo enega, v omenjenem sodnem senatu ne bi smeli 
sodelovati, saj bi se njihove dosedanje izkušnje v tovrstnih primerih morale smatrati kot 
negativna, ne pozitivna okoliščina, saj so na področju konkurence pokazali pomanjkljivo 
usposobljenost. 
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Ena od najpomembnejših nalog senata, razen pravilnega odločanja v novih zadevah s 
področja konkurence z vidika postopkov in vsebine ter upoštevanja ciljev konkurenčnega 
prava, je spreminjanje trenutne sodne prakse, ki jo je vzpostavilo upravno sodišče v zadevah 
na področju konkurence. Upravno sodišče je namreč napačno razlagalo določbe 
konkurenčnega prava in ustvarilo škodljive precedense, ki bodo ovirali učinkovito izvajanje 
politik konkurence v bližnji prihodnosti, če ne bo prišlo do sprememb. 
Da bi Kosovo lahko hitro napredovalo in premagalo glavne izzive, ki jih je prepoznala 
raziskava, bo treba izpolniti določene predpogoje. Najprej bi morale pristojne institucije –  
vlada in skupščina – povišati prejemke uslužbencev in sodnikov, odgovornih za izvajanje 
politike konkurence. Na ta način bi to področje postalo privlačno za najbolj usposobljene 
pravnike in ekonomiste s področja konkurence, ki so se izobraževali na najprestižnejših 
univerzah v ZDA in EU. Višji prejemki teh uslužbencev bi torej pritegnili strokovnjake, 
hkrati pa bi bistveno zmanjšali tveganje za korupcijo. Rezultati pregleda dejanskih prejemkov 
uslužbencev pristojnega organa (Priloga II in III) v okviru raziskave niso obetavni. Zaposleni 
v podobnih uradih na Kosovu, ki imajo bolj omejeno vlogo v smislu ustvarjanja pogojev za 
konkurenčno gospodarstvo, so bolje plačani kot uslužbenci organa za varstvo konkurence. 
Višina prejemkov najvišjih uslužbencev tega organa odvrne številne strokovnjake. Drug 
razlog za dvig plač uslužbencev pristojnega organa je zadržanje usposobljenih zaposlenih. 
Lahko bi rekli, da se vsakemu povrne toliko, kolikor v nekaj vloži. 
Raziskava je pokazala številne pomanjkljivosti in neučinkovitost pri delu pristojnega organa, 
zato so za ustrezno in učinkovito uveljavljanje konkurenčnega prava na Kosovu spremembe 
nujno potrebne. Organu je treba zagotoviti avtonomijo pri odločanju, pri čemer je predpogoj 
za tovrstno neodvisnost imenovanje strokovnega in nepolitičnega osebja organa. Strokovno 
usposobljenost stalnega osebja znotraj pristojnega organa je treba nadgrajevati s programi 
usposabljanja, ki jih na Kosovu ponuja EU, prav tako pa mora za to poskrbeti sam organ. 
Zagotavljanje strokovne avtonomnosti in imenovanje strokovno usposobljenih ljudi v organ 
odločanja bi prav tako morala vplivati na spremembo notranje strukture pristojnega organa, 
pri čemer bi morala Komisija ostati tisti organ, ki sprejema odločitve. Ustanoviti bi bilo treba 
ločene enote, ki bi imele točno določene naloge in dolžnosti na naslednjih področjih: (i) 
zloraba prevladujočega položaja; (ii) protikonkurenčni sporazumi; (iii) koncentracije ; in (iv) 
upravni in sodni postopki. Na ta način bi bila vsaka enota specializirana in bi zaposlovala 
ljudi, ki bi bili strokovno usposobljeni za točno določeno delo. To velja zlasti za upravne in 
sodne postopke, saj so delo pristojnega organa v preteklosti zaznamovale številne 
postopkovne pomanjkljivosti, kar je razvidno iz zadev, ki so bile predmet analize. 
Predstavniki pristojnega organa na sodiščih so trenutno inšpektorji, medtem ko je Oddelek za 
nadzor trga odgovoren za skoraj ‘vse drugo’, vključno s: protikonkurenčnimi sporazumi, 
zlorabo prevladujočega položaja, usklajenimi ravnanji, združitvami in sodnimi postopki.  
Predlagana nova struktura ne bi nujno pomenila ustanovitve velikega števila novih delovnih 
mest znotraj pristojnega organa, temveč bi privedla do tega, da bi obstoječ človeški kapital 
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reorganizirali v ločene, specializirane enote, v katerih bi bili štirje ali pet zaposlenih. Tako bi 
bila vsaka enota osredotočena na področje, ki ga pokriva. Če bi prišlo do primera, ki bi 
vključeval  kršitev dveh različnih določb o konkurenci, npr. o protikonkurenčnih sporazumih 
in zlorabah prevladujočega položaja, bi pri zadevnem primeru morali sodelovati obe pristojni 
enoti. Na koncu niti ni pomembno, iz katere enote prihaja posamezna zadeva. V vsakem 
primeru mora zadevo obravnavati in o njej odločati Komisija, ki deluje kot organ odločanja 
znotraj pristojnega organa. Komisija je namreč krovni organ vseh posameznih enot, ki 
delujejo v okviru pristojnega organa. 
Glavni razlog za predlog nove strukture pristojnega organa je dejstvo, da ta organ v svojih 
dosedanjih odločbah ni bil zmožen nedvoumno opredeliti in dokazati posameznih navedb o 
protikonkurenčnih sporazumih in zlorabi prevladujočega položaja. Pri presojanju zadev skozi 
to prizmo so sodišča takšne odločbe razveljavila, med drugim tudi zaradi protislovnih 
obrazložitev. Pričakovati je, da bo delitev na enote imela pozitiven vpliv na kakovost 
odločitev pristojnega organa. 
Kljub kritikam na račun dela pristojnega organa in sodišč v preučevanem obdobju obstaja 
upanje. EU je podprla in financirala nov projekt, ki zagotavlja podporo delu pristojnega 
organa. Trenutno je projekt še v začetni fazi, trajal pa naj bi najmanj tri leta. Poleg 
usposabljanja in svetovanja prinaša tudi sodelovanje strokovnjakov iz držav EU pri samem 
delu. Na ta način bo pristojni organ pri svojih preiskavah dobival podporo in nasvete 
strokovnjakov iz EU najmanj tri leta. Tovrsten projekt naj bi pristojnemu organu nudil pomoč 
pri preiskavah in kaznovanju podjetij, ki dokazano kršijo pravila o konkurenci, hkrati pa bi 
tudi povečal verodostojnost pristojnega organa v očeh javnosti in institucij, kot je vlada. V 
načrtu je, da se bo projekt v prihodnje razširil tudi na sodišča, ki se ukvarjajo s sodnimi 
presojami zadev s področja konkurence. Učinke projekta bo seveda mogoče oceniti šele s 
prihodnjimi raziskavami. 
EU je podobne projekte financirala in izvajala tudi v drugih državah, ki so se želele pridružiti 
EU, kot so npr. Slovenija, Hrvaška in Albanija. V večini teh držav so bili upravičenci tudi 
organi za varstvo konkurence. Večina projektov, kot so bili tisti na Hrvaškem in v Albaniji, je 
bila osredotočena na zagotavljanje konkurenčnega okolja. Ta cilj so nameravali doseči tako, 
da so: poskrbeli za usklajenost zakonodaje s pravnim redom Skupnosti; pregledali 
zakonodajo, ki bi lahko imela neugoden vpliv na konkurenco; pojasnjevali in nadgrajevali 
postopke organov za varstvo konkurence, s katerimi so lahko zaščitili spoštovanje pravic 
vseh vpletenih do poštenega postopka; izboljšali učinkovitost izvajanja; ozaveščali o koristih, 
ki jih poštena konkurenca prinaša državljanom; z javnim zagovarjanjem krepili kulturo 
konkurence; usposabljali ciljne skupine, kot so pristojni organi, uslužbenci, sodniki in drugi 
deležniki. Organa za varstvo konkurence v obeh državah naj bi imela številne koristi od 
tovrstne podpore EU v smislu pospeševanja in doseganja ciljev konkurenčnega prava. 
Vse te države so se, zlasti na institucionalni ravni, le nekaj let pred pridružitvijo EU soočale z 
enakimi problemi pri učinkovitem uveljavljanju konkurenčnega prava in zagotavljanju 
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konkurenčnega gospodarstva na nacionalni ravni. Ni verjetno, da bi Kosovo bilo pri tem 
kakšna izjema. Številni poznavalci trdijo, da se je v prvih letih uveljavljanja pravil o 
konkurenci tudi sama EU soočala s številnimi izzivi. Da je v 1960-ih premagala te težave, se 
je zgledovala po dobrih praksah na področju uveljavljanja pravil o konkurenci na drugi strani 
Atlantika, v ZDA. EU je prav tako imela koristi od skupnih forumov, prenašanja izkušenj in 
pošiljanja zaposlenih na usposabljanja s področja boja proti monopolom v ameriške šole. 
Številne države, kot so Slovenija, Bolgarija in Hrvaška, so imele le nekaj let pred vstopom v 
EU podobne težave s človeškim kapitalom v organih za varstvo konkurence in sodiščih, prav 
tako pa so se soočale tudi z zakonodajnimi pomanjkljivostmi. 
Po mnenju Evropske komisije v letu 1997 se je Slovenija pri uveljavljanju pravil konkurence 
v javnem interesu soočala tako z zakonodajnimi kot tudi institucionalnimi težavami. Komisija 
je takrat zavzela stališče, da mora Slovenija, če želi učinkovito uveljavljati politike 
konkurence, svojo konkurenčno zakonodajo še bolj uskladiti s konkurenčno zakonodajo EU, 
prav tako pa mora okrepiti tudi upravne zmogljivosti znotraj Urada za varstvo konkurence, 
saj zaposleni in tehnična usposobljenost niso bili zmožni zagotoviti učinkovitega 
uveljavljanja pravnega reda EU. 
V tistem obdobju je bilo zaradi odsotnosti konkurence in visokih stroškov poslovanja veliko 
kritik zlasti na račun bančnega sektorja v Sloveniji. Banke v Sloveniji so takrat imele 
dogovor o obrestnih merah (kartelni dogovor), ki je določal najvišje obrestne mere na 
depozite, kar je odobril pristojni urad. Komisija je med drugim navajala tudi, da mora 
upravno osebje in zaposleni na sodiščih, ki delujejo na področju uveljavljanja pravil 
konkurence, pokazati zadostno razumevanje konkurenčnega prava in politike. Le tako bi 
Slovenija lahko dokazala verodostojno uveljavljanje pravil konkurence. 
Evropska komisija je v svoji oceni leta 1998 ponovno poudarila, da je finančni sektor še 
vedno daleč od konkurenčnega. Poleg neprivatizacije dveh bank v državni lasti se je 
zavarovalniški sektor moral zelo potruditi, da je postal konkurenčen. Čeprav je bila Slovenija 
prepoznana kot delujoče tržno gospodarstvo, so po drugi strani poudarjali tudi, da je prostora 
za napredek še veliko, saj je bila država močno vpeta v vodenje gospodarstva. EU je na 
koncu sklenila, da ima slovenska konkurenčnopravna zakonodaja še vedno veliko 
pomanjkljivosti in da so majhno število zaposlenih ter upravne pomanjkljivosti znotraj Urada 
za varstvo konkurence še vedno ovira pri učinkovitem uveljavljanju konkurenčnega prava. 
EU je leta 2000 ugotovila pomanjkanje konkurence na finančnih trgih v Sloveniji in to 
ocenila kot vrzel v učinkovitosti na področju instrumentov monetarne politike. Hkrati je na 
vseh področjih finančnih trgov zahtevala večjo konkurenčnost. EU je v tistem obdobju 
ocenila, da zavarovalniški sektor v Sloveniji nima zadostne tuje konkurence, in začela izvajati 
pritiske za dvig učinkovitosti. Poleg tega je Sloveniji sporočila, da mora, če se želi uspešno 
spopadati s konkurenčnim pritiskom in tržnimi silami znotraj EU, povečati konkurenčnost 
gospodarstva, pri čemer je eden od načinov, da to stori, zmanjšanje vloge države v 
gospodarstvu. 
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V poročilu o napredku iz leta 2002 je EU prepoznala pomen sodstva kot pomembne 
komponente pri učinkovitem uveljavljanju konkurenčnega prava v Sloveniji. Zato je 
predlagala, da mora biti sodstvo ustrezno usposobljeno, saj bo le tako lahko učinkovito 
odigralo svojo vlogo. 
Po zadnji oceni EU Slovenija ni niti tik pred tem, ko je postala država članica EU, dosegla 
učinkovitega uveljavljanja pravil konkurence. EU je posledično zahtevala, da se Slovenija 
prednostno posveti krepitvi upravnih zmogljivosti organa za varstvo konkurence, kateremu 
naj zagotovi neodvisnost. Poleg tega je zahtevala tudi obvezno posebno usposabljanje za 
sodnike. 
Učinkovito uveljavljanje pravil konkurence s strani upravne in sodne veje – za zagotavljanje 
potrebnih pogojev za učinkovito konkurenco med rivalskimi podjetji – je predpogoj, da se 
gospodarstva držav uspešno soočajo s konkurenčnim pritiskom ob članstvu v EU. 
Konkurenčni pritisk za vse države članice EU je dvojen. Na eni strani gre za pritisk tujih 
podjetij, ki lahko zaradi poenotenja trga konkurirajo domačim podjetjem, po drugi strani pa 
lahko domača podjetja uspešno konkurirajo tujim podjetjem, ki delujejo na notranjem trgu 
EU. Uspešno uveljavljanje pravil konkurence je za države, ki se želijo pridružiti EU, velik 
izziv. 
Kot je mogoče razumeti iz izkušenj držav, ki so začele s pristopnimi postopki z EU, je na 
področju konkurence treba premagati tri glavne izzive. Prvi izziv je zakonodajne narave –  to 
pomeni, da se mora konkurenčnopravna zakonodaja uskladiti z zakonodajo EU, kar je 
predpogoj za članstvo. Drugi izziv je zagotovitev zadostnih upravnih zmogljivosti izvršilnih 
organov, ki se bodo lahko prednostno ukvarjali z najhujšimi primeri izkrivljanja konkurence 
in se borili proti njim. Tretji izziv je pomanjkanje znanja v sodstvu glede namena 
konkurenčnega prava, pa tudi neuveljavljanje konkurenčnega prava v skladu z njegovimi 
notranjimi cilji. 
Kosovo bi se zato lahko učilo iz izkušenj drugih držav, ki so uspešno premagale podobne 
izzive na področju uveljavljanja konkurenčnopravne zakonodaje in ustvarjanja potrebnih 
pogojev za konkurenčno gospodarstvo. Dolgoročni cilj Kosova bi moral biti boljše in 
učinkovitejše uveljavljanje pravil konkurence glede na že ustaljeno prakso EU na tem 
področju. 
Pri tem pa si Kosovo ne more privoščiti, da bi napredek pri učinkovitem uveljavljanju pravil 
konkurence na upravni in sodni ravni trajal desetletja. Država mora nemudoma sprejeti 
vsebinske ukrepe, ki bodo pripomogli k uveljavljanju konkurenčnega prava v skladu z 
njegovimi cilji in najboljšimi praksami od drugod, npr. iz držav EU. V tem pogledu potrebuje 
Kosovo pri človeškem kapitalu na ključnih položajih, povezanih s politiko konkurence in 
njenim uveljavljanjem, ‘novo kri’, tako na upravni kot tudi na sodni ravni, hkrati pa tudi 
bistveno povečanje plač. Pri tem pa je nujno, da obe veji, upravna in sodna, napredujeta 
vzporedno – samo ena namreč ne bo pospešila procesa sprememb niti dosegla ciljev veljavne 
konkurenčne zakonodaje. 
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9 Appendix I1015 
9.1 Statistics  
 
                                                 
1015 Appendix I represent the work of the author of this dissertation.  
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10 Appendix II1016 
10.1 Net annual incomes of independent agencies in Kosovo 
Institution Position Net Annual Income (€) 
Kosovo Competition 
Authority 
Chairperson of the Commission 11,664.00 
Commissioner 11,200.00 
Secretary (equivalent of Director 
General) 14,760.00 
Head of Department 7,020.00 
Central Bank of Kosovo 
Chairperson of the Board 24,369.00 
Member of the Board 22,568.94 
Governor 44,284.32 
Head of Department 20,611.22 
Energy Regulatory Office 
Chairperson of the Board 25,584.18 
Member of the Board 22,294.68 
Director General 17,673.60 
Head of Department 14,600.00 
Regulatory Authority of 
Electronic and Postal 
Communication 
Chairperson of the Board 19,500.00 
Member of the Board 16,975.00 
Head of Department n/n 
Civil Aviation Authority 
of Kosovo 
Chairperson of the Board (non-
executive) 5,800.00 
Member of the Board (non executive) 5,400.00 
Director General 29,892.15 
Head of Department 27,600.00 
                                                 
1016 Source of information: Anti-Corruption Agency of Kosovo. However, Appendix II represents the work of 
the author of this dissertation.  
227 
 
 
27,600.00
29,892.15
5,400.00
5,800.00
0.00
0.00
16,975.00
19,500.00
14,600.00
17,673.60
22,294.68
25,584.18
20,611.22
44,284.32
22,568.94
24,369.00
7,020.00
14,760.00
11,200.00
11,664.00
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 40000 45000 50000
He
ad
 o
f D
ep
ar
tm
en
t
Se
cr
et
ar
y 
/ D
ire
ct
or
 G
en
er
al
Co
m
m
iss
io
ne
r /
 M
em
be
r o
f t
he
 B
oa
rd
Ch
ai
rp
er
so
n 
of
 th
e 
Co
m
m
iss
io
n 
/
Ch
ai
rp
er
so
n 
of
 th
e 
Bo
ar
d
Net annual incomes of independent agencies in Kosovo 
Kosovo Competition Authority
Central Bank of Kosovo
Energy Regulatory Office
Regulatory Authority of Electronic and Postal Communication
Civil Aviation Authority of Kosovo
228 
 
11.  Appendix III1017 
11.1. Net annual incomes of different competition authorities  
Institution Position Net Annual Income (€) 
Kosovo Competition 
Authority 
Chairperson of the Commission 11,664.00 
Commissioner 11,200.00 
Secretary (equivalent of Director General) 14,760.00 
Head of Department 7,020.00 
Lithuania Competition 
Authority  
Chairperson of the Board 26,868.00 
Member of the Board 24,360.00 
Director General 22,332.00 
Head of Department 20,796.00 
The Netherlands Authority 
for Consumers and Markets 
 
Chairperson of the Board 180,000.00 
Member of the Board n/n 
Director General n/a 
Head of Department 93,825.00 
                                                 
1017 Source of information: Via e-mail from Lithuanian and the Nederlands above mention institutions, upon the 
author’s request. However, Appendix III represents the work of the author of this dissertation. 
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12. Appendix IV1018  
12.1 Centre around the effective enforcement of competition law in Kosovo, among other 
things, include alterations as illustrated below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1018 Appendix IV represent the work of the author of this dissertation. 
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13. Appendix V1019 
13.1.Forecasting the Authority’s decisions, related to anti-competitive agreements, abuse of a dominant position and concerted practices at 
different levels of the court hierarchy. 
  
                                                 
1019 Appendix V represents the work of the author of this dissertation. 
The Insurance Company Cases
Court of First Instance
Elsig
Court vs. 
Authority
Dismissed
Illyria
Court vs. 
Authority
Dismissed
Insig
Court vs. 
Authority
Dismissed
Croatia 
Sigurimi
Court vs. 
Authority
Dismissed
Sigma
Court vs. 
Authority
Dismissed
Dardania
Court vs. 
Authority
Dismissed
Siguria 
Court vs. 
Authority
Upheld
Sigkos 
Court vs. 
Authority
Dismissed
Kosova Re
Court vs. 
Authority
Upheld
Sigal
Court vs. 
Authority
n/n
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The Insurance Company Cases
Court of Appeal
Elsig
Appeal vs. 
First Instance
Affirmed
Illyria
Appeal vs. 
First Instance
Affirmed
Insig
Appeal vs. 
First Instance
Affirmed
Croatia 
Sigurimi
Appeal vs. 
First Instance
Reversed 
Sigma
Appeal vs. 
First Instance
Reversed 
Dardania
Appeal vs. 
First Instance
Reversed 
Siguria 
Appeal vs. 
First Instance
Reversed 
Sigkos 
Appeal vs. 
First Instance
n/n
Kosova Re
Appeal vs. 
First Instance
Affirmed
Sigal
Appeal vs. 
First Instance
n/n
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The Insurance Company Cases
The Supreme Court
Elsig
Supreme vs. 
Appeal
Affirmed
Illyria
Supreme vs. 
Appeal
Affirmed
Insig
Supreme vs. 
Appeal
Affirmed
Croatia 
Sigurimi
Supreme vs. 
Appeal
n/n
Sigma
Supreme vs. 
Appeal
n/n
Dardania
Supreme vs. 
Appeal
n/n
Siguria 
Supreme vs. 
Appeal
n/n
Sigkos 
Supreme vs. 
Appeal
n/n
Kosova Re
Supreme vs. 
Appeal
n/n
Sigal
Supreme vs. 
Appeal
n/n
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The Insurance Company Cases
Court of First Instance in reprocedure
Croatia Sigurimi
Court vs. Authority
Dismissed
Sigma
Court vs. Authority
Dismissed
Dardania
Court vs. Authority
Dismissed
Siguria
Court vs. Authority
Dismissed
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Gekos Case
Court Decisions
Court of First Instance
Court vs. Authority
Dismissed
Court of Appeal
Appeal vs. First Instance
Affirmed
The Supreme Court
Supreme vs. Appeal
Affirmed
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Dukagjini Case
Court Decisions
Court of First Instance
Court vs. Authority
Upheld
Court of Appeal
Appeal vs. First Instance
Upheld
The Supreme Court
Supreme vs. Appeal
Reversed 
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